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Summary 
Drawing on a wide range of critical and theoretical material, this thesis explores the 
representation of subjective phenomena, such as dream, memory and fantasy, in the 
films of Ingmar Bergman, Alain Resnais and Stanley Kubrick. My introduction 
outlines my argument concerning how film represents or communicates non-verbal 
thought processes, before examining theories and depictions of cinematic thought in 
the silent era. Subsequently, the thesis is divided into three sections, each consisting 
of two chapters and focussing on the work of a single director. In the first section, I 
explore Bergman's representation of subjective processes. Chapter 2 offers a close 
formal analysis of the dream sequences in Wild Strawberries, while chapter 3 
examines the stylistic properties and thematic concerns of Bergman's later, 
experimental work of the 1960s and '70s. In chapter 4, I analyze Resnais' work, 
emphasizing in particular his early innovations in representing imagination, memory 
and streams of consciousness. Chapter 5 extends this analysis by examining the 
concept of collective memory (or imagination) in relation to Resnais' interrogation of 
France's recent history (the Occupation and the Algerian War). In the final section, I 
focus on Kubrick's work. Chapter 6 explores Kubrick's 1962 adaptation of Lolita and 
the notion of 'first-person' cinematic narration. My formal analysis of the film is 
contextualized through a discussion of its production history, and examines the 
relationship between cinematic thought, censorship and the values and norms of 
Hollywood. Chapter 7 builds upon this analysis, exploring different forms of 
subjective narration and 'uncanny' thought in Kubrick's later work. In conclusion, I 
summarize the key ideas developed in my thesis in order to support my central 
argument that cinema has a unique capacity for representing specific aspects of non-
verbal thought. 
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Introduction 
Approximately twenty minutes into Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), there is 
one of the most remarkable cuts in the history of cinema. Having discovered the 
possibility of using animal bones as weapons, a tribe of apes is able to fight off a rival 
clan and thus secure the territory and resources (a small waterhole) crucial to its 
survival. Subsequently, the leader of the anned tribe, who has demonstrated his 
supremacy by killing one of the rival apes, celebrates his newfound power by 
triumphantly throwing his bone-weapon into the air. The bone spins through the air in 
slow-motion, begins to descend, and is abruptly replaced by a new object - a man-
made satellite orbiting the earth, which slowly drifts downwards across the screen. 
Numerous critics have commented on the originality, audacity and narrative 
economy of the transition, which silently elides four million years of human 
evolution, moving us instantaneously from 'The Dawn of Man' to the space age of the 
not-too-distant future. 1 Equally, many have expounded upon the aesthetic elegance of 
the graphic match between the bone descending in slow-motion and the satellite 
gliding past the earth. Yet, surprisingly, few have given due attention to the thematic 
and conceptual significance of the cut, or have acknowledged its full complexity in 
articulating an extensive network of ideas that are essential to the film as a whole.2 
Embedded in a twenty-five minute 'prologue' that has neither dialogue nor 
explanatory voiceover, the cut's essential function is, I believe, to produce meaning 
non-verbally. More than being an elision or a transition, 2001's most famous edit is a 
juxtaposition of images that suggests a specific set of ideas and themes. It is an 
example of what I would tenn cinematic thought: the audiovisual expression of an 
abstract mental process. 
6 
In the context of 2001's prologue, the ape's use of the bone as a tool and weapon 
marks an evolutionary juncture, a first moment of creative thinking that becomes 
synonymous with 'The Dawn of Man'. The crucial instant of the ape's intellectual 
advancement is represented explicitly by Kubrick, again through the editing together 
of images as a direct expression of visual thought (in a sequence that, in many ways, 
presages the function of the later cut from bone to spacecraft). As the ape picks up the 
bone and uses it to smash a dead animal's skull, there are two inserts which depict a 
tapir falling to the ground, as if felled by the blow. Implicitly, these images represent 
the ape's thought process: the perception of the skull fracturing is juxtaposed with the 
mental image of the dying tapir, and together they suggest an act of abstract 
reasoning. This first instance of creative thinking not only ensures the immediate 
survival of the apes, who have suddenly moved to the top of the food chain, but also 
paves the way for every subsequent human achievement. As Michel Chion, who 
offers one of the most comprehensive and insightful analyses of 2001, observes: 'Out 
of these first ambiguous mental images is born abstract thinking and subsequently the 
power to send objects into space. ,3 With this in mind, the visual transformation of the 
bone into the satellite, which is in itself a form of abstract 'reasoning', celebrates the 
inventive power of the human intellect. Creative thought allows humankind to 
transcend its physical limitations, overcome gravity and, eventually, to explore and 
understand the cosmos. 
Yet if the transformation of the bone into the satellite represents the limitless 
potential of humankind's imaginative and technological feats, the symbolism of these 
two objects also suggests a number of darker meanings. From the outset, the 
acquisition of intelligence and technology is intertwined with an inseverable instinct 
for violence and domination. The first tool is a weapon, used not only to hunt, but also 
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to perpetrate an act of primitive warfare: the armed apes kill one of their own kind and 
seize control of the territory surrounding the waterhole. The tool that guarantees the 
survival and development of the proto-humans thus also poses an implicit threat to the 
species as a whole. This ambiguous representation of intellectual and technological 
advancement is exacerbated in the transition from past to future. As several critics 
have noted, the spacecraft that orbits the earth was conceived and designed as a 
military satellite carrying a nuclear warhead (an idea that also links back to Kubrick's 
previous film, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb [1964], which concludes with a nuclear apocalypse, denoted by images of 
mushroom clouds filling the earth's skies).4 Even if this militarization of space is not 
immediately discemable in the 2001 's seemingly innocuous satellites, the theme of 
humanity being destroyed by its own technology is very evident later in the film, 
when HAL, the computer onboard the spaceship 'Discovery', malfunctions and 
begins to kill the ship's human crew. The transformation of the primitive bone 
weapon into the machinery of the future should, therefore, be viewed as both a joyous 
affirmation of humanity's boundless ingenuity and a bleak diagnosis of its persistent 
brutality, irrationality and short-sightedness. 
When, in a 1968 interview, Kubrick was questioned about the 'message' of 2001, 
he gave the following response: 
It's not a message that I ever intend to convey in words. 2001 is a nonverbal 
experience ... I tried to create a visual experience, one that bypasses verbalized 
pigeonholing and directly penetrates the subconscious with an emotional and 
philosophic content. 5 
Clearly, 2001's most famous edit is integral to Kubrick's programme of expressing 
complex ideas and themes cinematically, without recourse to language. Chion 
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succinctly summarizes the importance of this cut, suggesting that 'Kubrick is taking 
on the impossible task of bringing to life Eisenstein's dream of conveying abstract 
thought on the screen through purely visual means.,6 Yet, as is implicit in Chion' s 
own analysis, Kubrick shows this task to be far from impossible. 2001's richly 
metaphorical cut, with its thematic density and layers of ambiguity and ambivalence, 
is a clear demonstration of the ample potential of cinematic thought. 
Two Types of Thought 
The close connection between film and thought, which is implicit in Kubrick's work, 
has been noted by a number of different theorists and filmmakers. Robert Jones 
writes: 
Motion pictures are our thoughts made visible and audible. They flow in a 
swift succession of images, precisely as our thoughts do, and their speed, with 
their flashbacks - like sudden uprushes of memory - and their abrupt transition 
from one subject to another, approximates very closely the speed of our 
thinking. They have the rhythm of the thought-stream and the same uncanny 
ability to move forward or backward in space or time ... They project pure 
thought, pure dream, pure inner life. 7 
Similarly, Alain Robbe-Grillet, in his introduction to the screenplay for Last Year at 
Marienbad (1961), suggests that, 
The memories one' sees again', the remote places, the future meetings, or even 
the episodes of the past we each mentally rearrange to suit our convenience are 
something like an interior film continually projected in our own minds, as soon 
as we stop paying attention to what is happening around us. 8 
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Each of these examples suggests a basic similarity between the way in which mental 
representations are manipulated in the mind and the way in which images and sounds 
are organized in cinematic narrative. In addition, each suggests two interrelated ways 
in which film might be used to express or represent thought. On the one hand, film 
can be used to articulate thought directly. If, as Jones argues, film has the same spatio-
temporal fluidity as thought, and the same capacity to juxtapose images and ideas in 
quick succession, then it may be utilized to construct (or reconstruct) a non-verbal 
thought process synthetically. Essentially, this direct, audiovisual expression of 
thought is what, I believe, underpins the sequence in 2001 described above. On the 
other hand, film may represent the thoughts of characters within the fiction. This 
representation may be limited to the individual shot - as with the insert in 2001 
depicting the falling tapir that the ape imagines - or it may extend through a 
protracted subjective sequence - as, for example, in a lengthy flashback depicting a 
memory. In the case of certain films, such as Last Year at Marienbad, most of what 
we see and hear is implicitly a product of a fictional character's perspective or 
imagination. These two types of cinematic thought will form the dual focus 
throughout this thesis, and will be discussed in depth in relation to the films of 
Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick. First, however, a few further preliminary comments 
are required. 
Language, Image and Thought 
In speaking of cinematic thought as non-verbal or prelinguistic, fundamental 
questions are raised regarding the relationship between language, image and thought. 
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Specifically, we might ask whether it is possible to determine or define the 'nature' of 
thought in particular circumstances, whether it is primarily linguistic or imagistic, or 
whether its character and composition varies with different mental processes. 
Although these questions are undoubtedly complicated, and difficult to answer 
definitively, introspection seems to suggest that thought operates on various distinct 
levels through a variable mixture of images and language. Jean Mitry offers an 
insightful analysis of how thought may be formulated inside and outside of language: 
Since language is the most direct expression of thought, we may say that the 
latter is, for the most part, formed in language. But language is an objective 
reaction whose nature is not essentially different from the majority of reactions 
that make up human behaviour and for which it can stand as a substitute. 
Nonformulated thought, reduced to states of awareness, pre-exists and stands 
outside language and may be translated - or at least become manifest - in other 
ways.9 
Mitry suggests that cinema is one such way in which thought can 'become manifest'. 
The organization of images in film, he argues, produces effects such metaphor, 
synecdoche, ellipsis and hyperbole. While these effects are usually thought of as 
'literary', Mitry observes that they are better defined as being conceptual figures that 
attest to underlying, fundamental patterns of thought, or 'mental shapes', through 
which ideas are formulated (via juxtaposition, comparison, substitution and so forth). 
Thus, for Mitry, language and image provide different forms in which thought 
processes can be actualized, but neither has a privileged claim to being the essential or 
primary 'material' of thought. 
Whilst analyzing the relationship between language, image and thought, it is also 
worth considering briefly the way in which film has itself been theorized as a 
language (or quasi-linguistic system). Under the influence of structuralism and 
semiotic literary theory, a significant area of film theory written in the 1960s and' 70s 
1 1 
sought to define and analyze film as a language-like system of signification. Christian 
Metz's work provides a good example of the problems associated with adapting 
critical tools derived from linguistics and literary theory to film analysis. In Film 
Language, Metz argues that in cinematic narrative there are 
certain 'syntactical procedures' that, after frequent use as speech, come to 
appear in later films as a language system: they have become conventional to a 
degree ... The inherent intelligibility of a dissolve or a double exposure cannot 
clarify the plot of a film unless the spectator has already seen other films in 
which dissolves and double exposures were used intelligibly.Io 
Undoubtedly, Metz is correct in identifying particular elements of cinematic narration 
that have become conventionalized 'to a degree', but this does not necessitate or 
justify the assumption that film can be analyzed as a language or language-like 
system. A dissolve usually implies a passage of time and/or a shift in location, but this 
meaning is never a direct consequence of cinematic convention: it is always 
dependent on the immediate and specific narrative context in which the dissolve 
occurs. Furthermore, the suggestion that such cinematic devices are to a large extent 
arbitrary, or are not 'inherently' intelligible to the uninitiated film viewer, is highly 
questionable. (It seems likely to me that the dissolve has become a conventional way 
of marking a significant spatial or temporal ellipsis because it does, by its very nature, 
accentuate and clarify the transition between two distinct images or scenes.) 
Ultimately, while there are various conventions, norms and codes that we can identify 
in cinematic narrative, film's meaning is not determined by these structures on a 
fundamental level. Language is inherently dissimilar to film in that its intelligibility is 
dependent on the laws and conventions that govern the language system as a whole. 
For these reasons, I believe that the notion of 'film language' (even if the phrase is 
used metaphorically) is unhelpful and, indeed, potentially misleading. 
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----_.--.... 
Responding to the various theories that have defined film as a form of language, 
Gilles Deleuze argues: 
Cinema is not a universal or pnmitIve language system [langue], nor a 
language [langage]. It brings to light an intelligible content which is like a 
presupposition, a condition, a necessary correlate through which language 
constructs its own 'objects'. But this correlate, though inseparable, is specific: 
it consists of movements and thought processes (pre-linguistic images) and 
points of view on these movements and processes (pre-signifying signs). It 
constitutes a whole 'psychomechanics'... the utterable of a language system 
which has its own logic. I I 
Deleuze, like Mitry, conceives of cinema as a prelinguistic system that gives a non-
verbal form to thought. This conception helps to avoid the theoretical problems 
associated with examining language and film as 'similar' semiotic systems, but, at the 
same time, it necessarily acknowledges how various codes, patterns and conventions 
(the formal structures that David Bordwell identifies as defining distinct narrative 
'modes ') help to articulate a set of audio-visual meanings. I2 
Additionally, the conceptualization of cinematic narrative as a form of 
prelinguistic thought implies that film is particularly attuned to representing mental 
states and phenomena that cannot be formulated, or depicted accurately, in linguistic 
terms. Haim Callev, in an analysis of Resnais' films, suggests that cinema has a 
distinct advantage (over literature, for example) in representing a stream of 
consciousness because it can convey our apprehension of non-verbal, sensuous 
phenomena faithfully and with relative ease: 'The amorphous, pre-speech level of 
thought can easily find its equivalent in the primary, non-intellectual nature of sounds 
and images, lighting and colours, graphical arrangements and motion, dynamic 
changes in screen directions and rhythms.' 13 This notion that film might have a 
special capacity for representing prelinguistic or 'sensuous' thought will be a 
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particular focus in my analysis of Bergman. However, it is important to re-emphasize 
at this point that if film is especially suited to depicting 'non-intellectual' or 
'amorphous' thought processes, this need not imply that film cannot also represent 
complex ideas with a high level of precision. The way in which non-verbal thought 
operates in 200 1 should, again, illustrate this point. 
Nevertheless, the possibility that cinema might be particularly attuned to 
expressing certain mental processes or phenomena raises further issues regarding the 
fidelity with which film can be said to 'represent' thought. The extent to which film 
can 'accurately' represent, or translate, various subjective mental states is, of course, 
questionable - and will be questioned throughout this thesis. One problem concerning 
the relationship between film and thought should, however, be noted at the outset. 
There is a fundamental, qualitative difference between the concrete, perceptual 
images of film and the intangible, virtual images that constitute mental 
representations. For some theorists, this obvious difference presents an 
insurmountable problem for the film that attempts to recreate subjective experience in 
a convincing manner. Greg Currie is particularly polemical in rejecting film's 
capacity to represent a subjective perspective, even if this perspective is purely 
optical: 
Viewing the cinema screen is ... in important ways rather like viewing the real 
world; it is not at all like viewing someone's subjective visual experience of 
the real world (a notion that barely makes sense anyway) ... it is only for short 
periods and with considerable efforts that we are able or willing to regard what 
is on screen as subjective and therefore as representing what some one thinks 
or claims, rather than what actually is. 14 
Currie's argument, however, rests on the reductive assumption that in order to 
'persuade' the viewer to regard its content as subjective, film must first be able to 
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capture the precise (visual and psychological) qualities of subjective experience in an 
illusionistic manner. Mitry, whilst acknowledging the essential difference between 
cinematic images and mental images, provides a more flexible and nuanced 
framework for assessing the success or failure of a particular film in conveying 
subjective experience to the viewer: 
It is completely impossible to represent a mental image, since, having become 
visual, it ceases to be mental. An image is only subjective to the extent that it 
relates to a pre-established character. In other words it is not the objectification 
of a subjective viewpoint but, quite the opposite, the 'subjectification' of a 
certain objective representation. The purpose is not to translate 'actual' 
psychological reality (which, in any case, it would be impossible to determine) 
but to give the audience - through an aesthetic equivalent - the impression that 
it is seeing or feeling 'as though' it were the character in the drama. IS 
Undoubtedly, Mitry's argument is correct, and of fundamental importance to any 
study of subjectivity in the cinema. Yet his ideas could equally well apply to the 
representation of thought in any artistic medium. The literary stream of 
consciousness, as it is variously constructed by writers such as James Joyce, Virginia 
Woolf and Arthur Schnitzler, is, of course, unable to reflect every nuance and detail 
of 'psychological reality'; instead, it offers an aesthetic reconstruction of thought, 
providing an insight into the general nature of consciousness and illuminating the 
specific world-view of a character. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to suggest that 
the film medium is particularly adept at recreating the specific qualities of certain 
mental phenomena, such as dream and memory (just as literature is particularly able 
to capture other aspects of subjective experience, such as inner monologue). There 
are, I believe, certain aspects of thought that, because of their primarily visual nature, 
are inherently 'cinematic', and can, therefore, be conveyed by film in an especially 
effective, accurate and insightful manner. 16 
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Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick: Why These Filmmakers? 
Needless to say, Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick share a strong interest in cinematic 
thought, in both senses of the term (as outlined above). All three have experimented 
with the medium as a means for representing the minds of fictional characters -
depicting a host of imaginative processes, such as dreams, reveries, memories and 
fantasies. 17 There are, however, also a number of evident differences between these 
directors in terms of their individual stylistics, their thematic concerns, and the 
industrial and cultural contexts in which they have worked. As much as their 
similarities, these differences are a central point of interest in this thesis. Each director 
offers, I believe, a particular conception of the mind and a rendering of cinematic 
thought that is rooted in a specific social and cultural context. The structure of this 
thesis - which is split into three main sections, addressing the work of Bergman, 
Resnais and Kubrick in tum - is, therefore, intended to facilitate both a broad 
exploration of how thought may be represented in film and a close analysis of how 
each individual filmmaker conceives of and utilizes cinematic thought. In other 
words, whilst each section is relatively self-contained, addressing the specific forms 
and themes that relate to each director's representation of thought, there are also 
several lines of argument and inquiry that traverse the individual sections and develop 
a general picture of how thought operates in film. 
Each section focuses on fairly distinct aspects of thought, exploring the formal and 
stylistic means by which they are represented to the viewer. The first section 
examines two key elements in Bergman's work: his representation of dreams, and his 
conceptualization of cinema as a type of 'sensuous thought'. Following up on some of 
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the ideas developed in this first section, the second explores Resnais' depiction of the 
imagination, with a particular emphasis on his rendering of memory and stream of 
consciousness. Finally, the third section looks at the ways in which Kubrick addresses 
the concept of 'first-person' cinematic narration, especially in his adaptations of 
Lolita (1962) and A Clockwork Orange (1971). However, while each section has 
different points of emphasis, there are also a number of common threads that unite the 
sections. Bergman's interest in dream, for example, is shared to a lesser extent by 
both Resnais and Kubrick, and my discussion of how Bergman conceives of dreaming 
is developed through later analyses of Resnais' depiction of the artist's creative dream 
in Providence (1977) and Kubrick's blending of dream and fantasy in Eyes Wide Shut 
(1999). Further connections between the directors' various ideas concerning non-
verbal thought, stream of consciousness, memory, and so forth, should become 
equally apparent as this thesis progresses. 
There is, however, one other recurring element that is particularly notable and 
worth mentioning at this point: each director's work engages with psychoanalysis, 
albeit to varying degrees and with differing levels of enthusiasm for its conclusions. 
Bergman's analysis of dreams, particularly in Wild Strawberries (1957) and Face to 
Face (1976), can also be seen as a critical analysis of Freud's The Interpretation of 
Dreams, while the disintegration of identity in Persona (1966) draws heavily on 
Jungian theory. Similarly, the psychoanalytic account of trauma, repression and 
'screen memories' is an implicit influence in several of Resnais' films, such as 
Hiroshima mon amour (1959) and Muriel, ou Le temps d'un retour (1963). Lastly, 
Kubrick is a particularly strong exponent of psychoanalytic theory. His explorations 
of violence, sexuality, fantasy and identity (in Lolita, A Clockwork Orange, The 
Shining [1980], Full Metal Jacket [1987] and Eyes Wide Shut) are, in part, founded 
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upon general psychoanalytic notions of unconscious drives and split psyches, while 
the Freudian conception of 'the uncanny' is integral to the narrative structures and 
motifs that underpin The Shining and Eyes Wide Shut. With the popularization of 
psychoanalysis in the 1940s, it is perhaps inevitable that these filmmakers should 
address this influential theory of the mind in their representations of thought and 
subjective phenomena. I8 Yet it is important to stress that none of these directors 
simply transposes the psychoanalytic model of the mind to the screen in a 
straightforward manner. Instead, each utilizes psychoanalysis, alongside other cultural 
or theoretical representations of the psyche (and, of course, personal introspection), to 
develop his particular view of thought, consciousness and the unconscious. 
Through close textual analysis, each section will, therefore, elucidate the 
conceptions of cinematic thought and the mind held by each director, and show how 
these conceptions interrelate. There is, however, a secondary issue regarding how 
these directors construct and conceive of cinematic thought that will provide an 
additional focal point in each section. For all three filmmakers, the expression of 
thought in film necessarily addresses the specific ideological context(s) in which this 
thought takes shape and operates. These ideological contexts are defined both by the 
dominant representational strategies within the cinema itself, and by wider cultural 
narratives and socio-political institutions. In exploring the ways in which Bergman, 
Resnais and Kubrick address the relationship between these various ideological 
frameworks and cinematic thought, I believe we can identify deep connections linking 
these directors in ways that may not be immediately apparent. 
Siegfried Kracauer suggests that, in general, 'What films reflect is not so much 
explicit credos as psychological dispositions - those deep layers of collective 
mentality which extend more or less below the dimension of consciousness.'}9 Yet the 
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films of Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick, as well as expressing' explicit credos', do not 
simply 'reflect', but reflect upon the collective mentality and psychological 
dispositions; in different ways, each director seeks to dissect, critique and (more often 
than not) criticize the ideological structures through which contemporary attitudes and 
beliefs are moulded. 
In Bergman's films, thought operates in relation to religious ideology. All the 
major themes of his cinema - the fear of mortality, the disintegration of identity, the 
failure of interpersonal relationships - are underpinned by a loss of faith in God and, 
consequently, a rejection of much of the ideology implicit in religious doctrine. 
Furthermore, Bergman's explorations of identity, gender and sexuality are shaped in a 
particularly forceful manner by his questioning of social taboos and religious 
morality. In contrast, Resnais' predominant concern is the interaction between 
thought, film and political ideology. Resnais is not only interested in the functioning 
of the individual imagination, but also in how a national, collective imagination of the 
past and the present might be forged through media images, propaganda and political 
discourse. In his explorations of how history is depicted or archived in film, Resnais 
repeatedly interrogates the fraught relationship between individual memories (or 
thought processes) and 'communal' representations of the past, suggesting that the 
latter that are often misleading or disingenuous narratives that are supported, 
cultivated and sustained by the era's dominant political institutions. Lastly, Kubrick, 
shares with Resnais an interest in how the collective imagination might be affected by 
film images, but for him, this fascination is centred on Hollywood as the dominant 
institution that sets the ideological parameters of film production and reception. 
Kubrick's films repeatedly explore the relationship between cinematic thought and 
Hollywood's standard storytelling practices as they have been defined by things such 
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as genre and narrative conventions, the star system, and, until 1968, the Production 
Code. For Kubrick, these elements produce a particular moral and philosophical 
outlook that it is necessary to deconstruct and challenge. 
Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick all seek, therefore, to represent a type of thought, 
or way of thinking, that is antagonistic within its specific ideological context. All 
three can be defined as dissident filmmakers and thinkers. This status becomes most 
apparent when we consider the different ways in which each director has had to 
contend with censorship in his career. Both Bergman and Kubrick faced censorship 
because of their attempts to depict sex and sexuality in the early 1960s - Bergman in 
The Silence (1963), and Kubrick in Lolita. Subsequently, of course, Kubrick's A 
Clockwork Orange also provoked considerable controversy and debate regarding the 
representation of violence in film. For Resnais, censorship has been equally 
problematical, though in his work, censorship has been motivated by political, rather 
than moral, concerns. In addressing politically sensitive issues such as French 
collaboration with Nazism, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, and the 
French-Algerian War, Night and Fog (1955), Hiroshima and Muriel all fell victim to 
some form of direct or indirect censorship. Furthermore, the latter two films also 
exhibit a powerful (if tacit) concern with the relationship between censorship and how 
the nation's past is collectively remembered. The repeated attempts that have been 
made to censor the films of Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick do not simply evidence a 
shared predilection for controversial or 'sensational' material; rather, they 
demonstrate the way in which these three filmmakers present a challenge to 
established ideologies and patterns of thought. 
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Cinematic Thought in the Silent Era: Theory and Practice 
Having established the main points of inquiry in this thesis, I shall, in the second part 
of this introduction, give a brief account of the representation (and theories) of 
thought in the silent cinema. This analysis will serve two connected purposes. Firstly, 
it will provide the essential historical background that will help to contextualize my 
later discussions of cinematic thought in the 1950s and beyond. Secondly, I believe 
that the narrative strategies of silent film had a particular influence on the three 
filmmakers I am examining. Perhaps inevitably, the representation of cinematic 
thought in the work of Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick looks back to the era of film 
when meaning was, by necessity, almost entirely non-verbal, being constructed 
through images rather than words. With the arrival of sound, cinema certainly lost 
some of its original visual inventiveness and narrative flexibility: editing practices 
became more firmly structured around dialogue scenes, camera and character 
movements were restricted by the need to position and conceal heavy sound-recording 
equipment, and expositional dialogue assumed a new prominence in terms of story-
telling. Writing in 1953, Julio Moreno noted that an immediate consequence of the 
arrival of the sound film was the loss of the necessity of transmitting thought 
processes in visual terms: 'Incentives were lacking to continue developing the visual 
means of expression which had reached such a high degree of complexity and 
refinement in the decade 1920-1930. The spoken word was to facilitate the saying of 
everything, or almost everything. ,20 Consequently, when later filmmakers attempted 
to represent thought in film, they inevitably drew upon the silent cinema. As James 
Monaco suggests: 
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What Resnais and the generation of the sixties had to do was to free film 
discourse from [its] dependence on dialogue as the governing element of the 
cinematic formula. The new obj ect was to tell stories in images rather than 
words and, in this respect, the innovators of the sixties often returned to the 
conventions of the silent film for models.21 
My close formal analysis of silent film, therefore, lays several important foundations 
for my subsequent explorations of how thought is represented by Bergman, Resnais 
and Kubrick. 
This early emphasis on silent cinema should not, however, imply that sound will 
be overlooked or neglected in my later arguments. Sound can, of course, play a 
crucial role in expressing or highlighting certain aspects of thought, and sound will be 
explored in some detail in later chapters. In particular, the relationship between sound 
and image, and the use of monologue will be addressed with reference to Resnais' 
films, while the role of voiceover narration and music in constructing or implicating a 
specific point of view will be discussed in relation to Kubrick. In examining cinematic 
thought, the important distinction I wish to highlight is not between sound film and 
silent film, but between the expression of ideas in language (or dialogue) and the 
audiovisual expression of non-verbal ideas. With this in mind, we can begin to 
explore the earliest theories of how thought operates in the cinema. 
Miinsterberg 
The first significant theory of how film might represent mental processes was 
advanced by Hugo Miinsterberg in 1916. Miinsterberg was a German-born 
psychologist and philosopher. He moved to the United States in 1897 to take up a 
permanent post at Harvard, where he enjoyed a distinguished academic career and 
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helped to establish the field of applied psychology. It was not until 1915 that 
Miinsterberg developed an interest in the aesthetic possibilities of film, but this 
interest grew rapidly, and soon he was writing short articles for the magazine 
Paramount Pictograph. The following year, he completed an extended analysis of the 
new art form, which was published as The Photoplay: A Psychological Study 
(reprinted in 1970 as The Film: A Psychological Study).22 In this pioneering work, 
Miinsterberg sought to show that various formal aspects of cinematic narrative were 
analogous to mental processes. Consequently, Miinsterberg argued that, because of 
this correspondence, film was not simply a means of recording or representing 
objective reality, but was also a medium capable of depicting the workings of the 
human mind. 
Miinsterberg's argument rests upon a short analysis of the cinematic techniques 
that he sees as being particularly effective in capturing distinct aspects of our 
everyday mental life. Foremost among these techniques are the close-up, flashback, 
and flash-forward, which are analogous to the psychic processes of attention, 
memory, and imagination respectively. In the case of the close-up, Miinsterberg 
writes: 
Whenever our attention becomes focused on a specific feature, the surrounding 
adjusts itself, eliminates everything in which we are not interested, and by the 
close-up heightens the vividness of that on which our mind is concentrated. It 
is as if the outer world were woven into our mind and were shaped not through 
its own laws but by the acts of our attention.23 
Thus, for Miinsterberg, the close-up both guides and mirrors our natural shifts in 
attention, reorganizing the dramatic space according to our immediate interests as 
observers of the action. Similarly, the temporal reconfiguration of the narrative, 
through flashbacks (or cut-backs, in Miinsterberg's terminology) and flash-forwards, 
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is viewed by Miinsterberg as an objectification of the nonnal mental functions of 
memory and speculative imagination: 
[T]he photoplay can overcome the interval of the future as well as the interval 
of the past. .. In short, it can act as our imagination acts. It has the mobility of 
our ideas which are not controlled by the physical necessity of outer events but 
by the psychological laws for the association of ideas. In our mind past and 
future become intertwined with the present. The photoplay obeys the laws of 
the mind rather than those of the outer world. 24 
In other words, film need not be bound to the chronological unfolding of events, but 
can cut rapidly between past, present and future, linking temporally disparate ideas, 
images, and scenes - functioning in the same way as memory or imagination. 
Miinsterberg draws concrete analogies between the close-up, flashback, and flash-
forward and specific intellectual processes: each fonnal technique is linked to a 
distinct mental function. However, he also suggests that there are a number of other 
cinematic devices that are more difficult to construe as direct mental analogues, but 
which nevertheless may represent important aspects of subjective experience. 
Miinsterberg argues, for example, that cross-cutting loosely parallels our ability to 
divide our attention between different objects or ideas. Likewise, he identifies 
numerous cinematic devices that may be suggestive of emotional states: visual 
distortions, camera movements, lighting effects, pathetic fallacy and so forth can be 
utilized to represent or evoke an emotional condition.25 The links between these 
cinematic devices and the psychological states they are meant to evoke are 
undoubtedly fairly abstract, and largely dependent on narrative context. But, in part, 
this is a reflection of the fact that the subjective experiences or emotional states that 
Miinsterberg is attempting to describe are inherently more difficult to define and 
analyze than mental functions such as attention and recollection. Overall, 
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Miinsterberg's taxonomy of 'subjective techniques', which is by no means exhaustive, 
suggests that film can represent an extensive range of mental processes and subjective 
states in a nuanced manner. 
For Miinsterberg, cinema's capacity to represent the inner world of the mind is 
what defines it as a unique art form: 'the photoplay tells us the human story by 
overcoming the forms of the outer world, namely, space, time, and causality, and by 
adjusting the events to the forms of the inner world, namely, attention, memory, 
imagination, and emotion. ,26 However, his eagerness to demonstrate the viability of 
the analogy between film and mind has provoked some criticism, most notably from 
Noel Carroll. Carroll argues that as a general theory of film narrative and film 
spectatorship, Miinsterberg' s analysis has serious deficiencies. Much of Carroll's 
criticism centres on Miinsterberg' s attempt to demonstrate the artistic credentials of 
film by downplaying its basic nature as a mechanical reproduction of reality.27 
Certainly, many of the problems that Carroll identifies are valid - in emphasizing how 
film can reflect mental processes, Miinsterberg does ignore fundamental issues 
concerning the illusion of reality commonly created in the cinema. However, we 
should not lose sight of the historical context in which Miinsterberg was writing. His 
analysis aims to challenge the dominant assumption that film narrative can only 
mirror, or, at best, reconstitute, objective reality. If he overstates his case, this is at 
least partially born out of a desire to alter deeply entrenched perceptions about the 
medium and its limitations. 
What is perhaps most impressive about Miinsterberg's theory is that it offers a 
clear account of how cinema has the potential to represent the mental processes of 
characters within the diegesis: 'The screen may produce not only what we remember 
or imagine but what the persons in the play see in their own minds. ,28 Carroll 
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acknowledges that while Miinsterberg's work suffers as a general theory of how film 
functions, it is a very useful critical tool for understanding films that aim specifically 
to represent thought processes or mental states. It is also important to note that 
Miinsterberg develops a very full account of how cinematic thought might function 
long before the first major expressionist and surrealist films were made. Above all, 
Miinsterberg's theory is extremely prescient, identifying a latent potential for 
subjective cinematic narratives. 
Soviet Montage Theories: Pudovkin, Eisenstein and Political Thought 
There are close similarities between Miinsterberg's ideas and the montage theories 
developed in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Vsevolod Pudovkin, in particular, is 
a key exponent of the notion that the editing of a dramatic scene mirrors the natural 
subjective response of the attentive observer: 
The lens of the camera replaces the eye of the observer, and the changes of 
angle of the camera - directed now on one person, now on another, now on 
one detail, now on another - must be subject to the same conditions as those of 
the eyes of the observer. The film technician, in order to secure the greatest 
clarity, emphasis and vividness, shoots the scene in separate pieces and, 
joining them and showing them, directs the attention of the spectator to the 
separate elements, compelling him to see as the attentive observer saw. From 
the above is clear the manner in which editing can even work upon the 
emotions. Imagine to yourself the excited observer of some rapidly developing 
scene. His agitated glance is thrown rapidly from one spot to another. If we 
imitate this glance with the camera we get a series of pictures, rapidly 
alternating pieces, creating a stirring scenario editing-construction.29 
Pudovkin shares Miinsterberg's view that scenes in films are organized according to 
the underlying logic of natural psychology, so that conventional editing practices 
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become an extension of our everyday perceptual habits - replicating the shifts in our 
attention as we visually dissect and interpret a scene as it unfolds. In addition, 
Pudovkin recognizes the potential for different editing rhythms to engage and 
augment the viewer's emotional response to the unfolding scene, further extending 
film's capacity to replicate subjective experience. Essentially, Pudovkin, like 
Munsterberg, is keen to emphasize that while cinema is founded on the mechanical 
reproduction of reality, this does not mean that cinematic narrative is limited to an 
objective description of the world. Contrarily, he suggests that through editing in 
particular (although we could extend the argument to other aspects of cinematic 
narrative such as lighting), film reconstitutes objective reality in terms of a specific 
conceptual (and often emotional) perspective. 
Despite the basic similarities between the ideas of Munsterberg and Pudovkin, 
there are also important differences in terms of how each theorist envisages the 
significance of film's capacity to represent thought processes. In particular, 
Pudovkin's theory diverges from Munsterberg's in its emphasis on the filmmaker's 
ability to assemble a cinematic sequence according to a specific ideological 
perspective, so as to impart to the viewer an abstract political message. For 
Munsterberg, editing techniques evoke thought processes (such as shifts in attention, 
speculations, mental associations, and so forth) in line with the immediate demands of 
the dramatic situation, and are governed by what is presumed to be the viewer's 
natural psychological response to the dramatic scene. In contrast, while not rejecting 
the organic link between dramatic content and stylistic processes, Pudovkin privileges 
the way in which film technique can be used to manipulate or mould the viewer's 
interpretation according to the filmmaker's intellectual agenda: 'One must learn to 
understand that editing is in actual fact a compulsory and deliberate guidance of the 
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thoughts and associations of the spectator. ,30 For Pudovkin, the editing of a scene 
should be 'coordinated according to a definitely selected course of events or 
conceptual line. ,31 In this view, editing is not simply a means of strengthening the 
viewer's natural emotional and intellectual response to the dramatic material, but also 
impels a specific ideological interpretation of the film's content. 
Pudovkin's belief that the spectator's response can (and should) be carefully 
manipulated according to the filmmaker's political agenda is closely paralleled in the 
writings of Sergei Eisenstein. However, Eisenstein is, if anything, even more didactic 
in his assertions concerning the ideological function of cinema. As David Bordwell 
writes, for Eisenstein, 'The task of cinematography is the "deep and slow drilling in 
on conceptions." The artwork's "message" will be furnished a priori - a slogan, a 
Party policy, a general thesis. ,32 Eisenstein suggests that the filmmaker's role is to 
communicate an unquestionable political meaning, which the spectator cannot fail to 
comprehend and, ultimately, accept. This notion undoubtedly seems simplistic, but it 
is important to note that Eisenstein does not necessarily imply that, when faced with 
the filmmaker's political message, the viewer's role is entirely passive. '[T]he 
spectator', he writes, 'is drawn into a creative act in which his individuality is not 
subordinated to the author's individuality, but is opened up through the process of 
fusion with the author's intention. ,33 Nevertheless, Bordwell is correct to note that 
Eisenstein's theoretical writings (and films) often rest upon the supposition that 
cinema is able to communicate very precise abstract concepts to the viewer. 
Eisenstein is perhaps the first theorist (and filmmaker) to regard cinema as a medium 
capable of articulating complex lines of abstract thought in images. To understand the 
basis of this theory, it is first necessary to consider Eisenstein's fundamental ideas 
concerning montage. 
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Eisenstein draws an analogy between film and 'ideogramatic' languages (such as 
written Chinese and Japanese) that combine a limited number of symbolic characters 
to create additional concepts.34 In such languages, Eisenstein notes, each ideogram 
'taken separately corresponds to an object but their combination corresponds to a 
concept. ,35 Similarly, he argues, the cinematic shot, in the first place, offers an iconic 
representation of concrete objects, but montage, the amalgamation of shots, is able to 
produce any number of abstract significations: 'two film pieces of any kind, placed 
together, inevitably combine into a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that 
. ··,36 juxtaposltIOn. 
From this starting point, Eisenstein begins to develop his theory of 'intellectual 
cinema'. In this theory, the localized concepts or symbolic meanings created by 
montage become the foundation for more extensive cinematic sequences that 
construct an entire logical argument in images. Although Eisenstein felt that he never 
managed to realize the full potential of intellectual cinema in a practical form (his 
long-held ambition was to make a feature-length film based on Marx's Capita!), there 
are several short sequences in his films that illustrate the basic principles of this type 
of cinema, such as the famous 'Gods' sequence in October (1928).37 Here Eisenstein 
juxtaposes a series of different images of God - from a Baroque representation of 
Christ to a wooden Eskimo idol- in order to highlight their incompatibility (and so to 
suggest that God is simply an idea created by humans within specific social and 
historical circumstances). In this sequence, Eisenstein writes, 
a conflict arises between the concept 'God' and its symbolisation. Whereas 
idea and image are completely synonymous in the first Baroque image, they 
grow further apart with each subsequent image. We retain the description 
'God' and show idols that in no way correspond with our own image of this 
concept. From this we are to draw anti-religious conclusions as to what the 
d· . h 11· 38 Ivme as suc rea y IS. 
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For Eisenstein, the sequence demonstrates the potential for a form of pure cinematic 
thought, in which the succession of images attains the status of a process of logical 
deduction: 
The conventional descriptive form of the film becomes a kind of reasoning (as 
a formal possibility). 
Whereas the conventional film directs and develops the emotions, here we 
have a hint of the possibility of likewise developing and directing the entire 
thought process. 39 
Eisenstein, I believe, succeeds in showing that film can communicate abstract, and 
often quite complex, thought processes to the viewer in purely imagistic terms. There 
is, however, a persistent ambiguity concerning the relationship between film viewer 
and cinematic text. Eisenstein states that cinema exhibits the possibility of 
'developing and directing' thought. On the one hand, this formulation could simply be 
taken to mean that the viewer's interpretation will be guided by the logical arguments 
and deductive reasoning represented in the film's images. On the other hand, it is 
equally plausible that the 'directing' of thought implies a more forceful manipulation 
of the viewer's response to ensure that the film's content is perceived through a 
particular ideological filter. As Anne Nesbet notes, 'In early writings and in his early 
films, Eisenstein seems taken with the idea that the images projected on the screen 
would actually become the thoughts in the spectator's brain. The film serves, in a 
sense, in the place of consciousness. ,40 Questions concerning the relationship between 
cinematic thought - understood as the direct audiovisual expression of ideas, beliefs, 
values, judgments, and so forth - and the viewer's consciousness are extremely 
complex, and will be taken up later in reference to Resnais' work, which deals with 
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issues of ideology, propaganda, consensus-building, and notions of collective memory 
or imagination. 
Many of these issues, however, depend upon another fundamental question raised 
by Eisenstein: what is the precise nature of the relationship between image and 
thought? Nesbet observes that Eisenstein's analogy between film and mind has a 
historical context in a contemporary debate concerning the nature of thought: 
This analogy attempting to bridge the distance between the cinema screen and 
the murkier arena of the spectator's brain responded not only to the desire to 
gain direct access to that brain (the 'educational' project), but also to a 
widespread, but perhaps deceptive, hunch that said that thinking was a process 
not unlike watching a movie. Was it though? To what degree was thinking 
based on images, rather than language, and what connection was there between 
image and word? In Eisenstein's day, the notion of thinking as 'inner speech' 
was very prevalent, but to what degree that 'speech' was like ordinary 
language was a heavily contested issue.41 
Eisenstein's SuspICIOn was that thought (or 'inner speech') operates through both 
images and language, as is implicit in his musings on the subject: 
How fascinating to listen to your own train of thought, especially in its affect 
(sic) when you catch yourself wondering: what do I see? how? what do I 
hear?! 
How do you talk 'within yourself as distinct from 'outside yourself? What 
is the syntax of internal language, as distinct from external? What quiverings 
of inner words accompany the corresponding image?42 
For Eisenstein, it seems, thought is comprised of both a verbal inner monologue and a 
series of corresponding mental images. One of the key tasks of intellectual cinema, 
therefore, is to elucidate the visual aspect of thought and thus expand our 
comprehension of how meaning can be constructed in images. 
Inevitably, the debate on the nature of thought was fuelled III part by the 
emergence of cinema, but it was also closely connected to the development of 
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Modernism in literature. Eisenstein himself took a particular interest in the works of 
James Joyce, and was fascinated by how Joyce represented the stream of 
conSCIOusness, or Inner monologue, in Ulysses. 43 Clearly, there is a close 
correspondence between how Joyce's inner monologues sought to depict the moment-
to-moment development of thought (through the free association of ideas, digressions, 
the constant movement between perceptions and memories, and so forth) and 
Eisenstein's intellectual cinema, which aimed to develop and direct abstract thought 
processes. However, Eisenstein's representation of thought (in the 'Gods' sequence, 
for instance) is often divorced from the immediate requirements of the narrative, 
acting as a kind of authorial commentary on the action rather than being rooted in the 
drama itself.44 The inner monologue suggested a more artistic way of representing 
thought, by making it fundamental to plot and characterization. Consequently, 
Eisenstein became very interested in the idea of developing a cinematic version of the 
inner monologue. 
Although Eisenstein's writings on silent film suggest the possibility of a protracted 
representation of visual thought, it is in the sound film that Eisenstein sees the full 
potential of the cinematic inner monologue. While literature can depict thought only 
in verbal terms, and silent cinema is restricted to showing imagistic thought, the 
sound film can combine the achievements of both. As Eisenstein writes, inner 
monologue 'can of course find its full expression only in cinema. For only the sound 
film is capable of reconstructing all the phases and all the specifics of a train of 
thought. ,45 The audiovisual representation of the inner monologue, Eisenstein 
believed, would be able be able to show the subtle interplay between words, sounds, 
and images in the gradual unfolding of a thought process. 
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Finally, there is one other important aspect of Eisenstein's theory of thought in 
film that is closely related to his conception of the cinematic monologue. While 
Eisenstein's early writings on intellectual cinema emphasize film's capacity to 
represent and develop rational lines of thought (through logic, argument, and the 
creation of concepts through montage) his later ideas on inner monologue also 
concern the less well-formulated aspects of thought. Bordwell provides a good 
summary of this aspect of Eisenstein's theory: 
He proposes that besides rational, logical thinking there also exists 'sensuous 
thought.' This is the flow and sequence of thinking unformulated into the 
logical constructions in which uttered, formulated thoughts are expressed. 
Logic requires that concepts and categories be differentiated, but sensuous 
thought springs from a more holistic sort of perception.46 
As the name suggests, sensuous thought progresses through the loose association of 
disparate sensations, fleeting images, and half-formed ideas. Whereas intellectual 
cinema attempts to use montage to represent precise concepts, sensuous thought 
returns us to a kind of pre-linguistic realm, where the connection between percept and 
concept is less tangible. 
Eisenstein's notion of sensuous thought foreshadows specific developments in 
Bergman's cinema, which will be considered in the next chapter, but this aspect of his 
theoretical work is also particularly pertinent to other areas of silent cinema. The 
irrational and unconscious aspects of thought are, of course, central to both 
expressionism and surrealism, and an exploration of these movements will provide 
additional insight into the early development of cinematic thought. 
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Expressionism 
Expressionism, one of the major artistic movements of the early twentieth century, 
rej ected the aesthetics of realism, and instead sought to emphasize the artist's 
subjective vision and interpretation of the world as the basis for representation. 
Although the movement was international in its scope, it was particularly prevalent in 
Germany, where, as John Titford points out, it was nourished by contemporary 
psychological and philosophical thought - most notably, that of psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology.47 It was also in Germany, shortly after World War One, that 
expressionism made its first impact on the cinema. 
German expressionist cinema is historically significant as it produced the first 
body of feature-length films that really challenged the realist aesthetics that had come 
to dominate narrative cinema in the 1910s. Expressionism created a cinematic image 
that could no longer be interpreted as providing an unmediated view of the 
autonomous fictional world, but instead represented a reality refracted through 
subjective experience. This reconfiguration of the basic status and function of the 
cinematic image can be traced back to The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Wiene, 1920). 
Not only is Caligari widely regarded as the first expressionist film, but it is probably 
the most significant and influential film of the silent era in terms of the development 
of subjective narrative techniques. In particular, the film pioneered the use of a 'first-
person' cinematic narrator, whose subjective recollection or idiosyncratic vision of 
the world determines the nature of the on-screen images. A short analysis of 
Caligari's narrative and stylistic innovations is, therefore, crucial to an understanding 
of the evolution of subjective cinema. 
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Caligari opens with a short scene in an overgrown park, where the film's main 
protagonist, Francis (Friedrich Feher), is sitting with an unidentified old man. The 
man begins to speak of occult occurrences that have driven him from his home, but 
his story is cut short by the sudden appearance of a young woman dressed in white 
(Lil Dagover), who slowly walks past the two men, staring straight ahead as if in a 
trance. Francis informs his companion that the woman is his fiancee, and says that he 
too has a strange story to tell, which concerns their past life together. An iris then 
reveals a new location marking the transition to Francis' story. 
Francis' story is set in his hometown of Holstenwall. Following the arrival of the 
annual fair, there are a series of murders, including the killing of Francis' best friend 
Alan (Hans von Twardowski). Francis and Jane (his fiancee) eventually discover that 
the murderer is Cesare (Conrad Veidt), a somnambulist whose mind is being 
controlled by the mysterious fairground hypnotist Dr. Caligari (Werner Krauss). The 
police arrive at the fair to arrest Caligari, but he manages to escape and, pursued by 
Francis, flees to the local asylum. Upon entering the building, Francis discovers that 
Caligari leads a double life, and is, in fact, also the respected director of the asylum. 
Desperate to prove that the director is an insane criminal, Francis persuades the 
members of staff at the asylum to search his office. Here they find the director's diary, 
which reveals the truth of his double identity. Francis' story draws to a close with a 
scene that shows Caligari being carried away in a straightjacket. 
However, as the scene shifts back to the frame story, there is a final twist. Francis 
and his companion are revealed to be inmates of the asylum run by 'Caligari', as are 
the various other characters who appeared in Francis' tale. The last scene in the film 
shows Francis being restrained by the asylum's staff as he hysterically reiterates that 
the director is the madman Caligari. Upon hearing this, the director says that he 
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finally understands the nature of Francis' delusion, and believes that he will be able to 
cure him. 
Francis' story is brought to life through numerous expressionistic devices which 
help to convey his subjective vision of the world. First and foremost, the use of an 
artificial, stylized mise-en-scene is essential in communicating a sense of dread, 
anxiety and horror. The streets of Holstenwall are narrow and mazelike, often 
seeming to lead nowhere as they disappear between the crowded buildings. The 
houses have inclined facades that jut out across the streets and block out the light, 
adding to the ominous, claustrophobic atmosphere. Throughout the film, Francis' 
environment is comprised of angular shapes, oblique lines and distorted perspectives 
that serve to impart a sense of discord or estrangement from normality. 
The expressionist aesthetic of the set design is extended to the film's intertitles, 
which are written in an irregular, stylized lettering and are placed against a 
background of various angular shapes. As well as contributing to the unsettling mood 
of the film as a whole, the design of the text also helps to evoke the sense of mania 
that frequently underlies the narrative. This function is most evident in the scene 
depicting the director's 'transformation' into Caligari, where the obsessive thought 
'You must become Caligari' is superimposed repeatedly across the screen. 
Finally, the performances of Werner Krauss and Conrad Veidt must also be 
recognized as part of the film's expressionistic design. These performances have a 
deliberately excessive, pantomimic quality that is necessitated by the functions that 
Caligari and Cesare fulfil in the film's underlying psychological drama. As John 
Barlow observes, Caligari and Cesare are not so much conventional, psychologically 
motivated characters as they are 'abstractions of social fears, the incarnations of 
demonic forces of a nightmarish world the bourgeoisie was afraid to acknowledge' ,48 
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Additionally, several critics have noted the importance of the doppelganger motif that 
underpins the characterizations of Caligari and Cesare, which extends the film's 
thematic concern with the conflict between the order of bourgeois society and the 
threat of a chaotic descent into irrationality or lawlessness. Dietrich Scheunemann 
suggests that Caligari's personality is split in two: he is both the benevolent asylum 
director, a respected scientist and authority figure, and the murderous fairground 
magician, operating outside of the normal boundaries of civilization and rational 
thought.49 Cesare, in tum, is an externalized representation of the latter aspect of 
Caligari's character, the 'personification Caligari' s impulsive drives. ,50 Paul Coates 
makes a similar point when, noting the possible irony of Cesare's name, he suggests 
that this ostensibly subservient character is, in fact, 'emperor of the unconscious. ,51 
Within Francis' story, Cesare and Caligari together represent the irrational and amoral 
impulses that threaten the coherence of both society and individual identity. And, 
given the film's final twist, these characters may, of course, also signify Francis' 
unconscious recognition of his own plight - as the asylum inmate who believes 
himself to be entirely sane and the sole possessor of the truth. 
This last point indicates the importance of the frame story in the construction of 
Caligari's subjective narrative. At first glance the function and meaning of this frame 
story would seem to be entirely self-evident. As Barlow states, 'the frame story is an 
explanation of the distorted images in the tale told by Francis: he is mad and the 
distortions are the visions of a madman. ,52 Yet the precise meaning and importance of 
the frame story has become a much-debated topic in discussions of the film, largely 
because of a thesis put forward by Siegfried Kracauer: that the frame story was, 
essentially, a last-minute addition to Caligari's narrative, and was radically 
antithetical to the scriptwriters' original intentions.53 Kracauer's argument and 
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subsequent critical responses to it are worth considering in some depth - not only 
because the framing device is, I believe, an integral element in the film's overall 
subjective design, but also because these debates raise some very pertinent subsidiary 
issues concerning the relationship between film and thought. 
Drawing upon an account of the film's production provided by Hans Janowitz 
(who along with Carl Mayer wrote the story and screenplay), Kracauer suggests that 
Caligari was originally an allegorical story critiquing the authoritarianism that had 
disastrously propelled Germany into World War One. Caligari was to represent the 
all-powerful authority figure who commands blind obedience from Cesare, who in 
turn symbolizes the common man (or soldier) forced to kill at his master's behest. In 
the story's original finale, Caligari is denounced as an insane tyrant, and this, for 
Kracauer, is an assertion of the film's underlying revolutionary meaning: 'reason 
overpowers unreasonable power, insane authority is symbolically abolished. ,54 
However, the introduction of the frame story, in which Francis is presented as a 
madman, reverses this meaning: 
While the original story exposed the madness inherent in authority, Wiene's 
Caligari glorified authority and convicted its antagonist of madness. A 
revolutionary film was thus turned into a conformist one - following the much-
used pattern of declaring some normal but troublesome individual insane and 
sending him to a lunatic asylum This change undoubtedly resulted not so much 
from Wiene's personal predilections as from his instinctive submission to the 
necessities of the screen; films, at least commercial films, are forced to answer 
d · 55 mass eSlres. 
Kracauer's interpretation of Caligari attaches a great deal of importance to the 
frame story, as a deeply meaningful symptom of specific ideological and 
psychological tensions prevalent in Germany in the aftermath of World War One, 
whilst simultaneously dismissing as facile the explicit narrative implications of this 
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plot device. For Kracauer, the framing device is not logically motivated by Caligari's 
internal aesthetic or narrative requirements, but has the primary function of placing 
the original story in brackets, so as to control its disruptive effects, and ultimately to 
dismiss its revolutionary content (and style) as the product of a madman's fantasy. 
Kracauer's reading of the film, therefore, rejects the intrinsic significance of 
Caligari's overt attempt to depict thought imagistically (as the product of Francis' 
subjectivity), but emphasizes the way in which the film operates as a cipher for a 
different type of thought: that of the collective imagination of the German film-going 
public.56 Wiene's decision to alter the basic mechanics of the film's narrative, 
Kracauer suggests, was an 'instinctive submission' to 'mass desires', which are 
circumscribed by specific ideological parameters. The film's revolutionary challenge 
to traditional authority is deemed by Kracauer to be a seductive but dangerous 
fantasy, and one that would ultimately prove unacceptable to a mass public craving 
social and political stability. The reconfiguration of Caligari's narrative, then, permits 
a tentative probing of the revolutionary 'fantasy' that has a certain allure for the 
downtrodden and defeated German nation, but, ultimately, reinstates the 'benevolent' 
authority figure who answers a deeper collective desire for socio-political cohesion. 
Kracauer's interpretation of Caligari is fascinating, insightful and deeply flawed 
in equal measure. His general premise - that commercial film, in responding to mass 
tastes and desires, testifies to (and usually reinforces) the dominant ideological trends 
and collective mentality of a particular era - exposes an additional, fruitful line of 
enquiry for analyzing how film may represent thought. Yet clearly, Kracauer's 
particular diagnosis of the national mentality underlying Weimar cinema is intensely 
problematic, being based, to a large extent, on the perspective provided by subsequent 
German history - that of 1930s' Fascism. In reading Caligari and numerous other 
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Weimar films as parables of submission to authority, Kracauer is able to construct a 
meta-narrative in which Weimar cinema is a portent of Nazism, repeatedly revealing 
the German nation's 'psychological disposition' towards authoritarianism. But he is 
able to do so only through a very selective interpretation of both the cinematic texts 
and German history. 
Scheunemann provides a very strong riposte to Kracauer's thesis concernmg 
Caligari's overall meaning and the significance of its frame story. As noted 
previously, he develops the argument that Dr. Caligari is much less the symbol of 
voracious authority than he is a perfect incarnation of the gothic motif of the 
doppelganger, an archetypal figure with an extensive history in German literature and 
film.57 Moreover, this reinterpretation of Caligari' s character offers a fresh 
perspective on the frame story, which, Scheunemann argues, functions essentially to 
duplicate and reinforce the doppelganger motif in an inherently ambiguous manner. 
The sudden reorientation of the narrative in the film's finale splits Francis' identity 
according to exactly the same dichotomy of rationality/ irrationality that has 
previously defined Caligari' s character. In addition, noting that expressionistic 
devices (such as stylized intertitles) occur in the frame story as well as in Francis' 
interior narrative, Scheunemann argues that 'it is difficult to uphold any interpretation 
that is based on the distinction between supposedly "normal" images in the first scene 
and the "madman's vision" determining the rest of the film. ,58 Instead, he suggests, 
we are forced to abandon any clear-cut division between 'experienced reality and 
. . . ,59 ImagmatIOn. 
Scheunemann's interpretation of Caligari is an important and well-conceived 
rejoinder to many of the weaknesses of Kracauer's analysis, but he perhaps goes too 
far in the opposite direction to Kracauer by disavowing entirely the overt logic of the 
-+0 
frame story as a fundamental signifier of the interior narrative's subjective status. 
Whilst recognizing that there is an element of ambiguity in the nature of the frame 
story, I believe it is important to acknowledge that its overriding function is to 
reaffirm and accentuate the SUbjective aesthetic that permeates the entire film, and, 
equally, it is vital to place (and interpret) this resolute reconfiguration of the narrative 
in its proper historical context. The twist in the frame story should be neither 
overlooked nor dismissed, nor rejected as an 'unsympathetic' treatment of the main 
narrative; instead it should be seen as being logically motivated by aesthetic 
considerations pertaining to the film's overall themes and expressionistic style. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Scheunemann fails to identify an organic link between 
Caligari's expressionism and its subjective themes and narrative. Instead, he suggests: 
The expressionist style was imposed on a neo-Romantic, gothic theme. Its 
strategic function was obviously twofold: to exert a desired emotional effect on 
the audience which would strengthen the impact of the gloomy tale, and at the 
same time to ensure that with this film cinema advances to a more widely 
accepted art form. 60 
Up to a point, these are undoubtedly valid explanations for the film's expressionistic 
style. 61 However, to suggest that expressionism was 'imposed' on the story is to 
downplay the many ways in which this style is, in fact, extremely well-suited to the 
material's latent psychological drama. The gothic motif of the doppelganger, as 
Scheunemann's analysis helps to show, is already inherently psychological, being the 
exteriorization of an inner state - the external representation of a divided psyche. It is 
not incidental that this motif became a key obsession of psychoanalysis: most notably, 
Otto Rank, one of Freud's closest disciples, wrote an entire book on the 
doppelganger. 62 If expressionism is, as Lotte Eisner claims, 'concerned solely with 
images of the mind', then it would seem to be perfectly suited to developing the 
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themes of Caligari as part of an inner, psychological drama. 63 The expressionist 
image represents the proj ection of inner phenomena (perceptions, beliefs, fears, 
desires, and so forth) onto the external environment, and as such is entirely 
sympathetic to the' gothic', doppelganger theme of Caligari. 
The framing device that reconfigures the main action as the product of Francis' 
insane imagination was introduced after the expressionistic set design had been 
approved, and must be seen as being motivated by the desire to both 'explain' and 
further elaborate the film's meaning as a subjective narrative. 64 It is undoubtedly the 
extreme nature of this 'explanation' that has prompted the critical backlash 
questioning its value or significance. The use of expressionism to convey the purely 
fantastical vision of a madman is seen by both Kracauer and Scheunemann, albeit in 
very different ways, as the betrayal of one of the expressionist movement's central 
aims: to champion subjective perception as the key to revealing the hidden meanings, 
or inner essence, of external reality. For both theorists, the main story of Caligari 
reveals important aspects of the inner workings of reality - be it socio-political reality 
or the psychological reality underpinning the individual's sense of identity - and these 
insights are devalued by a framing device that encourages the viewer to dismiss them 
as illusory. Yet these objections are perhaps the product of a modem perspective on 
the film that fails to give due recognition to Caligari's historical context, or, more 
specifically, to the radicalism of its aesthetic enterprise within this context. The basic 
premise that the cinematic image might represent an interior vision (rather than 
simply reproducing reality) was not entirely alien at the time of Caligarfs release.65 
But the film's extensive and systematic subjectification of cinematic narrative 
constituted an unprecedented challenge to the objective realism that dominated 
contemporary narrative cinema. As Barlow observes, the heavy emphasis that 
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Caligari's frame story places on the connection between the narrator's mental 
condition and the internal properties of his story is, in part, 'a way of bridging the gap 
between the everyday reality of the audience and the inner world of Francis' vision. ,66 
Above all, the twist in the final section of the frame story functions as a powerful, 
even excessive, reiteration of the narrative's subjective status, reaffirming one of 
Caligari's key aims and achievements: to show that cinema need not be bound to the 
mimetic reproduction of reality, but might also represent what a character says, 
experiences or thinks.67 
Caligari's Legacy 
There is no doubt that Caligari had a significant impact on a number of European 
filmmakers who were keen to explore stylistic alternatives to conventional cinematic 
realism. Scheunemann cites a comment made by Rene Clair in 1922, which gives a 
good indication of Caligari' s role in altering contemporary attitudes toward cinematic 
narrative: 'And then came The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari ... [and] toppled the realist 
dogma which had been considered as final. ,68 Similarly, Eisenstein, although 
extremely dismissive of the film's content, recognized that Caligari's audacious 
stylization was an important 'counterbalance' to the 'naturalistic tendency in Western 
Cinema. ,69 
The international critical and commercial success of Caligari also aided the 
further development of the expressionist film as a distinct German product. As 
Thomas Elsaesser observes, producers were quick to recognize the existence of an 
international niche audience for' artistic' films such as Caligari, and, consequently, 
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were eager to support projects that promised a similar degree of stylization or 
narrative experimentation.7o This, in turn, facilitated further aesthetic developments 
pertaining to subjective narration and representations of mental phenomena. 
Most noticeably, the German cinema of the early to mid-1920s saw a proliferation 
of the psychological themes and motifs that had underpinned Caligari. In particular, 
the internal, psychoanalytic conflict between rational and irrational forces (or between 
processes of socialization and instinctual drives) was frequently dramatized, most 
commonly through the portrayal of split personalities, doppelgangers, monsters or 
automatons. Notably, Conrad Veidt played a number of roles that clearly drew upon 
his characterization of Cesare in Caligari. In The Hands of Grlac (Wiene, 1924), 
Veidt plays a concert pianist who, following a train crash, has his hands amputated 
and replaced with those of an executed murderer. Upon his recovery, the pianist 
comes to believe that the hands have retained the violent impulses of their former 
owner, and struggles to control their murderous designs. There are perhaps even 
stronger echoes of the themes and characters of Caligari in The Student of Prague 
(Galeen, 1926), a remake of the popular 1913 film of the same name. Here Veidt stars 
as Balduin, the eponymous student who sells his reflection to the mysterious 
Scapinelli, played by Werner Krauss. Scapinelli eventually uses this spectral 
doppelganger to kill the wealthy aristocrat who is Balduin's rival for the affections of 
a countess. As in Caligari, the murder of the rival suggests that the actions of the 
'unthinking' automaton might, in fact, be related to the protagonist's own 
unconscious wishes. Both The Hands of Grlac and The Student of Prague can thus be 
said to dramatize an internal conflict between the rational, socialized aspects of the 
subject's mind and his unconscious desires and impulses. This thematic concern with 
irrationality and the fragmentation of the individual's psyche reached its apotheosis 
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with Pabst's Secrets of a Soul (1926), which took psychoanalytic theory as its explicit 
subject, and was co-written by Hans Neumann and Colin Ross, two of Freud's close 
associates. In this film, the protagonist's internal struggle with violent impulses 
towards his wife and anxieties over sexual inadequacy are represented through 
symbolic images and dream sequences, pre-empting later developments in surrealist 
cmema. 
While it is relatively easy to identify consistent themes and characters that became 
particularly associated with German expressionism, charting the stylistic evolution of 
expressionism in the 1920s is a more complex project. Perhaps surprisingly, only a 
few films (such as Genuine [Wiene, 1920] and Waxworks [Leni and Birinsky, 1924]) 
utilized expressionistic sets similar to those that had distinguished Caligari. 
Undoubtedly, the projection of a character's inner world continued to be the guiding 
principle for expressionist stylistics, but increasingly filmmakers sought to achieve 
effects comparable to those found in Caligari (the subjectivization of the 
environment) through subtler transformations in mise-en-scene, camerawork, editing 
and cinematography. The 'theatrical' elements that had been central to Caligari's 
aesthetic (such as artificial studio sets and expressionistic acting) were not abandoned 
entirely, but in addition, filmmakers developed a panoply of cinematic techniques that 
were particularly effective in conveying subjective experience. Features such as non-
naturalistic lighting, distorting lenses, special effects and extensive point-of-view 
editing were combined to represent the perceptions, ideas and emotions associated 
with a character's particular perspective. 
The evolution of the expressionist style into new forms of subjective narrative can 
perhaps best be seen in some of the films of F. W. Murnau. The Last Laugh (1924), 
for instance, is extremely innovative in the way it utilizes editing, camerawork and 
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aspects of mise-en-scene to convey the thoughts and emotions of its protagonist, the 
demoted hotel porter (Emil Jannings). The scene in which the porter is informed of 
his demotion is cross-cut with images of his younger replacement fluently unloading 
heavy luggage from carriages outside the hotel, effectively communicating the older 
man's sense of humiliation and despondency. Subsequently, the porter's dejection and 
loss of self-esteem are further conveyed through a series of expressionistic devices: 
high-angle shots are used consistently to minimize the porter's stature within the 
frame, suggesting his altered self-perception; a series of superimposed, subjective 
close-ups show the mocking faces of the porter's neighbours as he returns home from 
his new job. Camerawork and editing thus affect a general transformation of the 
external environment to reflect the protagonist's inner experience. Yet the most 
overtly expressionistic effects are confined to a wish-fulfilling dream sequence, which 
occurs after the porter falls into a drunken stupor. In the dream, the porter imagines 
that he possesses an inhuman strength, and sees himself effortlessly throwing a giant 
suitcase into the air while the hotel's guests and staff look on in amazement. The 
fantastic nature of the sequence is underscored by visual distortions, optical effects 
such as superimpositions, and a freely-moving subjective camera that sways through 
the action, imitating the dreamer's drunken perception of events. This direct 
presentation of mental imagery also presages the way in which Murnau would 
represent characters' thoughts in Sunrise (1927), his first American film. While 
Sunrise does not use expressionistic devices with the same frequency as The Last 
Laugh, it does, at several key points, use superimpositions or inserts to reveal the 
protagonist's thoughts. The most notable example occurs early on in the film, when 
the protagonist (George O'Brien) is tormented by a plot (devised by his lover 
[Margaret Livingston]) to murder his wife (Janet Gaynor) and make it look like a 
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boating accident. As the man watches his wife through the doorway of their house, we 
are shown a sudden cutaway image of him throwing her body into the lake. This is 
quickly succeeded by another shot of the man staring off-screen, over which the 
image of his lover is superimposed in such a way that it appears as if she is 
whispering into his ear. 
In the growing prevalence of subjective narrative sequences, in conjunction with 
the proliferation of psychological themes and motifs, we can see a general diffusion of 
expressionist aesthetics through the German art cinema after Caligari. However, 
whereas Caligari's whole narrative was presented as subjective, with this status being 
reaffirmed systematically through the film's ubiquitous expressionistic aesthetic, few 
of the expressionist films that followed attempted a similarly consistent level of 
narrative subjectivity. More commonly, as the above analysis of The Last Laugh 
indicates, short expressionistic sequences were utilized intermittently to represent 
localized thoughts or emotions pertaining to a character's immediate perspective. 
These short sequences undoubtedly built upon Caligari's mode of subjective 
narration, and they became a powerful tool for characterization and for expressing 
complicated ideas and emotions non-verbally. Consequently, the German film 
industry developed an international reputation for producing films of unusual 
psychological depth and complexity.71 Yet few of the expressionist films that 
followed Caligari seemed to pursue the representation of thought as an end in itself 
(Secrets of a Soul is the most notable exception). In contrast, this project of 
elucidating the nature of visual thought through cinematic narrative was to become 
the central goal of surrealist film. 
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Surrealism 
Cinematic surrealism, which developed in France shortly after German expressionism 
(in the mid-1920s), constitutes the second significant anti-realist movement of the 
silent era. Like expressionism, surrealism sought to formulate a new type of cinematic 
narrative based upon subjective experience, where the image no longer functions as a 
direct representation of reality, but reflects the inner workings of the mind. However, 
despite their similar conceptualizations of the relationship between image and 
thought, the two movements differ markedly in terms of their positions in relation to 
the mainstream film industry. While expressionism was an artistic movement that 
arose within the broad context of commercial narrative cinema, surrealism was, from 
the outset, a smaller and much more marginal, avant-garde movement that defined 
itself, to a large extent, through its opposition to mainstream cinematic practice. The 
handful of surrealist films that were made towards the end of the silent era - Entr 'acte 
(Rene Clair, 1924), La Coquille et Ie clergyman (1928, directed by Germaine Dulac, 
screenplay by Antonin Artaud), L 'Etoile de mer (1928, directed by Man Ray and 
based on a poem by Robert Desnos) and Un chien andalou (Bufiuel, 1929) - were 
produced for very little money, had short running times, and, initially, were exhibited 
at only a limited number of Parisian cinemas, cine-clubs and art galleries.72 
Nevertheless, these early experiments in cinematic surrealism developed a number of 
innovative strategies for representing certain aspects of thought, and, in the longer 
term, surrealism has had a significant influence on a number of filmmakers. 
Undoubtedly, Un chien andalou, co-written by Luis Bufiuel and Salvador Dali, is 
the best-known and most influential of the silent surrealist films. It is also, I think, the 
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film that best illustrates the key stylistic and thematic elements of cinematic 
surrealism. For these reasons, my discussion of surrealism will be limited to an 
analysis of this film's representation of thought. 
Bufiuel suggests that, 
Because of the way it works, the mechanism for producing film images is, of 
all the means of human expression, the one that is most like the mind of man, 
or better still, the one which best imitates the functioning of the mind while 
dreaming. 73 
Like Miinsterberg, Bufiuel argues that there is (at least potentially) a close 
equivalence between the functioning of the mind and the functioning of cinematic 
narrative. The key difference, of course, is that while Miinsterberg focuses mainly on 
the rational mental processes that film is able to imitate, such as attention and 
voluntary memory, Bufiuel suggests that cinematic narrative is better suited to 
representing the irrational thought processes of the dreaming mind. There are, as 
numerous theorists and filmmakers have observed, many areas in which film is 
analogous to dream, and these will be analyzed in close detail in the following 
chapter, in relation to Bergman. For now, it is sufficient to note briefly the key 
similarities between film and dream that help to support Bufiuel's central contention 
that the two function in an analogous manner. 
Firstly, dream, more than any other mental process, is characterized by its intense 
visuality. Deprived of external sensory stimuli, the dreamer experiences dream images 
as being particularly vivid when compared to mental images created in a waking state. 
Furthermore, because the dreamer is generally unaware that s/he is dreaming, dream 
images that are generated by the mind are mistaken for perceptions of the external 
world, and as a consequence, the dream events appear to the dreamer as real 
49 
74 
occurrences. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, it is the realism of the cinematic 
image that is one of its central assets from a surrealist perspective. Cinema, like 
dream, creates an illusion of reality that invites temporary belief in the fictional 
world. 75 In addition, film and dream have similar narrative properties, especially in 
terms of how we experience their spatial and temporal dimensions. Both film and 
dream are experienced as occurrences unfolding in the present moment (even when 
the chronological flow of the narrative is disrupted and the action is relocated in a 
new temporal setting), and both are marked by their spatial fluidity, by their capacity 
to move abruptly between distinct spatial fields or locations.76 
Classical realist cinema attempts to control the potential narrative disjuncture 
inherent to the medium through practices such as continuity editing, matches on 
action, eyeline matches, and so forth, all of which impose a strict unity of space and 
time. In contrast, surrealist film often exposes and exploits the disunities of space and 
time to create its dreamlike effects and meanings. Un chien andalou, in fact, 
purposefully foregrounds its disruption of conventional narrative by first evoking and 
then subverting classical story-telling devices. 
The film opens with an intertitle that reads 'Once upon a time ... ' After this 
cliched beginning, we see a scene of a nameless man (played by Bunuel) sharpening a 
razor. The scene is edited in a conventional manner, through a shot! reverse shot 
series that shows alternating close-ups of the man's face and the razor linked by an 
eyeline match. As the man walks out on to a moonlit balcony, there is a similarly 
diligent observation of classical continuity: a careful match on action across two shots 
depicts the man passing through the balcony door; conventional point-of-view editing 
(the character's glance off screen followed by a shot of the object seen from the 
correct angle) shows the man looking at the full moon. Then continuity is suddenly 
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disrupted through an insert depicting a woman's (Simone Mareuil) face in close-up. 
Her left eye is being held open by a man's fingers. There are then two quick shots, the 
first depicting a thin cloud passing in front of the moon, and the second showing a 
similar movement as the razor is drawn across the woman's eye. 
After the opening sequence, classical narrative continuity is repeatedly evoked 
only to be sabotaged. An intertitle following the eye-slicing sequence reads 'Eight 
years later', yet shortly afterwards we see the woman from the opening scene, and she 
bears no trace of the mutilation we have just witnessed. Throughout the film, 
intertitles are used to proclaim the passage of time, but because they have no apparent 
connection to images we see (or are even contradicted by those images), it becomes 
evident that the usual narrative suppositions they support (such as chronology and 
causality) are absent. 
Narrative space is shown to be equally incoherent by subsequent events in the 
film. The woman from the opening sequence is shown fleeing through a doorway (in 
what we are led to assume is her own bedroom) as she attempts to escape the sexual 
advances of another unidentified man (Pierre Batcheff). After she shuts the door, the 
woman looks around and finds herself back in the same room she has just exited. 
Towards the end of the film, the woman passes through the same doorway and finds 
herself on a beach. In both of these incidents, continuity editing and matches on action 
create a conventional sense of spatial coherence that is simultaneously subverted by 
the evident geographical anomalies. 
At first glance, it would be easy to view Un chien andalou's narrative as merely 
absurd. But the film is far from meaningless; it simply operates according to narrative 
principles that are very different from those that underpin conventional story-telling. 
In place of the causal logic of classical cinema, Un chien andalou utilizes a looser 
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associationism, indirectly connecting different themes and motifs in order to suggest a 
number of abstract meanings or ideas. The narrative operates according to the logic of 
dreams, as described by Freud: the film's manifest content has to be read as a 
symbolic representation of its latent meaning.77 From this perspective, the film's 
spatio-temporal inconsistencies cannot be interpreted as arbitrary, but help to signify a 
textual transformation or displacement of underlying unconscious thought processes. 
To take a clear example from a scene described above, when the woman flees her 
pursuer only to find herself back in the same room as him, this spatial anomaly can be 
interpreted as a cipher of the woman's unconscious sexual desire, a desire that directly 
contradicts her conscious attitudes and behaviour. 
Although certain localized narrative devices in Un chien andalou can plausibly be 
interpreted as representing the fictional characters' unconscious thoughts or desires, it 
is important to note that the film does not, in any definitive sense, identify specific 
images or effects as the direct product of a subjective experience internal to the 
diegesis. This clearly differentiates the film from expressionist works, where 
subjective images are related more or less directly to a character's experience -
through the immediate narrative context or frame story in which they are embedded. 
In Un chien andalou, every image is subjective - signifying an unconscious thought 
process - but the film does not posit an ultimate 'source' for this subjectivity. Linda 
Williams, in her excellent analysis of cinematic surrealism, suggests that this 
ubiquitous subjectivity is one of the key innovations of the surrealist film: 
[T]he exploitation of the film's resemblance to the dream image led to a new 
kind of film content: the film itself considered as an image-generating process 
of unconscious thought. This ... was a radical departure from the more typical 
Expressionist procedure of showing either glimpses (in The Last Laugh) or 
extended sequences (in Caligari) of a given character's subjective or 
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unconscious thoughts. Instead of showing what a character thinks, the 
Surrealist tendency in film was to show how images themselves can 'think' 
and how the apparent unity of the human subject is really a succession of 
identification with such 'thinking' images.78 
Although, as Williams correctly observes, the surrealists were the first to create entire 
films representing extended thought processes, they were, of course, not unique in 
conceiving of cinema as a means for expressing visual thought. As we have seen, 
Eisenstein's intellectual cinema (though never fully realized in practice) sought to 
utilize a succession of 'thinking' images in a way that closely parallels surrealist 
filmmaking. The crucial difference between Eisenstein's cinema and that of the 
surrealists, needless to say, is that while the former aimed to express rational thought 
processes (logical arguments and deductive reasoning), the latter used images to 
represent irrational, unconscious thought. Yet in both cases, these thought processes 
are not the product of a fictional character, but instead implicate a thinking subject 
(author or dreamer) who is, in some sense, exterior to the immediate diegesis. 
However, the lack of a fictional 'source' for the subjective images of the surrealist 
film does, potentially, raise certain interpretative problems. In psychoanalysis, the 
interpretation of dream images relies upon a detailed knowledge of the specific 
relevance of those images to the dreamer - that is, knowledge of the mental 
associations that connect the dream's symbols to the dreamer's waking reality. 
Although there may be some discernible internal logic by which the surrealist film is 
comprehensible, without access to the mental associations of the subject who 
produced the images, the symbolic significance of the film's manifest content may be 
far from obvious. Yet, as Williams points out, to produce a dreamlike discourse that 
can be easily decoded 'is to run the risk of planting psychoanalytic clues or 
conventionalized symbols that aid in interpretation but violate the unconscious and 
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irrational ambience so important to the dream.' 79 To an extent, Un chien andalou 
suffers from precisely this problem: some of its symbols and events seem suitably 
dreamlike but are extremely difficult to interpret, while others are more easy to 
decipher (according to their pre-ordained cultural or historical significance) but are 
somewhat cliched. 8o In some ways, this problem can be seen as a product of the 
competing demands of avant-garde and conventional narrative cinema, with the film 
attempting to replicate authentically psychological reality, whilst also trying to create 
a story that is engaging and (by a certain standard) comprehensible for an audience. 
Later films that have sought to represent unconscious thought have often managed 
to balance the dual imperatives of authenticity and comprehensibility through 
embedding extended dream sequences within a wider, more conventional narrative 
context. 81 In the best of these films, the symbolic significance of the dream images is 
derived from their connections to the dreamer's waking experiences as represented in 
the broader diegesis. This approach allows the preservation of the key narrative 
devices that surrealism utilizes to evoke the atmosphere of the dream (spatio-temporal 
fluidity, bizarre imagery, the refusal to distinguish the subjective image from its 
objective counterpart through more or less arbitrary stylistic markers), whilst 
rendering the dream's latent thought processes accessible to the viewer. 
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Thinking Without Language 
It was obvious that cinematography would have to become my means of 
expression. I expressed myself by means of a language which transcended the 
words I lacked ... Suddenly I had an opportunity to communicate with the 
world around me in a language which literally allowed soul-to-soul 
communication in terms which, almost sensuously, escape the restrictive 
control of the intellect. 1 
In the above quotation, Bergman outlines his belief in the expressive capacities of 
cinema in terms that may at first seem excessively romanticized. His conception of 
the transcendental language of film is not only open to criticism on the grounds that it 
marginalises issues surrounding the practicalities and commercial pressures of 
production, but also becomes contentious in relation to the ambivalence which his 
own films display towards problems concerning all forms of communication, an 
ambivalence which repeatedly confounds resolution. Yet there is an important sense 
in which Bergman's description of film 'language' is intentionally utopian, forming 
part of his sustained theoretical engagement with the possibilities (and problems) of 
cinema as a medium for self-expression. There is much to be gained from suggesting 
that Bergman's statement functions less as a descriptive overview of his work in 
general, than as a prescription of the goal towards which his cinema aspires at a 
specific point in his career. In other words, Bergman's idealized description of how 
film communicates has to be understood primarily as a statement of intent, not as an 
objective assessment of his own body of work or of the day-to-day experience of 
filmmaking in general. 
The opening quotation is taken from Bergman's short essay 'The Snakeskin', 
which was written in 1965 'in direct connection with the work on Persona'(l966), the 
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director's most experimental and self-reflexive exploration of cinematic thought.2 
Bergman later published 'The Snakeskin' as a loose preface to Persona's screenplay, 
reaffirming the specific relation between the essay and the film. Given the context of 
the essay's genesis and later publication, the specific picture of cinema that Bergman 
paints seems to serve a dual role: firstly, as a type of manifesto and tentative 
prediction of the direction in which he sees his cinema travelling; and secondly, as 
part of an explication or interpretative framework that illuminates a 'difficult' film. Of 
course, the fact that Bergman's essay might offer an interpretative handle on Persona 
is not without irony, considering that it sets out an idealization of cinema as a means 
for bypassing the necessity of verbal language. But this apparent paradox is worth 
unpicking, as it points to a key tension that recurs in Bergman's work, both 
stylistically and thematically: the conflict between intellectual and sensuous modes of 
thought, between our ability to conceptualize an idea intellectually and our ability to 
understand something on an emotional or intuitive level. As Bergman summarises, '1 
am caught in a conflict. .. between my need to transmit a complicated situation 
through visual images, and my desire for absolute clarity.,3 
The focus of this section of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, 1 shall explore Bergman's 
conviction that film is uniquely suited to communicating thought in non-linguistic 
terms. This will entail an investigation of the key films in which the director develops 
a repertoire of techniques for representing his characters' inner experiences. 1 shall 
begin with a close analysis of Wild Strawberries, and will follow this (in the next 
chapter) with an examination of The Silence, Persona, and Cries and Whispers 
(1972). My contention is that it is in these four films that Bergman is most successful 
in expressing his character's thoughts in non-linguistic terms, and in capturing the 
predominantly visual nature of certain subjective experiences, such as dreams and 
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memories. The second focus of this section, running parallel to the first, is the specific 
picture of mental experience that Bergman develops: his conception of the mind and 
of how it creates meaning. As suggested earlier, one of the main issues that Bergman 
tackles is the relationship between different levels of cognitive experience, broadly 
dividing the sensuous (or emotional) and intellectual aspects of consciousness - or, 
more simply and conventionally, separating thought from feeling. This division, 
though not as simple or rigid as it might first appear, also allows Bergman to develop 
a model of how thought is constructed and operates in relation to both an individual 
and a social context. The interaction between instinctual drives and the internalized, 
normative values or beliefs of society at large (often dictated by religion) is central to 
Bergman's representation of thought, repeatedly emerging as a formal and thematic 
concern with performance and taboos. In summary, I aim to show that Bergman's 
cinema strives to 'escape the restrictive control of the intellect' in two related senses: 
by communicating thought without language, and by exploring the emotional and 
psychological complexity of his characters in a manner that transgresses institutional 
and social taboos. 
The structure of this section reflects the fact that Wild Strawberries can be seen as 
a stepping-stone between two fairly distinct phases in Bergman's career. Bergman's 
outlook undergoes a definite philosophical shift in the early 1960s, after which his 
interest in consciousness and its cinematic representation comes to fruition. This 
chapter will, therefore, explore Bergman's early representation of the mind in Wild 
Strawberries, while the following chapter will focus on his later cinema. 
While Wild Strawberries presages the formal experimentation and complex 
rendering of thought that flourishes in Bergman's films of the '60s and '70s, it also 
looks back to an earlier era, drawing on many of the techniques for subjective 
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expreSSIOn found in the silent CInema. Indeed, Bergman's fascination with non-
linguistic representations of thought can be traced to his early interest in silent film. 
An examination of the ways in which Wild Strawberries builds upon the aesthetic 
legacy of the silent cinema, therefore, provides a logical place to begin our 
exploration of Bergman's cinematic thought. 
Wild Strawberries: Dreams, Memories, and the Silent Cinema 
From an early stage in his filmmaking career, Bergman had displayed interest in 
subjective narrative techniques such as flashbacks, dream sequences and 
expressionistic mise-en-scene. In Prison (sometimes known as The Devil's Wanton, 
1949), Bergman offers a vivid audiovisual representation of a nightmare experienced 
by the film's heroine, Birgitta Karolina (Doris Svedlung). Similarly striking is the 
extended flashback at the beginning of Sawdust and Tinsel (1953), which depicts the 
humiliation of a circus clown, Frost (Anders Ek), who discovers his wife, Alma 
(Gudrun Brost), bathing naked in front of a group of soldiers. The entire sequence is 
shot in a highly expressionistic style that recalls certain aspects of silent cinema: there 
is a deliberately hyperbolic (almost pantomimic) quality to the gestures and actions 
that we observe, and there is almost no dialogue. The background score provides the 
key commentary on the situation, accompanying the images in a way that is analogous 
to the live music of the silent era. Peter Cowie has noted that silent film, particularly 
German expressionism, played an important part in the development of Bergman's 
early aesthetics, with the director professing to have consciously imitated E. A. 
Dupont's Variety (1925) in his own work, and spending his wages in the late 1940s 
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collecting prints of silent classics such as The Cabinet of Dr Ca/igari.4 However, 
while Bergman's early films hint at his interest in the subjective narratives of silent 
expressionist cinema, they do not develop this interest into anything more than a 
marginal stylistic and thematic concern. Subjective sequences in these films form 
significant interludes, but never dominate the narrative for any length of time. It was 
not until Bergman made Wild Strawberries in 1957 that he embarked upon a sustained 
investigation of subjective experience, making the memories, dreams and fantasies of 
his central character the focus of an entire film. Wild Strawberries should, therefore, 
be recognized as the first truly significant step in Bergman's exploration of 
conscIOusness. 
Wild Strawberries centres on a single day in the life of a seventy-eight-year-old 
medical professor, Isak Borg (Victor Sjostrom), as he travels by car to the university 
town of Lund, where he is to receive an award in recognition of his distinguished 
career. During the course of the day, Isak is beset by a mixture of dreams and 
memories that gradually reveals to the viewer his anxieties, his present character and 
the significant moments in his past that have shaped his identity. The physical journey 
is thus paralleled by a spiritual journey of self-exploration, as Isak gradually 
reassesses his decisions and the significant relationships in his life - with his late 
wife, Karin (Gertrud Fridh), his partially-estranged son, Evald (Gunnar Bjornstrand), 
and his daughter-in-law, Marianne (Ingrid Thulin). In re-evaluating these 
relationships, Isak attempts to find some form of salvation from the crippling 
loneliness and emotional sterility he comes to recognize in himself. 
Clearly, the representation of Isak's inner world of dreams and memories gives us 
a piercing insight into his character, as well as condensing the back-story that is most 
relevant to his characterization into only a few reconstructed incidents from his past. 
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However, in contrast to Bergman's earlier films, Wild Strawberries depicts subjective 
experience in a way that cannot be reduced to a simple function of characterization or 
economical narrative exposition. Instead, the film takes an interest in these mental 
phenomena for their own sake, as a key facet of everyday experience. Indeed, 
Bergman suggests that it was his own day-to-day experience of moving constantly 
between reality and the intangible world of childhood memories and dreams that 
formed the basis of the script for Wild Strawberries: 
The truth is that I am forever living in my childhood, wandering through 
darkening apartments, strolling through quiet Uppsala streets, standing in front 
of the summer cottage and listening to the enormous double-trunk birch tree ... 
In Wild Strawberries I move effortlessly and rather spontaneously between 
different planes - time-space, dream-reality... The dreams were mainly 
authentic: the hearse that overturns with the coffin bursting open, a calamitous 
final examination in school, the wife who fornicates in public ... 5 
Wild Strawberries thus gives a form to Bergman's own inner world. In so doing, it 
can be seen as the first film in which Bergman really begins to interrogate the 
possibility of using the medium to represent psychic experience authentically, to 
move beyond the well-worn cliches and conventions through which subjective states 
are usually codified and develop a narrative and stylistic complexity that accurately 
reflects his personal experience and understanding of mental life. 
Although Bergman can be credited with numerous stylistic and narrative 
innovations in his depiction of Isak's subjective experiences, he did not have to rely 
entirely on his own inventiveness. Wild Strawberries, like the flashback in Sawdust 
and Tinsel, bears a clear debt to the narrative practices of the silent cinema. A close 
analysis of the film reveals many subjective sequences that build upon the techniques 
developed in the silent cinema in general, and in the work of Victor Sjostrom in 
particular. It is my contention that it was not only in his personal memories and 
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dreams that Bergman sought inspiration for the representation of Isak' s psychic 
experiences, but also in his remembrance of the stylistic devices through which silent 
film had attempted to depict characters' thoughts and feelings. As I have shown in the 
introduction to this thesis, in many ways, the silent cinema had already had to develop 
a complex array of techniques for conveying thoughts, ideas and meanings in purely 
visual terms, and Bergman inevitably drew upon this heritage when he sought to 
enrich the depiction of non-linguistic thought in his own films. 
The casting of Victor Sjostrom, Sweden's most celebrated actor and director of the 
silent era, in the central role of Isak Borg seems to be the first and clearest indicator 
that Bergman sought to recapture some element of the silent cinema in Wild 
Strawberries. Bengt F orstund suggests that: 
Because Bergman, almost as a rule, wrote his films with specific actors in 
mind, the role became of its own accord influenced to a large degree by the 
personality of Sjostrom - as Bergman knew him - and by certain 
reminiscences from his films and perhaps by incidents from his life. 6 
However, things are not quite that straightforward. Bergman himself denies that he 
had Sjostrom in mind at the writing phase: 
I never for a moment thought of Sjostrom when I was writing the screenplay. 
The suggestion came from the film's producer, Carl Anders Dymling. And as I 
recall, I thought long and hard before I agreed to let him have the part. 7 
Instead, Bergman again stresses the importance of autobiography and introspection to 
the film's central gestation: 'Isak Borg equals me. I B equal Ice and Borg (the 
Swedish word for fortress). Simple and facile. I had created a figure who, on the 
outside, looked like my father but was me, through and through.,8 Nevertheless, if 
Bergman is reticent about drawing any specific connection between Sjostrom's 
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character or screen persona and the original development of Isak's character, he is 
quick to affinn the fonnative influence that Sjostrom's work has had on his career and 
imagination in general. Of particular note is Bergman's recollection of seeing Thy 
Soul Shall Bear Witness (more commonly known by its alternative English title, The 
Phantom Carriage, 1921) as an adolescent: 
I don't think I could have been more than 15 or 16. My father, who was a 
pastor... had been to Svensk Filmindustri and hired Thy Soul Shall Bear 
Witness to show his confinnands. That was my first experience of a Victor 
Sjostrom film - and it made an extraordinarily powerful impression on me.9 
The direct influence of The Phantom Carriage can be detected in many of Bergman's 
films (the depiction of Death in The Seventh Seal (1957) is perhaps the most obvious 
example), but nowhere is this influence stronger, or more pervasive, than in Wild 
Strawberries. The similarities between the two films are manifested in terms of 
narrative structure, content, certain aspects of style, and specific iconography. 
The Phantom Carriage uses a series of innovative flashbacks to tell the story of 
David Holm (Victor Sjostrom), a man whose life has been ruined by alcoholism. The 
film begins on New Year's Eve, with David relating a ghost story to two friends as 
they sit drinking in a cemetery. David reveals that some years ago he was told the 
legend of The Phantom Carriage by his friend Georges (Tore Svenberg). The legend 
states that the last person to die on New Year's Eve is doomed to spend the next year 
as the coachman of The Phantom Carriage, charged with the duty of collecting the 
souls of deceased sinners and bearing them away to a hellish afterlife. The story is 
related to the audience as a flashback, first revealing a scene in a pub where Georges 
passes on the legend, and then cutting to a depiction of the ghostly carriage itself, 
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which appears eerily transparent (an effect achieved through the superimposition of 
the carriage over a bleak Swedish landscape). 
With the legend recounted, we cut back to the present of the framing story, where 
David becomes involved in a mindless, drunken brawl with his companions. He is 
accidentally killed, and after David's companions have fled the scene, The Phantom 
Carriage appears; a close-up of the church clock shows that it has just turned 
midnight. 
The coachman is revealed to be none other than Georges. David is told by Georges 
that he must take over the burden of driving the carriage, but first he will be given the 
chance to see the error of his ways so that he can repent his sins. We then see a series 
of flashbacks depicting the significant moments in David's downfall. Initially he is 
shown as a committed family man, enjoying a picnic with his wife (Hilda Borgstrom) 
and children in an idyllic, lakeside setting that immediately calls to mind the 
landscape surrounding the summer house in Wild Strawberries (a childhood memory 
recalled by Isak in three separate dream sequences). Soon afterwards, we see the 
disintegration of David's familial relationships: his brother is imprisoned after he and 
David are involved in a fatal drunken fight, and, having had enough of David's 
persistent abuse, his wife leaves him, taking their children with her. Finally, we see 
David's horrific behaviour towards Edit (Astrid Holm), a Salvation Army volunteer 
who has nursed David back to health and tries to reunite him with his family so that 
he can redeem himself. Having witnessed all the misery that he has inflicted upon 
those closest to him, David finally breaks down and repents his sins. His life is 
restored and he is able to achieve some form of redemption by racing to prevent his 
wife's suicide by telling her that he has changed and begging for her forgiveness. 
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The myriad thematic and structural similarities that exist between The Phantom 
Carriage and Wild Strawberries are immediately evident. The central conceit of a 
man reliving the significant moments in his life as part of a spiritual journey to self-
awareness and redemption clearly forms the backbone of both films. Furthermore, we 
can detect in the experimentalism of Sjostrom's film a desire to expand the expressive 
capacities of the medium in a way that is closely paralleled in Wild Strawberries. 
Both films seek ways to represent extra dimensions of experience - be they spiritual, 
supernatural or psychological - beyond everyday, objective reality. Sjostrom is one of 
the earliest pioneers in utilizing a series of flashbacks not merely as exposition but to 
communicate visually an inner experience and spiritual journey. Forstund asserts that 
the international critical acclaim afforded to The Phantom Carriage (and Sjostrom's 
cinema more broadly) can largely be attributed to Sjostrom's innovations In 
representing complex subjective experIences In purely cinematic terms - that IS, 
through visual imagery and the manipulation of filmic space and time: 
They [critics] were attracted to Sjostrom's way of telling stories more than to 
anything else, and Sjostrom had never liberated himself to such a degree from 
a literary source, and really "thought in images". In an almost astounding way, 
he used flashbacks - and even flashbacks within flashbacks - without 
disturbing the logical continuity of the narrative for a second. 1o 
In Wild Strawberries, Bergman's debt to these innovations is clear. 
As a final indication of the very direct influence that Sjostrom's film had on Wild 
Strawberries, we should note the iconography that is common to both. In addition to 
the lakeside idyll that occurs in both films as a symbol of the central characters' 
prelapsarian state, The Phantom Carriage itself seems to have been appropriated and 
reinvented in the first dream sequence from Wild Strawberries, where Isak sees an 
antiquated, horse-drawn hearse bearing his own corpse. 
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The dreams and memones that appear in Wild Strawberries clearly bear 
considerable debt to The Phantom Carriage, and yet, as already noted, Bergman has 
insisted that they were originally derived from authentic personal experiences. 
However, these two facts do not necessarily contradict each other. It would seem 
perfectly reasonable to assume that once Victor Sjostrom had been cast in the leading 
role, Bergman would draw upon The Phantom Carriage consciously, using 
Sjostrom's work as a template for committing his own dreams and memories to film. 
Another more intriguing, though undoubtedly more speculative, possibility is that 
Bergman had internalized Sjostrom's work to the extent that his imaginative outlook 
was from the start unconsciously indebted to The Phantom Carriage. It seems logical 
that Bergman's imaginative faculties should draw upon the film that made such an 
'extraordinarily powerful impression' in his youth. Moreover, Bergman's contention 
that the cinema as a medium allows 'soul-to-soul' communication (cited at the 
beginning of the chapter) already implies his belief in the capacity of film to influence 
the individual's mind directly - to impact upon his or her memories, fantasies and 
dreams. (I shall return to this aspect of cinematic thought later in this section, and in 
the following section in relation to Alain Resnais and collective memory.) 
The First Dream Sequence 
Aside from the specific parallels that can be drawn between The Phantom Carriage 
and Wild Strawberries, a more general influence from the silent cinema can be 
detected in the representation of 1sak' s dreams and memories. This is particularly the 
case in the first dream sequence, which occurs about three minutes into the film. In 
69 
this sequence, we see Isak wander into an unknown and deserted part of town whilst 
on his morning walk. A series of bizarre occurrences follows. Firstly, Isak tries to 
check the time on a street clock only to discover that the hands are missing. 
Underneath the clock there hangs a sign depicting a pair of bespectacled eyes; the 
right eye is damaged in such a way that it appears to be bleeding. Isak takes out his 
pocket watch and finds that it also has no hands. He then looks around and discovers 
that a man has appeared at the far end of the street. He approaches the man from 
behind and touches him on the shoulder. The face that spins to greet Isak has the 
appearance of a dummy with its eyes sewn tightly shut. The body then falls to the 
ground and blood gushes from its head. Finally, Isak notices the driverless, horse-
drawn hearse approaching. As it turns the comer onto Isak's street, the hearse catches 
its wheel on a lamppost, becomes unbalanced and spills a coffin into the road. Isak 
sees that a hand is protruding from the coffin and approaches it cautiously. As Isak 
bends over the coffin to get a better look, the hand comes to life and seizes him by the 
arm. Slowly, the body pulls itself from the coffin and Isak is confronted by his own 
reanimated corpse, which seems to be trying to speak to him. The sequence ends with 
a sudden cut to Isak awaking in fright in his bed. 
The first thing that is immediately striking about this sequence is the lack of 
speech (and in this it foreshadows Bergman's later work, in which many of the most 
important scenes are marked by a sparsity of dialogue). Two sentences of voiceover 
introduce the scene swiftly and economically, but after this there is no further verbal 
exposition. In its function, the voiceover in this sequence seems similar to the 
intertitle of the silent era, providing a bare outline of the situation to direct the 
viewer's interpretation of the image-track. As far as possible, it seems, Bergman tries 
to capture the atmosphere of the dream, to create a visual impact and to generate 
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meaning in purely non-verbal tenns. There are a number of means by which Bergman 
provides a clear insight into Isak's psyche - into the complex emotions and thought 
processes that the dream reveals - without recourse to verbal exposition, and these 
must be examined thoroughly. 
Firstly, it is essential to emphasize the importance of Victor Sjostrom's sensitive 
physical perfonnance. Sjostrom's various postures, gestures, movements and facial 
expressions are constantly affording the viewer a detailed and nuanced picture of 
Isak's thoughts and emotions - one that requires no explanation because it is grasped 
intuitively. As Philip and Kersti French suggest, the subtle power of Sjostrom's 
perfonnance is vital in rendering a palpable sense of the emotional journey that Isak 
expenences: 
The film's sixty-year journey into the past and its fifteen-hour one through the 
present are registered by an endlessly expressive face that exhibits the 
experience of a lifetime... and a body that learned to speak in silent films. 
With a tilt of the head, the flick of a muscle ... he can reveal the rare emotional 
depths that his mind and heart are tapping. 11 
Bergman capitalizes on Sjostrom's ability to convey complex emotions and thought 
processes without words. For example, the silent confrontation between Isak and his 
reanimated corpse at the end of the first dream is depicted through a shot/ reverse shot 
sequence in which the camera cuts between Isak and his doppelganger with a series of 
increasingly tight close-ups. This use of ovelWhelming facial close-ups at moments of 
extreme emotional intensity is another technique that becomes ever more important in 
Bergman's later psychological dramas. 
The empathetic response engendered by Sjostrom's silent perfonnance is bolstered 
by the Bergman's shot choices and the carefully controlled editing of the scene. Upon 
close examination, it becomes clear that the scene's cuts, camera movements and 
71 
editing rhythm are precisely orchestrated to reinforce the centrality of Isak's 
perspective, his visual, emotional and psychological experience of the dream. In this 
short dream sequence (it lasts for approximately four minutes and consists of sixty-
eight individual shots) we are given twenty-one readily-identifiable point-of-view 
shots, where the camera takes Isak's position in the scene, or shows us the object at 
which he is looking. In addition to this repeated visual identification with Isak's point 
of view, we are given a dramatization of his emotional and psychological perspective 
through abrupt changes in editing rhythm. Again, the sequence where Isak confronts 
his corpse illustrates this point. After a lengthy shot in which he approaches the 
coffin, the cutting between Isak and his doppelganger becomes increasingly rapid, 
articulating the confusion and panic that he is experiencing. These fairly subtle 
techniques, in conjunction with the lack of any verbal exposition, help to immerse the 
viewer in the immediacy of the dream, capturing the atmosphere of the subjective 
experience before any concrete interpretation or analysis is offered. 
The final feature of the dream sequence that needs exploring is its dense visual 
symbolism. Through the dream's dark imagery, we are given an intimation of the 
anxieties that Isak is suffering long before he consciously recognizes the truth of his 
emotional situation and attempts to change it. The various symbols in the dream - the 
handless clocks, the damaged eye, the deserted streets, the eyeless dummy that bleeds 
and the image of Isak confronting his corpse - are suggestive of death, blindness, 
isolation and the extreme loneliness from which Isak is suffering. 12 The overall 
metaphor of the dream is that Isak is experiencing a kind of eternal living death that 
he cannot perceive or refuses to acknowledge, but it is only after several more 
nightmarish visions that he is able to recognize and understand this message 
consciously. He eventually verbalizes the importance of his recurring nightmares to 
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Marianne: 'It's as if I'm telling myself something I don't want to hear when I'm 
awake ... That I'm dead, even though I'm alive.' Isak's emotional journey is thus 
comparable to a type of Freudian self-analysis, with Isak being both doctor and 
patient. It is only by translating his unconscious fears and obsessions into conscious 
thoughts that Isak is able to change his behaviour and find some peace by the end of 
the film. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of dreams, visual symbolism and self-
analysis in Wild Strawberries can be seen as providing an additional link to the 
cinema of the silent era. As Birgitta Steene notes, 
Non-Swedish reviewers have ... suggested that the film follows up an earlier 
trend in the history of filmmaking, the cinematic expressionism of the 1920s, 
and that Bergman profited from a realization of older German directors: that 
the camera has a distinct advantage over the stage in projecting a psychic 
situation into symbolic imagery and in destroying the unities of time and 
space. 13 
Bergman's early interest in German expreSSIOnISm has already been noted. It 
therefore seems more than reasonable to suggest that he drew upon this area of silent 
cinema in developing certain aspects of the dream sequences in Wild Strawberries. 
However, it is also important to emphasize that we should not attribute every 
technical or stylistic feature in the film's dream sequences to a prior cinematic source. 
Much of the invention and innovation in Wild Strawberries is Bergman's alone, as 
would be expected from his insistence that the psychic phenomena depicted in the 
film have a firm and authentic grounding in his personal mental experiences. The 
lighting of the first dream sequence provides a good example of Bergman's desire to 
adapt expressionistic conventions better to reflect his personal experience. The 
lighting in this sequence is non-naturalistic, but it is also very different from the 
chiaroscuro effects commonly used to depict a nightmarish world in German 
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expressionist cinema (and in much of Bergman's earlier work). Instead of filming a 
conventionally shadowy nightmare world, Bergman lights his set to the extent that it 
is almost bleached out by the unnatural glare. This, he claims, is simply to be faithful 
to his own experience of unpleasant dreams: 'My nightmares are always saturated in 
sunshine ... It's like a threat, something ... terrifying.' 14 
We can also identify the sound editing in the dream sequence as being original and 
innovative. The incorporation of sound is, of course, significant in indicating that 
Bergman's dream sequence does not intend simply to mimic every aspect of silent 
film, slavishly recreating a cinema of the past. Instead, the utilization of certain 
subjective narrative techniques from the silent era is enhanced through the addition of 
subjective sound effects - the sudden beating of Isak's heart as he looks up at the 
handless clock, the accentuated squeaking as the hearse rocks back and forth, the 
shrill, single note that sounds as Isak comes face to face with his corpse. As with the 
more conventional - though no less expressive - visual devices described earlier, the 
subjective soundtrack helps to place the viewer in Isak's position in a very direct and 
immediate manner. 
The Later Subjective Sequences 
Wild Strawberries' contains two further major subjective sequences that build upon 
the initial nightmare, in order to deepen our identification with Isak and our 
understanding of his psyche. These sequences are not indebted to the silent cinema to 
the same extent as the first. They contain expansive dialogue and several dramatic 
scenes that are constructed according to the broad conventions of contemporary 
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mainstream CInema. Nevertheless, each contains a number of innovations in the 
representation of the mind, many of which can be seen as foreshadowing the aesthetic 
developments in Bergman's later work. A brief exploration of the key thematic and 
stylistic features of the later SUbjective sequences should help to elucidate how 
Bergman expands his depiction oflsak's consciousness, and how this in tum begins to 
reveal some of the director's general conjectures about the human mind. 
The second subjective sequence occurs when Isak and Marianne take a break 
during their journey to visit the lakeside summer house where Isak spent much of his 
childhood. The sequence is not a dream as such, but something more akin to a reverie 
or daydream. Isak's voiceover introduces the sequence by stating: 'I came to think of 
a thing or two associated with the places where we played as children. 1 don't know 
how it came about, but the clarity of the present shaded into the even clearer images 
of memory.' After this, there is a depiction of Isak's youth that freely mixes memory 
and fantasy. We see Isak, still as the seventy-eight-year old man of the present, 
observing his family as they were in his youth. He sees a scene where his cousin, Sara 
(Bibi Andersson), to whom he was 'secretly engaged', is seduced by his younger 
brother, Sigfrid (Per Sj6strand), whom she later married. Isak then follows Sara into 
the summer house where he witnesses a large family gathering that is taking place. 
The first thing to note about the reverie is that while the people and settings from 
Isak's past appear as they were, as if frozen in his memory, it is the seventy-eight-year 
old Isak who wanders incongruously through this mental landscape. The same is true 
in another memory that resurfaces in a subsequent dream sequence, where Isak 
witnesses his wife's adultery. The point, as Birgitta Steene notes, is that, 'In TVild 
Strawberries all time is now, no matter whether we see scenes from Isak's youth, his 
mature years, or his old age.,I5 By foregrounding Isak's appearance as an old man in 
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all scenes, Bergman does not allow the viewer to lose sight of the present instant in 
which dream or memory takes place. In this, Wild Strawberries can be seen as a 
precursor to Resnais' films - particularly Hiroshima mon amour and Last Year at 
Marienbad - where memory is never 'relived' but is reconstructed in a concrete 
present moment. 
The second noteworthy feature in this revene, which is also shared with the 
original dream sequence, is that its significance to Isak is defined by its symbolism, or 
more precisely, by the central symbol of the wild strawberries that Sara collects. 
Philip Mosley observes that the wild strawberry has a long history of being used in 
Swedish drama as a symbol for beauty, peace and happiness, but '[t]he symbol has a 
darker side - in ripening only once, briefly, before disappearing, the berry represents 
the fleeting nature of both beauty and happiness.' 16 It is with this sense of loss that the 
strawberries are associated in Isak's reverie. He sees Sara being seduced by his 
brother, and as the two kiss she accidentally overturns the basket that is full of the 
fruit. The reverie is thus imbued with a definite symbolic meaning and purpose in 
Isak's mind, signifying the loss of his youth and first love. At the end of the sequence, 
Isak reaffirms this meaning, revealing in voiceover that he was 'overcome by a 
feeling of emptiness and mournfulness.' 
While the second subjective sequence is motivated by Isak's voluntary return to a 
location from his childhood, deeply ingrained in his memory, the third (another dream 
sequence) operates according to a very different - though equally familiar and 
convincing - logic. This sequence is again set at the summer house, but the tone has 
changed: the sky has darkened and gulls and jackdaws flock menacingly above the 
water. The sequence is also much more fragmented, with the normal unities of time 
and space giving way to the familiar logic of a dream: locations mutate rapidly and a 
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senes of disparate events unfolds. We see Sara cradling a newborn child at the 
waterside (an image that has its root in an earlier conversation, where Isak's elderly 
mother recalls a similar image from her memory). She retreats to the summer house 
and Isak follows her, but when he peers through the window he is confronted by the 
sight of Sara and Sigfrid sitting down for dinner together, a seemingly blissful scene 
from their married life. Isak knocks urgently on the door, which is eventually opened 
by Alman (Gunnar Sjoberg), a minor character with whom Isak has become briefly 
acquainted in the course of his car journey. (Alman and his wife were given a lift by 
Isak after their car overturned, but were quickly left on the roadside because of their 
constant, bitter arguments. It seems as if their feuding relationship reminded Isak of 
his own unhappy marriage, and this is the logical motivation for Alman's 
reappearance in Isak's dream.) Alman leads Isak down a dark corridor to a lecture 
theatre, where Isak is forced to sit a rigorous examination. Alman eventually 
concludes that the celebrated doctor is in fact incompetent, and states that further 
charges have been brought to his attention by Isak' s wife, including accusations of 
callousness, selfishness and ruthlessness. Isak is then led into the garden, where he 
witnesses his wife committing adultery. Afterwards, she states that Isak will forgive 
her transgression with 'false magnanimity'; in her view, 'he doesn't care about 
anything because he's utterly cold.' The dream ends with Isak being told by Alman 
that the punishment for his sins is to be 'the usual': loneliness. 
It is this sequence, more than any other in Wild Strawberries, which seems to 
capture most authentically the structure and logic of dreams. The dream makes use of 
incidental details from Isak' s experiences whilst awake - pieces of conversation, 
recollections, family photographs - and transforms them into a highly meaningful, 
symbolic narrative. The incorporation and transformation of recent real-life events 
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and conversations (the day's residues) has been repeatedly identified as a common 
feature of dream narratives. For example, Freud observes: 
[E]xperience has taught us that almost every dream includes the remains of a 
memory or an allusion to some event (or often to several events) of the day 
before the dream, and, if we follow these connections, we often arrive with one 
blow at the transition from apparently far remote dream-world to the real life 
of the patient. 17 
Similarly, the dream sequence's rapid geographical transformations, whereby Isak 
moves quickly between disparate locations, reflect another well-documented 
property of dreams. VI ada Petrie notes that bizarre spatio-temporal distortions are a 
key feature of dreams, recognized in both Freudian and neurobiological dream 
theories. 18 Finally, the sequence also has a consistent, internal logic that suggests 
Isak's unconscious thought processes in a particularly convincing manner. 19 Images 
relating to Isak's unfulfilled relationship with Sara give way to scenes from her 
apparently happy marriage, which in tum prompt the sequence where Isak is 
interrogated by Alman and forced to witness again his wife's infidelity. In its free 
association of ideas, images, characters, themes and counter themes, this dream 
sequence offers a thoroughly-developed conception of unconscious (or preconscious) 
mental activity, foreshadowing later films such as The Silence and Persona. 
The imagery of the third dream, which develops the symbolism of the previous 
subjective sequences, also seems more authentically 'dreamlike', being subtly rooted 
in the narrative situations in which Isak is involved. During his examination, Isak is 
asked to look through a microscope to identify a bacteria specimen, but confesses that 
he can see nothing at all, which reinforces the symbol of the eyeless dummy in the 
first dream. He is then asked to diagnose a patient, and after a confused glance, 
quickly reports that she is dead. The woman immediately sits up and starts laughing. 
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Again, the symbolism strongly recalls the images of living death in the original dream 
sequence, but here, with the reworking of the metaphor, we are given a much stronger 
indication that Isak is making a diagnosis of his own condition. Significantly, it is 
when Isak awakes from this latter dream that he offers his first, tentative interpretation 
of what his unconscious mind is trying to tell him. 
Psychoanalytic Dream Theory 
The discussion so far has at several points referred to ideas about dreaming and the 
mind derived primarily from Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Throughout Wild 
Strawberries, there is undoubtedly a strong engagement with Freud's theories 
concerning the nature and meaning of dreams. A number of psychoanalytic 
assumptions underpin the narrative: the symbolic value of dream imagery, the 
existence of repressed anxieties and desires which find an outlet in dreaming, and the 
suggestion that unconscious psychic trauma can be alleviated when we become 
consciously aware of it, most commonly by verbalizing our problems or anxieties. 
However, this psychoanalytic foundation does not signify Bergman's total acceptance 
of the description of dreams and the mind laid out in orthodox Freudian theory. A 
brief analysis of the relationship between Freud's dream theory and the depiction of 
Isak's dreams will indicate the extent to which Bergman concurs with psychoanalytic 
assumptions, clarifying his overall conception of the mind. 
For Freud, the dream is first and foremost the satisfaction of a repressed desire: 'In 
every dream an instinctual wish has to be represented as fulfilled. ,20 When we fall 
asleep, he suggests, the usual agency of censorship that represses the instinctual drives 
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is weakened (though not entirely disabled), allowing our unconscIOUS desires to 
surface in our consciousness. However, the emergence of these potentially disturbing 
or disruptive desires poses a constant threat to the rest afforded by sleep. To ensure 
the continuation of sleep, the mind transforms and distorts our latent thoughts into a 
dream narrative, providing an outlet for our desires in the form of a 'harmless 
hallucinatory experience. ,21 The images, sensations and dialogue that constitute the 
dream's narrative are drawn from a disparate selection of memories, some distant, 
many belonging to the previous 'day's residues', and from incidental external stimuli, 
such as noises, that are dimly perceived by the sleeping subject. Processes of 
'condensation' and 'displacement' help to release the dream's latent content in a 
distorted form. The former concentrates and conceals a number of unconscious ideas 
or desires in symbolic imagery, often compressing several thoughts into a single 
image, while the latter dislocates emotional effects from their immediate causes 
within the dream, shifting the dreamer's attention away from the images that have the 
greatest symbolic significance. The rapid shifts in the dreamer's attention, along with 
the use of bizarre imagery drawn from disparate sources, help to explain the spatio-
temporal discontinuity often experienced in dreams, which adds to the impression that 
the dream narrative is incoherent or even incomprehensible. Thus for Freud, 
'Interpreting a dream consists in translating the manifest content. .. into latent dream-
thoughts, in undoing the distortion which the dream-thoughts have had to submit to 
h· f h . ,22 from the censors Ip 0 t e reSIstance. 
Many of the typical attributes of the dream identified by Freud feature 
prominently In Wild Strawberries, suggesting that Bergman accepts the 
psychoanalytic description of the dream's surface characteristics. As already noted, 
Isak's dreams are composed from a mixture of distant memories and recent events, 
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are subject to various spatio-temporal discontinuities, and are rich in densely symbolic 
images that can be directly related to his latent concerns. Several critics have 
emphasized the various ways in which Isak's dreams appear to comply with 
conventional psychoanalytic theory. Hobson, for example, writes that the first dream 
sequence 'conforms absolutely to neo-Freudian ego psychology in its relation to the 
plot of the film', while Steene suggests that as the film progresses, Isak's dreams 
increasingly 'become self-explorations, classical dreams that could be taken right out 
of Freud's Traumdeutung. ,23 However, even if the dream sequences in Wild 
Strawberries adhere strongly to a basic psychoanalytic framework, there is still reason 
to question the extent to which the film supports more specific Freudian suppositions 
pertaining to the nature and meaning of dreams. The clearest point of contention 
concerns Freud's insistence that every dream is a form of wish-fulfilment. Freud 
himself described this basic assumption as the 'most disputed point in the whole 
theory ... The inevitable and ever recurring objection raised by the layman [is] that 
there are nevertheless so many anxiety dreams ... ,24 Freud's response to this 
complaint was to suggest that anxiety arises as a direct consequence of the guilty 
feelings associated with the imminent fulfilment of the dreamer's forbidden desire.25 
In a similar manner, Freud is able to dismiss the suggestion that 'punishment' dreams 
refute the wish-fulfilment hypothesis by again emphasizing the existence of psychical 
divisions in the dreamer, which lead to contradictory desires and impulses: 
Punishment-dreams, too, are fulfilments of wishes, though not of wishes of the 
instinctual impulses but of those of the critical, censoring and punishing 
agency of the mind [the super-ego]. If we have a pure punis~ment-dream 
before us, an easy mental operation will enable us to restore the WIshful dream 
to which the punishment-dream was the correct rejoinder and which, owing to 
this rejoinder, was replaced as the manifest dream. 6 
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Even if we accept Freud's arguments - despite his failure to support his 
conjectures with unequivocal evidence - it is difficult to interpret Isak's anxiety 
dreams as disguised wish-fulfilments. It requires extremely circuitous reasoning to 
conclude that Isak's nightmares - which he describes as 'highly unpleasant' and 
'humiliating' - satisfy hidden desires. The examination sequence, in which Isak is 
charged with professional incompetence, offers a good example of how Bergman's 
conceptualization of the function and meaning of dreaming conflicts with Freudian 
assumptions. Freud has noted that the 'examination dream' is a typical manifestation 
of the anxiety dream, but one that affords a clear explication of how anxiety is 
covertly linked to wish-fulfilment. He suggests that the dreamer invariably 
experiences failure in an examination that he or she has passed in real life: 
It would seem, then, that anxious examination dreams (which, as has been 
confirmed over and over again, appear when the dreamer has some 
responsibility ahead of him the next day and is afraid that it will be a fiasco) 
search for some occasion in the past in which great anxiety has turned out to be 
unjustified and has been contradicted by the event.27 
In Wild Strawberries, this reassuring function is almost exactly reversed. In reality, 
Isak is shortly to be presented with his fiftieth jubilee doctorate in recognition of his 
service to his profession; in the dream, he is deemed incompetent, callous and selfish. 
For Isak, the public affirmation of his success only accentuates his concerns over his 
personal short-comings, which find an outlet in the dream. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that in the screenplay to Wild Strawberries, Isak explicitly expresses doubts 
over the Freudian conception of dreams as wish-fulfilments, while conceding that his 
dreams nevertheless seem to have a symbolic significance. Bergman has Isak 
introduce the sequence containing the examination dream with these words: 
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I record these [images] in the order in which they occurred, without the 
slightest intention of commenting on their possible meaning. I have never been 
particularly enthusiastic about the psychoanalytical theory of dreams as the 
fulfilment of desires in a negative or positive direction. Yet I cannot deny that 
in these dreams there was something like a warning, which bore into my 
consciousness and embedded itself there with relentless determination.28 
While this introduction is modified in the film, so that the direct commentary on 
psychoanalysis is effaced, the content of the dreams continues to support the written 
sentiments. Isak's anxiety dreams function primarily as 'warnings' or encoded 
messages, not as wish-fulfilments. 
There is one further area in which I believe that Bergman's representation of 
Isak's dreams differentiates itself from conventional psychoanalytic theory - with 
regard to its perspective on childhood memory and desire. This is not to say that Wild 
Strawberries overlooks the formative importance of childhood experience on Isak' s 
personality and imagination; childhood memory provides the recurring locale for 
Isak's introspection, and there are several indications that Isak's poor relationship 
with his mother is partially responsible for his inability to form close adult 
relationships. However, it would be wrong to suggest that childhood desires and 
preoccupations have the same meaning or level of significance for Bergman as they 
do in Freudian theory. For Freud, frustrated childhood desire is the primary (and 
overwhelmingly predominant) cause for the dreams experienced in adulthood, and he 
is adamant on this point: 'Our theory of dreams regards wishes originating in infancy 
as the indispensable motive force for the formation of dreams. ,29 In contrast, Bergman 
identifies various significant moments in adulthood that have equally shaped Isak's 
personality and imagination, and consequently determine the desires and 
preoccupations expressed in his dreams. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe 
that Bergman attaches any particular importance to infancy - as opposed to later 
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phases of childhood or even adolescence - in tenns of how the adult imagination 
develops. 
If we are to avoid reductive conclusions concernmg Wild Strawberries' 
representation of thought, it is imperative that we acknowledge the significant areas in 
which Bergman's conceptualization of the dreaming mind differs from Freud's. 
Bergman certainly integrates specific aspects of psychoanalytic theory into his 
depiction of dreaming and character psychology, but this does not amount to an 
indiscriminate acceptance of all of Freud's assumptions. Analyses of Wild 
Strawberries that are overly reliant on psychoanalytic suppositions invariably 
misconstrue or distort the film's representation of Isak's psyche. The problems 
associated with any attempt to apply an orthodox Freudian framework to Bergman's 
representation of the mind are exemplified in Jacob Zelinger's exploration of the 
'faceless man' symbol in Isak's initial nightmare. Having established that it is 
difficult to locate any 'specific associations from the text or elsewhere' that might 
illuminate the meaning of this motif, Zelinger suggests: 'It is at least possible to 
conjecture from what is known of the whole film that this faceless man is a symbol 
for Borg's father. It is well-known that parents are often disguised in dreams. ,30 This 
leads Zelinger into a series of further speculations concerning the possibility that Isak 
harbours an unconscious aggression towards his father, and that the dream image of 
the faceless figure collapsing in a pool of blood, therefore, fulfils the repressed 
infantile wish to commit patricide.3 ! However, this level of speculation is frequently 
promoted by the basic methodology and premises of psychoanalysis, which suggest 
that the dreaming subject will often retreat from the 'true' implication of his thoughts. 
Freud writes, 
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an association often comes to a stop precisely before the genuine dream-
thought: it has only come near to it and has only had contact with it through 
allusions. At that point, we intervene on our own; we fill in the hints, draw 
undeniable conclusions, and give explicit utterance to what the patient has only 
touched upon in his associations. This sounds as though we allowed our 
ingenuity and caprice to play with the material put at our disposal by the 
dreamer and as though we misused it in order to interpret into his utterances 
what cannot be interpreted from them ... But you have only to carry out a 
dream-analysis yourselves or read a good account of one in our literature and 
you will be convinced of the cogent manner in which interpretative work like 
this proceeds.32 
Essentially, Freud's methodology ensures that interpretative power lies with the 
analyst, and therefore archetypal psychoanalytic conclusions can always be upheld 
despite any protestations from the analysand.33 This suggests a final point of 
contention between Bergman's depiction of thought and the theoretical model of the 
mind constructed by Freud. Despite his acceptance that repressed thoughts, anxieties 
and desires may be hidden in dream imagery, Bergman places faith in the dreamer's 
capacity to discover these ideas or emotions and interpret their deepest meanings 
reliably. 
Nevertheless, while there is a marked difference between Freud and Bergman in 
terms of what each regards as constituting a dream's ultimate meaning, there is still 
some common ground pertaining to the subject's ability to resolve intellectual and 
emotional problems encountered in the day through thought processes operating in the 
dream. Freud acknowledges: 'Reports of numerous cases ... seem to put it beyond 
dispute that dreams can carry on the intellectual work of daytime and bring it to 
conclusions which had not been reached during the day, and that they can resolve 
doubts and problems and be the source of inspiration ... ,34 
In Wild Strawberries, Bergman certainly suggests that dreaming provides the 
means for Isak to understand and resolve his unconscious problems. When he awakes 
from his second dream (in the car), Isak begins to articulate his anxieties, and this 
85 
marks a turning point in the narrative. With his conscious recognition of the latent 
meaning of his dreams, Isak is able to engage emotionally with Marianne, and the 
film moves quickly towards a resolution in which he also begins to rebuild his 
relationship with his son. Wild Strawberries ends with a final, fleeting dream 
sequence in which Isak returns to the idyllic setting of his childhood, having 
apparently found some inner peace. 
Through the progression of Isak's subjective experiences, Bergman suggests that 
introspection is a powerful means for achieving some form of solace or salvation from 
mental anguish. This affirmation can be seen as the beginning of a new strain of 
thought in Bergman's work. While Bergman would continue to be greatly concerned 
by questions of religion and theology (at least until he had finished Winter Light 
[1962]), the ideas that are developed in Wild Strawberries augur a new phase in his 
cinema. Mosley points to the new strain of thought that Wild Strawberries suggests by 
comparing it to The Seventh Seal, which was released earlier in the same year: 
The problems in Wild Strawberries are as great as in The Seventh Seal but 
more personal and psychological; the question of God's presence or absence, 
so crucial to the denouement of The Seventh Seal, gives way to a vaguer notion 
of order, that personal salvation and peace of mind depend upon simple 
manifestations of human love and understanding rather than on divine or 
I . . 35 supernatura InterventIOn. 
The key difference between the two films is that in The Seventh Seal the characters 
are constantly looking outward for answers (as, perhaps, is the director), appealing to 
an exterior authority to assuage their deepest anxieties. In Wild Strawberries, the 
psychological problems that Isak faces are resolved by looking inward. Bergman 
creates a cinema of introspection, making thought itself the new object of the 
camera's gaze. Faith in God has been replaced by faith in the power of the human 
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mind to understand its own workings and create its own meanings, and it is this faith 
that will dominate Bergman's future cinema. 
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Sensation and the Intellect in Bergman's Chamber Films 
Citing several contemporary newspaper reVIews, Laura Hubner notes: 'Wild 
Strawberries was viewed by many as confusing and opaque at the time of its initial 
showing outside Sweden in 1958'.1 In the New York Times, Bosley Crowther 
described the film as being 'so thoroughly mystifying that we wonder whether Mr 
Bergman himself knows what he was trying to say. ,2 Hubner argues that in terms of 
the symbolism and meaning of Wild Strawberries' dream sequences, there is little that 
should have proved overly challenging to a contemporary audience; many of the ideas 
and symbols used, she points out, are 'drawn from filmic [expressionistic and 
surrealist] and psychoanalytic conventions, which would have been fairly familiar at 
the time, if not so easily identifiable as in retrospect.,3 This leads Hubner to suggest 
that 'It was not so much the content of the dreams ... that was causing many of the 
confusions but the way that dreams, dreamlike scenes and memories were depicted 
alongside everyday life.,4 What was perhaps most innovative in Wild Strawberries, 
therefore, was the narrative structure (the way in which reality and dreams intertwined 
throughout the film) and the style in which psychic phenomena were depicted. Critics 
who praised the film isolated these elements as being the source of its originality and 
artistic accomplishment. Jympson Harman described Wild Strawberries as 'A New 
Kind of Film', while in the Glasgow Herald, the film was commended for its 
'flawless' structure, the length of screen time allotted to rendering Isak's dream 
world, and the sophistication with which the dreams were realized, in contrast to the 
'silly' manner in which dream sequences are usually depicted on screen.5 
However, while it is true that Wild Stralvberries discards many of the 
conventional, and often arbitrary, methods for depicting dreams or other subjectin~ 
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sequences - such as soft-focus photography, superimposition or other yisual 
distortions that mark the image as unreal - it is important to note that these sequences 
are still cued in a very clear manner. Each sequence is introduced by a shot of Isak 
falling asleep, a dissolve, and a voiceover commentary, all of which inform us of the 
transition to the dream sequence in a very obvious and conventional way.6 There is an 
intricate, interlocking relationship between Isak's real-life experiences and his dreams 
- whereby each facet illuminates the other - but there is never any ambiguity with 
regard to what is real and what is imagined. It is for this reason that Philip and Kersti 
French - who also draw attention to the widespread contemporary conception of Wild 
Strawberries as 'a difficult and demanding picture' - assert that, 'We do not, however, 
find it obscure or unduly problematic, as are a good many Bergman films of the 
following two decades.,7 What is crucial in this analysis is the retrospective 
contextualization of Wild Strawberries within Bergman's wider oeuvre. If today it is 
difficult to appreciate the contemporary response to Wild Strawberries' representation 
of mental phenomena, this is largely owing to the substantial transformations that 
occurred in Bergman's subsequent cinema (and in European art cinema in general). 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Bergman's cinema underwent a rapid evolution. 
The director adopted an increasingly minimalist style which he described as 'chamber 
cinema', in reference to August Strindberg's conception of 'the chamber play'. Peter 
Cowie cites the description of the key features of chamber drama supplied by Martin 
Lamm (whose lectures Bergman had attended): 'A compact and simple structure, a 
small cast of characters, an action limited almost entirely to the moment of 
catastrophe, intensified pathos, and the universal sense of the tragic. ,1\ In Bergman, the 
development of this highly refined style of narrative is coupled with a still greater 
focus on the psychological conflicts of the central characters. Marsha Kinder suggests 
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that, 'Starting with Through a Glass Darkly, Bergman's later films begin to become 
more dreamlike', but, in contrast to Wild Strawberries, 'the line between reality and 
dream tends to dissolve.,9 In addition, Kinder accurately notes that these 'later dream 
films' have several essential characteristics that mark them as belonging to a new 
phase in Bergman's cinema (some of which partially overlap with the features of 
chamber drama described above): 
they tend to reduce the earlier, more diffuse and conventional plots to primary 
configurations; there are fewer characters; the tone is consistently dark and 
ominous; the psychic intensity is unrelieved by comic subplots; the structure 
moves inward toward a greater psychological penetration; situations are 
primordial, involving incest, madness, vampirism and death. 10 
Thus Bergman's later films become more generally oneiric or psychological in terms 
of tone, themes and structure, while at the same time there is no longer a clear 
differentiation between what is real and what is imagined. For Bergman, this shift 
engendered a crucial reconfiguration of the conditions of spectatorship and 
identification: 'You stop watching from the outside and become part of the madness 
inside. ,11 Our unsettled position as viewer, therefore, parallels the psychological 
trauma, confusion or madness within the narrative, strengthening our identification 
with the characters and affording a powerful insight into their minds. However, before 
exploring these minds in more detail, it is necessary to take a step back and consider 
the additional reasons for the evolution of Bergman's chamber cinema. In order to 
understand the full significance of the transformations in Bergman's cinematic 
representation of thought, it is necessary that these transformations be contextualized 
in relation to both the internal development of Bergman's own philosophy and wider 
currents in European art cinema in the late 1950s. 
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To begin with the latter point, Bergman's films of the early 1960s have to be 
contextualized as belonging to a period of increased experimentation in European 
cinema. The emergence of the French New Wave and the evolution of Italian art 
cinema through the mature works of directors such as Fellini and Antonioni are 
particularly pertinent to Bergman's development in terms of their experimentation 
with subjective narratives. There are obvious parallels between Fellini's films -
especially 8lh (1963) and Giulietta degli spiriti (Juliet of the Spirits, 1965) - and 
Bergman's psychological films of the early 1960s, all of which undermine the 
distinction between objective and subjective occurrences, making the ontological 
status of certain narrative events ambiguous. In Antonioni' s trilogy, consisting of 
L 'Avventura (1960), La Notte (1961) and L 'Eclisse (1962), and in his subsequent 
film, Il Deserto rosso (1964), there are many concerns that resonate with Bergman: 
the focus on the 'subjective time' in which events unfold, the weakening of 
conventional narrative causality, the projection of internal, emotional states on to the 
external landscape, and the close emphasis on the psychological or spiritual crises 
besetting the protagonists (with a particular prominence afforded to female 
protagonists). Similarly, the work of Alain Resnais in France during this period is 
crucial in terms of how it expands the possibilities of subjective cinematic narratives. 
Both Hiroshima mon amour and Last Year at Marienbad follow the type of narrative 
path laid out by Bergman in Wild Strawberries, representing the protagonists' 
subjective experiences or recollections as they unfold in the present. Yet, in tum, 
Bergman's later films, such as The Silence and Persona, bear a clear debt to Resnais' 
cinema - particularly in terms of their psychological and narrative ambiguities. In 
summary, we can highlight the following as features of Bergman's chamber cinema 
which are closely linked to the subjective aesthetics being developed in the European 
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art CInema III the late 1950s and early 1960s: a reduction of dialogue (and, 
concomitantly, less emphasis on speech as explication of plot); fewer dramatic 
'events' and a weakening of the causal connections between actions; a fragmentation 
of classical narrative space and time, which is reconfigured as an expression of 
subjective perceptions; a blurring of the distinction between events that are 'real' and 
those that are dreamt, remembered or imagined; and a closer focus on female 
protagonists and female subjectivity. 
However, it is equally vital that we consider these changes in relation to the 
logical, internal evolution of Bergman's cinema. Specifically, it is the gradual 
transformation in Bergman's attitude towards religious questions that motivates the 
formal and thematic shift in his cinema. As indicated previously, this transformation 
is manifested in the differences between The Seventh Seal and Wild Strawberries. 
While both display a sceptical agnosticism, the latter begins to suggest a more 
humanistic strand in Bergman's philosophical outlook, with Isak looking inward for 
his 'salvation'. In Through a Glass Darkly, God's silence again becomes an explicit 
narrative concern, and one that is intrinsically linked to our subjective perception of 
the world around us. The Biblical passage from which the title is taken, which appears 
in St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, affirms the notion that our perception of the 
world is like a dim reflection of reality; only through God is full knowledge of the 
world possible: 'For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now I 
know in part; but then shall I know even as I am known.' 12 However, in Through a 
Glass Darkly, Bergman actually begins to suggest something very different. In the 
film, God only appears to Karin (Harriet Andersson), who is suffering from 
schizophrenic hallucinations, implying that the presence of God does not clarify our 
perceptions, but instead is a fundamental part of our delusions. Yet, at this time, 
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Bergman was still unwilling to reject the idea of God - despite his growing doubts -
and included an epilogue in which a new conception of human love as 'proof of 
God's existence is advocated. Subsequently, Bergman wrote: 
Through a Glass Darkly was a desperate attempt to present a simple 
philosophy: God is love and love is God. A person surrounded by love is also 
surrounded by God ... 
So here we started with a falsehood, largely unconscious, but a falsehood 
nevertheless. 13 
With hindsight, Bergman recognized a disingenuous aspect to Through a Glass 
Darkly, which he described as a 'false tone' running throughout the film.14 Again, 
there is a growing humanism (or even existentialism) at the core of the film, but this is 
masked by the reassertion of the need for a theistic framework in which meaning and 
value is to be understood. 
Bergman's next film, Winter Light (1962), marks an important turning point in his 
cinema. The film concerns the spiritual crisis experienced by Pastor Tomas Ericsson. 
(Gunnar Bj6rnstrand). Tomas' faith in God has been shaken following his wife's 
death from cancer. In the course of an afternoon following the Sunday service, Tomas 
is confronted by a suicidal parishioner, Jonas (Max von Sydow), seeking guidance. 
For Jonas, life appears utterly futile, and Man's capacity for hate and destruction is a 
constant source of anxiety (he is obsessed by the thought of an imminent nuclear 
apocalypse). Tomas responds to these fears by saying, 'We must trust God', but his 
words are entirely hollow, with his voice and countenance betraying his lack of 
conviction. In truth, Jonas' anxieties mirror Tomas' deep-seated doubts. Unable to 
comfort Jonas, Tomas later articulates his own lack of faith to his parishioner: 'Death 
is just a snuffing out, a disintegration of body and soul. There is no creator. no 
sustainer.' With these words, Tomas unwittingly endorses Jonas' suicide plans, and 
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shortly afterwards, he learns that Jonas has shot himself. This tum of events seems 
inevitable to the viewer, but it is a shock to Tomas, who has been entirely fixated on 
his own problems. If there is an implicit criticism of Tomas' character in the film, this 
is not directed at his lack of faith, but at his inability to show real empathy or 
compassion to Jonas. 
Winter Light is uncompromisingly bleak, yet Bergman regarded it as one of his 
finest achievements, and as the ultimate articulation of his own spiritual crisis. IS 
Certainly, the film marks a decisive shift in Bergman's philosophical outlook, and the 
importance of this to the development of his later cinema should not be overlooked. 
After Winter Light, Bergman's films are atheistic; the protracted interrogation of 
God's existence or nature has been effaced as a direct thematic concern, and God is 
only significant as a conspicuous absence - that is, as the eponymous silence that 
heralds a new era in Bergman's cinema. Needless to say, the atheistic position that 
underpins this new phase of Bergman's cinema has a number of far-reaching 
consequences in terms of how (and why) subjective thought is represented. 
Firstly, the absence of God implies the loss of any transcendental meaning or 
value system that can illuminate human existence. For Bergman, acceptance of this 
position necessitates a re-examination of how human beings create their own values 
and meanings within a social context. In The Silence, this inevitably leads to a greater 
focus on subjective experience, along with a closer exploration of fundamental 
aspects of human emotion and behaviour - things such as love, hate, aggression and 
sexuality. In addition, the loss of faith in the explanatory power of religion can be 
closely related to Bergman's increased willingness to depict psychological ambiguity 
or uncertainty. In Bergman's atheistic cinema, character motivations are frequently 
obscure, and, more often than not, thoughts and emotions are depicted as ambiguous 
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or ambivalent. One of the major faults that Bergman identified retrospectively in 
Through a Glass Darkly was his 'need to be didactic', which led to the film's resolute 
but disingenuous conclusion. I6 In contrast, his later films are more concerned with 
asking questions and challenging assumptions. 
Part of the motivation for Bergman's desire to represent thought non-linguistically 
can also be traced to his rejection of religion. There is a clear, historical link between 
religious authority and the illuminating power of language, crystallized in the 
centrality of written doctrine in the major religions. Written doctrine purports to be an 
authoritative - and objective - account of the world, containing incontestable truths, 
meanings and values. For Bergman, the son of a pastor, the connection between 
authoritative language and religion must have been particularly resonant. In his 
biography of Bergman, Peter Cowie observes: 'All three Bergman children were 
made to go to church on Sunday to hear their father preach. Religion was "something 
to get hold of, something substantiaL'" 17 Bergman's rejection of religion is, therefore, 
a very literal rejection of patriarchal discourse. As further evidence for this, it is 
important to note that the spiritual conflict portrayed in Winter Light is also rendered 
as a symbolic struggle between father and son. Ingmar Bergman's father was named 
Erik; in Winter Light, the protagonist is Pastor Ericsson, suggesting that this character 
merges the figures of Bergman and his father, reconfiguring the inner conflict as an 
imaginary battle between father and son. This symbolic conflict is strengthened when, 
following his failure to comfort Jonas, Tomas quotes Christ's words on the Cross, 
echoing his appeal to the intransigent, silent Father: 'God, why hast Thou forsaken 
me?' On several levels, Tomas' inner struggle is envisaged as the conflict between the 
son who questions and the intractable father who demands obedience and faith.I8 
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Finally, the centrality of female protagonists and female subjectivity to Bergman's 
representation of non-linguistic thought is also explicable in terms of his rejection of 
religion - insofar as this is a rejection of patriarchal language and authority. In The 
Silence, Persona and Cries and Whispers, Bergman focuses almost exclusively on 
female subjective experience. This is not to suggest that Bergman tacitly reinforces a 
series of reductive binary oppositions, contrasting supposedly 'male' traits of 
objectivity and rationality with female subjectivity and irrationality. Instead, he seeks 
to emphasize the relationship between individual thought and the dominant 
ideological framework that produces normative beliefs and values. Since this 
framework has historically been defined by patriarchal society, female subjective 
expenence provides an obvious position from which to question the dominant 
viewpoint. 
It should be clear that the aesthetic developments In Bergman's depiction of 
cinematic thought are closely related to the changing ideas, beliefs and attitudes 
represented in that thought. Therefore, through a close formal analysis of The Silence, 
Persona and Cries and Whispers - which I regard as Bergman's most significant 
films in terms of how thought is represented - I shall also be exploring the way in 
which important psychological themes of identity, sexuality, gender and performance 
are conceptualized. This analysis will build upon the previous discussion of 
subjectivity in Wild Strawberries, with a similar focus on the non-linguistic, 
predominantly visual means by which thought is rendered cinematically. I believe that 
the techniques Bergman uses to represent thought cinematically can be explored 
fruitfully by dividing them into two broad categories: those that relate to the 
manipulation of narrative space (editing, composition. camera movement), and those 
that relate to the manipulation of narrative time (narrative structuration - flashbacks, 
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plotting, continuity and discontinuity - and, again, editing). Inevitably, there is some 
overlap across the two categories, but by isolating and cataloguing the techniques by 
which Bergman depicts thought, I hope to show how his formal representation of 
subjective experience develops across a series of films, and how specific stylistic 
features relate to certain thematic concerns. 
The Silence: Expressionistic Space 
In terms of its plot, The Silence is very simple. Two sisters named Ester (Ingrid 
Thulin) and Anna (Gunnel Linbolm), and Anna's young son, lohan (Jorgen 
Lindstrom), are travelling by train through an unidentified foreign country. In the 
course of the journey, Ester becomes seriously ill, and the group has to disembark in 
an occupied city. While Ester convalesces in a large hotel suite, Anna explores the 
city, and lohan is left to wander through the hotel's labyrinthine corridors. Anna has a 
series of sexual liaisons with a barman whom she meets in a cafe. This leads to a 
bitter argument with her sister, who is very disapproving of Anna's actions (it is 
implied that the sisters may have had an incestuous relationship in the past). Anna 
rejects Ester's attempts to control her behaviour, and subsequently Ester's condition 
deteriorates rapidly. Later, we see Ester bedridden and seemingly close to death. 
Dispassionately, Anna tells Ester that she and lohan will be departing, and the film 
ends with the mother and son resuming their train journey. 
As well as being deliberately economical in tenns of its plot, The Silence is very 
sparse in dialogue. This lack of speech reflects one of the film's central thematic 
concerns: the breakdown of communication. On an immediate level, normal verbal 
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processes are impaired through the placement of the characters in a foreign city with 
an unknown language. This immediately focuses our attention on the alternative, non-
verbal forms of communication by which the characters express their thoughts and 
feelings. Gestures, mimes, facial expressions, body language, the showing of 
photographs, and even puppeteering become crucial in terms of how ideas and 
emotions are conveyed, both among the characters and (indirectly) to the viewer. This 
emphasis on the importance of non-verbal communication is carried through to 
Bergman's later work. In Persona, we are again confronted with a situation in which 
spoken dialogue is problematized. The film centres on the relationship between 
Elisabet (Liv Ullmann), an actress who suddenly and inexplicably stops speaking, and 
Alma (Bibi Andersson), her nurse and companion. Similarly, in Cries and Whispers 
problems of verbal communication are highlighted, as implied by the title. This film 
concerns the relationship between three sisters, Karin (Ingrid Thulin), Maria (Liv 
Ullmann) and Agnes (Harriet Andersson), and their maid, Anna (Kari Sylwan). Agnes 
is dying from a terminal illness, and Karin and Maria have returned to their childhood 
home to nurse and comfort their sister through her final days. Despite the situation, 
Karin and Maria remain distant from each other and from Agnes, finding it almost 
impossible to engage in meaningful conversation or recapture the intimacy of 
childhood. Yet, as with The Silence, the complexity of the characters' fraught 
relationships is conveyed largely without expositional dialogue, through non-verbal 
exchanges and interactions. For Bergman, the restriction of verbal processes on an 
immediate diegetic level helps to refocus our attention on the 'sensuous' aspects of 
thought and cinematic communication. 
With limited verbal exposition, the manipulation of space becomes essential III 
offering us a clear insight into the characters' relationships and minds. In The Silence, 
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space is not clearly delineated according to the conventions of classical realism. The 
characters do not occupy a preordained dramatic space in which the action unfolds 
objectively. Instead, spatial configurations are frequently expressionistic, conveying, 
or even projecting, subjective judgements and evaluations. The film's opening shot is 
exemplary in tenus of how space is configured in relation to the three central 
characters. The shot lasts approximately two minutes, during which time the camera 
moves back and forth among the three protagonists. Initially, a tight close-up reveals 
lohan with his eyes closed. The camera then pans right before halting once more, 
framing Anna in a medium close-up as she lazily fans herself. After this brief pause, 
the camera pans again, revealing Ester in medium shot. Subsequently, lohan awakes, 
rubs his eyes, and the camera follows him as he paces restlessly around the train 
carriage. During the course of this shot, we are gradually able to discern details about 
the immediate environment in which the action is unfolding. There is no initial 
establishment of space and setting; the opening close-up is deliberately disorientating. 
Our experience in this scene is similar to lohan's: it is almost as if we 'awake' into 
this unfamiliar setting. Yet, at the same time, by framing each character in tum, the 
opening shot helps to establish three distinct subjects with whom we are invited to 
identify. The initial camera movement prefigures later shifts in identification and 
perspective, as the narrative point of view consistently switches among the three main 
characters. In addition, the rendering of space helps to convey a number of subjective 
evaluations of the situation and environment, which are rooted in the characters' 
immediate perceptions. The initial, visual isolation of each character in the frame 
reflects the emotional or spiritual isolation that defines these characters and their 
interactions throughout the film. In contrast to this, the way in which the overall space 
is represented also gives a sense of the tension arising from the characters' physical 
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confinement and proximity to each other. A powerful impression of claustrophobia is 
created through the closeness of the actors to the camera, 1 ohan' s pacing around the 
small carriage, and the high contrast photography which seems to compress the depth 
of field. The dramatic space is constructed in relation to how the characters perceive 
and react to their surroundings. Consequently, it is possible for us to grasp intuitively 
aspects of the characters' attitudes and emotions before these have been formulated as 
intellectual abstractions. 
The expressive use of space developed in this opemng sequence continues 
throughout the film. Frequently, spatial organization or composition offers a specific 
insight into a character's mind, imbuing the ostensibly objective image with a 
subjective meaning. A strong example of this occurs in the hotel suite when Ester 
overhears Anna and lohan discussing their possible departure. lohan asks his mother 
if Ester will be leaving with them that night, and she replies that she does not know. 
During this exchange, Ester is positioned in the foreground of the image, in profile, 
while Anna and lohan occupy a separate room in the background and are framed by 
the doorway. There is a cut to a tight two-shot of Anna and lohan hugging, followed 
by a cut back to Ester, who now wears a slightly pained expression. Shortly 
afterwards, Ester moves further into the foreground, now facing the camera, while 
Anna and lohan continue to be framed together in the background. The composition 
forces our attention to alternate between the pained expression we see on Ester's face 
and the brightly illuminated figures of mother and son sharing the background, 
synthesizing the two images as an instant visual realisation of Ester's mental distress. 
This powerful, wordless intimation of how Ester perceives her isolation and exclusion 
acts as a stark counterpoint to the verbal fac;ade she creates, calmly telling Anna and 
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lohan that they should leave that night. Again, Bergman suggests the way in which 
film can expose aspects of thought that language masks. 
In this instance, the way in which the characters occupy the fragmented dramatic 
space offers a clear insight into the specific mental dimensions of the image, but often 
there is a more general expressivity in the rendering of space. Repeatedly, the 
characters' immediate surroundings are depicted as being confusing or overwhelming. 
The hotel corridors and chambers in which lohan plays are represented as being vast 
and mazelike. The hotel suite itself, with its array of separate rooms, doorways, 
windows and mirrors (frames within the frame), is a disorientating space; on several 
occasions it is not easy to make sense of the space or situate the characters in relation 
to each other. Added to this, on a structural level the film dislocates the different 
environments in which the action occurs. A shot of Anna and lohan on the train is 
followed by a high-angle shot of an unidentified street, with no attempt to create a 
smooth transition between the two. 
In many ways, this extensive use of expressive space and visual discontinuity can 
be compared to the organization of space in the dream sequences in Wild 
Strawberries. As in the earlier film, the use of fragmentation and discontinuity helps 
to create a dreamlike atmosphere in which the usual unities of time and space are 
disrupted. The critical difference, of course, is that in The Silence there is no clear 
demarcation of individual subjective sequences. The film is expressionistic 
throughout, interweaving objective representation and subjective impressions. Sven 
Nykvist, Bergman's cinematographer, reported that when planning The Silence 
Bergman had insisted that 'There must not be any of the old, hackneyed dream effects 
such as visions in soft focus or dissolves. The film itself must have the character of a 
dream.,19 In The Silence, Bergman purposefully refuses any obvious cues that 
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differentiate sUbjective and objective representation. This can be related to his 
description of the viewing process in Through a Glass Darkly, where we 'stop 
watching from the outside and become part of the madness inside.' Our position as 
spectators is similar to that of the characters: we are thrown into an unfamiliar, 
dreamlike environment and confronted with a series of bizarre situations that defies 
easy interpretation. Despite the fidelity with which Wild Strawberries represents the 
dreaming process, there is always a certain critical distance between the viewer and 
the dream material. Our awareness that a dream is being represented inevitably 
colours our attitude to the action depicted, so that we are ready to interpret events 
symbolically, and restore a rational premise to illogical occurrences. Yet, as several 
commentators have observed, when we dream, our unquestioning acceptance of the 
dream events as 'real' is intrinsic to the experience; the dreaming state is 
characterized fundamentally by our inability to discern its subjective status. As Freud 
writes, when we dream 'we appear not to think but to experience; that is to say, we 
attach complete belief to the hallucinations ... ,20 Because The Silence does not overtly 
'represent' a dream, but instead has 'the character of a dream', it can be seen as an 
attempt to replicate dreaming on an experiential rather than conceptual level. Once 
more, the distinction that Bergman draws between sensuous and intellectualized 
modes of thinking is important. In The Silence, there is a strong emphasis on the 
immediacy of perceptual and emotional experience. Our critical engagement with the 
film's themes is temporarily suspended. As Bergman writes: 
In this medium, as in music, we go straight to the feelings. Only afterwards can 
we start to work with our intellect. If. .. the suggestions from the filmmaker are 
strong enough, they'll stimulate your thoughts when you leave the screening 
room.
21 
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'An Eye Unprejudiced': The Child's Point of View 
In Metaphors on Vision, experimental filmmaker Stan Brakhage asks us to imagine 
'an eye unprejudiced ... an eye which does not respond to the name of everything but 
which must know everything encountered in life through an adventure of 
perception.,22 For Brakhage, cinema has the potential to defamiliarize everyday 
objects, restoring to us this type of vision in which sights are not yet classified. In so 
doing, it enables 'a pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and founded upon visual 
communication, demanding a development of the optical mind, and dependent upon 
perception in the original and deepest sense of the word. ,23 The parallels between 
Brakhage's theory of the optical mind and Bergman's 'sensuous' communication 
should be evident immediately. Both are based upon the idea of a pre- or non-
linguistic mode of thinking, and both recognize the potential restrictions that the 
intellect imposes upon everyday experience. For Bergman, as for Brakhage, cinematic 
communication is capable of deconstructing the familiar, and so is inherently suited to 
questioning conventional knowledge or ideas. The Silence, in particular, exposes a 
gap between perception and understanding, revealing the essential processes by which 
consciousness 'makes sense' of the world, or retrospectively organizes disparate 
sensations and emotions into conceptual frameworks. Unsurprisingly, the child's 
point of view is of primary importance in reconfiguring our perceptual experience. As 
noted previously, the first shot of the film shows lohan as he awakes, rubs his eyes, 
and begins to explore his environment. He is, in Cowie's words, 'fresh to the world. ,24 
The child provides the 'eye unprejudiced' through which everyday objects, ideas and 
assumptions are scrutinized afresh. 
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The clearest example of how The Silence defamiliarizes the everyday through the 
child's point of view occurs very early in the film, when lohan stands at the train 
window and watches a long progression of tanks stream past. The window becomes a 
screen through which the events perceived lose both their sense of reality and their 
sense of connection to the perceiver. We see a series of shots and reverse-shots, which 
alternate between the rapt expression on lohan's face and a seemingly endless line of 
tanks flying across the screen. As lohan becomes more deeply engrossed in the 
spectacle, shots of the window taken from behind the child's back are replaced with 
direct optical point of view shots, so that the window fills the frame. As this transition 
occurs, the sense of 'unreality' is accentuated. The tanks seem increasingly artificial 
and two-dimensional: they have the appearance of models or toys. The objects 
perceived appear to have been distorted by the perceiver's imagination. Thus as the 
sequence progresses, we are forced into an ever-closer identification with the child's 
perspective, and as this happens the act of subjective perception itself becomes the 
focus of our attention. 
Although this sequence delineates lohan' s point of view in a conventional manner 
(the glance towards the out-of-field object followed by a shot revealing the object 
being observed), it is important to recognize the unusual way in which The Silence 
utilizes point-of-view shots. 25 The point-of-view shot is always subjective, in that it 
represents what a particular character sees, but in its classical incarnation this implicit 
sUbjectivity rarely conflicts with the autonomy of the object represented. The shot is 
used to convey important narrative information, and to orientate us in a well-defined 
narrative space. The primary focus is on what the character sees, not on questions of 
how the appearance of the object relates to subjective perception. As lulio Moreno 
observes, the point-of-view shot is most frequently used 'as an adjunct of continuity, 
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helping to string the narrative together. This was the first form in which the usage 
appeared, and its earliest manifestations date from the very beginnings of motion 
pictures.,26 In contrast, lohan's point of view is used not to convey unambiguous 
narrative information or to reinforce continuity. Instead, it arrests the flow of 
narrative, drawing attention to an act of perception that fails to confer a clear meaning 
on the objects perceived. Essentially, this point of view represents an inability to 
make sense of the external environment, imparting to the viewer a sense of 
estrangement from the world. 
Stuart Kaminsky observes that Bergman frequently uses child characters to 
interrogate (and problematize) the world of adult knowledge: 
Bergman's children are constantly reaching out to touch and communicate 
with an adult world which they cannot understand. If the child does make 
contact, either by his own experience or a shared experience, his protective 
innocence is tom away and he must face the insight which he has only vaguely 
sensed. He must face the realisation that God does not exist or does not 
communicate, that terrible things are possible because man is unprotected, that 
death exists as a frightening and real end.27 
Kaminsky's ideas are particularly applicable to the scene in which lohan views the 
tanks through the train window. Here the figurative concept of 'reaching out' to the 
adult world is enacted physically when lohan places his palm against the windowpane 
(a gesture that is directly echoed in Persona when the same actor touches a screen 
depicting the unstable, constantly shifting close-up of the film's two leading 
actresses). The glass offers the child perceptual access to the adult world whilst 
simultaneously acting as a barrier which prevents him from directly apprehending that 
world. However, it would be wrong to suggest that Bergman draws a radical 
distinction between the child's 'naIve' perception and the comprehensive worldview 
of the adult. Nor does it follow that the child's inability to make sense of the adult 
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world implies a deficiency. The 'insight' of adulthood, as described by Kaminsky, 
centres on the destruction of certainty and absolute meaning, primarily through a loss 
of faith in the overarching explanations of existence offered by religious discourse. In 
this context, the child's incomprehension is, for Bergman, emblematic of the general 
condition of humanity when faced with the 'terrible things' that have proven possible 
in the twentieth century. In 'failing' to attach a conventional meaning to the spectacle 
of innumerable tanks passing the train, lohan's perspective - the 'eye unprejudiced'-
instead alerts us to the fundamental irrationality or incomprehensibility that seems to 
underpin the modem experience of mechanized warfare. 
Persona: The Subjective Response to the Documentary Image 
In The Silence, lohan's point of view is used to defamiliarize the environment for the 
viewer. Our optical identification with the child provokes us to re-evaluate the world 
from a different (and novel) perspective, and thus to perceive more deeply. For lohan, 
the external world is not yet replete with meanings that are 'given' or taken for 
granted. His mind is constantly interrogating, analyzing and attempting to interpret. 
Similarly, the viewer, whose perspective is aligned with lohan's, is prompted to an act 
of reconceptualization. It is here that we can see exactly why cinematic 
communication represents an ideal for Bergman. The manipulation of space gives us a 
very direct apprehension of lohan's imaginative engagement with the world, 
replicating the conditions by which his mind struggles to interpret the disordered 
impressions of its environment. This expresses a type of purely visual thought. We 
can, of course, attempt to translate the meaning of the scene into abstract linguistic 
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terms - working with our intellect once we have left the screening room. But for 
Bergman, the primary operation of cinema is to communicate sensuously, to construct 
and convey ideas in a non-verbal form. 
Because of its capacity to evoke a direct identification with a character's sensory 
or emotional experience, cinema is especially adept at expressing traumatic, confusing 
or ambivalent psychological states that cannot easily be conveyed or understood in 
words. In Persona, there are two scenes that are reliant on this ability to represent the 
mind's primordial, non-intellectual response to sudden trauma. Elisabet encounters 
two images of twentieth century violence which provoke a powerful emotional 
response. The first encounter occurs towards the beginning of the film, while Elisabet 
is still confined to her hospital room. Whilst watching television, Elisabet is suddenly 
confronted with a newscast showing the image of a Vietnamese monk's self-
immolation. In the second half of the film, while she is convalescing in the beach 
house, Elisabet opens a book and discovers the famous photograph of a group of Jews 
being cleared out of the Warsaw Ghetto by Nazi soldiers. Each scene is particularly 
illuminating, both in terms of the specific insight we are given into Elisabet's mind 
and in terms of Bergman's broader approach to depicting mental processes. 
Therefore, I shall analyze each in some detail, beginning with the latter. 
After Elisabet discovers the Warsaw Ghetto photograph, there is a shot/ reverse-
shot depiction of her carefully regarding the image. At first the photograph is shown 
from a distance, with its outer edges clearly visible on the table, approximating 
Elisabet's optical point of view. Subsequently, after another shot of Elisabet's face, 
the photo is reframed so that a single detail - the young boy with his hands held above 
his head - fills the entire screen. This reframing can be said to enact a movement from 
optical point of view to 'psychological' (or mental) point of view: the image on screen 
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no longer depicts what Elisabet sees, but represents her thought processes, showing 
how her attention shifts as she examines the picture in front of her. The photograph is 
fragmented and reassembled through a series of cuts that successively focus on 
specific details of the image. The boy is framed in a medium-shot then a close-up. 
This is followed by a shot of the Nazi guard holding his gun threateningly. This, in 
tum, is succeeded by a shot isolating the crowd of Jews in the left of the image, where 
they appear to have been herded together like cattle. This editing clearly indicates the 
attempt of the observer to reconstruct a narrative from the image, to imbue the static 
present moment that has been captured with a temporal aspect that would reanimate 
the figures. The meaning of this reconstruction, however, is open to debate. David 
Vierling argues that Elisabet' s 'analytical' reaction to the picture engenders a failure 
to grasp its overall significance: 'Her dissection of the photograph analyzes parts of 
the whole; yet, by seeing them only as parts she fails to experience the overall 
synthesis of the parts - the emotion, the horror of the image. ,28 While I agree that 
there is, in some sense, a failure of the intellect to comprehend the image through its 
dissection and reconstitution, it is wrong to imply that this attempt at analysis is 
antithetical to an emotional response, or, indeed, that Elisabet's response is not 
emotional. 
Vierling's analysis is misleading because it overlooks two key stylistic elements in 
Bergman's depiction of Elisabet' s response. The first is the rhythm of the editing: the 
tempo increases noticeably as the sequence progresses, so that we are progressively 
bombarded with fragments of the image that we have time to perceive but not to 
analyze. The second is the use of the soundtrack, on which we hear a sustained note 
that gradually increases in pitch and volume, becoming intrusive and abrasive. Its 
crescendo is accompanied by a fade to black. Both of these components convey the 
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non-intellectual response to the image. Both, in fact, imply an emotional reaction 
which overwhelms the intellect's attempt to analyze and reconstruct a narrative from 
the image. 
The scene In which Elisabet witnesses the television image of the Buddhist 
monk's self-immolation is constructed along similar lines to the later scene with the 
photograph. Again, we are made to identify with Elisabet as she is suddenly and 
involuntarily confronted with an image of horror. As Elisabet realizes what is being 
depicted on screen, she recoils and backs into the comer of the room, placing as much 
distance as possible between herself and the image. But this physical and mental 
retreat is accompanied by a compulsion to look. Once more, a series of shots and 
reverse-shots is used to represent Elisabet' s psychological point of view as she 
becomes engrossed by the image. We cut back and forth between close-ups of the 
television image and Elisabet's face, each of which fills our screen. Simultaneously, 
the diegetic sound becomes subjective as the noise from the television intensifies. 
These techniques effectively collapse the physical gap between subject and object. In 
Elisabet's close-ups, the light from the television is reflected in her eyes, and her skin 
appears clammy, as if in an empathetic response to the heat depicted on screen. 
Finally, there is a jump cut from the image of the burning monk to a long shot of 
Elisabet breathing anxiously. The television is now switched off, and the break in 
continuity makes it appear that this has happened autonomously: it is as if the image 
has suddenly been cut or blocked out in response to its overwhelming intensity. The 
discontinuity, which Hubner suggests is "'felt" rather than noted intellectually', seems 
to mirror Elisabet's emotional response.29 It is worth comparing this moment to the 
apparent 'breakdown' of the projector later on in the film, which occurs after Elisabet 
steps on a piece of broken glass that Alma has planted in her path. In the latter case, 
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the celluloid appears to catch fire, creating a sudden, almost visceral shock. Once 
more, the occurrence of physical (and psychological) pain is accompanied by a fonnal 
disruption of narrative and continuity. In these instances, the objective representation 
of space, time and action is entirely eliminated, being replaced by an abstract 
representation of subjective emotions and sensations. 
A note that Bergman made whilst working on the screenplay for Persona, and 
which he later published in Images, reveals the line of thought that inspired his 
insertion of documentary images into the film: 
I am unable to grasp the large catastrophes. They leave my heart untouched. At 
most I can read about such atrocities with a kind of greed - a pornography of 
horror. But I shall never rid myself of those images. Images that tum my art into a 
bag of tricks, into something indifferent, meaningless.3o 
Bergman's statement is complex and, in places, almost appears self-contradictory. He 
confesses to being unable to 'grasp' atrocities when he reads about them, but the 
images associated with these horrors seem to be indelibly grafted on his mind. 
Implicitly, these images possess a communicative power that cannot be replicated in 
narrative, whether factual or fictional. Yet the failure of the intellect when confronted 
by the documentary image of horror is something that Persona conveys extremely 
well. Again, for Bergman, cinematic communication is able to express the seemingly 
ineffable aspects of thought that resist verbalization. As Susan Sontag observes: 
Elizabeth watching a newsreel on TV of a bonze in Saigon immolating 
himself, or staring at the famous photograph of a little boy from the Warsaw 
Ghetto being led off to be slaughtered, are, for Bergman, above all, images of 
total violence, of unredeemed cruelty. They occur in Persona as images of 
what cannot be imaginatively encompassed or digested, rather than as 
occasions for right political and moral thoughts. In their function, these images 
don't differ from the earlier flashbacks of a palm into which a nail is being 
b d· . h 31 hammered or of the anonymous 0 les In t e morgue. 
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Sontag is certainly correct to suggest that these images are in some sense indigestible, 
and function primarily on an affective rather intellectual level. However, her analysis 
ignores the question of how the documentary images are qualitatively different to 
other images of violence in the film. The recognition of the documentary images' 
authenticity makes us respond to them in a very different way compared to similar 
violent images. Indeed, Elisabet's response, with which the viewer is invited to 
identify, acknowledges the fundamental difference between these real-life images and 
representations of pain constructed in film or theatre. Her perspective appears to be 
similar to that expressed by Bergman: her art is reduced to 'a bag of tricks' when she 
confronts the inimitable power of photographed reality. Implicitly, Elisabet's 
muteness has been provoked at least in part by her sudden conviction that her life -
both publicly and privately - is constituted by hollow perfonnances (the psychiatrist 
[Margaretha Krook] suggests that Elisabet's silence is provoked by a 'hopeless dream 
of being', the search for an authentic identity that is not defined by social role-
playing). Therefore, while the documentary images are not inserted to inspire political 
thought, as such, they are not devoid of thematic meaning. They have a direct 
thematic significance insofar as they highlight issues of perfonnance and reality as 
these relate to both Elisabet's concept of identity and Persona's wider, self-reflexive 
exploration of different levels of cinematic 'reality' .32 
Shot/ Reverse Shot: Identification and Self-Reflexivity 
Both Persona and The Silence contain important sequences that foreground our 
identification with a character's point of view. This identification is achieved, 
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primarily, through the shot! reverse shot editing that is also used to codify subjectivity 
in classical cinema. However, while Bergman utilizes a 'classical technique' to 
convey subjective impressions, his overall representation of point of view diverges 
from the classical paradigm in a number of ways. A brief consideration of the 
classical deployment of the shot/ reverse shot structure is illuminating, for it reveals 
the way in which Bergman reconfigures classical narrative space in order to make us 
more conscious of character subjectivity, and the processes by which we identify with 
this subjectivity. In Persona, particularly, there is a self-reflexive engagement with 
the illusionism of classical technique, which acts as a touchstone for the contrasting, 
subjective aesthetics of Bergman's cinema. This strong engagement with classicism 
should not come as a surprise. As Birgitta Steene notes, Bergman did not' spring forth 
as a European auteur', but learned his craft within a popular film industry similar to 
Hollywood in terms of its commercial foundation, and which encouraged a close 
adherence to 'the principles of classical sutured cinema.,33 
In many ways, the unity of shot and reverse shot in classical continuity editing 
underpins the apparent autonomy of space and narrative events. Taken on its own, the 
single shot is necessarily selective: it is framed from a specific angle, and depicts a 
limited spatial field that has been temporarily annexed from its surroundings. A sense 
of geographical fullness is only achieved when a second shot, usually depicting the 
reverse field of the first, is introduced to synthesise the offscreen and onscreen space 
as a unified dramatic location. Several theorists have suggested that this movement 
between shot and reverse shot provides the fundamental, objective foundation for 
classical realist cinema. 34 When the reverse shot is appended to the original shot, it 
enacts an effacement of the process of the camera's subjective selection: the 
discriminative framing of one event is subordinated to a dyadic structure that 
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reinforces a logical spatial relationship. Traditionally, this organization of space is 
used to incorporate characters and their subjective perspectives within an overarching 
objective-realist mode of representation. This means that the shot! reverse shot 
structure is predominantly used to alternate between character perspectives in 
dialogue scenes and to codify optical point of view. Spectatorship of classical cinema, 
therefore, becomes a process of many localized subjective identifications within a 
narrative framework that ensures the illusion of an overall objectivity and autonomy 
of events. Furthennore, the viewer is unlikely to be conscious of the ongoing process 
of identification, insofar as the classical cinema does not draw attention to its stylistic 
construction. As noted previously, point of view editing is used primarily to convey 
important narrative infonnation rather than to confer an independent significance on 
the act of perceiving. As a consequence, the classical cinema rarely raises questions 
concerning the ontological difference between objective and subjective shots. 
Bergman's deployment of shot! reverse shot and point of view is clearly different 
III a number of important ways. In the cases we have examined, the narrative 
significance of the represented object of perception is, at best, a secondary concern. 
The primary focus is on how the object is represented - that is, how its representation 
relates to the perceiver's consciousness and thought processes. Images, actions and 
events that clearly belong to an exterior reality (the tanks, the Vietnamese monk) lose 
their sense of autonomy. Their meanings become contingent upon their situation 
within an overarching subjective experience. Moreover, our identification with the 
perceiver is heavily emphasized through repeated cutting between subject and object. 
Having established a subjective narrative framework, Bergman consistently draws 
attention to the processes of identification by which we are orientated in relation to 
the story. 
1 1.+ 
Bergman's desire to make us aware of the processes of identification that underpin 
our viewing experience is evident very early on in Persona. After the film's initial 
stream of images, which seems to erupt from the projector that flares to life, we are 
presented with a shot of a white room occupied by an unidentified boy (Jorgen 
Lindstrom). The boy looks directly towards the camera, and then reaches towards it. 
A reverse shot then shows him from behind, touching a screen which depicts a close-
up of Elisabet gradually morphing into an image of Alma. This sequence is crucial 
because it is the first instance in the film in which two shots are linked formally to 
represent a continuous dramatic occurrence (the previous stream of images is not 
organized according to any conventional spatio-temporal structure denoting narrative 
continuity). Yet, as P. Adams Sitney points out, this particular inception of shot! 
reverse shot does not ease the viewer into a conventional narrative situation, but 
instead addresses its own artifice: 
This first instance of shot-countershot in the film draws attention to itself in 
two ways: first, by having the boy look directly into the camera, and reach out 
as if to touch it, the filmmaker brings into play the only locus of offscreen 
space that would not be automatically absorbed into the fictive arena that all 
other pivots of shot-countershot generate. Secondly, the reversed shot does 
nothing to hide the fact that the boy is confronting a screen. The unified spatial 
'event' that he thus depicts has been drained of its fictional authority.35 
Essentially, shot/ reverse shot editing usually produces a coherent spatial field that 
'contains' the film's action in a naturalistic manner. The first instance of shot/ reverse 
shot at the beginning of Persona is very different in that it foregrounds the conditions 
of film viewing. It draws attention to the artifice of 'normal' editing, implies the 
presence of the camera, and makes us conscious of the sharp reorientation of our 
perspective from shot to shot. In short, we are alerted to the mechanisms by which we 
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as film viewers are positioned in relation to the narrative, and to the processes of 
interpretation and identification that follow from this positioning. 
This early self-reflexive sequence serves several purposes. Firstly, it sensitizes the 
viewer to the ways in which conventional filmic narrative and representation will be 
subverted. Throughout the film, events that appear initially to be 'real' occurrences, 
and which are presented as such, gradually lose their credibility, so that we are forced 
to re-evaluate these incidents as being subjectively rendered (the depiction of physical 
vampirism or the scene in which Elisabet's husband [Gunnar Bjomstrand] appears are 
obvious examples). Secondly, the sequence also alerts us to the difficulty of locating a 
specific origin of many of the film's subj ective visions. The sequence offers the boy 
as a potential surrogate viewer with whom we may identify; indeed, because he 
watches a screen depicting the fiction's two main protagonists, it might seem 
reasonable to suggest that the subsequent events are in some way filtered through his 
awareness of the narrative. This interpretation is strengthened by the same actor's 
similar role in The Silence. In the earlier film, the boy is more an observer than a 
participant in the action. In Persona, this role is developed so that the character is 
physically removed from the film's main action (we cannot even say that he occupies 
the same diegetic space as Elisabet and Alma in any conclusive sense). However, the 
second shot of the shot/ reverse shot pair reveals that our initial optical viewpoint can 
also be attributed to the Alma/ Elisabet image. Retrospectively, we discover that our 
perspective has been aligned with that of the women on the screen. The sequence can 
be seen as a microcosmic representation of the film as a whole, where subjective 
viewpoint is constantly shifting and often ambiguous. Finally, the sequence also 
highlights the themes of identity and identification that are central to the film's 
narrative. The identification of the viewer with the characters on screen, which 
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underpins our experience of film, is represented directly when the boy reaches out 
towards the giant image. This foreshadows the psychological identifications that take 
place between Alma and Elisabet and cause their identities to 'merge'. Initially, Alma 
also occupies the position of film-viewer, and identifies with Elisabet's screen image. 
She relates her experience of having seen the actress in a film. 'When I came home,' 
she recalls, 'I saw myself in the mirror and thought: we're alike ... 1 think 1 could tum 
myself into you. If I made a real effort. I mean inside.' The recognition of the 
viewer's potential identification with the character on the screen is intrinsically linked 
to the film's exploration of mimicry, projection and role-playing as facets of 
personality formation. 
Towards the end of Persona, there is another episode that can be thought of as an 
aberrant shot/ reverse shot sequence, and which further develops the film's 
examination of identification and identity. We are presented with a repeated 
monologue in which Alma makes a series of assertions about Elisabet's failure as a 
mother. The actress, Alma suggests, found herself unable to play the 'role' of mother: 
she was horrified by the pregnancy, failed to bond with her son, and secretly wished 
that he would die. As Alma speaks for the first time, the camera remains fixed upon 
Elisabet's face, showing her reactions to the nurse's 'revelations'. Immediately 
afterwards, the entire monologue is repeated, but with the camera angle reversed, so 
that Alma's face is depicted as she speaks. In a way, the scene has the appearance of 
having been placed in the film in a raw, 'unedited' state: it depicts a series of shots 
and reverse shots - actions and reactions - that have not been spliced together to form 
a continuous narrative and a cohesive dramatic space. This spatial deconstruction 
changes the viewer's role, which becomes less passive and more critical, as s/he is 
forced to adopt a strange, dualistic perspective in which the two separate 'takes' must 
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be reconfigured mentally in relation to each other. Again, this disintegration of the 
classical space of shot/ reverse shot functions to break the cinematic illusion of an 
objectively documented reality. As Sontag observes: 
[Film] always gives the illusion of a voyeunstIc access to an untampered 
reality, a neutral view of things as they are. What is filmed is always, in some 
sense, a 'document'. But what contemporary film-makers more and more often 
show is the process of seeing itself, giving grounds or evidence for several 
different ways of seeing the same thing, which the viewer may entertain 
concurrently or successively.36 
The doubled monologue not only foregrounds the different perspectives that may 
operate within a single scene, but also raises the question of whose 'thoughts' are 
being presented in the dialogue. Alma delivers her analysis of Elisabet's feelings 
towards motherhood as if she has some sort of telepathic ability - or at the very least, 
has access to information about her patient that has not been divulged to the viewer. 
She relates details about Elisabet's past experiences as if these are indisputable facts, 
and as if she is able to penetrate and explain the actress' innermost thoughts. At the 
same time, the initial representation of Elisabet's facial expressions seems to confirm 
the accuracy of Alma's report. Elisabet appears guilty and uncomfortable, frequently 
looking away from the camera as she breaks eye contact with Alma. Yet when the 
sequence is repeated, depicting Alma's face as she delivers her speech, we are 
suddenly forced to reconsider the validity of the analysis, to question its accuracy as a 
representation of Elisabet's psyche. Alma's face reveals a sense of malicious intent 
that is not evident from her voice alone, as if she is taking a cruel pleasure in 
'unmasking' Elisabet. This, of course, heightens our awareness of the possibility that 
Alma's analysis may not be a fair or accurate evaluation of Elisabet's character. The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that some of Alma's accusations might 
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equally well be interpreted as self-criticisms. Earlier in the film, in another long 
monologue, Alma reveals that whilst on holiday with her fiance she participated in an 
orgy with three strangers, after which she became pregnant and had an abortion. 
Alma's accusations against Elisabet can, therefore, be seen as a proj ection of her own 
sense of guilt arising from her infidelity and its consequences.37 After the doubled 
monologue, Alma seems to recognize the ambiguity regarding whose thoughts and 
actions she is describing, as she suddenly exclaims, 'No! I'm not like you. I don't feel 
like you'. This is preceded and followed by the composite image of the two women's 
faces, which encapsulates the merger of two apparently distinct perspectives and 
consciousnesses within a single identity. This image articulates a number of 
conclusive realizations on Alma's part, concerning the instability of identity, the 
complex relationship between self-perception and the perception of the Other, and the 
different layers of personality that operate in different social contexts. But, as Robin 
Wood notes, it can also be said to symbolize the film viewer's imaginative 
engagement with the characters: 'most people find it possible - even inevitable -
during the film to identify with both Alma and Elizabeth: their consciousnesses find a 
common denominator in the consciousness of the spectator. ,38 The fluidity of our 
identifications with each character's point of view (specifically in the doubled 
monologue sequence, but also in the film as a whole) prepares us for their symbolic 
amalgamation. 
The Close-Up and the Mask 
Each section of the doubled monologue is presented through a series of four shots, 
linked by dissolves, that gradually bring us closer and closer to the character's face. 
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The first section begins with a medium shot of Elisabet taken from over Alma's 
shoulder (as if this is to be a conventional dialogue scene utilizing shot/ reverse shot 
editing), and ends with a full-screen close-up of Elisabet's face as she stares directly 
into the camera. The second section mirrors the first, with the camera angles reversed. 
Each section generates a progression from an objectively presented dramatic space, in 
which there is a clear delineation of the spatial relationship between the two 
characters (through the over-the-shoulder shot), to a subjective, 'expressive' space 
that has lost its geographical grounding. We are gradually compelled to focus solely 
on the face and its immediate expressivity. 
Gilles Deleuze considers the close-up (of any object including the face) to be a 
pure 'affection image', in the sense that it creates an immediate emotional or sensorial 
effect for the viewer. 39 Deleuze argues that the close-up does not simply enlarge a 
specific object, but instead' abstracts it from all spatia-temporal coordinates', so that 
the overall change in the object is qualitative rather than quantitative: 'The close-up is 
not an enlargement and, if it implies a change of dimension, this is an absolute 
change: a mutation of movement which ceases to be translation in order to become 
expression. ,40 This argument builds upon the theoretical work of Bela Balasz, who 
suggests, 'The facial expression on a face is complete and comprehensible in itself 
and therefore we need not think of it as existing in space and time. ,41 For both 
theorists, the facial close-up articulates the movement that is also implied by Bergman 
in the doubled monologue sequence. The close-up of the face, Deleuze and Balasz 
suggest, momentarily transports us from a clearly defined spatial realm to a mental or 
spiritual realm in which we are given a privileged access to a character's thoughts and 
feelings. 
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For Balasz, facial expression is the ultimate representation of the individual's 
subjectivity, and the facial close-up is unique in objectively capturing this subjective 
phenomenon: 
Facial expression is the most subjective manifestation of man, more subjective 
even than speech, for vocabulary and grammar are subj ect to more or less 
universally valid rules and conventions, while the play of features, as has 
already been said, is a manifestation not governed by objective canons, even 
though it is largely a matter of imitation. This most subjective and individual 
of human manifestations is rendered objective in the close-up.42 
The idea that the close-up objectively captures the idiosyncratic expression of the self 
is something that can broadly be accepted, but requires certain caveats. Firstly, we 
cannot totally abstract our interpretation of a facial expression from the memory of its 
context. This has been famously demonstrated by the Kuleshov experiment, in which 
a 'neutral' facial expression was juxtaposed with different emotive images in order to 
gauge the effect of montage in altering the viewer's perception of the individual 
image. Kuleshov's results suggested that the viewer's interpretation of the facial 
expression tends to be influenced by the immediate narrative context.43 Similarly, the 
scene in Persona in which Elisabet confronts the image of the burning monk 
illustrates the montage effect, with the horrified expression on the actress' face being 
magnified by its juxtaposition with the extremely emotive documentary footage. 
Added to this, we must account for the ways in which lighting and sound effects 
potentially alter our perception of the facial close-up. Nevertheless, Balasz's basic 
premise that the close-up may present us with an objective view of a character's 
unique subjectivity can be accepted in principle. The central point of his argument is 
that the facial close-up presents an ideal in terms of its communicability: from the 
face in close-up, we intuitively read a character's subjective impressions, thought 
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processes, and emotions. In this regard, the facial close-up exemplifies the type of 
unique cinematic technique that Bergman regards as operating in prelinguistic terms, 
or as a form of 'soul-to-soul' communication. 
The notion that the face, especially as it is captured in close-up, provides a unique 
access to thought and feeling is reiterated throughout Bergman ~ s cinema. In Wild 
Strawberries, as has already been noted, Victor Sjostrom's face is repeatedly framed 
in close-up: the expressiveness of the silent cinema actor's face is integral in 
communicating to the viewer the innermost thoughts of the film's laconic protagonist. 
In the third dream sequence, Sara holds up a mirror to Isak's face and proceeds to 
'read' his features, cataloguing his secret obsessions and anxieties as if she were 
looking directly into his mind. There is a similar scene in Cries and Whispers. Maria 
stands before a mirror while David (Erland Josephson), the doctor with whom she is 
having an adulterous affair, enumerates the emotional flaws that he sees as being 
written upon her face. As Peter Cowie notes, 'Bergman's men and women abhor the 
mirror; it reflects the truth they are unwilling to accept. .. [F]acial expressions and 
bodily behaviour are more suggestive of inner feelings and soul condition than the 
words pronounced by Bergman's characters. ,44 Indeed, there are several incidents in 
Bergman's cinema where the truthfulness of the face is contrasted with the duplicity 
of language. In The Silence, as we have already seen, Ester creates a vocal fac;ade, 
calmly suggesting that Anna and Johan should leave her alone in the foreign city. At 
the same time, her facial expression betrays her true feelings to the viewer. The face's 
capacity to reveal thoughts that the individual attempts to conceal with disingenuous 
language is also emphasized in Autumn Sonata (1978). Eva (Liv Ullmann) accuses 
her mother (Ingrid Bergman) of habitual insincerity. When she was a child, Eva tells 
her mother, 'I mistrusted your words. They didn ~t match the expression I saw in your 
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eyes.' In these instances, Bergman portrays the face as providing an inimitable insight 
into the secret thoughts that his characters try to hide. 
There is, however, another side to the face that IS scrutinized in Bergman's 
cinema, and particularly in Persona. The facial close-up is also used, at times, to 
make us aware of the limits of the face's 'readability'. The idealized access to a 
character's innermost thoughts and emotions that the facial close-up would seem to 
guarantee is disrupted periodically by the problematic face that proves indecipherable. 
In Persona's doubled monologue scene, the series of close-ups brings us ever-nearer 
to the face. We are encouraged to explore the face, to discern the true reason for 
Elisabet's silence, or the validity of Alma's accusations. Yet in the final, full-screen 
close-up that ends each section, we are suddenly confronted with an ambiguous image 
of the face, which is lit from one side so that it is half illuminated and half in shadow. 
We are presented with two diametrically opposed possibilities epitomized in the 
single image - that the face offers a window on to an authentic mental realm, or that 
the face functions as an opaque, or even duplicitous, fa9ade. Throughout the film, 
there is an ongoing tension between these two possible roles for the face. Initially, 
Alma places unquestioning faith in her ability to discern the (genuine) thoughts and 
feelings signified by Elisabet' s facial expressions. She believes that Elisabet is 
friendly, compassionate, and interested in (and sympathetic to) her problems. Alma 
only realizes that she may have misread Elisabet's character when she discovers the 
contents of a derisive letter which the actress has written about her. Elisabet's 
appearance, as Alma perceives it, does not reflect her inner self. 
The potential disparity between the qualities signified by the face and the 
authentic, inner character (or between 'seeming' and 'being') is central to Persona's 
exploration of performance and personality. As numerous commentators on the film 
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have noted, 'persona' is the Latin word for mask, and, historically, refers to the mask 
worn by actors or actresses in classical theatre. The film's title, therefore, can be seen 
as highlighting a fundamental distinction between 'authentic' identity and the 
metaphorical masks, or social disguises, which people may wear. However, for 
Bergman the relationship between identity and performance is more complex than this 
distinction might suggest. The meaning he attaches to the 'persona' is undoubtedly 
influenced by the specific theorization of the term in Jungian analytic psychology.45 
Jungian theory adopts the usual definition of the persona - to denote the character one 
displays in public - but, crucially, does not assume that this aspect of one's 
personality is necessarily 'inauthentic', suggesting instead that identity is 
fundamentally a multifaceted phenomenon. A short analysis of Jung's theory is highly 
illuminating when considering Bergman's representation of the mind. 
Jung asserts that there is inevitably a disparity between the personality one adopts 
and displays in public - which is shaped by social requirements - and one's private 
behaviour and attitudes: 
[Man] puts on a mask, which he knows corresponds with conscious intentions, 
while it also meets with the requirements and opinions of his environment, so 
that first one motive then the other is in the ascendant. This mask ... I have 
called the persona, which was the designation given to the mask worn by the 
f . . 46 actors 0 antIqUIty. 
Jung contrasts the persona with the 'inner attitude', which he calls the 'anima' (the 
Latin term for mind or spirit).47 However, this dichotomy should not automatically 
suggest a hierarchy in which the persona worn by an individual is less a part of his or 
her 'real' character than the attitudes and beliefs adopted in private life. Furthermore, 
an individual may be said to display several different personae according to the 
effects of different social situations. As Jung writes: 
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[A] moderately acute psychological observation can succeed without much 
difficulty in proving at least the traces of character-splitting in the normal 
individual. For example, we have only to observe a man rather closely under 
varying circumstances, to discover that a transition from one milieu to another 
brings about a striking alteration in his personality, whereby a sharply-outlined 
and distinctly changed character emerges ... Which, then, is the true character, 
the real personality? This is a question it is often impossible to answer.48 
Performance and role-playing are, for lung, a basic component of everyday life and 
identity. The mask that a person may wear can be seen as a disguise, but it must also 
be seen as a concrete expression of one aspect of his or her personality in a particular 
social context. For lung, identity is not singular, but is always, to a greater or lesser 
extent, split. 
In Persona, Elisabet's identity seems, to her, to be split to an unusual degree. It is 
implied that Elisabet suddenly perceives her identity as being constituted by a series 
of social performances that seem disconnected from her 'inner self. During a 
performance of Electra, she suddenly falls silent. The following day, she has entirely 
given up speaking. In withdrawing from interpersonal relations, Elisabet refuses to 
'perform', or to play a social role. Alma, in contrast, initially sees her identity as 
something coherent and unproblematic. It is only through her contact with Elisabet, 
and perhaps through her attempt to identify with the actress' perspective, that Alma 
becomes aware of the fissures in her own personality. At the beginning of the film, 
Alma introduces herself to Elisabet, telling her patient that she is twenty-five years-
old, engaged, has been a nurse for two years, and that her mother was also a nurse. 
With this small talk, Alma reveals that she has a conventional, uncomplicated view of 
her own identity, and that there is a simple correspondence between her private and 
public self. She is a nurse - a carer - just as her mother was, and we are led to assume 
that once she marries and has children, this role will also define her private life. 
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Later, in the beach house, she tells Elisabet that at the hospital there is home for old 
nurses, 'Ones that have always been nurses, lived for their work. Always in uniform.' 
She concludes that she likes the idea of devoting her life to a single, meaningful role. 
However, shortly afterwards, Alma begins to articulate a different side to her 
personality, recognizing the limitations that a singular identity imposes upon the 
individual. When she relates the details of the orgy in which she participated (and of 
which her fiance, presumably, remains unaware), Alma is extremely ambivalent. As 
she recollects the scene, she appears simultaneously elated, embarrassed, surprised, 
and frightened. The purely instinctual, irrational facet of her identity that emerges in 
this sexual experience, and that appears entirely contrary to her everyday sense of 
self, is something that astounds and scares Alma. After she has told her story, she 
cries uncontrollably and says, 'It doesn't make sense. None of it fits together.' Alma 
is forced to confront the irrational aspect of her identity again, when she discovers 
Elisabet's apparent duplicity, and physically attacks the actress. First Alma plants a 
shard of glass in Elisabet's path, and then she threatens Elisabet with a pot of boiling 
water. With these incidents, a dark, animalistic aspect of Alma's identity emerges, one 
that contrasts directly with the caring persona that defines her earlier in the film. 
Echoing lung, we might well ask: which is the true character, the real personality? 
Persona suggests a complex, dialectical relationship between performance and 
identity, and in this regard, the film's self-reflexivity - its stylistic and thematic 
concern with its own fictitiousness - is again highly significant. Persona's self-
reflexivity explains, in part, why Bergman's characters' faces sometimes appear to be 
impenetrable masks, which defy our attempts to discern definitively a stable identity. 
Balasz saw the close-up of the face as 'complete and comprehensible in itself, as a 
window on the character's inner life, but his theorization of the close-up is, implicitly, 
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built upon the assumption that cinema conforms to the tenets of objective realism. 
Balasz was writing in 1945 (building on theories that he had first developed even 
earlier, in the preceding two decades), and his ideas are grounded in the paradigm of 
classical realist cinema. His concept of characterization, and of how we read 
character, is rooted in a notion of cinema as an illusionist art form that dispenses with 
theatricali ty: 
The public of today will not tolerate the spoken soliloquy, allegedly because it 
is 'unnatural.' Now the film has brought us the silent soliloquy, in which a face 
can speak with the subtlest shades of meaning without appearing unnatural and 
arousing the distaste of the spectators. In this silent monologue, the solitary 
human soul can find a tongue more candid and uninhibited than in any spoken 
soliloquy, for it speaks instinctively, subconsciously. The language of the face 
cannot be suppressed or controlled. However disciplined and practisedly 
hypocritical a face may be, in the enlarging close-up we see even that it is 
concealing something, that is looking a lie.49 
For Balasz, the singular soul reveals itself in the facial close-up - regardless of any 
conscious effort to mask or conceal character. Facial expression may display 
simultaneously multiple 'feelings, passions and thoughts', but these are readily 
interpretable, and reflective of a coherent inner self.5o However, the relationship 
between camera, face and 'soul' that Balasz postulates is almost antithetical to the 
self-reflexive, Modernist aesthetic that underpins much of Bergman's later cinema. 
The foregrounding of the fictional context in which a character acts is often used to 
negate the authenticity of the most 'private' moments. This is most evident in the 
actual 'soliloquies' with which Bergman experiments. Alma retires to her room, 
having just met Elisabet for the first time, and, finding herself alone and unable to 
sleep, begins to speak aloud about her thoughts and feelings. She speaks naturally, 
pondering over her future prospects in terms of her marriage, family and career - as if 
this is simply an interior monologue in which she is trying to organize her thoughts. 
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But as she speaks, she intermittently glances directly into the camera, drawing 
attention to the construction of the scene. Clearly, this self-reflexivity emphasizes to 
the viewer the artificial parameters by which s/he is suddenly afforded an insight into 
Alma's 'private' thoughts. In addition, and more profoundly, it suggests Alma's first, 
embryonic awareness that her identity is constituted, in part by personae, that she 
defines herself according to the social roles of nurse, wife, and mother. (The idea that 
these roles are 'masks' is subtly reinforced by the visual symbolism of Alma rubbing 
her face with lotion as she speaks.) Our identification with Alma is particularly strong 
in this scene, in the sense that our consciousness of her performance reflects her 
sudden self-consciousness. 
With the introduction of a self-reflexive element to characterization, the camera 
begins to act almost as a mirror for the onscreen character, reconfiguring her actions, 
words and gestures in terms of her consciousness of her own appearance. 
Alternatively, the camera becomes the locus of a spectral, objectifying gaze that 
belongs to both the self and the imaginary other. More simply, the self-reflexive 
acknowledgment of the camera suggests an introspective gaze that has been 
externalized, projected onto a hypothetical spectator. As previously noted, both Wild 
Strawberries and Cries and Whispers contain mirror scenes that explicitly externalize 
the act of self-perception. In both there is an underlying narrative subjectivity by 
which the criticisms of another character are transformed into self-criticism. In Wild 
Strawberries, Isak dreams that Sara holds a mirror to his face and describes what she 
sees. In Cries and Whispers, Maria's flashback shows David pointing out her flaws as 
they stand before the mirror: it is a depiction of the event as it is subjectively 
recollected or imagined. In representing this subjective recollection, Bergman has the 
camera literally take the place of the mirror. Both characters, framed in close-up, look 
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directly into the lens while David analyzes Maria's features. A shot incorporating a 
mirror often causes confusion concerning subject and object positions, or conflates 
these positions so that the character is simultaneously subject and object of the gaze. 
Similarly, Bergman's camera, insofar as it acts as a mirror for the character , 
transforms the normal, objective status of space. The camera no longer records the 
world with objective integrity, but functions in relation to the character's self-
conscious imagination. 
Narrative Structure and Characterization 
Bergman describes his initial plan for The Silence as follows: 'My original idea was to 
make a film that should obey musical laws instead of dramaturgical ones. A film 
acting by association - rhythmically, with themes and counter themes. ,51 This 
reconceptualization of narrative structure is fundamental to the representation of 
thought, not only in The Silence, but also in Persona and Cries and Whispers. In place 
of conventional plotting, in which events, actions and reactions are linked together in 
a logical, causal chain, Bergman substitutes an open, associational structure, in which 
the viewer must identify patterns, connecting disparate ideas, motifs and themes. 
Many of these' themes and counter themes' are recurrent across Bergman's work, and 
are deeply psychological. In The Silence, Persona, and Cries and Whispers, plot and 
characterization are to a large extent founded upon binary oppositions such as 
rationality and irrationality, compassion and cruelty, mind and body, mask and soul, 
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and public and private identity. 52 In all three films, 'realistic' plotting is secondary to 
the affirmation of symbolic meaning. 
The portrayal of Ester's illness in The Silence provides a good example of how 
Bergman rejects the usual logic of causality in order to foreground the existence of 
specific leitmotifs. Through the course of the film, Ester's condition deteriorates, so 
much so that by the time Anna and J ohan leave, she appears to be close to death. Yet 
this deterioration is not, by any standard, depicted in a conventional, realistic manner. 
Periods of abject sickness are followed swiftly by moments of almost total recovery. 
At one point, Ester is shown writhing in her bed as if suffocating, but shortly 
afteIWards she appears utterly composed, working at her typewriter. This rapid 
recovery makes little sense in terms of realistic plotting, but it makes plenty of sense 
thematically and in terms of characterization. The physical degradation associated 
with Ester's illness - the chaotic collapse of her bodily functions - is contrasted 
directly with her attempts to maintain the orderly existence, defined by her intellectual 
pursuits. This can be seen as part of a thematic refrain concerning the relationship 
between the mind and the body. Ester's desire to assert order over her body reflects 
her desire to project an authoritative, intellectual persona. 
The use of 'themes and counter themes' is fundamental to Bergman's 
characterizations: his central characters are often archetypal, incarnating a specific set 
of ideas or motifs. This is not to say that these characters are unrealistic or lack depth, 
but that they possess exaggerated qualities that directly relate to Bergman's 
underlying philosophical or moral concerns. In The Silence, the sisters are portrayed, 
on the surface, as having polarized personalities: Ester's veneer of cool intellectualism 
is contrasted with Anna's flagrant sensuality, typified by her meaningless sexual 
liaison with a foreign bartender, with whom she cannot verbally communicate. Of 
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course, this polarization is not absolute, and in some ways, each sister can be said to 
represent the repressed element of the other's identity. Ester's intellectual aspect is 
something of a mask. Whilst she languishes in her sickbed, she shows herself to be 
ruled by her immediate bodily impulses: at various times, we see Ester drinking 
alcohol excessively, chain-smoking and masturbating. Conversely, the impulsive 
behaviour that seems to define Anna is underpinned by an element of conscious 
calculation. Her animalistic sexuality is depicted as a form of symbolic rebellion 
against Ester's desire to control her. In Persona (as we have seen) Elisabet and Alma 
are also depicted initially as 'opposites', yet turn out to be alike in a number of ways, 
and in Cries and Whispers, the characterizations again conform to this general pattern. 
Karin and Maria's relationship is similar to that of Ester and Anna: Karin is cold, 
intellectual, and acts as if she despises all forms of human contact; Maria is sensual 
and flirtatious. Yet, once more, each of these diametrically opposed characters needs 
something from the other. Maria desires Karin's approval and acceptance, just as 
Karin secretly wishes for Maria's love. These characterizations can, therefore, be 
described as dialectical. Each character is defined in relation to the other, and each is 
internally 'split', being constituted by opposing forces or desires. 
Another, equally productive, way of understanding the relationships between these 
characters is to propose that each represents a different aspect of a single 
consciousness. Beverle Houston suggests: 
In The Silence, this extreme contrast [of personalities], together with the 
characters' isolation in an unknown city, creates a dream-like situation where 
the figures seem to represent not so much characters in a dramatic fiction, but 
unconscious forces at war in the mysterious terrain of the inner life. 53 
Similarly, Sontag writes: 
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It's correct to speak of Persona in tenns of the fortunes of two characters 
named Elisabeth and Alma who are engaged in a desperate duel of identities. 
But it is equally pertinent to treat Persona as relating to the duel between two 
mythical parts of a single self: the corrupted person who acts (Elisabeth) and 
the ingenuous soul (Alma) who founders in contact with corruption. 54 
In Cries and Whispers, there is also a blurring of the distinction between individual 
characters and minds. At one point, Maria tells Karin that, as sisters, they have 
'memories in common.' This phrase would usually be taken as metaphorical, but at 
certain points the film does seem to represent a shared or split consciousness. Most 
notably, after Agnes has (we think) died, she calls out to each of the other women in 
tum, pleading for comfort and compassion. Maria and Karin are horrified by their 
sister's 'resurrection', and quickly run from her chamber. Only Anna, the loyal 
servant, remains behind to comfort her fonner mistress. It is unclear that this pivotal 
incident is being attributed to anyone character's imagination (although it can be 
construed as Anna's fantasy). Instead, this ambiguous moment seems to function as a 
shared psychic or spiritual experience, or, alternatively, to represent in abstract tenns 
a single, but ambivalent, response to death. 
In 1964, in between The Silence and Persona, Bergman told an interviewer that he 
saw 'more and more clearly that the film as an art fonn is approaching a discovery of 
its essential self. It should communicate psychic states, not merely project pictures of 
external actions. ,55 In the films I am discussing, it is often untenable to consider the 
action and events represented as being 'real' occurrences. From The Silence through 
Persona to Cries and Whispers, the external actions are increasingly symbolic 
projections of mental conflicts or inner happenings. In The Silence, most events retain 
a basic sense of realism, but expressionistic techniques are used throughout to make 
us aware of the subjective comprehension of the external world. In Persona, several 
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occurrences seem entirely imaginary: Elisabet's nocturnal visit to Alma's bedroom, 
the arrival of Elisabet's husband (who mistakes Alma for his wife), the scenes that 
depict Elisabet sucking Alma's blood. Clearly, these incidents should be interpreted 
symbolically, as visual representations of the central characters' conscious or 
unconscious mental activities. Finally, in Cries and Whispers, the status of various 
events as real or otherwise is almost irrelevant. The film does not attempt to define 
rigid boundaries between reality and imagination when representing flashbacks or 
fantastical occurrences (such as the resurrection scene). All 'external actions', to a 
greater or lesser extent, reflect an immediate psychological reality as it is experienced 
by the film's characters. 
Bruce Kawin, in his study of 'first-person' cinematic narrative, suggests that many 
of the unreal, dreamlike visions that occur in Persona can be interpreted as symptoms 
or projections of the film's latent, psychological meaning: 
Much of Persona's excellence lies in its decision not to pinpoint the origin of 
these visions, but to offer them as in some way 'happening' - as if the film 
itself had in these moments shifted the territory of its exposition from the 
surface of the story to its eerie undercurrents.56 
As they are not depicted as part of any particular character's subjective experience, 
Kawin argues that these 'mindscreens' (direct cinematic representations of thought) 
could be regarded as 'systemic', attributable to an offscreen, extradiegetic narrator.57 
Of course, there are several problems inherent to the postulation of an unidentified, 
supra-fictional narrator. Nevertheless, the narrative form that Kawin describes has a 
clear precedent in the drama of Strindberg. Strindberg's work exerts an extremely 
powerful influence over Bergman's imagination. As several critics have pointed out, 
Persona's basic storyline is based upon Strindberg's one act play The Stronger 
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(1889), which concerns the power struggle between two women, one of whom talks 
while the other remains silent. However, it is Strindberg's A Dream Play (1901) that 
should be identified as the fundamental stylistic model for Persona - and, equally, for 
The Silence and Cries and Whispers. Strindberg describes his intention with regard to 
A Dream Playas follows: 
[T]he author has in this dream play sought to imitate the disjointed yet 
seemingly logical shape of a dream. Everything can happen, everything is 
possible and probable. Time and place do not exist; the imagination spins, 
weaving new patterns on a flimsy basis of reality: a mixture of memories, 
experiences, free associations, absurdities and improvisations. 
The characters split, double, multiply, evaporate, condense, dissolve and 
merge. But one consciousness rules over them all: the dreamer's; for him there 
are no secrets, no inconsistencies, no scruples and no laws.58 
In A Dream Play, all external actions reflect the state of the dreamer's mind; every 
event and character represents an aspect or thought process of a single consciousness. 
The dramatic form developed by Strindberg clearly provides a paradigm not only for 
Bergman's dream sequences in Wild Strawberries, but also for the depiction of 
thought in Bergman's later films. We should note that Bergman produced two 
versions of A Dream Play in the 1960s: one for Swedish television in 1963 (the year 
The Silence was released), and one for the stage in the winter of 1969 Gust before he 
began working on Cries and Whispers).59 Bergman's representation of consciousness 
during this period, through 'split' characterizations, associative narrative structures, 
and fantastical action, draws heavily on Strindberg's conceptualization of the 
dreaming mind. 
Strindberg's notes on A Dream Play describe a narrative form in which thought is 
dramatized, in which all external actions signify psychic states. For Bergman, film is 
the ideal medium for achieving this form. 
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'No Scruples, No Laws': Censorship and Unconscious Thought 
There is a second aspect of the narrative form described by Strindberg that is 
particularly pertinent III relation to Bergman's depiction of thought. Because the 
dreaming mind is not subject to the normal processes of censorship that operate in 
waking life, Strindberg emphasizes that for the dreamer there are not only 'no 
inconsistencies' in the ostensibly disjointed dream narrative, but also 'no scruples and 
no laws'. Implicitly, the thought processes rendered in A Dream Play express 
instinctual, unconscious drives. Similarly, many of the sequences in Bergman's films 
can be seen as representations of the characters' unconscious impulses or desires. 
Kawin's description of the 'eerie undercurrents' that surface sporadically in Persona 
begins to address this issue of the interplay between consciousness and the 
unconscious, or text and subtext. The fantastical sequences that cannot be definitively 
attributed to anyone character's subjective experience can be interpreted as direct 
expressions of unconscious (or repressed) thought. Equally, the various scenes in The 
Silence, Persona and Cries and Whispers that address issues of unconstrained 
violence or sexuality attempt to formulate a relationship between conscious ideas and 
attitudes, and the unconscious mind. 
Upon its release, The Silence was perceived by many as an offensive, immoral 
film. Its frank depiction of Anna's sexual behaviour, along with the subtextual 
implication of a former incestuous relationship between the sisters, was very 
controversial by contemporary standards. Cowie states that the Swedish censors 
originally deemed certain scenes in the film too sexually explicit for release: 
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At first, the Swedish censorship bureau intended to make cuts in the cabaret 
sequence. But a campaign in the liberal press led to an amendment in the rules, 
whereby a film should not be cut if its artistic quality was beyond reproach. 
This new statute came into effect just three days before The Silence was due to 
receive its certificate - in July 1963.60 
The Silence also caused controversy abroad. Initially, the French Censorship Board 
refused to issue a visa to the film, requesting cuts, and in West Germany debate over 
the film reached parliament.61 
In at least one sense, the behaviour depicted in The Silence is immoral - or, better 
still, amoral. For Bergman, the concepts of transgressive behaviour and sexual taboo 
define a specific category of thought that operates in relation to social institutions 
such as the Church, the family and the state. In The Silence, Anna's sexual behaviour 
should be perceived as being profane, in the sense that it is devoid of any spiritual or 
moral significance. Anna's uninhibited sexuality is symptomatic of a complete loss of 
belief in conventional religious ideology. This is not, of course, to say that Bergman 
portrays Anna in a positive light: in her character, the absence of a spiritual dimension 
is almost synonymous with total moral bankruptcy. Nevertheless, for Bergman, 
Anna's amoral sexuality expresses a truth concerning one aspect of human nature. 
Her behaviour is depicted in a deliberately shocking and provocative manner in order 
to challenge the ideas and values concerning sexuality (and, in particular, female 
sexuality) that have been defined historically by patriarchal religious thought. In 
Through a Glass Darkly, there is a similar subversion of the conventional sexual 
morality circumscribed in religious doctrine. In Karin's hallucination, God appears 
before her in the form of a spider and attempts to 'penetrate' her body. The image 
suggests that a violent lust lies behind the fac;ade of 'holy' love. Karin's 'skewed' 
perspective is utilized to question God's demands for submission and worship, which 
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are symbolized as an attempted sexual violation. Like many other characters in 
Bergman's films, Karin discovers in the idea of God not illumination but a 
fundamental constraint on her ability to act and think for herself. In this context, 
sexual transgression represents a rejection of a specific moral ideology. 
The Silence and Through a Glass Darkly depict a form of instinctual sexuality, 
unencumbered by laws or scruples. This is potentially liberating, in the sense that it 
frees thought and action from the ideological constraints imposed by social 
institutions. At the same time, such unconstrained behaviour is depicted as 
dangerously nihilistic. In both films, basic humanistic values of love and compassion 
are supplanted by greed, lust and self-interest; indeed, the loss of the fundamental 
distinction between love and lust is implicit in the incestuous relationships that are 
suggested to have occurred between Karin and her brother (Lars Passgard), and 
between Anna and Ester. Similarly, in Cries and Whispers, it is intimated that Karin 
harbours an incestuous desire for Maria, and her guilt prevents her from showing any 
signs of affection to her sister. In Persona, uninhibited sexuality is again depicted as 
both liberating and threatening. When Alma recollects the beach orgy, she is 
extremely ambivalent. The incident is described as a moment of joyous abandon, in 
which Alma experienced a total liberation from her everyday character and principles. 
Yet this loss of identity is simultaneously perceived as something dangerous and 
deeply disturbing. Alma recognizes in herself instinctual forces over which she has 
limited control, and which are entirely contrary to her normal sense of self. It is these 
same forces that are unleashed when Alma attacks Elisabet. The utter collapse of 
Alma's normal, socially-defined identity at this point is conveyed by the simultaneous 
'collapse' of the narrative, as represented by the images depicting the breakdown of 
the projector. The collapse of the cinematic illusion is a powerful metaphor for the 
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sudden disintegration of the conceptual structures that support Alma's senses of 
reality and self-identity. As Robin Wood observes: 
After the depiction of the projector-breakdown, the 'naturalist' drama is 
resumed, but we can no longer feel in quite the same relation to it: our sense of 
security has been (like Alma's) irreparably undermined, and from here on we 
have the constant feeling that anything may happen62 
Once Alma discovers the violent (and sexual) impulses that threaten to overturn her 
conscious principles and beliefs, her coherent worldview is irrevocably lost. Again, 
Bergman represents transgressive or profane behaviour as a shock to habitual patterns 
of thought. 
In Cries and Whispers, sexual behaviour is, once more, of central importance with 
regard to characterization and the representation of thought. Maria's sexual attitudes 
are similar to Anna's in The Silence. Maria's sexual promiscuity seems correlative to 
a sort of spiritual atrophy. Her adulterous affair with the doctor appears to be devoid 
of emotional significance for either party. It does, however, signify the contempt with 
which Maria regards her husband (Henning Moritzen). Equally, Karin's marriage is 
depicted as an unpleasant sham. In a flashback, Karin and her husband (Georg Arlin) 
are shown sitting at opposite ends of a large dinner table. Conversation is sparse and 
perfunctory, and the atmosphere is very uncomfortable. Karin breaks a wine glass, 
prompting a disdainful glance from her husband. As she regards the broken 
fragments, Karin utters, 'It's nothing but a tissue of lies. All of it.' Later, after she has 
retired to her bedroom, Karin uses a shard from the broken glass to cut her genitals, 
and when her husband approaches her, she proudly smears the blood across her face. 
The images are hallucinatory, and the action is staged in such a theatrical way that 
there is little reason to believe that the sequence faithfully portrays a past experience 
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as it actually occurred. Karin's recollection seems to condense many disparate ideas, 
impressions, emotions and memories into a single symbolic sequence. 
This 'flashback' provides another example of the film's mixing of fantasy and 
reality, or of an instant where subtextual or unconscious thought is represented. Yet 
again, the sudden emergence of violence is intended to shock. The film's setting is 
important in this respect. Significant emphasis is placed on the veneer of propriety 
that defines the milieu of the Swedish upper class at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In this milieu, certain aspects of thought, emotion and behaviour are 
constrained by the strict social hierarchy and sexual inequality (reinforced by 
religious doctrine). Karin perceives her everyday existence in this society to be a 
'tissue of lies'. Her marriage does not represent a holy union with her husband, but is 
seen as a form of degradation, a state of enforced subservience. Karin's self-
mutilation is a shocking expression of her perception of the repressed reality of her 
marriage. What Bergman depicts is a type of 'uncensored' thought that challenges the 
laws and scruples that constitute everyday, conscious attitudes. 
Memory and Free Association 
Cries and Whispers is Bergman's fullest exploration of memory as a distinct mental 
phenomenon. In terms of story, Bergman's own memories (particularly his childhood 
memories) provide substance for a number his films (for example, Wild Strawberries, 
Winter Light and Fanny and Alexander [1982]). However, Cries and TVlzispers is 
more explicitly concerned with representing memory processes than any other film in 
his oeuvre. 
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As we have seen, Bergman utilizes a senes of flashbacks to represent the 
characters' memories, but these flashbacks are unconventional insofar as they give us 
reason to question the veracity of what is being depicted. The flashbacks in Cries and 
Whispers cannot be said to function as straightforward 'recollections', but seem to 
represent an imaginative or fantastical reconstitution of past events. They do not show 
'what happened', as such, but explore the psychological meaning or significance of 
past events for the different characters. In part, this imaginative reinvention of the past 
is symptomatic of a specific conceptualization of memory as an inherently creative 
process. The relationship between' film and memory will be addressed in detail in the 
following chapter, with regard to the work of Alain Resnais, and therefore I shall limit 
the present discussion of this issue. However, it is important to note that Bergman, 
like Resnais, does not portray the memory image as an accurate record of the past, but 
as something that is created in the present moment. Memory is an act of interpretation 
that transforms the past according to the psychological requirements of the present. 
For Bergman, memory also proves an ideal device for developing an associational 
narrative structure, founded on a limited number of themes and counter themes. In 
Cries and Whispers, memory organizes the past in relation to the present, creating a 
narrative that connects disparate recollections, impressions, ideas and emotions. 
Maria's flashback, in particular, seems to be constructed according to the logic of 
association. The flashback depicts Maria's adulterous affair with David, which is 
resumed one night while Maria's husband, Joakim, is away from the house on 
business. The following morning, Maria discovers her husband slumped in a chair 
with a knife embedded in his stomach. He turns toward her and pleads for help, but 
Maria slowly retreats from him, shaking her head. We are led to assume that Joakim 
has become aware of the affair, that there is a direct causal connection between 
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Maria's infidelity and what we assume to be his attempted suicide. Yet there is no 
explicit evidence to support this hypothesis, and, again, the action depicted is 
sufficiently melodramatic and symbolic to prompt questions about its 'authenticity'. 
We can, however, be confident that a causal connection between the events 
depicted exists in Maria's mind. The sequence represents an abstract psychological 
reality that exists for Maria, and is organized according to her perception of the 
meaning of the past. Furthermore, her flashback represents mental associations not 
only between past events, but also between past and present. Maria's memory of her 
husband's physical and psychological torment is also a reflection on Agnes' suffering 
in the present. Both plead for help and compassion from Maria, and in both cases she 
finds herself unable to comply. The memory sequence operates as a kind of self-
recrimination, showing Maria's suppressed acknowledgement of her own faults and 
failings, both past and present. 
The fluid movement between past and present is used to identify and juxtapose 
key moments that define the sisters' characters and their relationships with each other. 
In this respect, Cries and Whispers is similar to Wild Strawberries. In both films, the 
past and present are intertwined, so that each is viewed in relation to the other. A few 
symbolic events and memories provide us with a clear insight into the minds of the 
protagonists, and show how present behaviour, attitudes and perceptions are affected 
by the remembrance of the past. In Cries and Whispers, the connections between past 
and present are particularly strong because the childhood home provides the sole 
setting for both memory and the action that takes place in the present. This 
unchanging location gives the impression of timelessness; there is little sense of 
separation between events of the past and those of the present. The way in which the 
past and present seem to become conflated in the minds of the sisters is exemplified in 
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a scene that occurs shortly after Karin's flashback. Karin is sitting with Maria 
discussing the sale of the house following Agnes' death. The positioning of the 
women in the frame, far apart at opposite sides of a table, replicates the composition 
used to depict Karin's memory of having dinner with her husband. The similarity of 
the images emphasizes the connection between Karin's failed marital relationship and 
the comparable failure of the sisters' relationship. This connection is further 
highlighted when Karin again knocks over a wine glass. This time the glass does not 
break, but Karin glances anxiously towards her sister. She then nervously tells Maria 
that her husband often accuses her of clumsiness. As the scene unfolds, we are made 
increasingly aware of how past and present are being linked together to elucidate the 
thought processes and mental associations that underpin Karin's behaviour. The scene 
demonstrates film's unique capacity to make wordless connections between 
temporally disconnected events and motifs, to communicate the psychological subtext 
of the external action. 
In the free associative structure of Cries and Whispers, Bergman finds a means of 
expressing abstract thought processes in visual terms. However, it is the experimental 
opening sequence of Persona that perhaps constitutes Bergman's fullest attempt to 
represent thought entirely without language. Bergman has described this sequence as 
comprising a 'poem ... in images,.63 This statement is highly pertinent, as it suggests 
precisely that this stream of images should be seen as a visual expression of abstract 
thought. According to Bergman, the poem relates to the situation in which he first 
conceived of Persona (whilst in hospital recovering from pneumonia), but he refuses 
to attribute a more specific meaning to the sequence: 'As for the interpretation, you 
can interpret it any way you like. As with any poem. Images mean different things to 
different people.,64 In conclusion to this section, I will offer my interpretation of these 
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images, demonstrating the way in which they can be related to wider aspects of 
Bergman's cinematic thought. 
While it is important to stress the abstract nature of the 'poem', it is slightly 
disingenuous of Bergman to suggest that there is a total openness to the interpretative 
process. The opening sequence seems to be constructed according to the broad 
principles of free association, so that the individual images are connected together to 
produce quite specific lines of thought. As Sitney points out, while Bergman's visual 
poem lacks the spatio-temporal continuity that defines conventional filmic narrative, 
it nevertheless has a 'thematic and associational structure' that guides our response to 
its images.65 Similarly, in an excellent analysis of this sequence, Kawin shows that 
there is a definite thematic and stylistic evolution in Bergman's imagery, and this 
provides a logical framework for our interpretation.66 In order to show how 
Bergman's association of images communicates thought, it is first necessary to give a 
brief overview of how the opening sequence unfolds. 
An initial series of shots shows the two filaments in an arc lamp flaring to life, and 
film strip beginning to pass through the projector. After this, we are presented with a 
shot of a screen, on to which a simple, silent animation is being projected. The image 
on the screen is grainy and degraded, suggesting that film stock is old and worn. The 
animation gives way to a scene from the silent farce that Bergman shot as part of 
Prison, and which was based upon a story he made up as a child.67 This, in tum, is 
succeeded by a single image of a spider crawling across the screen, and then by shots 
depicting the slaughter of a lamb. This is followed by three shots of a nail being 
driven through a hand into a wooden surface (presumably a cross). For the first time 
since the opening shots of the projector, the image is accompanied by synchronous 
sound: the noise of the nail penetrating the wood. Subsequently, we hear church bells 
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on the soundtrack, and there is a sequence of shots that depicts a church and the 
surrounding area. We see a large snow drift against the wall of the church. There is 
then a cut to the interior of a morgue, which graphically matches the image of the 
snowdrift to the profile of a dead woman's face. Further shots of corpses are cross-cut 
with a shot of the white room in which the unidentified boy lies immobile. 
Throughout this section, we hear background noise, such as water dripping, doors 
opening and closing, and echoing footsteps. Finally, the camera returns to the 
unidentified boy as he awakes and touches the screen depicting Alma and Elisabet, 
introducing Persona's main narrative section. 
At first glance, it would appear that this sequence consists largely of disconnected 
images, lacking in thematic or formal unity. But, upon closer inspection, the stream of 
images contains several distinct trains of thought, or discernable narrative strands. 
Kawin detects two specific narrative paths that are followed concurrently in 
Persona's opening section. The first concerns the historical evolution of the cinema 
itself. The sequence begins by depicting a crude animation (captured on out-of-date, 
deteriorated film stock), then shows the silent farce, and, finally, goes on to represent 
images that have synchronous sound and are captured on modem film stock. The 
historical or technical evolution depicted in the images is paralleled by a simultaneous 
formal evolution within the sequence. As Kawin suggests, 'it is important to notice 
that a grammar of film techniques is maturing - on an interior level - from fragment 
to fragment, as the image continues to sophisticate (or limit) itself. ,68 Discrete 
individual images (such as the spider) give way to more complicated arrangements of 
shots that begin to suggest a rudimentary form of narrative. The transitions between 
sections also become increasingly meaningful: the cut from the snowdrift to the 
corpse, for example, is a graphic match that links an image of winter with an image of 
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death, suggesting the development of an underlying theme. Finally, as the opening 
sequence nears its end, the use of continuous background noise on the soundtrack 
begins to give a basic sense of spatio-temporal continuity. This prepares the viewer 
for the first shot/ reverse shot sequence, which, as noted earlier, establishes a tentative 
dramatic space for the subsequent action. The formal development in the sequence 
emphasizes the various ways in which cinema can construct a set of logical relations 
between disparate images in order to create visual meaning. 
The second narrative strand that Kawin identifies concerns the development of 
religious thought (and specifically Christian belief). He notes an important 
succession of images: the lamb being slaughtered, the shots depicting the nail being 
driven into the hand, and finally the image of the church.69 We might add to this list 
a shot from the morgue sequence, in which one of the corpses appears to open its 
eyes - which clearly evokes the idea of the Resurrection. The images represent an 
evolution of religious belief, from pagan ritualistic sacrifice, through the crucifixion, 
to the establishment of the Christian Church and its complex mythology. What is 
particularly striking in this series of images is the subversion of conventional 
religious iconography and ideology, which expresses a particular aspect of 
Bergman's thought. The image of hand being nailed to a plank clearly evokes the 
idea of Christ's crucifixion, but it produces a markedly different effect to the familiar 
Catholic icon depicting Christ's body on a cross (as it is seen, for example, on the 
church wall in Winter Light). The three close-ups of the nail penetrating the hand 
create an immediate visceral impact, emphasizing the physical brutality of the act 
rather than its symbolic dimensions. The crucifixion is depicted in the same violent 
manner as the ritualistic animal slaughter with which it is juxtaposed, implying their 
underlying conceptual similarity. Bergman does not represent the two acts as being 
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different, but as distinct incarnations of the same religious principle of sacrifice 
leading to rebirth or new life. Similarly, the image of the corpse opening its eyes 
transforms the religious conception of resurrection into something horrific - in the 
same way that both Wild Strawberries and Cries and Whispers use images of the 
dead coming alive (lsak and Agnes) to denote physical or psychological torment. 
Overall, the opening sequence of Persona can be said to represent the 
development of Bergman's own cinematic imagination; it constitutes the director's 
self-reflexive statement about the possibilities of visual thought and the future 
direction of his cinema. The twin narrative strands that are developed through the 
opening can be considered as a unified exploration of the evolution of Bergman's 
filmmaking career prior to Persona. The multiple references to his previous films 
delineate a roughly chronological picture of how Bergman's cinematic thought has 
developed. The silent farce is drawn from Prison, the very first film that Bergman 
both wrote and directed, but also looks back to the story that Bergman created as a 
child (which was itself derived from a short film that he owned and used to run 
through his toy projector).70 This farce also provides an early indication of some of 
the themes that will become central in Bergman's later work, in depicting death as a 
physical being who terrorizes the living. Further images in the opening sequence seem 
to be more or less direct references to the themes articulated in Bergman's previous 
work: the spider conveys the image of God that is described in both Through a Glass 
Darkly and Winter Light; the juxtaposition of pagan and Christian ritual evokes the 
religious background of The Virgin Spring (1960); and, finally, the morbid 
examination of the corpses in the morgue returns us to the anxieties over death 
expressed (in particular) by The Seventh Seal and Wild Stra-wberries. 
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The opening sequence of Persona recapitulates the ideas and themes that have 
defined Bergman's cinema in the past, whilst also articulating his desire to move 
forward and create radically new forms of subjective cinematic narrative. Its free 
associative structure represents a significant development in the director's 
communication of non-linguistic thought. Indeed, Bergman would eventually suggest 
that with the experimental narratives of Persona and Cries and Whispers he had 
attained his fullest realization of the cinema's unique expressive possibilities: 
Today I feel that in Persona - and later in Cries and Whispers - I had gone as 
far as I could go. And that in these two instances, when working in total 
freedom, I touched wordless secrets that only the cinema can discover. 71 
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Thinking Modernity 
For me the film represents an attempt, still very crude and primitive, to 
approach the complexity of thought and of its mechanisms. I 
Perhaps more than any other filmmaker of the postwar period, Alain Resnais has 
shown himself to be acutely aware of the potential parallels between our most private 
internal thought processes and cinema, the most public of art forms. Critical analysis 
of this facet of Resnais' work has largely centred on the issue of memory - and 
inevitably this lies at the heart of many of Resnais films - but for the director memory 
is not, in itself, the fundamental aspect of our mental lives that his cinema addresses: 
'I prefer to speak of the imaginary, or of consciousness. What interests me in the mind 
is that faculty we have to imagine what is going to happen in our heads, or remember 
what has happened.,2 This process of visualization, our ability to conjure and 
manipulate mental images, is central to our everyday experience and understanding of 
the world around us, but it is also something which is highly abstract, entirely 
subjective and, as such, is not easily open to scientific analysis. Indeed the exact 
nature of mental representation is still a subject of heavy debate in the realm of 
cognitive psychology: 
Mental representations are created by the processes of perception and are 
exchanged between cognitive processes, serving as the currency of thought. 
There has therefore been much debate about the nature of mental 
representation. Much of this debate has focussed on the issue of whether 
mental representations are analogical, that is whether we think in images, or 
whether they are propositional (symbolic), that is language-like descriptions of 
the world. 3 
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While recent research seems to support the theory that mental representation utilizes 
both symbolic and analogical descriptions (and, certainly, this seems intuitively to be 
the case), it is still very difficult to offer a rigorous scientific understanding of 
consciousness.4 Arguably, the importance of Resnais' films lies in their recognition of 
the capacity of cinema to both represent and shape thought processes. Resnais' 
cinema offers an intuitive exploration of consciousness which grapples with both 
visual and symbolic aspects of our psychic experience. 
In Resnais' first feature film, Hiroshima mon amour, Emmanuelle Riva's 
unnamed French woman watches as her Japanese lover's hand twitches in his sleep. 
We then cut to the brief image of a dying German soldier, whose hand also spasms in 
a short close-up. On an immediate level, this sequence offers a visual representation 
of a memory, a flashback that draws its strength from the graphic analogy between the 
sleeping Japanese in the present and the dying German of the past. But as 
Hiroshima's narrative unfolds, and we learn more of the characters' circumstances, 
we also gain some awareness of the symbolic significance of this flash of memory, 
which helps to explain the French woman's subsequent compulsion to tell her story. 
For the French woman, this is not merely an involuntary memory evoked by a graphic 
analogue, but is also the beginning of a recognition of the basic analogy between two 
'transgressive' relationships. In her wartime relationship with the German, the French 
woman was seen as betraying her community and nation; through her adulterous 
relationship with the Japanese man, she is likewise betraying her family back in 
France. The nascent similarity between the two affairs comes into full consciousness 
when the French woman, in recounting her story to the Japanese man, begins to refer 
to the German as 'you', equating her present listener with her dead lover. As the film 
progresses, it becomes increasingly apparent that the single - and ostensibly simple -
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mental image is surprisingly dense in its connotations. This symbolic density not only 
points to the 'complexity of thought' that Resnais' cinema attempts to imitate, but 
also offers an insight into the significance of Resnais' subtle distinction between 
memory per se and the imaginative act of remembering. For Resnais, memory is 
rooted in the present moment: it is never a straightforward recollection of the past, but 
a reconstruction of the past through the lens of the present. Thus in Hiroshima the 
event recalled - the death of the German soldier - is not necessarily a faithful 
presentation of the event as it happened; rather, it is the event as it is filtered and 
reconstituted through the concerns of consciousness in the present moment. 
Although Hiroshima mon amour was, upon its release, rightly seen as a 
revolutionary film - as Jean-Luc Godard remarked, 'seeing Hiroshima gave one the 
impression of watching a film that would have been quite inconceivable in terms of 
what one was already familiar with in the cinema' - we can certainly locate its 
director within a broad tradition of filmmakers concerned with challenging the tenets 
of objective realism that had (and have) dominated narrative cinema since the arrival 
of sound. 5 Indeed, in the early 1960s, Resnais was frequently eager to list the 
filmmakers whom he felt had laid the ground for his own aesthetic, citing in particular 
Bunuel, Cocteau, Antonioni, Welles, Eisenstein and Visconti. 6 As Roy Armes notes, 
despite some major thematic, stylistic and ideological differences among the members 
of this group, 'What these directors do have in common ... is a dissatisfaction with the 
conception of cinema as the direct recording of reality. ,7 In diverse ways, all of these 
directors had challenged the basic assumption that cinema is in essence a realist art 
form. Where Resnais' early work went much further, was in its systematic exploration 
of the complicated interface between cinema, mental life, and external reality. It is 
worth noting, at this point, that Resnais came to feature filmmaking through first 
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working as a documentarist, and his output of the 1950s and '60s seems to thrive on 
the potential tension that exists between cinema's ability to document (or simply 
record) and its ability to fictionalize. If Resnais recognizes a visual component to 
thought that can be replicated in cinema, then he also recognizes the importance of 
audiovisual artefacts in moulding and transforming the collective imagination. The 
point can be clarified by returning to the example of how memory works in Resnais' 
cinema. Memory works on the personal level as a subjective recollection of the past 
mediated by conditions in the present, and this recollection can be imitated in 
audiovisual terms. However, as a physical record of the past, film can also be seen as 
a repository for collective memories, necessarily conditioning our interior 
representation of past events and our concomitant understanding of our history. 
There are thus two distinct aspects to Resnais' cinematic thought, and in this 
section, I will explore each in succession. Firstly, in this chapter, I will analyze the 
formal strategies that Resnais utilizes to explore thought in its various guises 
(memory, fantasy, dream and imagination). This will involve a close consideration of 
how Resnais' representation of his characters' thoughts can be related to different 
models of mental life: both theoretical models and those implicit in extant modernist 
literature and cinema. My analysis will, therefore, also build upon some of the ideas 
developed in the Bergman section. In the following chapter, I will go on to examine 
the historical and political dimensions of Resnais' work, focussing on how he 
addresses, and often problematizes, the relationship between the individual's 
subjective expenence and the wider 'collective imagination'. However, as a 
preliminary to these main lines of discussion, I feel it is necessary to consider another 
issue pertaining to the tensions between personal and collective imagination: the 
question of auteurism. 
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Cinematic Authorship 
Although Resnais had been making short documentaries since the late 1940s, the 
release of his first feature film coincided with the birth of the French New Wave. 
Consequently, he became identified, to a certain extent, with both the movement itself 
and the politique des auteurs that it advocated.8 However, the concept of auteurism 
becomes problematical when addressing Resnais' working practices. From an early 
stage in his career, Resnais showed a predilection for working with scriptwriters with 
a strong literary reputation. In 1950, the French poet Paul Eluard wrote the script for 
Resnais' short film Guernica, which explored the famous Picasso painting. Similarly, 
Resnais went on to collaborate with another poet (and concentration camp survivor), 
Jean Cayrol, on Night and Fog and Muriel, ou Le temps d 'un retour, and famously 
worked with the modernist writers Marguerite Duras and Alain Robbe-Grillet, on 
Hiroshima and Last Year at Marienbad respectively. As James Monaco astutely 
points out, the issue is not that Resnais utilizes scriptwriters better to fulfil his own 
vision, but that he actively rescinds the singular creative control credited to the 
director in auteur theory: 'he has made the opposition between auteur and author one 
of the main dynamics of his films.,9 In an article in 1960, Resnais himself disclaimed 
his auteur status in fairly explicit terms: 'Do I consider myself to be the author of my 
own films? No, but above all I consider that this does not interest me.' 10 To view 
these sentiments as simply self-deprecating, or as a rebuttal of auteur theory per se, is 
perhaps to miss the significance of Resnais' wholesale rejection of interest in being 
the 'author' of his work. A consideration of the deep importance of collaboration and 
collectivity in Resnais' cinema helps to illuminate this significance, especially as it 
relates back to the question of approaching thought - or imagination - through film. 
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Although Resnais has consistently sought out established writers with a distinctive 
personal style, and has encouraged these writers to be faithful to their own thematic, 
stylistic and narrative inclinations, he nevertheless is something more than a silent 
partner when it comes to scriptwriting. As Monaco deftly summarises: 
All of Resnais' screenwriters make it clear that he never imposes his views on 
them. All of them are equally insistent that the finished product - somehow -
strongly bears his mark. When the script has reached its final stage it 
represents a quiet collaboration between writer and director, and, as a result, 
Resnais changes very little of the scenario during the shooting. Resnais likes to 
have his film mapped out precisely before he begins so that he can pay 
attention to realizing the script in the mise-en-scene.!! 
The challenge that Resnais presents to conventional models of auteurism is further 
complicated when we consider the thematic and aesthetic consistency of his early 
work. This work displays a profound coherence that transcends the different 
collaborations underpinning each individual film, as several critics have observed. 
John Ward, for example, notes with some surprise the 'detailed unity' that marks 
Resnais' first quartet of feature films, asserting that this level of cohesiveness 'would 
be surprising from collaboration with a single writer, let alone with four.'!2 An 
obvious solution to this conundrum lies in the fact that Resnais is very careful in 
choosing collaborators: he seeks out writers whose themes and styles already 
complement his own particular worldview. Less obviously, perhaps, these 
collaborations also suggest an underlying symbiosis between cinematic narrative and 
French literary modernism in this period. 
In an excellent study of the relationship between the New Wave and the New 
Novel, Lynn Higgins scrupulously identifies the ways in which literature and cinema 
began to impact on each other in postwar France, transforming their respective formal 
properties in recognition of a shared philosophical ground and communal cultural 
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purpose. On the one hand, this equation manifested itself in 'the New Wave's 
adoption of a literary frame of reference for cinematic reform - its emphasis on the 
camera as a pen, on the development of individual auteuristic directorial forms of 
expression ... ,13 On the other hand - and more significantly, for the present discussion 
- the writings of the New Novelists evidenced a new kind of 'cinematic imagination', 
in tum suggesting a transformation in consciousness itself: 
If the filmmakers have attempted to bring into being what Agnes Varda calls a 
"cinecriture," the vision of the novelists is distinctly cinematic. [Claude] 
Simon frequently uses movie metaphors, and his descriptions are often 
implicitly film-like. He and Robbe-Grillet have both developed techniques of 
moving from one scene to the next. .. based on cinematic editing: their novels 
contain fades, extreme close-ups, wipes, rapid cuts and conspicuous montage, 
and cinematically articulated flashbacks. 14 
As Claude Simon makes clear, this is not a mimicry of cinema's narrative forms so 
much as it is a recognition of, and deference to, the way in which cinema modifies our 
capacity to process visual information: 'For me ... the cinema has enriched our vision 
of things (angles and distance of shots, panning shots, stills, dolly shots, close-ups). 
And naturally, that new way of seeing shows up in what I write.' 15 It is only a small 
step to extend Simon's recognition of the links between cinema and visual 
imagination into an argument concerning the ways in which cinema enriches thought 
more broadly - indeed, it is difficult to see how Simon's ideas can avoid being 
integrated into a wider web of issues relating to cinema and consciousness. In addition 
to Resnais' own comparable remarks on cinema and imagination, further support for 
Simon's intuitions can be found in areas of cognitive film theory. In an overview of 
such theory from the 1950s onwards, Dan Nadaner identifies the development of a 
conception of how audiovisual technology might impact upon thought processes: 
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Following Paivio's (1971) contention that human cognition possesses alternate 
modes of information processing and Olson's (1970) concept of intelligence as 
a skill in a medium, Salomon reasoned that new communication media might 
be calling upon or even developing new cognitive skills. 
Thus moving pictures might develop new skills in thinking in framed 
moving pictures, complete with flashbacks, close-ups, and zoom-ins. 16 
Again, while this theory is difficult to prove or disprove, it certainly seems plausible, 
and it keys into the dual interests of Resnais' cinema in terms of how film may both 
represent thought processes and, in tum, come to shape or transform the imaginative 
schemata through which our conceptions are formed. 
With this in mind, we can now directly address the question of why personal 
authorship is of little interest to Resnais. In stressing the importance of collective 
imagination as a facet of both production and reception, Resnais recognizes cinema 
not only as an art form particularly suited to rendering an approximation of individual 
thought processes, but also as a site of shared consciousness that inflects our 
imaginative engagement with the world. This partially explains Resnais' repeated 
conflation of private and public memory (or consciousness) in his early work. Private 
and public traumas constitute the two narrative strands in Hiroshima mon amour. 
Similarly, there are dualistic narratives in Muriel and The War is Over (1966), both of 
which use an individual's consciousness as a way of approaching collective 
experience (of the Algerian War and Spanish Fascism respectively). In each of these 
cases, Resnais challenges the dominant national discourses that seem to circumscribe 
the representation of historical events, using the representation of the individual's 
experience and consciousness as a way of redressing prevalent, and often officially 
sanctioned, ideology. I shall return to these issues concerning the collective 
imagination in the next chapter. First, it is crucial to embark upon a full discussion of 
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the fonnal innovations that Resnais utilizes III order to represent individual 
consciousness through film. 
Representing the Individual's Consciousness: Hiroshima mon amour 
Resnais' most fundamental innovation in representing subjectivity in film is perhaps 
his general refusal to utilize obvious visual markers to distinguish the subjective 
image from its objective counterpart. 17 In the vast majority of films, strongly 
subjective impressions that are generated in isolated moments of remembering, 
imagining, dreaming or fantasizing are marked as being different from objective 
images. Subjectivity is usually indicated through the use of visual devices such as soft 
focus photography or overexposure of the film stock. In contrast, Resnais' films rarely 
draw a qualitative distinction between the image as it is objectively recorded and the 
image as it is subjectively imagined or remembered. This is not to ignore the degree 
of abstraction that is still present in the subjective images of Resnais' films; but this 
abstraction is usually derived from content and context rather than from direct 
technical manipulation of the image. This strategy of representation has to be seen as 
a basic tenet of the mental realism that Resnais' cinema attempts to achieve. In 
affording an equal degree of realism to objective and subjective images, Resnais 
refuses to acknowledge an inherent difference between direct perception and our 
experience when we visualize something. 
The opening of Hiroshima mon amour exemplifies Resnais' innovative approach 
to representing a complex thought process through a series of images that are almost 
documentary-like in their realism. 18 It also introduces another important facet in 
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Resnais' construction of an interior monologue: an ambiguous relationship between 
the image-track and the soundtrack. Images of Hiroshima are cross-cut with abstract 
close-ups of two intertwined bodies, whilst on the soundtrack two voices argue: a 
female voice claims to have seen 'everything' in Hiroshima while a male voice 
repeatedly dismisses this claim, stating that the woman 'saw nothing.' It is only in 
retrospect that we can identify the voices as belonging to the French woman and the 
Japanese man, and surmise that the abstract bedroom scene represents the beginning 
of their brief affair. However, even when we understand these basic facts, the logic of 
the opening sequence is not immediately evident and requires some unpicking. 
Firstly, it is important to establish that the 'documentary' segment of the opening 
functions as some form of interior monologue, or memory, taking place in the mind of 
the French woman. The images that we see are not only 'directed' by the woman's 
voiceover, but also, at certain moments, seem to imply her presence as an observer. 
For example, when she speaks about her experiences at the hospital, we are given a 
slow forward tracking shot through the corridors (at approximately walking pace) 
while various patients and nurses look directly towards the camera, acknowledging 
the existence of a witness to the scenes. 
If this segment of the opening sequence is representative of the French woman's 
memory or consciousness, it might seem logical that the bedroom scene acts as the 
'present moment' from which previous events are being described, remembered or 
imagined. However, there is strong reason to doubt that the opening shots represent a 
concrete situation in which a real debate between the two characters is taking place. 
Firstly, the poeticism, repetition and rhetoric that mark the dialogue seem to be at 
odds with such a hypothesis. especially when we consider the generally more prosaic 
dialogue which typifies subsequent sections of the film. It therefore makes more sense 
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to regard the 'dialogue' as being simply another facet of the woman's internal 
monologue or thought process, representing some aspect of her uncertainty as she 
strives to make sense of her experiences in Hiroshima. Similarly, the repeated images 
that depict the entwined couple, whilst obviously referencing a real liaison, are 
deliberately abstract and unrealistic, and so must be regarded as another part of a 
complex interior monologue. The opening shots depict the two bodies covered by - in 
the words of Marguerite Duras - 'ashes, rain, dew or sweat.' 19 This symbolic 
depiction of the lovers clearly foreshadows the specific details that emerge when the 
French woman 'recollects' her experiences at the museum in Hiroshima, where she 
saw various reconstructions and newsreels depicting the aftermath of the atomic blast. 
During these reconstructions, we again see bodies covered by ashes and by rainfall 
that has become tainted with nuclear fallout. Similarly, we can identify more general 
connections between the two segments of the opening sequence, reinforcing the sense 
that together they constitute a continuous and unified stream of consciousness. To 
take another example, the two segments share a common emphasis on the sensitivity -
or vulnerability - of flesh: repeated close-ups of the lovers caressing each other's 
unblemished skin in the first segment are jarringly contrasted with images of 
horrifically burnt flesh in the second. Thus when we reflect upon the opening 
sequence as a whole, the two 'distinct' segments seem to be subtly, but inextricably, 
linked by underlying thought processes within a singular consciousness. 
I have referred to the opening sequence of Hiroshima mon amour as both an 
interior monologue and a stream of consciousness, but I believe it is important to 
make a subtle distinction between the terms as I am using them. As the term is 
commonly used, stream of consciousness implies a continuous flow of thoughts, ideas 
or impressions, which may be either verbal or non-verbal. The term suggests a fairly 
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unstructured, associative mental process wherein fleeting impressions and ideas are 
brought together without necessarily being given a concrete form. In contrast, interior 
monologue suggests a more structured mental state, with thoughts being resolved 
linguistically, or at least with an equivalent degree of mental organization. In the 
initial representation of the French woman's thought processes and memories, there is 
a movement between different degrees of mental organization. As we have seen, there 
is a very tentative free association of ideas and visual motifs through which the 
woman begins to relate - perhaps unconsciously - her experience of Hiroshima to 
both her present situation and her personal wartime trauma. However, large sections 
of the opening sequence also seem to be scrupulously organized, with the image-track 
working in close conjunction with the woman's verbal descriptions as she mentally 
catalogues her thoughts about the city. At certain points, the methods used to 
represent the French woman's memories, impressions and ideas are strikingly similar 
to the documentary techniques found in Night and Fog. Therefore, it seems crucial to 
ascribe aspects of both the stream of consciousness and the interior monologue to the 
opening sequence. The opening is marked by an oscillation between a conscious 
effort to work through concrete data and the involuntary free association of ideas as 
they arise from moment to moment. As the film progresses, this oscillation 
consistently typifies the representation of the French woman's thought processes as 
she begins to recollect her own traumatic wartime experience. 
The movement from involuntary memory to conscious recall is demonstrated most 
clearly through the way in which the details pertaining to the French woman's first 
love affair (in wartime Nevers) are presented to us. Initially, as previously noted, we 
are given an isolated glimpse of the affair's traumatic conclusion, in the form of an 
involuntary flash of memory. Whilst being questioned by the Japanese man, the 
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woman begins to recall further details of her experience, and subsequently recounts 
the entire story as a coherent and chronological narrative. However, even within this 
purposeful recollection of events, the details that emerge from the woman's story are 
mediated by a series of free associations with her present situation, so that the Nevers 
story is, in part, reconstructed in relation to the woman's recent experiences in 
Hiroshima. As Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier insightfully observes, there is a 
powerful mirroring process whereby several ideas and motifs that surface in the 
woman's initial recollection of the museum in Hiroshima are reflected in the 
subsequent recollection of Nevers: 
A deformed hand, a destroyed eye, hair tom out, a distraught woman breaking 
out of a cavernous dwelling, legs of passers-by, river, anger, stone -long is the 
list of materials which the narrative of Nevers drags out of Hiroshima's 
museum and reconstructs into appeased, if not acceptable, forms. 2o 
This mirroring structure begins to formulate a relationship between the individual and 
collective experiences of wartime trauma, a point to which I will return in the next 
chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the interior monologue that accompanies 
the French woman's verbal recollection of Nevers does not function as a 'flashback' 
in the conventional sense, with the images faithfully depicting an immutable past. 
Instead, the 'memories' that we see on screen reconstruct the past as it is experienced 
and imagined in the present moment. 21 
The juxtaposition of past and present in the act of remembering has an important 
consequence: it emphasises the creative aspects of memory, reaffirming the 
significance of Resnais' distinction between straightforward 'recollection' and 
imagination or consciousness more broadly. There are two ways of looking at how 
underlying imaginative processes assert an influence on the French woman's 
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memones or perceptions III a gIven present moment. We could say that her 
recollection of Nevers is guided by her analogous (but obviously indirect) experience 
of wartime trauma in Hiroshima. Or, alternatively, we might argue that her immediate 
perceptions of Hiroshima, and in particular the details that she focuses on in the 
museum, are already inflected by her own memories of the war. However, the two 
interpretations need not be mutually exclusive, and it might be more productive to 
suggest that there is simply a dynamic movement between past memories and present 
perceptions that shapes the woman's thoughts as they are presented to us. In any case, 
the creative function of memory lends a heightened significance to the specific images 
that occur while the woman is recollecting or narrating. The precise formulation of 
these images is highly significant in terms of the insight it affords us into the French 
woman's mental state and thought processes. As Lynn Higgins argues: 
If we view her, for a moment, in terms of her narrative function rather than in 
terms of the actress's presence on the screen, we can see that the French 
woman is told by her stories more than she tells them, and her subjectivity is 
the product rather than the source of the spectacle she sees.22 
This reversal, whereby the narration of a story emphasises the primary importance of 
the teller's subjectivity, is not in itself an innovation. Both Citizen Kane (1941) and, 
in particular, Rashomon (1950) develop a similar shift in focus, so that the subjective 
act of recollection takes priority over, and in many places obscures, the accurate 
depiction of events. The difference with Hiroshima, and Resnais' cinema more 
broadly, is that it offers a more subtle and complex rendering of subjectivity and 
thought processes within its extended first-person narratives and streams of 
consciousness. In earlier examples of 'first-person' cinema, there is usually an 
obvious level of narratorial bias (or a specific 'agenda') that justifies the distortion or 
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obfuscation of past events; in Resnais' films, the creative composition of first-person 
narratives and memory images is rarely symptomatic of conscious falsification, but 
instead reveals the complexity of the individual mind. 
Along with the content and composition of the images that represent the French 
woman's memories, the order in which some of these memory images are presented 
to us provides further insight into her mental processes. In particular, the gradual, 
non-chronological evocation of the details surrounding the shooting of the German 
soldier suggests the difficult recollection of the French woman's worst, suppressed 
memories. When, at the Japanese man's behest, the woman begins to relate the story 
of her first affair with the German soldier, she provides only a few details of their 
clandestine meetings before abruptly stating, 'Then he died ... I was eighteen.' This 
statement is accompanied by a seemingly innocuous low-angle shot of a balcony 
garden, followed by a dissolve back to the present scene at the Japanese man's house. 
We have to wait until the next scene, where the woman narrates the rest of her story in 
the tea room, before we can understand the significance of the balcony image. Having 
related the aftermath of the German's death (her descent into 'madness' and the long 
period of confinement in the cellar), the French woman returns to the death itself, 
finally recollecting all the details of the event as a continuous narrative. She reveals 
that on the day that Nevers was liberated, the German soldier was shot from a balcony 
by a Resistance fighter. As she speaks, her memory of the incident is succinctly 
represented by an image of her running to meet the German, followed by a swift pan 
to her approximate optical point-of-view of his fallen body, followed by another quick 
pan up to the balcony. The accumulation of details eventually builds up a coherent 
picture of events, as we move from isolated, disordered images of the German's death 
to a full understanding of what happened. As Haim Callev observes, 
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This process of evocation reflects the operating principles of the originating 
mind. It begins with resistance to the emerging memories, peaks with their full 
evocation and ends with detachment, which leads to a new liberating oblivion. 
The order in which the mental images appear on the screen re~resents the 
difficulties in the mental process of extracting repressed memories. 3 
Ultimately, the conscious recollection of Nevers - in terms of both the visual interior 
monologue and the verbal narration - represents a therapeutic attempt to make sense 
of something that seems at first to be incomprehensible. Ropars-Wuilleumier is again 
particularly insightful on this point, suggesting that the French woman's narration acts 
to 'transform one isolated, brutal, incomprehensible image - the first mental 
visualization of the dying German - into a coherent and continuous whole whose 
verbalization guarantees, moreover, its interpretation. ,24 This gradual process of 
interpretation can be seen as the underlying narrative trajectory of the entire film, 
applying equally to the personal history of Nevers and, in a more oblique way, to the 
public history of Hiroshima. The thought processes that are represented in the film 
trace a movement from a loose association of ideas and fleeting impressions towards a 
more comprehensive mental interpretation, expressed in a coherent narrative form. 
The Ambiguous Internal Monologue: Last Year at Marienbad 
Last Year at Marienbad begins in a similar way to Hiroshima. A man's voiceover, 
accompanied by lugubrious organ music, comments upon the baroque decor of the 
large hotel (or, perhaps, hotels) in which the film is set. At the same time, the camera 
glides through endless, labyrinthine corridors in a series of tracking shots, gradually 
revealing details of the mise-en-scene without pausing or focusing on any feature in 
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particular. Eventually, we arrive in a dark salon where a play is being performed - a 
play which, it subsequently transpires, has the same basic plot as Marienbad itself. 
After a short time, the camera tracks towards the stage (on which an actress stands 
motionless), before cutting to reveal a rapt audience. With this cut, both the music and 
the man's voiceover come to an abrupt end, being replaced by the diegetic dialogue 
between the actor and actress on stage. It is immediately noticeable that the actor's 
speech is markedly similar to the previous voiceover, repeating specific words and 
phrases from the monologue, and sharing its distinctive rhythm and intonation. 
As in Hiroshima, we are given an introductory sequence that functions as a form 
of interior monologue, with the voiceover and the shots of the hotel obliquely setting 
up later ideas, motifs and narrative. The subsequent staging of the play, with its 
reworking of the voiceover, suggests a plausible 'present moment' in which the 
monologue might be rooted. We come to recognize that the opening voiceover was 
spoken by Giorgio Albertazzi, whose character - identified in Robbe-Grillet's 
screenplay as 'X' - is present in the audience of the play.25 Therefore, with hindsight, 
the most obvious interpretation of the opening might suggest that it is a function of 
X's imagination, a daydream that he experiences whilst watching the play. Several 
critics have taken this idea even further, postulating that the entire story of Marienbad 
could be the fantastical imaginings of one of the characters in the audience, as he or 
she reworks the play's basic narrative into the drama involving X, A (Delphine 
Seyrig) and M (Sacha Pitoeff).26 Regardless of whether we accept this particular 
interpretation or not, the fact that such an interpretation is feasible is suggestive of the 
complexity of Marienbad's narrative structure, and of the potential ubiquity of the 
internal monologue within the film. 
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Resnais himself has stressed that most of the scenes found in Marienbad must be 
understood as interior monologue; the film provides a pervasive, visual representation 
of consciousness: 
The interior monologue is never in the soundtrack; it is almost always in the 
visuals, which, even when they show events in the past, correspond to the 
present thoughts in the mind of the character. So what is presented as the 
present or the past is simply a reality which exists while the character is 
k· 27 spea mg. 
The fact that the interior monologue is 'almost always' present in the image-track, 
regardless of whether it ostensibly refers to present or past, this year or last year, 
marks the most obvious and significant divergence from the narrative form of 
Hiroshima. Marienbad introduces a new level of ambiguity in terms of what is 
imagined or remembered and what, if anything, is 'real'. This ambiguity also extends 
to the question of which character, at anyone point, remembers or imagines: 'one 
never knows if the images are in the man's head or the woman's. There is throughout 
a movement between the twO.,28 This principle is emphatically demonstrated at an 
early point in the film. After the play, X observes an argument between two 
characters, a man and a woman. They are framed in a mirror, with X occupying a 
position in the foreground between the mirror and a doorframe. As the argument 
intensifies, the camera pans away from X, centring the couple in the frame. After a 
few seconds, the camera pans back, but X has disappeared and A is now present at the 
scene of the argument, leaning against the far side of the doorframe. This scene seems 
to serve little narrative purpose, other than to emphasize for the viewer the 
ambiguities that will consistently be present in the film's representations of space, 
time and point of view. 
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The uncertainty of who visualizes during the interior monologues aids a tentative, 
psychologically-ambiguous, mental relationship between X and A. Robbe-Grillet 
describes Marienbad as being, essentially, 
the story of a persuading: it deals with a reality which the hero creates out of 
his own vision, out of his own words. And if his persistence, his secret 
conviction, finally prevail, they do so among a perfect labyrinth of false trails 
variants, failures and repetitions.29 
X's struggle to persuade A of the veracity of his vision is crystallized in specific 
images that are explicitly shaped and directed by his verbal narration. For example, he 
describes encountering A leaning against a stone balustrade in the gardens of 
Frederiksbad, giving precise details of her position and posture. At the same time, we 
see an image of A that is contrary to this description: A's position on screen is notably 
- defiantly - different. However, after a pause of a few seconds, A appears to 
acquiesce, 'correcting' her position on screen to fit the previous description. Again, 
the precise details of this encounter may have little narrative significance, but they 
draw attention to several important questions regarding the nature of the 'mental 
reality' that is being created on screen: To whom we should attribute the mental 
images? Are these memories or fantasies or a mixture of the two? Is A beginning to 
accept (or even recollect) X's story? Is there a potential conflict in how the two 
characters remember or imagine the past? All of these questions become more 
important as the film progresses and the story of what happened 'last year' grows 
increasingly contentious. 
In addition to the ambiguities that arise from having two different 'narrators', with 
(possibly) different interpretations of the 'reality' that is being created, there is a more 
general sense of narrative ambiguity that we can identify in Marienbad. This arises 
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from Resnais and Robbe-Grillet's particular conceptualization of consciousness, and 
their concern with faithfully depicting the complexity of our mental lives. In the 
introduction to the Marienbad screenplay, published shortly after the film's release, 
Robbe-Grillet recalls that one of the first things he and Resnais agreed upon was that 
their film should abandon traditional relations of cause and effect in favour of a more 
accurate depiction of thought processes taking place during a subjective time frame: 
Everyone knows the linear plots of the old-fashioned cinema, which never 
spare us a link in the chain of all-too-expected events ... In reality, our mind 
goes faster - or slower, on occasion. Its style is more varied, richer and less 
reassuring: it skips certain passages, it preserves a perfect record of certain 
'unimportant' details, it repeats and doubles back on itself. And this mental 
time, with its peculiarities, its gaps, its obsessions, its obscure areas, is the one 
that interests us since it is the tempo of our emotions, of our life. 30 
Throughout Marienbad, we see the fundamental importance of subjective time to the 
construction of the narrative and the representation of individual incidents - even 
when those incidents seem, at first, to be entirely realistic. At several points, during 
the course of apparently banal background conversations, the hotel guests suddenly 
stop talking and become as motionless as the statues in the gardens. After several 
seconds, the conversations resume as if there had been no break. We also see the mind 
'doubling back' on itself in the several scenes and motifs that recur at various stages 
in the narrative: the scene at the statue, the game of Nim that M always wins, the 
firing range, the tracking shots through endless corridors. All of these repeated scenes 
serve to arrest normal narrative progression in deference to the construction of a 
subjective reality and time frame. The complexity of the film's narrative structure is 
demanded by its objective of representing complex thought patterns and emotions, as 
Robbe-Grillet emphasizes: 
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Marienbad is as opaque as the moments we live through in the climaxes of our 
feelings, in our loves, in our whole emotional life. So to reproach the film for 
its lack of clarity is really to reproach human feelings for their obscurity.31 
Given the ambiguities concerning causal connections and narrative point of view, 
is it still possible - or even worthwhile - to offer an interpretation of 'what happened' 
last year at Marienbad? A further comment made by Robbe-Grillet helps to clarify 
this issue. He suggests that form, as opposed to immediate content, dictates the 
ultimate meaning of Marienbad: 'It is in its form that we must look for its true 
content. ,32 It is specifically in the formal representation of certain events, ideas and 
emotions that we can begin to build a picture of what might have happened. Resnais 
similarly suggests that through close formal analysis we can discern different levels of 
plausibility in images representing past events: 
[ ... ] if you study Marienbad closely, you see that certain images are 
ambiguous, that their degree of reality is equivocal. But some images are far 
more clearly false, and there are images of lying whose falsity is, I feel, quite 
evident.33 
One such image, which seems to have a high degree of narrative significance, occurs 
when X describes going up to A's bedroom. We see an over-exposed shot which is 
repeated four times, depicting A apparently welcoming X with open arms. The over-
exposure of the shot suggests overt subjectivity in a very conventional manner, and 
the fact that Resnais so rarely uses this type of stylistic marking only serves to 
emphasize further the director's desire that we infer the questionability of this 
particular image. The narrative implication is clear: if X and A did indeed have some 
form of relationship in the past, it is not necessarily as depicted in X's account. 
Indeed, the later stages of Marienbad become increasingly dominated by the deeply 
disturbing 'potential' narratives that we can infer from the formal presentation of the 
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mental images conjured by X and A, including the suggestion that A was raped by X 
and this was followed by her murder or suicide. 
X may present a false account of the nature of his previous relationship with A, 
but this does not mean that he is deliberately lying. As his story progresses, it 
becomes increasingly marked by moments of self-doubt, hesitation, confusion and 
denials of alternative versions of events ('No! That's wrong ... It wasn't by force ... '). 
If his narrative is hiding a more sinister version of last year's events, it seems that the 
details have become subject to repression and self-censorship. The film might 
represent the mechanisms of a mind seeking to suppress certain memories. This idea 
is given added credence by the comparable processes explored not only by Resnais in 
Hiroshima mon amour, but also by Robbe-Grillet's previous written work. The 
Voyeur (1955), for example, tells the story of a few hours in the life of a travelling 
salesman, Matthias, who, it is implied (though never confirmed), may have murdered 
a young gir1. 34 We are given a precise, and seemingly objective, visual description of 
Matthias' movements and observations, and from this we gain an oblique insight into 
his mental state. During this time, we learn about the murder through a newspaper 
which the protagonist repeatedly unfolds. We are led to infer Matthias' involvement 
in the crime through the ambiguous timeline of events and a suspicious gap in his day, 
where his movements are not recounted. Arguably, the narrative structure of Last 
Year at Marienbad follows an extremely similar pattern, with a central idea or event 
being repressed, or even entirely excised from the story as it is presented to us. 
Robbe-Grillet offers a highly illuminating description of how his work relies upon a 
conspicuous narrative gap, 'a sort of hollow in the heart of reality': 
In Marienbad it is the 'last year' which provides the hollow. What happens 
then - if anything - produces a constant emptiness in the story ... The narrative 
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covers everything as far as the void, and everything subsequent to it; and we 
then try to join the two so as to dispose of that disquieting emptiness. But the 
opposite happens; the emptiness spreads, it fills everything.35 
In a very real sense, we can say that it is an unrepresented rape which forms the 
hollow of Last Year at Marienbad. Robbe-Grillet actually scripted a 'swift and brutal 
rape scene' which Resnais decided not to shoot. 36 The primary reason might have 
been anticipated problems with censorship, but the decision to omit the rape certainly 
also reinforces the atmosphere of 'disquieting emptiness' that Robbe-Grillet describes 
in his work. Throughout the filmed version of Marienbad, we are given unsettling 
intimations of the repressed rape of A by X, as if the absent trauma at the heart of the 
story does indeed distort the rest of the narrative, 'filling' every other event. Lynn 
Higgins provides an incisive account of this process: 
If rape as an event has been suppressed from the story, it is present as 
discourse, dispersed in multiple thematic codes. It is represented symbolically 
by a series of broken things: a glass, A's shoe, later a balustrade over which X 
escapes being seen by M. It is present in a theme of penetration (into rooms, 
into thoughts). It can be seen in the fear A's face displays and in her repeated 
and increasingly frantic refrain, 'Please [more literally, I beg of you] ... let me 
alone ... ' It is there in the various manifestations of X's pursuit and A's flight. 
And it is visible in the actress's self-protective gesture, arm held diagonally 
across her torso, which becomes her character's signature.37 
We might add that along with these recurrent symbols and themes, the editing of 
certain sequences is also suggestive of a concealed or repressed narrative wherein X, 
having been spumed, violently assaults A. An early scene at the firing range is 
particularly noteworthy. Here we see a number of armed men in a line, with X present 
in the middle of the line-up. In tum, each man turns around and quickly fires his 
pistol. When it is X's tum to fire, he turns around and aims his pistol, but before he 
shoots there is a cut to a different location, showing A emerging from a darkened 
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background. The two shots are joined in such a way as to suggest a coherent space, as 
if X is indeed shooting at A. Again, we are given a glimpse of a narrative that might 
be absent or repressed from the film's direct 'content', but may yet subsist in its style 
and structure. 
Speculation and Dream: The War Is Over and Providence 
After the formal experimentation that marked Resnais' first two feature films, his 
subsequent work seems, by comparison, somewhat simpler; it is less complex in terms 
of narrative structure and less ambiguous in terms of meaning. Nevertheless, the 
director's fascination with the workings of the brain and consciousness persists 
throughout the first half of his career, emerging as a thematic concern in all of his 
films from Muriel to Man ancle d 'Amerique (1980). In Muriel, Resnais once again 
explores wartime trauma and its impact upon the psyche, telling the story of a young 
veteran of the French-Algerian conflict who struggles to live with his memories of the 
atrocities committed by French soldiers. The film deals with both the personal and the 
collective experience of decolonization, and charts a profound shift in consciousness 
with regard to the implications of French imperialism (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter). In a very different way, Stavisky (1974) also addresses a specifically 
French collective experience. This film is a historical drama which recreates the 
events leading to the suicide, or possibly murder, of Serge Alexandre, the notorious 
French-Jewish financier and conman. In the course of Stavisky, Resnais' interest is not 
only in recreating a significant political scandal and mysterious death, but also in 
exploring how these events might be remembered or imagined.38 By contrast, Man 
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oncle d'Amerique again confronts the workings of the brain in a very direct manner, 
investigating the role of genetic determinism in human social behaviour. The film 
mixes conventional narrative with scientific treatise, balancing a contemporary human 
interest story with a series of interviews with behavioural scientist Henri Laborit, 
whose sociobiological theory provides a sort of intermittent commentary on the 
fictional drama. 
In very different ways, all of the films that Resnais made during this period (1963-
1980) attest to his ongoing concern with the relationship between film and thought. 
However, in the context of our present discussion, two films, The War Is Over (1966) 
and Providence (1977), require particular attention. Although not as systematically 
experimental as his earliest works, these films offer significant developments in terms 
of the formal strategies that Resnais utilizes in order to represent thought and explore 
consciousness. I shall, therefore, conclude my analysis of Resnais' stylistic and 
narrative innovations with a brief investigation of each film. 
The War Is Over was Resnais' first collaboration with Jorge Semprun (who would 
later write the screenplay for Stavisky), and tells the story of Diego (Yves Montand), a 
Spanish revolutionary who has spent thirty years trying to mobilize resistance to 
Franco's Fascist regime. Diego works out of France as part of a small, left wing 
movement which is involved in distributing subversive literature across the border. 
The film concerns the revolutionary group's attempt to organize a general strike in 
Spain amidst the government's large counter-insurgency operation, which leads to the 
capture of several key members of the resistance. 
For the most part, the story of The War Is Over is told in a straightforward, 
realistic and stylistically conventional manner. However, this largely conventional 
presentation of events is punctuated by the intermittent representation of the 
protagonist's thoughts as he imagines future events.39 Sequences of subjective images 
depict possible future scenarios as they play out in Diego's mind. This unusual 
narrative technique is introduced at a very early stage in the film, while Diego is being 
driven across the Spanish border back into France. The driver (Dominique Rozan) 
reassures Diego that they should reach the train station before the train to Paris is 
scheduled to depart. As the driver continues to talk, we are presented with a rapid 
succession of shots depicting Diego's speculative thought process. The shots 
represent various potential scenarios: Diego boarding the train as it pulls away, or 
narrowly missing the departure, or being greeted by a friend as he arrives in Paris, and 
so forth. Many critics have described these images as 'flashforwards', but as James 
Monaco observes, this term is not very precise: 'Diego doesn't summon up pictures of 
what is about to happen but rather alternatives of what might happen. ,40 These shots 
might, therefore, be better described as speculative or subjunctive images. In any case, 
while these images anticipate a possible future, they follow Marienbad's 
representation of the internal monologue in being firmly rooted in the perpetual 
present moment of consciousness. Throughout the film's first proleptic sequence, the 
unbroken conversation on the soundtrack constantly reaffirms the present reality. 
Similarly, background noise and conversation is a consistent feature of later 
representations of Diego's speculative imagination, so that we are very aware of how 
the images function as a fleeting 'mental reality' occupying a finite time in the 
present. 
This representation of thought - as a rapid oscillation between perception and 
imagination - has an inherent value as an accurate depiction of everyday mental life. 
However, the recurring evocation of the protagonist's mental speculations also has a 
powerful resonance within the specific narrative context of The War Is Over. Diego's 
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precanous situation means that he has to be constantly looking forward, being 
concerned with both evading the Spanish authorities in the short-term and planning a 
long-term revolutionary strategy. Monaco observes, 
Diego's continual involvement in decision-making introduces an important 
new facet of Resnais' s investigation into the phenomenon of imagination. In 
the past, alternate realities for Resnais' s characters had been composed of 
equal parts memory and fantasy: both were essentially psychological. But now 
the life of the mind takes on a new meaning: logical rather than emotional.41 
The War Is Over is undoubtedly marked by a more systematic use of logic as a 
structuring principle for thought processes. This is particularly noticeable in Diego's 
voiceovers, where he consistently refers to himself in the second person (as 'tu'), 
analyzing his thoughts and actions in an apparently objective manner. However, it is 
misleading to suggest that Diego's attitude is logical rather than emotional. Diego's 
imagination of the future frequently seems involuntary and prompted by anxiety, as 
when he imagines the possible capture of Juan (Jean-Fran90is Remi), a fellow 
revolutionary who may have been identified as an insurgent by the Spanish 
government. Similarly, the proleptic images that reveal Diego's friends and associates 
before they are encountered in actuality do not merely reaffirm the logical pre-
planning of subsequent actions, but offer an insight into the protagonist's emotions. 
Resnais offers an interesting interpretation of the effect of introducing the characters 
in Diego's imagination before they appear in 'real' scenes: 'It interests me when one 
sees the scenes that they correspond to a feeling of deja-vu, that they are anticipated. I 
think that all of the characters in the film are presented as imaginary figures before 
they appear in reality. ,42 The feeling of deja-vu that is created for the viewer gives 
some sense of the repetitive routine that constitutes Diego's long experience as a 
revolutionary. It suggests Diego's weariness, his emotional response to a constant 
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battle that does not seem to be marked by significant progress and does not have an 
end in sight. 
Through the course of the film, Diego displays a great deal of ambivalence 
towards his vocation. This is not because of any lack of conviction in the worthiness 
of his revolutionary cause, but because he has come to question the level of personal 
sacrifice it entails and the effectiveness of his movement's policies. Diego's 
ambivalence extends to the realm of his personal relationships, where his involvement 
with two women seems to present us with something of a symbolic dichotomy. 
Firstly, we see Diego's brief affair with Nadine (Genevieve Bujold), the daughter of 
Rene Sallanches, the man whose passport Diego uses in order to cross the Spanish 
border. It later transpires that Nadine is also part of a radical left wing group which 
plans to use explosives to disrupt Spain's tourist trade and so financially cripple the 
regime. Diego is also involved in a long-term relationship with Marianne (Ingrid 
Thulin), whom he stays with while in Paris. Marianne is the antithesis of Nadine, 
being much closer to Diego's age, having a seemingly normal life and job, and 
expressing the desire to raise a family with Diego. Although both women are fully 
developed characters, they also seem to have a strong symbolic function, presenting 
Diego with two possible futures. Marianne seems to symbolize security, comfort and 
a permanent identity, while Nadine symbolizes freedom and a youthful revolutionary 
fervour, untouched by the cynicism of experience. Diego's attraction to both women 
can thus be seen as an extension of his general emotional uncertainty regarding his 
future as a revolutionary fighter. Again, this facet of Diego's mental life is given a 
concrete representation in a sequence of imaginative images. After learning that he 
will not be returning to Spain for some time, his comrades deeming it to be too 
dangerous, Diego immediately phones Marianne to tell her that he will be staying in 
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France with her, 'maybe forever.' While he insists that he is not unhappy with this 
outcome, we are simultaneously presented with a sequence of mental images 
depicting his possible ambivalence, culminating in a lengthy shot of Nadine as he 
recollects their brief liaison. 
While the subjective images representing Diego's thoughts provide The War is 
Over with a very distinctive aesthetic and offer an ongoing insight into the 
protagonist's mind, in real terms, these short interludes occupy only a small 
proportion of the film's running time. In contrast, Providence, Resnais' only English 
language film, offers a more pervasive representation of mental life, more in line with 
the director's earliest works. 
Providence is divided into two parts. The first depicts a restless night in the life of 
a dying, alcoholic author, Clive Langham (John Gielgud). During this night, Clive 
begins to imagine a story where the principal characters are his three children: his 
sons, Claud (Dirk Bogarde) and Kevin (David Warner), and his daughter-in-law -
Claud's wife - Sonia (Ellen Burstyn). This story begins with an apparent mercy 
killing: Kevin shoots an old man who seems to be metamorphosing into an animal. He 
is subsequently put on trial for murder, with Claud as the prosecuting lawyer, but is 
acquitted. Afterwards, Sonia - who is trapped in a loveless marriage with Claud -
tries to initiate an affair with Kevin. This narrative can be seen as the product of both 
the conscious and unconscious processes of its author: at times, Clive seems to be 
knowingly creating, 'directing' his characters and interpreting their actions (through 
voiceover) as he plans out a future novel; at other times, Clive may well be dreaming, 
with certain recurring nightmare images encroaching on the story as its author lapses 
in and out of sleep.43 The second, shorter part of Providence is set the following day, 
on Clive's seventy-eighth birthday. Here Clive is visited by Claud, Kevin and Sonia, 
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and there are obvious and startling discrepancies between these real life characters 
and the fictional counterparts dreamt up by Clive. For example, the previously cold, 
arrogant and contemptuous Claud is now portrayed as being warm and sensitive; 
similarly, his relationship with Sonia is now revealed to be loving and monogamous. 
The discrepancies between how Clive's children act in the dream! story and how 
they act in reality are very telling. Retrospectively, what emerges in Clive's story -
much more than an insight into the minds of his children - is the revelation of his own 
psyche - his fears, desires, anxieties, preoccupations and so forth. Marsha Kinder 
observes that Providence lends itself to 'a Gestalt approach to dreams in which all 
characters, settings, and props are seen as projections of the dreamer. ,44 
Consequently, the rather two-dimensional characters who populate Clive's story can 
be seen as exaggerated or purified aspects of his own personality: 
From a Freudian perspective Clive is the ego, who is hounded by Claud, the 
'contemptuous' lawyer and 'jailer,' functioning as super-ego: in self-defence, 
the ego encourages the childish id figures - the rebellious Sonia and the radical 
visionary Kevin - to act out their (and his) libidinal desires.45 
Although Resnais' previous representations of the mind have engaged with a general 
psychoanalytic framework - in terms of depicting repression, trauma and hysteria, for 
example - Providence does so in a much more obvious and self-conscious manner. A 
Freudian reading of the film is playfully encouraged by the Oedipal struggle that 
underpins several different narrative strands. Most notably, Claud's mistress (Elaine 
Stritch) resembles his dead mother, Molly, who we later learn committed suicide 
whilst suffering from terminal cancer. Clive's guilt concerning this fact goes a great 
way towards explaining much of the psychical drama that unfolds in the first section 
of the film. At the moment when Clive 'invents' Claud's mistress, his voiceover 
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commentary reveals, 'She looks like his mother! Clearly, the boy must have an 
unconscious mind, just like everybody else. ' 
Of course, the unconscious mind that is revealed to us is Clive's own, through his 
dreams and through the process of sublimation as he creates his story. Clive's 
unconscious introspection is encapsulated in a recurring visual metaphor: the image of 
an autopsy, perhaps the fantastical representation of Clive's own body being dissected 
after death. Later, in the second section of the film, Claud will reaffirm one aspect of 
this image's significance, using his own verbal metaphor to make a connection 
between the writer's creative process and a gruesome dissection. After Clive reveals 
that he has been working on an idea for a new novel, Claud immediately asks, 'Who 
are you disembowelling this time?' The metaphor is doubly apt, not only pointing to 
the way in which Clive's story reveals the gruesome traumas that underlie his psychic 
dysfunction, but also recalling Clive's physical illness: the breakdown of his digestive 
system is the main symptom of his terminal illness, and it is this that leads to his 
nightmarish nocturnal experience. For Clive, the visual metaphor is similarly over-
determined. The image of the autopsy also signifies the spectre of Clive's imminent 
death, something which constantly haunts his imagination. This vision is recurring 
and involuntary, a fact that is emphasized when the image first appears and Clive's 
voiceover pleads, 'Get out of my mind.' 
There is one other image which 'intrudes' into Clive's waking life: the memory of 
his wife's suicide. In the second section of the film, while Clive looks at an old 
photograph of Molly, comparing his mirrored image to her portrait, we are shown a 
sequence depicting his vivid memory of her suicide. We see Molly's body lying in the 
bathtub where she has opened her veins. As Wilson points out, the image is designed 
to create a powerful visual impact: 'the blood-red bathwater is in stark contrast to the 
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black and white of the rest of the frame. ,46 The indelibility of the image is very 
important, as it is Molly's suicide which determines and explains how Clive imagines 
his relationship with his children, particularly Claud. It is implied that although he 
may have loved his wife, Clive was not faithful to her and may, at times, have treated 
her with the same coldness that Claud displays towards Sonia in his fantasy. 
Therefore, Clive sees himself as being partly culpable for Molly's suicide, and 
imagines that Claud likewise blames his father - despite Claud's protestations to the 
contrary. Monaco argues: 'This is the basic emotional set of the film: a quasi-
paranoid, irreconcilable dichotomy between one's image of oneself and one's image 
of the self as perceived by others. ,47 At times this dichotomy is definitely 'paranoid', 
but we might question whether there is not some reality, or at least plausibility, behind 
the thoughts and emotions that Clive attributes to his son. Although, in the second 
section, Claud states that he does not blame his father for Molly's death, his words do 
not seem entirely convincing. He attempts to absolve his father of guilt, but their 
relationship remains strained, as if the suspicion of mental recriminations can not be 
so easily eliminated. Indeed, the entire second section - with its sunshine and bucolic 
setting - seems like something of a false idyll. Just as the second section 
retrospectively transforms our interpretation of the first, so too does the first section 
alter our perception of the family relationships in the second. Underneath the benign 
social interactions we are witnessing there are still - at least for Clive - all the 
unresolved and unconscious emotional issues that are latent to the fantasy narrative. 
In creating a narrative which follows the logic of a dream, Resnais represents 
Clive's imagined story through a collage of disparate locations, drawn from various 
moments that subsist in the author's memory. The 'settings' are constantly evolving 
with the author's imagination: the veranda at the back of Claud's house, for example, 
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is presented with three different backdrops in the course of the film, each seeming to 
refer to a specific, important location from Clive's memory. Providence thus follows 
a similar spatio-temporal rationale to the final dream sequence in Wild Strawberries. 
Like the earlier film, Providence constructs a flexible, purely subjective space-time, 
which connects ideas, images and symbols according to implicit mental associations 
rather than conventional narrative logic. 
The dreamscape created in Providence is, therefore, radically subjective in the 
sense that it reflects the specificity of the individual's mind and thought process. Yet, 
at the same time, the film also identifies collective, cultural reference points that 
shape the protagonist's imagination. Clive Langham's nightmares involve recurring 
images of surveillance, incarceration and deportation. He repeatedly imagines armed 
soldiers herding the elderly and infirm into a large stadium surrounded by a wire 
fence. These images are extremely powerful in evoking the very real, twentieth-
century nightmares that have already been documented by Resnais in Night and Fog 
(specifically, the spectre of Paris' Vel' d 'Hiv, which was, during the Occupation, 
transformed into a temporary internment camp). Wilson provides an incisive 
summary of the effects of these images: 
Certainly the film draws on the scenarios, the structures which in the 
twentieth-century imagination speak of threat, dehumanisation and death. Yet 
it does not conjure specific ghosts of the past, nor engage effectively with 
particular situations, showing instead how those horrors become a conduit, 
even a concrete form for the expression of anxiety and terror. The film depends 
on the sense that these scenarios will be pregnant with pathos and fear for the 
viewer as well, that we will share their cultural context and menace.48 
Providence shows us only a glimpse of the 'twentieth-century imagination', but this 
collective consciousness is a constant, pressing concern of Resnais' cinema. Resnais' 
desire to represent individual thought processes is relentlessly intertwined with his 
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equally powerful desire to explore the collective aspects of memory and imagination. 
His films do not simply 'represent' thought in images; they also recognize how 
images might actively shape thought, or might transform the ways in which the 
individual imagines the past. The complex issues regarding the relationship between 
film, history, and the collective imagination will be the concern of the following 
chapter. 
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Cinema and the Collective Imagination 
Especially in a society enmeshed in its own cultural artefacts, with a history 
which transcends any individual experience and memory but is recorded in 
texts and images, memory has burst the confines of the individual, the 
personal, and has become collective ... Who of my generation can fail to have 
scarred on their own memories the images of the bulldozed piles of bodies 
recovered from the Nazi death camps in 1945, or the screaming, napalm-
flamed girl-child running down the road from her village in Vietnam?1 
As a physical record of the past, cinema provides a visual archive for a culture's 
collective memories and imagination. What Providence seems to grasp is the potential 
influence of concrete audiovisual artefacts upon the individual's imagination. The 
film suggests that specific images disseminated in the audiovisual culture of 
modernity might shape our psychic experience in a very direct manner, and, 
moreover, this is particularly significant in our imaginative engagement with the past. 
As noted earlier, Resnais' acute awareness of the role that cinema might playas a 
repository for communal memory (or imagination more broadly) can be fruitfully 
traced to his origin as a documentary filmmaker. In particular, it is essential to 
emphasize the importance of Night and Fog in formulating Resnais' conception of 
cinema's role as a transmitter of collective memory. Night and Fog was formally 
commissioned by the Committee on the History of the Second World War (Comile 
d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale) in 1955 to mark the tenth anniversary of 
the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps.2 The film was to be based upon 
research carried out by the Committee. It followed on from the publication of the 
Committee's lengthy book (Tragedy a/the 1940-45 Deportations: Testimonies o/the 
Survivors o/the German Concentration Camps, 1954), and a 1954 exhibition in Paris, 
which together documented the history of the deportations. Therefore, Night and Fog 
was always intended to be part of the official remembrance of the atrocities of the 
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Second World War, providing an audiovisual account of the concentration camps to 
accompany the written documentation. Clearly, a concept of collective memory and 
commemoration was implicit in the film's inception. 
In Night and Fog, Resnais responded to the central issues of memory and 
commemoration in a number of revealing ways. Firstly, he insisted that the 
commentary be written by Jean Cayrol, a concentration camp survivor, as a condition 
for his own participation. Resnais argued that Cayrol's involvement was essential to 
give the film the authenticity and integrity it demanded. 3 The film is thus grounded in 
personal experience and memory. Furthermore, the film directly appeals to the 
viewer's imaginative faculties to recreate the horrors of the concentration camps. 
Nowhere does the film offer a visual reconstruction of the past. Instead, Resnais 
utilizes present-day footage of the ruins of the camps, in conjunction with Cayrol's 
commentary, as a catalyst for the viewer's active, imaginative engagement with past 
events. For example, the camera shows the ruined dormitories at Auschwitz whilst the 
commentary states, 'No description, no image can reveal their true dimension -
endless, uninterrupted fear ... Of this brick dormitory and these tormented dreams, we 
can but show you the outer shell, the surface.' Throughout the film, there is a 
rhetorical strategy that suggests that the images of the camps are incomplete without 
the viewer's imaginative input. 
However, set against this rhetorical strategy is the use of concrete images of the 
camps drawn from the historical archives, and the importance of this visual 
'testimony' in creating a collective memory of the atrocities cannot be overstated. 
Night and Fog was the first documentary on the Holocaust to bring the archive 
footage of the camps to the attention of a wide public, and Resnais was particularly 
aware of the necessity of introducing into the public domain the footage that had been 
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shot by the liberating annles. In a 1961 interview in Premier Plan, Resnais 
emphasized that his film incorporated some of the most horrific archive footage -
such as the images showing the burial of victims in mass graves, which had been 
shown as part of the Nuremberg Trials - precisely because this footage had not yet 
had the chance to become part of the public's comprehension of the Holocaust: 'The 
short films that were made in the camps in '45 and '46 did not reach an audience. 
With Night and Fog, I hoped to make a film capable of reaching a wide public.,4 
Ewout van der Knaap argues that Night and Fog did reach its wide audience, and, in 
so doing, was the first film to forge a sense of shared public consciousness with 
regard to the Holocaust: 
[I]t was the first film on the Holocaust to have such a major impact. It played a 
crucial role in the dissemination and appropriation of images of the past, 
discussions about it helped to define or construct identity and to shape 
5 
memory ... 
The film's images, particularly those drawn from the archival footage, created a 
shared cultural reference point for the mapping of consciousness of the Holocaust. 
This discussion of 'collective consciousness' should already imply the wider 
socio-political context in which audiovisual culture - or the mass media more broadly 
- has assumed a particular importance in moulding identity, imagination and our 
conception of both history and the present. However, the role that the audiovisual 
media might play in shaping ideas, attitudes and thought processes is intensely 
problematic: as much as audiovisual representation might provide an authentic 
documentary basis from which to construct a shared understanding of past and 
present, it can also be utilized to engineer an ideologically distorted picture of reality, 
or, more simply, a false consciousness. This latter function of the audiovisual media 
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is, of course, especially notable in wartime, with newsreels and propaganda films 
attempting to manufacture a sense of shared identity and purpose within stringent 
ideological frameworks. Furthermore, nowhere was the awareness of film's potential 
ideological function better expressed than in Nazi Germany, and Night and Fog has to 
be seen, in part, as a response to, and reinterpretation of, the cultural mythology of the 
Third Reich. In its first foray into the past, Night and Fog utilizes the infamous 
images of the 1934 Nuremberg rally created in Triumph of the Will (Riefenstahl, 
1935). Cayrol's sparse commentary suggests the wider historical perspective that 
necessarily must frame our conceptualization of the images: '1933. The machine goes 
into action. A nation must have no discord.' What Cayrol's commentary pithily 
recognizes is the central role played by images of conformity and machine-like 
efficiency in manufacturing a collective consciousness of national identity that is in 
line with the ideals of Fascism. But in addition, and perhaps even more importantly, 
the commentary recognizes and responds to the type of passive spectatorship that is 
invoked by Triumph of the Will and audiovisual propaganda more broadly. With its 
Wagnerian soundtrack and overwhelming imagery of the massed German people, 
Triumph of the Will creates the spectacle of the nation revitalized under the singular 
leadership of the Fuhrer - the spectacle of Fascist power - which the viewer is 
encouraged to absorb passively. 
Night and Fog reacts against the pernicious, manipulative images of history and 
nationhood created in Nazi Germany, seeking to construct a different form of 
collective consciousness and identity. Many of the film's formal strategies seem to 
respond directly to the power of audiovisual representation - and abuses of this power 
- in structuring our awareness of history. First and foremost, the refusal to reconstruct 
the past is closely tied to the rejection of the manipulation of the viewer's response 
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through staged spectacle. Similarly, when the commentary is not demanding the 
viewer's active, imaginative response to the images depicted, it largely avoids direct, 
subjective analysis, offering instead an understated description of the camps in a 
neutral tone. 6 Finally, Night and Fog's use of music as a subtle, often ironic, 
counterpoint to its imagery also attests to its overriding formal concern with avoiding 
any kind of extrinsic emotional manipulation, which again needs to be placed in 
contrast to the utilization of Wagner's music both at the Nuremberg rallies and in 
Triumph of the Will.7 Night and Fog's awareness of the possibility of creating 
authentic visual reference points for our collective memory of the past and conception 
of the present inevitably entails an equal awareness of - and reaction to - the 
propagandistic misuses of audiovisual representation. 
If mass media images (photographs, newsreels, propaganda films, and so forth) 
seem particularly important in shaping a collective imagination and identity in the 
1930s and '40s, this is increasingly the case in the post-war years, particularly with 
the advent of television in the 1950s. Resnais' problematization of the relationship 
between the 'documentary' image and concepts of history, identity and nationhood is 
grounded in a broader questioning of the increased prominence of audiovisual 
documentation in the construction of historical discourse or consciousness. The 
proliferation of documentary news footage of the present moment, disseminated 
through the mass media, raises fundamental questions about the relationship between 
the image and our perception of reality, both past and present, and perhaps prompts a 
fundamental shift in our conceptualization of history. Following the influential French 
historian Pierre Nora, Higgins suggests that 'the visual or spectacular media (de)form 
our notions of what is thinkable in historical terms', and Resnais' cinema is finely 
attuned to this epistemic transformation: 
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Nowadays, the possibility of viewing news 'as it happens' has created an 
unprecedented sense of the historicity of the present: the mass media give us a 
present tense that is already historical. Nora believes that the modem mass 
media, especially television, have transformed the category of historical 
thought that has come to be called the 'event.' A further consequence, 
particularly applicable to Hiroshima mon amour, is the increased complexity 
of the distinction between public and private, as 'the event is projected into 
private life and served up as spectacle.,8 
For Higgins, Resnais' cmema demonstrates a new conceptualization of how the 
'historical event' is imaged (and subsequently imagined) in the present: that is, how 
the mass media image historicizes the present and simultaneously transforms the 
individual's relationship with, and understanding of, historical discourse. The 
increasing incursion of the mass media into the 'private space' of daily life has 
certainly led to a greater awareness of how the present is historicized, but arguably the 
fundamental conceptual shift was made possible originally by the development of 
photographic technology itself. Susan Sontag argues that photographic reproduction 
implies a new relationship between image, time and thought: 
[W]hat photography supplies is not only a record of the past but a way of 
dealing with the present, as the effects of the countless billions of 
contemporary photograph-documents attest. While old photographs fill out our 
mental image of the past, the photographs being taken now transform what is 
present now into a mental image, like the past. Cameras establish an inferential 
relation to the present (reality is known by its traces), provide an instantly 
retroactive view of experience.9 
In this way, the present moment is frozen, preserved and instantaneously transformed 
into historical document. Consequently, with the increasingly rapid transmission of 
the recorded image through the mass media, we become aware of the inscription of a 
historical discourse of the present - or the creation of a historical consciousness which 
is not only a public record, but may also become our future, private memory of the 
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event (our 'mental image'). The opportunity arises for a seemingly instant historical 
perspective. The problem, of course, is that this perspective, whilst appearing to be 
rooted in the 'objective' recording of reality through photography, is not necessarily 
impartial: it may be subject to a variety of ideological pressures, including direct 
political and institutional censorship, which can lead to a conscious or an unconscious 
distortion of events. 
It is perhaps this last point that is most important to Resnais' cmema. In 
questioning how a collective consciousness of history might function, Resnais 
frequently identifies, and challenges (with varying degrees of success), the dominant 
discourses and ideological structures that may circumscribe the 'thinkable' at a given 
historical moment. This process of historical revision is not a separate, 'thematic' 
concern of Resnais' films, but rather is intimately tied to his formal representation of 
the mechanisms of thought. For Resnais, individual thought cannot be isolated from 
the political and historical framework in which it operates (a conjecture that is 
increasingly valid in the audiovisual culture of the twentieth century). Censorship and 
political repression thus become prominent concerns when Resnais seeks to represent 
the nature of his fictional characters' thoughts (particularly in Hiroshima and Muriel). 
But to understand fully the ideas that Resnais develops regarding the relationship 
between dominant ideologies and thought, we must first examine the role that 
censorship has played in the production and reception of some of his own films. 
Censorship and Repression 
From an early stage in his career, Resnais displayed a keen interest in the relationship 
between history, art and politics (or, more specifically, dissident thought). This 
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interest can be traced back to Guernica, Resnais' film of 1950 which explores 
Picasso's modernist representation of the bombing of civilians during the Spanish 
Civil War. Not only does this film engage with political dissidence on a thematic 
level, it also postulates an early, tentative idea of a possible relationship between 
image and thought. Emma Wilson argues that the film is not simply 'about' the 
painting, but rather 'it is an attempt to convey an artist's vision of the world, and ... to 
use that vision in order to animate and respond to an event of enormity and horror. dO 
The representation of the individual's perspective as a means of exploring the 
historical traumas of the twentieth century clearly foreshadows Resnais' later 
narrative concerns. 
Resnais' own political dissidence became more evident with Statues Also Die 
(1953). This documentary, which Resnais made in collaboration with Chris Marker, 
lamented the destruction of African art under the pressures of French colonialism and 
cultural hegemony. It suggested that the imposition of Western European ideas, tastes 
and values in the colonies was gradually destroying the indigenous artistic heritage, 
and, in so doing, implied a wider condemnation of the whole 'civilizing mission' that 
was a cornerstone of imperial ideology. While attempting to confront the suppression 
of free artistic expression in the colonies, Statues Also Die was itself subjected to a 
more direct form of censorship. As Alan Williams tersely observes, 'The film was 
sufficiently effective to be banned outright by the [French] government after one 
public showing.' 11 It remained banned for fifteen years. It was only after the 
ideological upheavals that accompanied French decolonization (especially of Algeria) 
and the uprisings of May 1968 that the film was again screened in France (in 
17 November 1968). -
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The fate of Statues Also Die was highly significant in reaffirming Resnais' 
awareness of the problems associated with constructing a historical or political 
perspective that conflicts with the dominant, officially sanctioned ideology. 
Nevertheless, the director ran into similar censorship problems with Night and Fog 
(his subsequent film), and here there is an added layer of significance when we are 
considering how the construction of an 'official' historical discourse defines the 
parameters of collective memory or imagination. The main censorship issue that arose 
from Night and Fog has subsequently, and rightly, become somewhat notorious. Upon 
receiving Resnais' final cut of the film, the French board of censors insisted that a 
particular shot evidencing France's active collaboration in the internment and 
deportation of Jews be removed from the film. The shot depicted a transit camp at 
Pithiviers which was founded specifically to intern Jews arrested in Paris. The camp 
was set up by the Germans but administered by the French, a fact that was indirectly 
acknowledged in Night and Fog through the presence of an officer in French uniform 
in the foreground of the original image of the camp. The board of censors argued that 
this shot should be removed because it might prove offensive to the present-day 
French military. With the full support of his producers, Resnais refused to delete the 
image, and it was only after an impasse lasting several weeks that a compromise was 
reached. The shot of the French officer was left in the film but a black beam 
superimposed over his kepi (the French military cap) so as to obscure his nationality.13 
The censors' official justification for their decision - on the grounds of potential 
offence to the military - may have had some basis in reality, but it clearly fails to 
acknowledge the wider socio-political rationale behind the alteration, or, moreover, to 
address the issue of historiographic integrity. The historian Henry Rousso provides a 
resolute summary of what this act of censorship, whatever the stated reasons, actually 
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entailed: 'The censors ... obliterated not the filmmaker's words or images but an 
actual historical detail, an incontestable fact. The fact that an official historical agency 
was included in the production of the film made no difference.' 14 Rousso' swider 
thesis is very interesting, for he identifies this act of historical distortion as part of 
what he terms the 'Vichy syndrome', a kind of officially-sanctioned postwar 
'amnesia' whereby the population at large was encouraged to forget the extent of 
French collaboration in favour of the myth of almost universal resistance during the 
Occupation. IS I will return to this idea shortly when considering the way in which 
Resnais represents memory of the Occupation years in Hiroshima and Muriel. For 
now, it is sufficient to note that the key act of censorship in Night and Fog powerfully 
illuminated the way in which collective memory can be partially constrained by the 
ideological imperatives of those in power. If Resnais was already very interested in 
how a collective memory could and should be constructed, this was undoubtedly 
compounded by the role that censorship played in obscuring a small but significant 
detail in Night and Fog's representation of the past. 
Despite the direct intervention of the censors, there was still much about Night and 
Fog that was politically sensitive, both in France and abroad. As a consequence, the 
film was subjected to further, indirect acts of suppression, most notably in the 
withdrawal of the film from France's official selection for the Cannes film festival. 
The decision to withdraw Night and Fog was made by the Secretary of State for 
Trade, Maurice Lemaire, after he received an official request from the German 
Embassy that the film be removed on the grounds that it might once more inflame 
anti-German sentiments. I6 The decision met with widespread protests in sections of 
both the French and German press, and following several high-profile debates 
concerning freedom of expression, Lemaire agreed that Night and Fog could be 
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screened at Cannes, but outside of the official competition. This strategy 
acknowledged the concern regarding the repression of basic freedoms of expression, 
but nevertheless made it clear that the film did not represent France and was not 
compatible with the demands of diplomacy and official ideology. Tellingly, the fate of 
Night and Fog at Cannes was to be shared by both Hiroshima man amour and The 
War Is Over. Both of the latter films were excluded from the official selection on the 
grounds that their politically sensitive material might cause offence to other nations 
(the United States and Spain respectively). In all three excluded films, one might 
argue that it was not simply the subject matter that provoked their exclusion, but also 
their specific dedication to reappraising historical traumas in relation to current 
political situations and dominant ideological positions. Again, Resnais' films are 
particularly contentious because they identify and deconstruct elements of the 
officially-sanctioned historical discourses that mould the collective imagination of 
past and present. 
It is also worth questioning whether the exclusion of Night and Fog and 
Hiroshima from the official competition at Cannes was motivated solely by anxiety 
regarding the sensibilities of other nations. In the case of the latter film, Lynn Higgins 
argues that it seems unlikely that the mere assertion of a historical fact - that the US 
bombed Hiroshima - could prove sufficiently sensitive to see the film disqualified 
from entry at Cannes. Instead, she suggests that the film's indelicate probing of the 
Vichy past and French collaboration was the true reason for its exclusion: 'It seems 
that it was not the Americans that the film would offend, but the French. According to 
Edgar Morin, Resnais was told that his film was incompatible with the ideals of the 
Fifth Republic.' 17 Similarly, even in its final state, with the explicit display of French 
collaboration removed, Night and Fog touches upon some contentious issues 
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concerning postwar memory, ideology and imperialist foreign policy. With the film's 
final tracking shots across the ruins of Auschwitz, the commentary directly addresses 
the viewer in the present tense, reframing the act of remembrance as a way of thinking 
about the present as well as the past. Cayrol' s lyrical and highly affecting commentary 
is worth quoting at length: 
As I speak to you now, the icy waters of the ponds and ruins fills the hollows 
of the mass graves, a frigid and muddy water, as murky as our memory ... 
Who among us keeps watch from this strange watchtower to warn of the 
arrival of our new executioners? Are their faces really different from our own? 
[ ... J Somewhere in our midst lucky kapos still survive, reinstated officers and 
anonymous informers. There are those who refused to believe, or believed only 
for brief moments. With our sincere gaze we survey these ruins, as if the old 
monster lay forever crushed beneath the rubble. We pretend to take up hope 
again, as the image recedes into the past, as if we were cured once and for all 
of the scourge of the camps. We pretend it happened only once, at a given time 
and place. We tum a blind eye to what surrounds us and a deaf ear to 
humanity's never-ending cry. 
As is the case in Resnais' later representations of individual memory, Night and Fog 
suggests, in general terms, that the act of remembering illuminates the present, just as 
the conditions of the present help to determine how we remember. Consequently, it 
defines memory, ideally, as a critical analysis of the relationship between past and 
present, and thus suggests that the act of commemoration should also promote 
universal vigilance with regard to the present conditions of society. Yet beyond the 
universalism of Night and Fog's warning against forgetfulness, Resnais and Cayrol 
had a very specific target in mind when they called for vigilance with regard to 
present-day injustices: namely, French colonial policy in Algeria. ls Statements from 
the director and the writer following the film's completion underline the criticism of 
French foreign policy implicit in Night and Fog. In an article published in the 
communist newspaper Les Lettres Franr;ais, Cayrol wrote, 'Do not forget that our 
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own country is not exempt of the racist scandal', while Resnais expressed similar 
sentiments in L'Express on January 31,1956. 19 In a much later interview, in 1985, 
Resnais strengthened his emphasis on the specific political message that Night and 
Fog attempted to convey at the time of its release, claiming that in the closing lines of 
the commentary 'The whole point was Algeria. ,20 Given Night and Fog's subtextual 
critique of the current French regime's handling of the Algerian crisis, it seems highly 
plausible that the film's disqualification from competition at Cannes had imperatives 
beyond those that were stated officially. 
However, it should not go unnoticed that Night and Fog's specific critique of 
contemporary French foreign policy exists only as sub text. In part, it is reasonable to 
attribute this reticence to the film's prime concern with emphasizing the universality 
and timelessness of its messages. Nevertheless, we should be alert to the fact that an 
explicit criticism of French policy in Algeria would probably have been 
impracticable. The banning of Statues Also Die had already demonstrated to Resnais 
the firm prohibition against questioning colonial ideology, and since the declaration of 
a state of emergency in Algeria (in March 1955), this prohibition had been 
strengthened through additional legislation restricting 'subversive' discourse.21 The 
Algerian War, and in particular the emergence of new restrictions on the freedom of 
expression following its outbreak, thus provides a general background of increasing 
political censorship that both mirrors and shapes Resnais' personal experience with 
the direct and indirect forms of censorship that were imposed on his films. Therefore, 
an understanding of the repressive strategies utilized by successive French 
governments to control the representation of the Algerian crisis is a final, essential 
prerequisite to understanding Resnais' early cinema, and in particular the 
development of his incisive awareness (and critique) of the concrete socio-political 
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mechanisms that help to control both present public perceptions and the collective 
consciousness of 'history.' In short, the official manipulation of public perceptions of 
Algeria provides a crucial context for Resnais' explorations of how individual thought 
or subjectivity interacts with wider collective and cultural memories, and thus requires 
further exposition. 
State Propaganda and the Algerian War: 'Managing' Public Perceptions 
The Algerian War lasted for almost eight years, from the first major insurgencies led 
by the FLN (the Front de Liberation nationale) in November 1954 to the Evian 
Accords of March 1962, wherein it was agreed that there should be an immediate 
ceasefire with a view to organizing an Algerian referendum on the question of 
independence. This referendum saw an overwhelming majority vote in favour of 
Algerian independence, which was formally ratified by the French government on 
July 3, 1962. During the conflict, the French government attempted to restrict and 
control public perceptions of events in Algeria through the promotion of an 
'orthodox' ideology which suggested that 'French-Algeria' was being threatened by a 
barbaric, terrorist minority, whilst simultaneously suppressing reports, representations 
and discourses that questioned the official doctrine. Martin Harrison, writing two 
years after the declaration of Algerian independence, offers a very valuable insight 
into the French government's attempts to 'manage' the public's perception of the 
Algerian conflict. Harrison writes: 
Historically, most countries have tried to condition the image of reality 
reaching their citizens at periods of domestic and international tensions. In 
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France the temptations were particularly pressing. The gulf between official 
myth and Algerian reality was exceptionally broad. Governments wanted the 
public to believe first that the rebellion was the work of a handful of terrorists, 
then that the 'last quarter of an hour' had come, and later that peace could be 
achieved without political negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. To 
sustain these beliefs they inevitably 'managed' the news ... As outright military 
victory became less likely, vocal sections of the armed forces became 
preoccupied with 'conditioning' the people of both Algeria and France.22 
It is important to emphasize at this point that attempts to 'condition' the people in 
mainland France were much more problematic than in Algeria, for, as Harrison later 
notes, throughout the war the French press remained essentially 'free.' This is not to 
say that indirect forms of censorship were not attempted. Seizures of papers that 
printed 'subversive' articles regarding French policy in Algeria were common. These 
seizures, along with the financial losses that they caused, provided a strong 
disincentive against contradicting official doctrine, as did more general ideological 
pressures from above, such as the appeal for national solidarity against the terrorist 
threat. 23 As Harrison observes, 
Prudence and patriotism led many papers to promote official versions of reality 
and to sustain the wishful thinking which persistently jeopardized the 
emergence of intelligent opinion about Algeria... Unpalatable facts and 
opinions tended to be smothered and pertinent questions went unasked ... Even 
when 400 000 troops were in the field many papers considered the war a 
'police action', and the rebels as 'outlaws' who were 'slaughtered' like animals 
rather than 'killed' like soldiers.24 
However, prior censorship of the press in France was imposed only once, and for only 
a few days, in May 1958. This meant that although the mainstream press, more often 
than not, upheld the official doctrine on Algeria, dissenting views could not be 
entirely eradicated, and did reach the French public in a limited capacity. Disturbing 
reports of the scale and nature of the French campaign in Algeria - which directly 
contradicted official representations and reports - could not be totally suppressed. 
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As early as 1955, isolated reports of serious violations of human rights in Algeria 
began to emerge, and these reports were not always confined to political newspapers 
with a small circulation. In an article detailing Le Monde's coverage of the Algerian 
War (which was largely supportive of official doctrine), Mohammed Khane notes one 
such instance of the mainstream press reporting on evidence of abuses of executive 
power in Algeria. On June 15 1955, Le Monde reported on a leaflet being distributed 
by an Algerian students' union which exposed the practical consequences of 
emergency legislation on Algeria - legislation which, among other things, had 
transferred significant power to the military. Khane observes that this leaflet 
'indicated that there had been forced transfers of population, the setting up of 
"resettlement centres" or camps, euphemistically termed "shelters" (centres 
d'hebergement), and an extension of the [March 31] legislation's implementation to 
include Algerians found in mainland France. ,25 
However, revelations such as these were soon to be eclipsed by the emergence of 
even more disturbing reports evidencing the French army's widespread and 
systematic use of torture to interrogate Algerian prisoners, suspected terrorists, and 
even French nationals accused of subversive behaviour. Two cases are particularly 
important for the role they played in inflaming critical attitudes to the war among 
France's left wing intelligentsia. Firstly, in 1957, Henri Alleg, a French-Algerian 
journalist who was sympathetic to the cause of the Algerian nationalists, was arrested 
in Algiers, imprisoned without charge, and tortured by French paratroopers. He 
subsequently managed to write a full account of his ordeal, which was smuggled out 
of Algeria and published as La Question in Paris in 1958. The French authorities tried 
to limit the impact of the book, first by censoring any newspaper articles that 
mentioned it, and then by banning it outright and seizing the unsold copies. 
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Nevertheless, the book continued to be circulated clandestinely, posing an ongoing 
challenge to official accounts of lawful 'pacification' in Algeria.26 The second case of 
French military brutality that became particularly infamous among Parisian 
intellectuals concerned the torture, rape and murder of an Algerian woman, Djamila 
Boupacha, by French paratroopers in Algeria. This case was brought to the attention 
of the public by Simone de Beauvoir, who eventually co-authored a full account of 
the case, published in 1962. As Lynn Higgins observes, the horrific details of the case 
became, for many, a powerful metaphor for French activity in Algeria: 'in the words 
. of one historical source, "the rape of Djamila became the symbol of Algeria 
violated. ",27 
Consequently, throughout the Algerian conflict there existed a small but 
significant counter-discourse that could not be effectively suppressed, and which 
challenged the 'picture of reality' that was propagated by official representations of 
the war. The fact that successive French governments were particularly resolute, but 
only partially successful, in attempting to 'manage' the public's perceptions of 
Algeria had, perhaps, an ironic consequence. The constant, but ultimately untenable, 
attempt to suppress unflattering representations of the Algerian War may have simply 
alerted certain intellectual sectors of French society to the government's 
determination to manipulate public opinion through a spurious depiction of reality. 
However, while it was extremely difficult to control the way in which Algeria was 
portrayed in the press, the same was not true in the case of audiovisual 
representations. Politically-minded filmmakers such as Resnais were fully aware of 
the spurious and misleading nature of official representations of the Algerian War, but 
were unable to directly challenge these representations through their own films. 
Harrison notes that there were several crucial factors that strictly limited the way in 
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which the Algerian war was depicted - and could be depicted - in the audiovisual 
media: 
The handful of film producers who set out to tackle controversial subjects had 
to contend with commercial hostility, censorship and a subsidy system that 
could be employed for political ends. Usually the result was mutilation or 
outright prohibition. Newsreels were firmly under official influence ... Most 
importantly, Radiodiffusion-Television Fran<;ais was subordinated more 
inflexibly than ever to governmental policies.28 
The tacit, but steadfast, prohibition against films which sought to address the 
suppressed controversies of the Algerian war was demonstrated, most famously, by 
the banning of Jean-Luc Godard's Le Petit Soldat, which was completed in 1960 but 
denied theatrical release until 1963, after the war had ended. Le Petit Soldat concerns 
the activities of Bruno (Michel Subor), an ideologically-confused Frenchman who 
becomes involved with a clandestine counter-terrorism unit combating Algerian 
nationalists and FLN sympathizers in Switzerland. Having refused an assignment to 
assassinate a journalist who supports Algerian independence, Bruno is betrayed by his 
unit and captured by Algerian nationalists. The most controversial section of the film 
follows, with Bruno being tortured by his captors, who defend their actions by 
denouncing the French army's prior use of torture to question prisoners in Algeria. 
Bruno's captors support their claims by reading excerpts from La Question - which 
Bruno dismisses as a crude attempt to indoctrinate him. In addition to this blunt 
acknowledgement of French atrocities as a suppressed reality, the film also touches 
upon another highly sensitive issue: the possibility that aspects of French policy in 
Algeria are facilitating, or are symptomatic of, a resurgence of French Fascism. Bruno 
reveals, in voiceover, that his counter-terrorist group is 'financed by a former MP, a 
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luminary of the Vichy days', a detail which implies a continuity between the Fascism 
of the Occupation era and the right wing politics of contemporary life.29 
In Le Petit Soldat, Bruno makes the (now often-quoted) claim that 'Photography is 
truth, and the cinema is truth twenty-four times a second.' Yet what Godard's film 
powerfully demonstrates is the problematical status of such a claim - both through its 
own narratorial complexity (Philip Dine accurately describes the film's 'truth' as an 
'emphatically first-person account of a confused individual's incoherent attempt to 
make sense of the historical absurdity in which he finds himself) and through the 
censors' inevitable refusal to approve the film for exhibition.3o At this time, cinema 
was patently not truth, but rather a version of reality delimited by official ideology 
and institutional censorship. Nevertheless, Godard's proposal of an ideal equivalence 
between cinema and truth certainly has some validity. As noted earlier, cinema is 
predicated upon the technical ability to record images and sounds accurately. At its 
most fundamental level, cinema seems to be simply the mechanical reproduction of 
reality, independent of human agency and authorial bias. But paradoxically, it might 
be said that film's particular propagandistic utility rests upon its apparent objectivity, 
or at least upon an (illogical) assumption that cinematic representation has an 
unshakable truth value because it is rooted in the fidelity of the mechanical recording 
process. If we accept that cinematic representation appears to have an inherent 
objectivity, that it may seem to allow an unmediated access to reality, then part of the 
rationale behind the French government's stringent control over the audiovisual media 
(as opposed, for example, to the looser restrictions imposed upon literature and the 
press) becomes apparent. 31 The efficacy of government-controlled newsreels was 
dependent upon presenting a carefully selected vision of reality as unmediated 'truth', 
whilst simultaneously suppressing alternative representations that might undermine 
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this VISIOn (or even challenge the basic assumption that unmediated cinematic 
objectivity is a practical possibility). Superficially, cinematic representation has an 
instant credibility that the written report lacks: conceptually, it is more difficult to 
denounce 'filmed reality' on the grounds of authorial bias or as an impoverished 
interpretation of the world. 
Given the ways in which state censorship and propaganda during the Algerian 
War problematized the notion that cinema acts as a transparent window on the world, 
it is easy to identify a political motivation behind Resnais' increasing interest in 
subjective narration and how film might represent thought rather than immediate 
reality. Resnais' interest in subjective narration is not exclusively derived from his 
conviction that there is an inherent value in representing the subjectivity of everyday 
experience, but is also born out of his scepticism regarding the cinematic 'objectivity' 
that underwrites contemporary images of political and historical reality. By 
representing a fictional character's subjective experience of real-life historical and 
political situations, Resnais is able to question accepted historical 'truths', or the 
officially-sanctioned picture of reality, whilst also highlighting the importance of 
ideological frameworks such as these in moulding the individual's worldview. In the 
final section of this chapter, I shall explore the two films in which Resnais most 
thoroughly reinterprets France's recent past through subjective experience -
Hiroshima and Muriel. The former utilizes personal memory as a means for revisiting 
the traumas of Occupation and collaboration, mounting a challenge to the political 
myths about the era that were laid down immediately after the Liberation. The latter, 
released only a year after the official declaration of Algerian independence, directly 
explores the repressed realities of the Algerian war, investigating both an individual 
veteran's traumatic memories and the wider impact of decolonization on the French 
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psyche. In neither case does Resnais simply offer a subjective 'alternative' to 
contradict the official picture of the recent past. Instead, he shows how the subjective 
experience (or memory) of history is embedded in a dominant ideological framework. 
In so doing, he explores the complex relationship between public and private history, 
drawing attention to the ambivalence, uncertainty and ideological confusion that can 
be said to subsist in both the individual and collective consciousness of the recent 
past. 
Reinterpreting the Recent Past 
The careful management of information during the Algerian War forcefully 
demonstrated how an officially-endorsed representation of 'reality' might set the 
parameters in which events could be perceived, understood and, eventually, 
remembered. Yet it would be wrong to suggest that prior to the Algerian war official 
discourse and ideology were unimportant in moulding conceptions of current and past 
events. In particular, several historians have noted that following World War Two, 
official discourse repeatedly misrepresented France's situation during the Occupation, 
and the conditions under which the country was liberated, in order to reconstruct a 
sense of national unity and purpose. Rousso cites a speech made by Charles de Gaulle 
immediately after Paris was liberated that set the official agenda regarding how 
France's involvement in the war was to be remembered: 
Paris! Paris humiliated! Paris broken! Paris Martyrized! But Paris liberated! 
Liberated by itself, by its own people with the help of the armies of France, 
with the support and aid of France as a whole, of fighting France, of the only 
F 32 rance, of the true France, of eternal France. 
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Rousso suggests that this official interpretation of the prevalence of French resistance, 
and the role the French populace played in the Liberation, is a flagrant rewriting of 
history for political ends. Similarly, Philippe Burin argues that de Gaulle's speeches 
ignored a complex history of deep political divisions, promoting instead a simple 
narrative wherein a unified France, barring a treacherous minority, had arisen to resist 
the occupying forces: 
Gaullist rhetoric lent authority to an image of France as 'Free France', a France 
from which a handful of traitors had excluded themselves only to receive their 
just deserts at the Liberation. France, Resistance, de Gaulle: together these 
three magic words substituted a glorious, mythic past for a complex, shifting 
and divided one.33 
The myths that were laid down in the immediate aftermath of the Liberation were 
sufficiently compelling and successful to shape how the war was represented and 
remembered for years. Rousso argues that for almost a quarter of a century following 
the Liberation, a kind of false consciousness, or willed amnesia, seemed to define 
both official accounts and private memories of wartime France. In emphasizing the 
extent to which 'The Vichy Syndrome' has to be seen as an active constituent in the 
postwar French psyche, Rousso goes so far as to describe it as a 'neurosis.' The 
psychoanalytic metaphor is particularly apt in capturing the sense that the trauma 
France suffered through four years of Occupation and latent civil war became the 
repressed reality of the postwar collective consciousness. This reality was quietly 
censored - consciously or unconsciously - from private memory and official record, 
so that only traces (or indirect symptoms) of France's divided past were allowed to 
subsist. Clearly, this overlapping of public and private repressions following the war 
finds a particular resonance in Resnais' cinema. As Naomi Greene argues: 
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It is the smothered unease of this era that gives Resnais' cinema, I think, its 
special cast. Marking a particular moment in the evolution of French memory 
of the Vichy past, his films are rooted in, and yet implicitly denounce, the 
climate of 'unfinished mourning' and 'repression' that. .. characterized Vichy 
memory from the end of World War II until the early 1970s.34 
The significance of Resnais' willingness to explore the repressed realities of the 
Occupation has to be understood in the context of wider trends in French cinema. 
Rousso notes that while World War Two inspired countless American and British 
films (many of which were distributed in France), French filmmakers seemed, on the 
whole, very unwilling to make films about the war or even to use the period as a 
dramatic setting: between 1944 and 1986, only two hundred such films were produced 
or co-produced by France, and 'Even in periods when wartime films were at a peak, 
they never accounted for more than 7 percent of total French production, at most a 
dozen films per year. .. ,35 It was not until the late 1960s and early '70s (over twenty-
five years after the Liberation) that the first French films to address Collaboration 
directly and honestly, such as The Sorrow and the Pity (Ophiils, 1969) and Lacombe 
Lucien (Malle, 1974), began to appear - and these films remained somewhat 
exceptional in the way that they challenged the dominant historical perspective. For 
Rousso, the unwillingness of filmmakers to revisit the war years - and much less to 
explore the reality of those years in any depth - is symptomatic of the wider desire to 
forget the facts of wartime life and accept, without too much thought, the appealing 
myths about the period laid down immediately after the Liberation. 
The prevalence of a collective myth or false consciousness of France's almost 
universal resistance to the Occupation provides the context in which Night and Fog's 
acknowledgment of French collaboration proved to be so controversial. Similarly, it 
provides the context in which Hiroshima mon amour's reinterpretation of the past, via 
208 
the heroine's personal memories, is embedded. The heroine's repressed trauma is 
exacerbated because her experience cannot be accommodated by the dominant 
accounts of the war, which propose a simple dichotomy between the vast majority 
who courageously resisted German Occupation and the treacherous minority who 
collaborated. Her dead lover was' an enemy of France', marking her as a collaborator; 
yet in reality, her actions were entirely apolitical: her relationship with the German 
soldier is represented as being not merely innocuous, but, moreover, as something 
rather innocent and beautiful - the blossoming of first love. The film gives the 
impression that the nationality of the French woman's lover is, at least for her, 
entirely incidental, a product of historical chance that carries no wider political or 
ideological connotations. Her memory of being unjustly vilified by her community' 
points to the inadequacy of dominant, dualistic accounts of resisters and collaborators, 
and, furthermore, suggests that contemporary versions of such accounts may have 
played a role in compounding the widespread ideological and moral confusion that 
followed the Liberation. The narrative that the French woman has repressed since the 
end of the war touches upon many of the extremely sensitive issues that have also 
been repressed, censored or overlooked in the dominant historical discourse of the 
postwar period. In her story, private and public traumas are intertwined. 
The French woman's conscious recollection of her personal trauma can, therefore, 
be seen in part as a symbolic reinterpretation of those aspects of France's past that 
have been repressed from the postwar collective memory - namely, the ideological 
divisions and uncertainties that typified the Occupation era, the shame of active (or 
even passive) collaboration, the problems associated with the accurate identification 
of collaborators, and, consequently, the questionable success of the post-Liberation 
purges in punishing genuine Fascist elements in French society. Many, if not all, of 
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these issues are highlighted in a single, powerful image: that of the public shaving of 
the heroine's head. This image is specific to the fictional character's traumatic 
memory, but is also emblematic of the wider communal memory of post-Liberation 
France. Julian Jackson notes that this particular type of punishment, reserved 
particularly for women who had slept with German soldiers, was widespread 
throughout France and was notable for its extreme theatricality: 
Shavings were carried out all over the country, in cities as well as villages. 
Frequently, they were made into public spectacle: the women were paraded 
down the street, sometimes naked; then they were shaved in front of an 
audience on a hastily erected platform or balcony; swastikas were daubed on 
their faces or shaved skulls ... Sometimes they were the result of personal 
vendettas masquerading as people's justice. Sometimes angry crowds searched 
for scapegoats in a random and sadistic manner. 36 
This type of popular justice was clearly designed to be spectacular, symbolic and 
memorable, yet, as Jackson also suggests, it was from the beginning inherently 
problematic. The theatrical excesses of popular justice could not entirely mask the 
lack of discrimination in determining the true culpability of individual 'collaborators.' 
Jackson argues that as a consequence 'the initial enthusiasm [for the shavings] was 
quickly replaced by a sense of shame. The Liberation Committee of the French 
Cinema which produced a film on the Liberation of Paris at the end of August 1944 
omitted any scenes of shavings despite having footage of them. ,37 In this context, we 
can see how the return of the French woman's memories of her public humiliation in 
Hiroshima is also, in some sense, the return of what has been repressed from France's 
collective memory. In one brief scene, we see a selection of the people of Nevers 
dutifully shaving the heroine's head while she is subjected to taunts and mocking 
glances from the crowd of onlookers. The fact that Hiroshima's heroine is, 
essentially, innocent of any serious charges of collaboration not only adds poignancy 
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to her situation, but also highlights the failure of the community to identify those who 
truly deserve punishment. 
The French woman's narrative offers a critical perspective on the collective 
memory of the Liberation, whilst also illuminating the historical ideology that is 
perhaps implicit in communal behaviour. It has already been suggested that the public 
degradation of female 'collaborators' had a highly symbolic function, and as such can 
be said to offer an insight into the collective psyche. Jackson writes that contemporary 
witnesses noted the 'carnival-like atmosphere' of the head-shaving ceremonies, and 
concludes that these ritualized public spectacles provided 'a means by which the 
community symbolically reappropriated the public space after four years of 
occupation. ,38 Further to this, he adds that the ritualized punishment of women who 
had slept with German soldiers was 'described as a sort of moral disinfecting of the 
community.,39 More than representing a justified - or justifiable - punishment for 
female collaborators, the shavings represented a communal attempt to symbolically 
exorcise the trauma of Occupation, to re-establish a rigid moral order, and to cleanse 
the collective conscience. 
Higgins also offers an interesting account of how the public humiliation of the 
French woman in Hiroshima carries a symbolic function that taps into the post-
Liberation French psyche. Higgins suggests that the situation in France after the 
Liberation can be elucidated through Rene Girard's concept of a 'sacrificial crisis', 
wherein self-perpetuating acts of violent retribution threaten to destroy the community 
or plunge it into endless civil war. In this situation, 
Categories of thought and oppositions between groups break down, so that it is 
no longer possible to distinguish enemy from ally, inside from outside. The 
enemy - violence itself - is within and the risk is one of undifferentiation ... 
Such situations invite the identification of a substitute victim or scapegoat on 
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which unanimous hostility can be exorcised, thus arresting or preventing a 
perpetually endless chain of violence.4o 
In Higgins' reading of Hiroshima, the heroine fulfils this role of scapegoat, drawing 
attention away from the real military and political crimes that may have been 
committed but cannot be rooted out and punished without radically destabilizing the 
community as a whole. In line with the official myths propagated at the time of the 
Liberation, justice has been symbolically enacted: the treacherous minority has been 
swiftly identified, punished and effectively excommunicated from 'the true France.' 
Of course, for the audience, the heroine's memory of her ritual humiliation simply 
emphasizes the community's failure to deal with the trauma of collaboration in a 
meaningful way (and the subsequent repression of this failure). 
The moral and ideological crisis that is implicit in the French woman's memory of 
post-Liberation France can be seen as part of a much wider crisis of thought with 
regard to the traumas of World War Two. Specifically, of course, it is the dropping of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima that is at the very centre of this crisis. It is worth 
stressing again that the heroine remembers Nevers from the present moment in 
Hiroshima; her experience of Hiroshima provides the constant background context in 
which her thoughts take shape. It seems reasonable, therefore, to postulate an implicit 
mental connection between the utter destruction of Hiroshima and the ideological 
crisis in postwar Nevers. Hiroshima is a constant reminder of the fact that during 
World War Two atrocities were committed by the Allies as well as by the Axis 
powers. In a global postwar context, as in post-Liberation Nevers, the distinction 
between the innocent and the guilty, or allies and enemies, has become problematic to 
the point of being untenable. Ultimately, Hiroshima draws attention to the 
fundamental impossibility of rationalizing the worst traumas of the war, pointing 
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instead to the need to reconceptualize postwar morality and politics in global rather 
than nationalistic terms. In exploring the heroine's traumatic memories of the war, 
and paralleling these with her experiences in Hiroshima, Resnais and Duras also 
invite the viewer to reflect upon the collective traumas of World War Two that have 
not been given due attention, or have been distorted or simplified, in existing 
representations (cinematic and otherwise) of the period. 
Hiroshima was made at the height of the Algerian War, and the way in which the 
film represents the collective confusions and failures of memory pertaining to World 
War Two clearly has some grounding in the contemporary political climate. In 1958, 
the extent to which the public was being offered a distorted picture of the Algerian 
conflict was becoming apparent. This contemporary misrepresentation of a political 
situation clearly bears some comparison to the misrepresentations of World War Two 
that proliferated after the Liberation. In addition, the questions Hiroshima raises 
regarding the Occupation, French collaboration and the sustainability of nationalistic 
ideology are particularly pertinent, and often highly ironic, in relation to the situation 
in Algeria. From a retrospective position, the parallels between the German 
occupation of France and the French colonial presence in Algeria seem obvious, and 
likewise the draconian measures undertaken to suppress the Algerian uprising - such 
as the resettlement or internment of native populations and the transferring of 
executive power to the military - seem unnervingly analogous to actions carried out 
by the Nazis. But at the time, the logical discrepancy between France's constant 
commemoration of its heroic resistance to foreign occupation and its ongomg 
imperialism was not recognized as such by the vast majority. Dine argues that 
France's actions in Algeria, and the country's initial determination to hold on to the 
colony at all costs, have to be understood primarily in terms of the extent to which 
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imperialist ideology was entrenched in the collective psyche: 'This is not so much to 
imply a rejection of historical materialism as to acknowledge the Algerian question's 
importance as a generator of collective confusions, which we may variously refer to 
as phantasms, instances of false consciousness, or myths. ,41 Algeria was seen by 
many as being an integral part of France itself, and as such was central to the 
collective sense of national identity. The violent and drawn-out decolonization of 
Algeria thus had a huge and traumatic impact upon the collective imagination, and 
this is the angle from which Resnais approaches the Algerian War in Muriel. As was 
the case in Hiroshima, the traumatic events in France's recent history are not 
recreated as such, but rather are approached and interpreted indirectly in terms of how 
those events might be imagined or remembered. 
Muriel has two main narrative threads. In the first, Helene Aughain (Delphine 
Seyrig), an antiques dealer living in contemporary Boulogne, is visited by Alphonse 
(Jean-Pierre Kerien), an ex-lover whom she has not seen since the outbreak of World 
War Two. Alphonse claims to have spent the past two decades running a small cafe in 
Algeria, but it later transpires that this story is entirely fabricated. He has in fact been 
living the whole time in France with a wife whom he failed to mention. Although his 
motives are never made clear, it seems as if Alphonse has contacted Helene in the 
hope of resuming their relationship: his fantasized past is part of his new life and new 
identity. The second narrative concerns Helene's stepson Bernard (Jean-Baptiste 
Thierree), a young veteran of the Algerian War. Bernard is unable to readjust to 
civilian life, has become deeply introverted, and spends most of his days alone 
shooting and editing a film with contents that he is unwilling to disclose. We 
eventually find out that Bernard is traumatized by the memory of having been 
involved in torturing a female prisoner in Algeria, who later died of her injuries. (It is 
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also implied that she may have been raped by one or more of Bernard's comrades: 
Bernard recounts that her clothes were 'ripped off, but says no more on the sUbject.) 
The woman was known to Bernard as Muriel; he never discovered her real name. 
Bernard admits that he was directly involved in beating Muriel, but implies that the 
ringleader in the violence was Robert (Philippe Laudenbach), a former friend who 
disposed of the dead woman's body. Robert is also now living in Boulogne, 
apparently remorseless, and Bernard spends a lot of time secretly filming his former 
friend, 'gathering evidence' against him. Eventually, Bernard can no longer bear the 
possibility that Robert's crimes will go unacknowledged and unpunished. Muriel ends 
with Bernard shooting his former friend and fleeing the city. 
Muriel is unlike Resnais' previous feature films in that it cannot be said to be 
'subjectively' narrated in any straightforward sense: the subjective images and interior 
monologues of Hiroshima and Marienbad are absent from Muriel. Nevertheless, we 
can identify at least three distinct sets of memories that constantly underpin the action 
and affect the way in which that action is represented: Alphonse and Helene's 
recollections of World War Two, Alphonse's fabricated memory of Algeria, and 
Bernard's traumatic memory of Muriel. Wilson suggests that Bernard's ever-present 
memories of Algeria frequently 'colour the seemingly unrelated domestic scenes in 
his home town. ,42 Throughout Muriel there is a persistent sense of unease achieved 
through the stylized construction of even the most banal domestic scenes. The 
constant use of disjunctive editing defamiliarizes the everyday settings, moving us 
abruptly between disparate shots and scenes with little regard for conventional 
narrative continuity. Similarly, there is often a lack of obvious relationship between 
the images we see and the soundtrack: the film's discordant and ominous music 
frequently intrudes into apparently innocuous conversations or otherwise insignificant 
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narrative moments. The overall effect is one of estrangement from everyday reality. 
Long before the revelations about Bernard's traumatic memory and Alphonse's 
deceptions, the viewer is given an intimation that nothing in Muriel is quite as it 
seems on the surface. It is reasonable to suggest that while Muriel's narrative is not 
presented to the viewer as being directly 'subjective', the film's representation of the 
world is deeply inflected and distorted by the perceptions and memories of its 
principal characters. 
The memories of Algeria that are presented to the VIewer by Alphonse and 
Bernard are also representative of how Algeria has been collectively imagined or 
represented in the past decade or so. The fabricated memory of Algeria that Alphonse 
has constructed is a misrepresentation that is very much in line with the old colonial 
myths that existed prior to the first insurgencies. As Greene observes, 'Alphonse 
paints a picture of an imaginary Algeria - sunny, open, welcoming - that masks and 
replaces the image of a nation ravaged by war. ,43 If Alphonse's story represents the 
false consciousness of Algeria that helped to sustain the French colonial project, 
Bernard's experience represents the shameful reality of the colonial war that has been 
largely repressed from the public record. While Alphonse is eager to share his 
appealing fabrication with anybody willing to listen, Bernard finds it almost 
impossible to talk about his experience of Algeria, signalling, in part, the proliferation 
of the dominant myths about the colony and the concomitant repression of the facts 
that contradict these illusions. 
The remarkable scene in which Bernard's memory of Muriel is revealed to the 
viewer is also vital in conveying the way in which the harshest realities of Algeria 
have been censored from the historical record and the collective imagination. Bernard 
relates the story of Muriel's torture to an elderly friend at his makeshift film studio 
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whilst projecting documentary footage of Algeria. The grainy images of Algeria -
which appear to have been taken from newsreel footage - fill the screen while 
Bernard makes his confession in a continuous voiceover monologue. There is an 
immediate and obvious disparity between what we see and what we hear. We see 
innocuous shots of the Algerian landscape and architecture followed by images 
depicting young soldiers relaxing in the sun, smiling and even play-fighting. At the 
same time, Bernard recounts his story, revealing how he and a group of four other 
men were asked to interrogate the woman known as Muriel. When he starts to reveal 
the details of the torture, Bernard begins to talk in the present tense, reliving the 
traumatic memory: 'Robert kicks her and shines a torch on her. Her clothes are ripped 
off. She is propped on a chair but falls ... ' The juxtaposition of Bernard's evocative 
account with the innocuous documentary footage serves to emphasize the conspicuous 
absence of any visual testimony to the brutal realities of the Algerian War; the only 
cinematic images of Algeria that exist are the official newsreels that mask rather than 
illuminate the reality of the situation. In refusing to represent visually Bernard's 
memory, Resnais responds to the climate of censorship and repression that existed 
throughout the Algerian War, suggesting that Bernard's mental images of the conflict 
are precisely those which have been excised from the public domain and are thus 
precluded from the collective imagination. 
However, it is not only state-imposed censorship that has limited the circulation of 
accounts of Algeria that run contrary to the official myths of the colony. Muriel 
suggests that many French men and women would simply prefer not to acknowledge 
the traumatic realities of recent foreign policy and decolonization. It is because of the 
general climate of repression that Robert is not perturbed when he discovers that 
Bernard wishes to expose the crime they committed in Algeria. Robert tells his former 
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friend, 'You want to talk about Muriel. But Muriel's story can't be told ... Every 
Frenchman feels alone. He's frightened to death. He'll put the barbed wire up around 
his little world all by himself. He doesn't like trouble. ,44 As was the case in 
Hiroshima, the comforting myths, or false memories, of the recent past are a means 
for avoiding the traumatic reality. 
Repressed memories of Algeria can be said to provide the constant background to 
Muriel, inducing the feeling of estrangement or alienation that underpins the 
representation of domestic life. While this sense of alienation is clearly most 
applicable to Bernard, who finds it impossible to readjust to everyday life after 
Algeria, the other characters seem to share his lack of direction and the difficulty he 
experiences in building close, honest relationships. Again, it is tempting to suggest 
that rather than focussing directly on the individual subjective experience, Resnais' 
concern in Muriel is with the collective experience, or collective consciousness, of a 
national trauma. This attention to the collective experience is perhaps most noticeable 
in the way that Resnais films the urban landscape of Boulogne, using the city as a 
microcosmic representation of the French nation as a whole and as a physical record 
of the traumas of recent French history. Greene suggests: 
Boulogne itself, a bewildering maze of bleak and sterile modem buildings in 
which nothing distinguishes one street, one neighborhood, from another, is the 
perfect geographical expression of a nation that, as one pedestrian complains 
of the city, has lost its 'centre. ,45 
We can take this analogy between the condition of the city and the condition of the 
nation further by noting that the urban chaos in Boulogne is largely a consequence of 
the extensive damage inflicted upon the city at the beginning of World War Two. In a 
rapid sequence depicting the city, Resnais emphasizes the discontinuity between past 
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and present, juxtaposing shots of new shops, the casino and high-rise flats with a lone 
shot of the small area of the old town that was not destroyed by German bombs. 
Shortly afterwards, another sequence shows damaged buildings and partial ruins that 
have not yet been repaired or demolished in conjunction with the street signs 
commemorating the local resistance to the Occupation. (The official memorials to 
France's fight against an occupying power are, of course, bitterly ironic in the context 
of a film dealing with French colonialism.) The city is not shot as neutral background, 
but is utilized as a recurring reminder of the physical and psychological damage 
inflicted upon the French nation during the war and as a symbol of the problematic 
process of social reconstruction. 
Muriel is not so much a film about the Algerian War as it is a film about the 
French nation's collective memory of Algeria, a memory that is problematical 
because it is largely defined by official myths regarding the colony and the 
concomitant repression of representations that challenge official ideology. Dine 
suggests that it is specifically Resnais' awareness of the tension between individual 
memory and officially-sanctioned history that makes Muriel so successful in 
capturing the French population's communal experience of the Algerian War. The 
film, Dine writes, 
casts a particularly revealing light on the radical incommunicability of the 
'Algerian experience'... That it should have done so in 1963 and should 
continue to do so today is a result of its exceptionally productive juxtaposition 
of the individual and collective will to forgetfulness as regards events in 
Algeria, with its characters and the French Nation's obsessive remembering of 
the Second World War: by hinting at convenient omissions in the memory of 
that earlier devastation, it serves to emphasize, if not quite to define, the 
officially encouraged silence surrounding recent events on the other side of the 
M d · 46 e Iterranean. 
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For both World War Two and the Algerian War, Resnais suggests that the 'officially 
encouraged' repression that has defined the collective memory or imagination of these 
events is, at best, an inadequate response to significant national traumas. In Muriel, as 
in Hiroshima, the repressed traumas of the recent past inevitably persist in everyday 
life, leading only to political confusion and protracted, ineffectual mourning. The 
implication is that the nation's psychological scars will only heal after the official 
myths of the past are dismantled and the complex and often shameful realities of 
recent French history are acknowledged. Ultimately, this is one of the key goals of 
Resnais' cinema: to develop an alternative consciousness of the recent past. In 
reinterpreting recent history through his characters' subjective experiences and 
memories, Resnais mounts a small but significant challenge to the dominant myths 
that have moulded the collective imagination of the past. 
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Thinking Through Hollywood 
When Stanley Kubrick's adaptation of Lolita was released in 1962, the film's tag line 
- which was fore grounded throughout the marketing campaign - playfully posed a 
question which must have been in the minds of many people: how did they ever make 
a movie of Lolita? On an immediate level, this of course references the problems 
associated with bringing the novel's risque subject matter to the screen in an era when 
Hollywood was still committed to its conservative Production Code, which effectively 
forbade the depiction of any material which could be deemed offensive or sensational 
in favour of its family-friendly brand of entertainment. Yet in addition to questions of 
sensational content, the tagline can also be seen to address a stylistic issue that relates 
to this particular adaptation. The novel is narrated in the first-person and gains much 
of its force and meaning from the evocation of its protagonist-narrator's uniquely 
skewed perspective on the world, brought to life by Nabokov's exuberant prose style. 
Indeed, this narratorial perspective underpins the entire story: at no moment are we 
permitted to forget that the fictional world is being refracted through a particular point 
of view. In short, to make a movie of Lolita is to tackle the problem of how film 
might translate the literary first-person narrative, and represent the thoughts and 
perspective of its protagonist. 
Reviewing the film shortly after its release, Raymond Durgnat argued that 'Lolita 
is one of those stories which cry out for a first-person camera. First-person in the 
sense of being, not the hero's-eye-view - which isn't important - but his mind's eye 
view. ,1 The lack of such a device, he concluded, was the film's . glaring omission', 
and he was not alone in his assessment of Kubrick's 'mishandling' of the materia1. 2 In 
a retrospective analysis of the film, Brandon French presented a similar argument, 
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cataloguing the ways In which Kubrick 'failed' to capture the novel's essential 
stylistic properties: 
Kubrick photographed Lolita predominantly in medium shots, the least 
intrusive choice a director can make. There are virtually no distortions of lens 
or angle, no flourishes of movement, no extreme close-ups or long shots or 
zooms. The lighting is consistently naturalistic. And there is no appreciable 
audio manipulation. Kubrick's decision to film in this manner may have been 
based on his assumption that the bizarre nature of the material required 
directorial detachment for balance ... But the majority of Lolita's content is 
banal until it is worked upon by Humbert's distorted romantic perspective. To 
accommodate that content appropriately, Kubrick needed a stylistic equivalent 
for Nabokov's prose. 3 
Criticism such as this clearly addresses the stylistic issue raised by the film's 
tagline, but it does so by divorcing this aspect of the adaptation from the industrial 
and cultural context that is also identified as a condition of the film's production. The 
underlying assumption is that these are distinct and separate issues. Yet to make such 
an assumption is to overlook the possibility of a more complex interaction between 
the artistic motivations and institutional constraints that shaped the adaptation. 
Durgnat and French raise several valid points regarding the relationship between the 
book and the film of Lolita, but, I believe, they are wrong to suggest that Kubrick 
disregards the novel's narratorial slant and its intrinsic importance to the story. My 
contention is that while Kubrick does not attempt a systematic reworking of the 
novel's first-person narration, his careful manipulation of point of view at significant 
moments in the film demonstrates his awareness of the crucial relationship between 
form and content in the original story.4 At the same time, the stylistic modifications 
that he makes are, for the most part, necessitated by the transposition of the source 
material to its new medium - not least because of the changes to content that were 
imposed by the censors. In order to understand fully Kubrick's reworking of Lolita, it 
is essential that we first consider both the general challenges presented by the notion 
of 'first-person' cinematic narrative, and the specific censorship problems that the 
production had to negotiate. 
This chapter will, therefore, firstly provide a brief analysis of the history of first-
person narration in the American sound film, discussing in particular Orson Welles, 
Robert Montgomery and film nair in the 1940s and early 1950s. Primarily, this will 
allow us to consider central issues concerning processes of spectatorship, 
identification and narratorial perspective in the cinema, whilst clarifying the historical 
context that helped to shape Kubrick's early films. It will also help to elucidate the 
many different forms of subjective narration that recur throughout Kubrick's work -
from brief dream sequences and fantasy images (Killer's Kiss [1955], A Clockwork 
Orange, Eyes Wide Shut), to representations of visions and hallucinations (2001, The 
Shining), and first-person voiceovers (Killer's Kiss, Lolita, A Clockwork Orange). In 
addition, this discussion of We1les and film nair will facilitate an exploration of the 
complex and shifting relationships between Hollywood, European art cinema, and 
Kubrick's own brand of filmmaking. Under the influence of earlier European films, 
We1les and film nair introduced greater narrative experimentation, expressionistic 
aesthetics, increased psychological complexity, and more 'adult' themes (often 
dealing with sex, violence and criminality) into the American cinema. Kubrick's 
cinematic thought, in tum, clearly draws upon this heritage, and attempts to expand 
further the stylistic and thematic boundaries of American filmmaking. 
This preliminary discussion will lay the foundations for an analysis of the 
difficulties that Kubrick faced in making Lolita, which will focus on how he sought to 
balance the artistic, commercial and institutional demands that framed the adaptation. 
This, of course, will address his attempt to negotiate the fundamental problem of how 
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to evoke a psychological content that is integral to the story but, because of 
censorship, cannot be represented by conventional means. 
In exploring the relationship between Lolita's production history and its narrative, 
I believe we can identify several distinct senses in which Kubrick 'thinks through 
Hollywood' - or, in different terms, utilizes Hollywood's conventions, codes and 
ideology as a frame of reference for his own cinematic thought. In the same way that 
Resnais reflects upon the role of political discourses, censorship and propaganda in 
shaping thought, Kubrick addresses the influence of Hollywood and its narrative 
formulae on the popular cultural imagination. His fascination with genre (in most of 
his films) and his creative use of the star system (particularly in Lolita and Eyes Wide 
Shut) attest to his shrewd understanding of how Hollywood formulae can operate as a 
means of guiding audience expectation and generating meaning. Yet in working with 
these tried and tested formulae, Kubrick also probes their limits. Hollywood's generic 
and narrative conventions are built upon a number of tacit ideological assumptions. In 
critiquing or subverting these conventions, Kubrick continuously exposes and 
deconstructs the moral, political and philosophical frameworks that define the 
parameters of American commercial cinema. Kubrick's cinematic thought, therefore, 
operates through its antagonistic - yet extremely productive - relationship with 
Hollywood. This is precisely what is reflected and reinforced by Lolita's tagline, 
which foregrounds the problematical conditions of the film's production as a 
determinant of our mode of reception. 
The overall purpose of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate the way in which 
Kubrick's formal representation of thought (or, specifically, first-person narration) in 
Lolita is embedded in a wider exploration of how thought might be organized and 
expressed in relation to Hollywood cinema. Many of the ideas considered in this 
226 
initial discussion will then be taken up in a second chapter, which will deal with the 
various fonns of subjective narration in Kubrick's later work. 
Orson Welles, Robert Montgomery and First-Person Narration 
In 1953, Julio Moreno noted a 'growing rapprochement' between the film and the 
novel as narrative fonns. 5 On the one hand, cinema's 'objective' presentation of facts 
was beginning to have an impact on a number of American and French authors. As we 
saw in the previous section, Robbe-Grillet and the other New Novelists should be 
counted foremost among those whose writing style was influenced directly by the 
cinema. On the other hand, several filmmakers were starting to experiment with 
different fonns of subjective, or first-person, narration, based to a large extent on 
literary precedents. The sound film, Moreno suggested, was 'tending toward a greater 
personalization of the story, replacing the impersonal presentation of facts by 
narration by one of the characters or, going further, presenting the events subjectively, 
as seen and felt by one of the characters. ,6 In short, by 1953 (the year in which 
Kubrick made his first feature-length film), first-person cinematic narration, 
representing a specific character's viewpoint and thoughts, was well established in 
both theory and practice. 
Tracing the furthest ongm of any stylistic or narrative device is always 
problematic, but when discussing American first-person cinema, Orson Welles' work 
is undoubtedly a good place to start. With its multiple flashbacks, ostentatious 
camerawork and expressionistic mise-en-scene, Citi~en Kane mounted a decisive 
challenge to the American convention of 'invisible' narration. In place of the 
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omniscient and unobtrusive mode of storytelling that had, since the 1910s, been 
synonymous with Hollywood filmmaking, Citizen Kane utilized a more sUbjective 
approach, wherein the life story of Charles Foster Kane (Orson Welles) is 
'recollected' by a series of different characters. Yet W e1les' attempt to introduce a 
form of first-person narration into the American cinema predates Citizen Kane. Before 
analyzing his screen debut, it is instructive to consider W e1les' aborted adaptation of 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, in which he first envisaged the concept of the 
cinematic first-person narrator. 
Heart of Darkness was the film We1les initially planned to make for RKO, an 
intention which was publicized by the studio in September 1939.7 The film was to be 
made under the same contract that eventually set the terms for the production of 
Citizen Kane, which guaranteed We1les an unprecedented level of creative control 
over any approved project, including the right to final cut. With this promise of almost 
total freedom to pursue his own ideas, and all the resources of RKO placed at his 
disposal, We1les was eager to experiment. Clinton Heylin records that in a memo of 
September 15, 1939, Welles was already suggesting that Heart of Darkness would be 
'told in an entirely new way'. 8 It soon transpired that Welles intended to replicate the 
form of the original novel, so that the major part of the story would be told from the 
perspective of Marlow (the book's primary, first-person narrator). In fact, he planned 
a very literal evocation of Marlow's point of view: 'Welles had ... decided to shoot the 
film as if the camera represented Marlow's line of vision - to make the first film in 
history that not only told its tale in first-person narrative but took the actual vantage of 
its narrator. ,9 Welles intended that the film should systematically utilize Marlow's 
optical perspective, with all events and characters being seen through his eyes. Tilts. 
pans and tracking shots would come to represent the physical mo\'ements of Marlo\\'~ s 
eyes and body through the course of the story, and when he was addressed by other 
characters, they would speak directly into the camera. At the same time, subjective 
sound was to playa key role in rendering the first-person perspective. The script for 
Heart of Darkness indicates that We1les intended to make extensive use of devices 
such as voiceover, voice-off and internal monologue to evoke Marlow's point of 
. 10 VIew. 
Unfortunately, the type of first-person narrative that Welles envisaged also 
presented considerable technical problems. In particular, the fact that the camera was 
meant to represent Marlow's eyes meant that there could be no conventional cutting. 
As Welles stated in another (undated) memo to RKO: 
In filming Heart of Darkness the intention is to operate the camera so that, 
aesthetically speaking, there will be no interruption of the action at any time, 
no cuts ... the camera has to function not only as mechanical recording device 
but as a character. I I 
This, Welles acknowledged, would require both aesthetic and technical innovation, 
but he believed that a film of 'continuous' action was, in principle, achievable. Any 
necessary cuts, he suggested, could be hidden within what he termed 'feather wipes': 
whilst the camera was directed on a background detail, such as a wall, an 'invisible' 
edit could be made, with one shot segueing seamlessly into another. After, several 
days of test shooting, however, We1les discovered that while these feather wipes 
worked as intended, they were difficult to orchestrate and, consequentially, very time-
consuming. Furthermore, once a sequence had been shot, it could not be altered or 
edited in any way without breaking the film's continuity: if anything needed 
changing, entire segments would have to be removed or re-shot. This, of course, 
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meant that every sequence in the film would have to be planned and executed with the 
greatest precision. 
With the logistical problems created by Welles' umque VISIOn of Heart of 
Darkness, projected costs rose rapidly. After Welles submitted his finished script, the 
budget department at RKO estimated that it would cost just over one million dollars to 
make the film - double Welles' allotted budget. Reluctantly, he agreed to postpone 
the film, and to find a more manageable project for his debut. 
While We1les never got to fulfil his ambition of making a film seen entirely from 
the first-person perspective, one such film was made in the 1940s. Robert 
Montgomery's Lady in the Lake (1946), adapted from a Raymond Chandler story, 
stands alone in the history of cinema as the only film to have systematically deployed 
a first-person camera. Apart from a few short, expositional scenes in which Philip 
Marlowe (played by Montgomery) addresses the camera directly (in a prologue, an 
epilogue and during two brief intennissions), everything is shot from his optical 
perspective. Inevitably, this means that many of the stylistic devices that Welles 
envisaged using for Heart of Darkness feature prominently in Montgomery's film: 
camera movements aim to imitate bodily movements and sensations (so, for example, 
tracking shots are slightly shaky, rather than smooth, which is intended to mimic our 
vision whilst walking); when characters speak to Marlowe, they look directly into the 
camera; and in place of conventional continuity editing, we are given a series of long, 
continuous shots, with any cuts within scenes being carefully disguised. Almost every 
aspect of the film was designed with the aim of placing the viewer in Marlowe's 
position. As Moreno notes, 'even Montgomery's voice was recorded with a more 
muffled tone than this natural voice, since this is the way everybody hears his own 
. ,\2 VOIce. 
' .... 0 
_.J 
Unfortunately, what this exercise in transposing a literal first-person viewpoint to 
the screen demonstrated, for audiences and critics alike, was the dramatic 'failure' of 
such a device. Moreno suggests that contemporary audiences were, for the most part, 
frustrated and confused by the film's continual use of subjective camera, and the 
subsequent critical response has not improved the film's reputation. 13 Edward 
Branigan provides an accurate description of Lady in the Lake's position in film 
history: 'It is one of the few classics whose fame rests on its convincing failure.' 14 Yet 
we cannot afford to dismiss the film. The critical attention Lady in the Lake continues 
to receive testifies to the film's significance in clarifying some central issues 
concerning subjectivity and identification in narrative cinema. Furthermore, I believe 
it is reductive simply to state that the film as a whole is a 'failure'. Certain sequences 
undoubtedly work better than others, and while Lady in the Lake is deeply flawed in 
many areas, there is much in the film that is worth discussing. A brief analysis of why 
the film 'fails' in certain respects, but also succeeds, in a limited capacity, in others, 
will help to elucidate the basic nature of first-person narration and suggest how it 
might be adapted to operate in film. 
One of the primary criticisms that has been levelled at Lady in the Lake is that in 
attempting a 'faithful' reproduction of a subjective viewpoint, it simply draws 
attention to the many ways in which the camera's view is fundamentally dissimilar to 
our everyday visual experience. Joseph Brinton, in an early article on Lady in the 
Lake, provides a convincing catalogue of ways in which the camera's view is unlike 
human vision: its field of view is much narrower (typically, showing only a third of 
the 1800 panorama open to eyesight), the camera lacks the essential agility of the 
human eye, and depth perception presents a significant problem for the monocular 
camera, something that is exacerbated whenever Marlowe's limbs are filmed 
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protruding from the bottom of the frame (when, for example, he reaches out to take 
documents or sign his name).15 Deficiencies such as these go unnoticed when 
subjective camera is used in the flow of normal cinematic narrative, but are constantly 
evident, and, indeed, are unintentionally foregrounded, in Lady in the Lake. 
The numerous ways in which the film reminds us of the basic differences between 
human perception and the camera's mechanical vision is linked to another central 
problem: that of identification. Both Moreno and Brinton assume that one of the key 
aims of the first-person camera is to facilitate a greater identification between the 
viewer and the protagonist, so that the viewer feels, in Moreno's words, 'personally 
involved in the action' .16 And this assumption seems reasonable. MGM's advertising 
for the film certainly suggested something very similar, promising the viewer 'a 
Revolutionary motion picture; the most amazing since Talkies began! YOU and 
ROBERT MONTGOMERY solve a murder mystery together!,17 Yet if a close 
identification of viewer with protagonist was the film's primary goal, many of its 
'first-person' devices had an opposite, alienating effect. It is difficult to become 
immersed in a narrative where there are constant distractions, such as Marlowe's 
protruding limbs or cigarette smoke, which periodically drifts across the frame. 
Similarly, although one may become partially acclimatized to having characters speak 
directly toward the camera, this technique never loses entirely its strange and eerie 
qualities. 18 
There are, however, more fundamental problems with Lady in the Lake's 
SUbjective perspective, and these directly concern the nature and significance of first-
person narration. The assumption that the literary first-person perspective can be 
mimicked, or even approximated, simply through the continual use of subjective 
camera is deeply flawed, and patently fails to address the motivational and formal 
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logic that underpins first-person narration in literature. Clearly, there is more to first-
person narration than the narrator's perceptual point of view, and it is this reasonably 
self-evident fact that is reaffirmed repeatedly through Lady in the Lake. In restricting 
itself to the optical perspective of its protagonist, the film also severely limits its 
capacity to offer any insight into Marlowe's thoughts and feelings. 19 Again, both 
Moreno and Brinton, for similar reasons, identify this lack of psychological insight as 
an acute failing of Lady in the Lake. Brinton suggests that Montgomery ought to have 
found a means of representing the movement of Marlowe's attention and thoughts 
through editing, rather than trying to undertake the impossible and fruitless task of 
recreating subjectivity as a continuous visual experience: 
Because Lady in the Lake fastidiously avoids cuts, it denies the shifting focus 
of attention and becomes unnaturally static. Ideally, it should have played 
Marlowe's gaze over a continual succession of objects, and the nature of these 
objects would have served as a guide to his insights.2o 
Similarly, Moreno argues that 'the fragmentary representation of diverse aspects of 
reality, made coherent by the logic of montage, is psychologically truer than the 
reproduction of reality in large continuous takes. 21 Clearly, in presenting their ideas of 
how the film might better have depicted Marlowe's psychological point of view, both 
writers echo many of the arguments put forth by Miinsterberg in his theory of 
cinematic thought, as described in my introduction. 22 Brinton, in fact, perhaps goes 
even further than Miinsterberg by suggesting that editing might be used to depict 'not 
merely what a character thinks, but how he thinks, in terms of his physical 
individuality. ,23 For Brinton, the representation of a thought process through editing 
might reveal a great deal about a character; and, we should add, if editing is of some 
value in depicting the mind of the archetypal, taciturn hero of a Raymond Chandler 
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novel, it should be seen as an indispensable resource when portraying the 
individualistic psyches of the narrators of Lolita and A Clockwork Orange. 
A character's immediate perceptual experience, we should perhaps conclude, is 
(usually) only of limited importance to the first-person narrative. In contrast, the 
detailed representation of a character's thought processes and psychological make-up 
is crucial, for this suggests the narrator's entire worldview, fostering a close 
identification of viewer with protagonist. This is, I believe, borne out by the fact that 
the most successful scenes in Lady in the Lake are those that manage to transcend the 
limitations of the first-person camera and evoke some aspect of Marlowe's 
psychological perspective. The few scenes that utilize some form of extra-diegetic 
music, for example, attain a dramatic and psychological depth that is lacking in most 
of the film. When Marlowe is searching a house, in which he eventually discovers a 
murder victim, a sense of anxiety is built up through the gradual introduction of tense 
background music, which works well in conjunction with the subjective camera's 
restricted point of view. Similarly, a sequence in which Marlowe limps from his 
crashed car, fleeing the approaching police vehicles, strikes me as particularly 
effective in evoking the psychological dimension of the action. After Marlowe climbs 
from his car, we hear sirens, and the camera pivots to reveal the flashing lights of 
distant police cars. It then quickly pans back, stopping abruptly on a group of trees at 
the roadside. As the sirens quickly grow louder, the camera slowly and shakily moves 
forwards, reaching the trees just as the police arrive at the scene. Both of these 
sequences are successful insofar as they do not merely show what Marlowe sees, but 
offer some insight into his thoughts and emotions. Nevertheless, it is important to 
reiterate that they are by no means typical of the film as a whole, which rarely 
achieves any sense of psychological depth. 
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Whether or not We1les could have succeeded where Montgomery failed, in 
making a dramatically and psychologically satisfying film shot entirely in the first-
person, is, of course, impossible to say. His extensive use of voiceovers, monologues, 
and so forth, in the Heart of Darkness script suggests that he was very aware of the 
need to represent his narrator's thoughts and not merely his perceptions. Yet it is 
difficult to imagine We1les overcoming all of the fundamental aesthetic problems 
associated with the systematic use of first-person camera. In any case, by the time he 
came to make Citizen Kane, We1les had abandoned the central stylistic premise of 
Heart of Darkness. 
This is not, however, to imply that We1les had lost interest in subjective narration 
and the possibility of using film to represent thought. Many of the radical ideas 
(concerning cinematic point of view, the relationship between the audience, camera 
and characters, and so forth) that underpinned W e1les' conceptualization of Heart of 
Darkness re-emerge, in a modified form, in Citizen Kane. In particular, the basic idea 
that a film might be told by characters within the fiction, rather than being presented 
in an unmediated state, subsists as a central premise. Indeed, We1les has suggested 
that Citizen Kane was originally conceived as a story that would be told from 
drastically differing points of view. 24 In the same way that Rashomon, nine years 
later, would present contradictory eye-witness accounts of a single event, Citizen 
Kane was to have different characters delivering conflicting accounts of the 
eponymous protagonist's life and personality - with each testimony revealing more 
about its narrator than about Kane himself. Although We1les and his co-writer 
Herman Mankiewicz eventually removed the more dramatic disparities in point of 
view from the script, the various flashbacks in the film still betray some subtle 
differences in their portrayal of Kane. 25 
235 
We should, however, perhaps be reluctant to suggest that these flashbacks attempt 
to represent the witnesses' memories in an 'authentic' manner (in the same way, for 
example, that flashback operates in Hiroshima mon amour). As Laura Mulvey points 
out, 
during the flashback sequences, the mise-en-scene goes beyond the literal 
vision of the five witnesses, and the film's images, at certain moments, show 
more than the characters on the screen can see or understand. Only the camera 
and the audience have a vision that will allow them to figure out the film as 
puzzle. The opening sequence signals this privileged relation between the two, 
giving the audience a cue or hint, as it were, to use their own eyes and powers 
of decipherment and not to fall back into habits of dependence or to expect 
their surrogate on screen to understand the language of film. 26 
Both inside and outside of the flashbacks, the camera does not restrict itself to 
showing a specific character's perspective, but rather personifies a kind of 
investigative impulse that underpins the film. In this way, the camera is still, in some 
sense, analogous to the 'first-person' narrator it would have represented in Heart of 
Darkness. In relentlessly exploring Kane's past, the camera is almost character within 
the fiction, playing the same role as Thompson, the investigative journalist charged 
with unravelling the mystery of Kane's life; at the same time, it is also an unusually 
direct surrogate for the viewer, mimicking his or her desire to unmask and understand 
the central character. Ultimately, the film's probing camera, which effortlessly passes 
the fences and 'no trespassing' signs with which the reclusive Kane has surrounded 
himself, promises a voyeuristic access to the mind of its protagonist. 
Nevertheless, as Mulvey suggests, the terms by which we are offered an insight 
into Kane's psyche are by no means conventional. Much of what we learn about Kane 
is derived not from what we are directly 'told' (or, specifically, from the dialogue), 
but more obliquely from mise-en-scene, compositions and camerawork; certainly, 
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many of the most acute psychological insights relating to Kane's character are 
implicit within the film's imagery rather than being openly stated. When asked what 
he has discovered about Kane at the end of the film, Thompson replies, 'Not much, 
really.' Yet the viewer is permitted to discern a great deal about the film's 
protagonist; it is simply that this information is, for the most part, conveyed visually 
rather than verbally. 
This proliferation of visual meanIng attests to an underlying expressionistic 
aesthetic in Welles' work. With its repeated use of chiaroscuro lighting effects, 
oblique camera angles, and baroque backgrounds, captured in minute detail through 
deep-focus photography, Citizen Kane seeks a more communicative alternative to the 
ubiquitous 'realism' of American cinema. And, as with the earliest forms of German 
expressionism explored in my introduction, Welles' expressionism most often 
attempts to communicate the psychological dimension of what is being represented on 
screen through the projection of subjective states onto the external environment. In 
Citizen Kane, the way Kane is shot in relation to his surroundings is often especially 
significant in both illustrating his immediate state of mind and developing his 
psychological portrait through the course of the film. In the first flashback, for 
instance, depicting Kane's meteoric rise to wealth and power, he is frequently shot 
from a very low angle, so that his physical stature within the frame is greatly 
exaggerated.27 Later on, at the political rally that Kane holds as part of his campaign 
to become Governor of New York, he is again repeatedly framed from a low angle, 
this time in front of the giant poster depicting his own face. Ultimately, of course, 
Kane will be unable to live up to this idealized, gargantuan public image that he has 
cultivated for himself: in fact, the rally scene ends with a different, high-angle shot of 
Kane taken from the vantage point of his political rival, Jim Gettys (Ray Collins), 
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whose machinations soon guarantee Kane's public disgrace and downfall. Finally, in 
the last sections of the film, in which Kane is becoming ever-more isolated and 
reclusive, he is more frequently framed in extreme long shots, his figure becoming 
lost within the cavernous rooms of the mansion he shares with his increasingly-
estranged second wife (Dorothy Comingore). 
W e1les' expressionistic method of representing aspects of character through 
composition and mise-en-scene is not only of great interest in itself, but also for the 
way in which it foreshadows Kubrick's technique of organizing space to represent 
thought. Robert Kolker is one of the few writers to note the deep similarity between 
Welles and Kubrick in this respect. He suggests that one of Kubrick's most admirable 
talents is 
his ability to generate ideas from the organization of a complex spatial realm 
that encloses his characters and expresses their state of being. For in Kubrick's 
films we learn more about a character from the way that character inhabits a 
particular space than ... from what that character says.28 
These comments, as Kolker later suggests, could equally be applied to Welles. Yet 
there is perhaps a more fundamental connection between We1les and Kubrick, which 
is partially implicit in Kolker's argument: namely, both see film as a means of 
expressing thought outside of language. Where both directors excel is in creating 
extremely powerful, vivid and memorable audiovisual symbols, which seem to 
condense an endless wealth of meaning. Just as 2001's prehistoric bone is densely 
symbolic, Citizen Kane's sledge and glass paperweight, the dual symbols of Kane's 
lost innocence, have an ongoing, emblematic importance that resonates throughout the 
narrative. Mulvey, writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, identifies a similar 
significance in Citizen Kane's pervasive use of pre- or non-linguistic symbols, 
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pointing out that one of the truly innovative features of the film is its recognition of 
the relationship between cinematic and mental imagery: 
The language of the mind, with its dream images, allegorical objects, scenarios 
of desire, frozen memories and so on, finds a resonance in the language of 
cinema. In cinema objects, gestures, looks, mise-en-scene, lighting, framing 
and all the accoutrements of the filmic apparatus materialise into a kind of 
language before or even beyond words. Citizen Kane's originality lies in its 
self-conscious awareness, even exploitation, of this process.29 
In the final analysis, the expressionistic technique of Citizen Kane provides a much 
more detailed psychological portrait, and greater insight into the nature of thought, 
than Heart of Darkness' first-person camera could have ever hoped to achieve. 
Film Noir and Subjectivity 
At the same time that Welles was developing his own expressionistic aesthetic, 
American cinema in general was undergoing a more modest transformation along 
somewhat similar lines. The emergence of film nair in the early 1940s signalled a 
small but significant shift away from the illusionistic, 'invisible' style that had always 
underpinned Hollywood filmmaking, and toward different forms of subjective 
narration. In part, this shift can be linked to the influx of German directors, writers 
and technicians who arrived in Hollywood in the early 1930s, fleeing Fascism. As 
numerous critics have noted, the nair 'look', with its frequent non-naturalistic 
lighting, chiaroscuro effects, oblique camera angles, and unbalanced compositions -
often designed to reflect the central protagonist's sense of anxiety and uncertainty -
bears a clear debt to German expressionism.3o Many of the other subjective aspects of 
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nair narratives (first-person voiceover, flashback structures, and so on) can be traced 
to stylistic features of the 'hard-boiled' fiction that provided the primary source 
material for the genre. But before analyzing the subjective style and content of film 
nair in more detail, I wish first to round off my discussion of We1les by briefly 
considering the 'problem' of formal experimentation within the Hollywood studio 
system. This problem is best elucidated by examining one of W e11es' own film nair 
thrillers: The Lady from Shanghai (1947). 
On the surface, The Lady from Shanghai is a straightforward film nair. It displays 
all of the main stylistic and thematic hallmarks of the genre: the story is told in 
flashback, with a first-person voiceover; the protagonist-narrator, Michael O'Hara 
(Orson Welles) is a dupe, endlessly manipulated by the femme fatale, Elsa (Rita 
Hayworth), and corrupt officials Arthur Bannister (Everett Sloane) - the 'world's 
greatest criminal lawyer' - and George Grisby (Glenn Anders); and the film 
frequently utilizes a highly expressionistic mise-en-scene to reflect the protagonist's 
inner experience - most notably, of course, in the famous hall of mirrors finale, where 
Michael, having been drugged, awakes in a fairground crazy house and finds himself 
confronted by countless, distorted images of Elsa and Arthur Bannister. Yet the final 
version of The Lady from Shanghai represents only a fraction of the film that Welles 
planned and shot. Upon seeing W e1les' preferred cut of the film, Harry Cohn, head of 
Columbia, decided that it was too long and too complicated, and ordered extensive re-
editing and re-shooting, which eventually saw the film's running length reduced from 
155 to 86 minutes. 3 ! Many of the cuts were intended to streamline the narrative, so 
that the plot advanced quickly towards its conclusion, jettisoning any 'extraneous' 
ornamentation. So, for example, even the film's spectacular finale was greatly 
reduced with the hall of mirrors scene being only the final segment in what was , 
originally an extensive, nightmarish sequence that depicted Michael wandering 
confusedly from room to room in the crazy house. 32 Similarly, many other scenes that 
did not directly advance the film's plot, but contributed immeasurably in terms of 
atmosphere, theme and characterization, were ultimately excised from the picture. 
The cutting of The Lady fram Shanghai is particularly pertinent to the present 
discussion because it again highlights the problems of formal experimentation with 
subjective narration within the inherently conservative context of Hollywood 
filmmaking. Whereas classical narrative prioritizes things such as clarity and 
economy, Welles' cinema, like Kubrick's, clearly attempts to develop a mode of 
visual storytelling that is more subtle, intricate and stylistically complex.33 Clearly, 
film nair is also stylistically experimental in a way that other Hollywood genres are 
not, but this experimentation has strict limits. The non-naturalistic stylistic elements 
offilm nair signify a small shift toward subjective narration (conveying, for example, 
a general atmosphere of ambiguity, uncertainty or anxiety that mirrors the 
protagonist's mental state). In contrast, Welles' brand of expressionism is more 
radically subjective, more pervasive, and more integral in terms of how it 
communicates quite specific narrative meanings. Consequently, it presents a more 
fundamental challenge to Hollywood's narrative conventions. 
Although film nair does not, in general, have the stylistic complexity of Welles' 
work, it should, nevertheless, be recognized as being equally significant in 
introducing new forms of subjective narration into the American cinema. It is also 
equally significant when discussing Kubrick's early work. Two of his earliest films, 
Killer's Kiss and The Killing (1956), belong to the genre, and the former, in particular, 
seems heavily influenced by the subjective narrative techniques found in earlier nair 
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thrillers. Some further discussion offilm nair and subjectivity will, therefore, help to 
contextualize the early evolution of Kubrick's cinematic thought. 
The expressionistic aspects of film nair are consistently supported by two 
additional devices that foreground the subjective status of events on screen: first-
person voiceover and a flashback structure. Numerous archetypal films nair - such as 
Double Indemnity (Wilder, 1944), The Postman Always Rings Twice (Garnett, 1946), 
Gilda (Vidor, 1946) and Out of the Past (Tourneur, 1947) - utilize these key devices 
in such a way that the main narrative is recast as a story that is 'told' by the male 
protagonist. As was the case in Citizen Kane, the flashbacks in these films are not 
supposed to offer an accurate representation of the narrator's 'memory'. Instead, we 
are given a reconstruction of past events that is presented, broadly speaking, from the 
psychological perspective of the protagonist-narrator. This means that our access to 
narrative information is usually restricted, so that only events that have been 
witnessed directly by the protagonist are depicted on screen.34 Indeed, even in those 
films nair that do not utilize voiceover or flashback - such as The Maltese Falcon 
(Huston, 1941) - the narrative is often focalized by the central male protagonist, 
whose subjective experience determines precisely what we see and what we know at 
any given point in the story.35 
Alongside these general strategies for organizing the narrative around a central 
psychological perspective, film nair occasionally makes use of more discrete, 
stylistically flamboyant 'subjective sequences'. A particularly noteworthy example is 
the dream sequence in Stranger on the Third Floor (Ingster, 1940), one of the earliest 
films nair. Having witnessed a murder, the film's protagonist, Mike Ward (John 
McGuire), provides the testimony that secures the conviction of the only suspect in 
the case. Shortly afterwards, Mike is beset by doubts over the man's guilt, which are 
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exacerbated when he sees a sinister stranger (Peter Lorre) lurking outside his 
neighbour's apartment. Back in his own apartment, Mike becomes convinced that his 
neighbour, with whom he has had a long-running feud, has been murdered by the 
stranger. After Mike falls asleep, we are shown a fairly lengthy dream sequence in 
which his neighbour's body is discovered and Mike is promptly arrested and 
sentenced to death. 
For the most part, the dream sequence does not appear particularly authentic. 
There are some interesting expressionistic effects that, in places, help to suggest a 
nightmarish atmosphere - oversized rooms and furnishings, distorted perspectives, 
and a series of low-angle shots of policemen and a judge, recreate the protagonist's 
sense of being overwhelmed by his surroundings. Yet the sequence is far too coherent 
and logical to convincingly imitate a real dream, and its meaning is purposefully 
transparent. Nevertheless, the sequence indicates the more direct means by which 
film nair sometimes attempts to evoke or probe the protagonist's psyche, and provides 
a key illustration of the genre's fascination with subjective drama. 
Moreover, the dream sequence in Stranger on the Third Floor highlights the 
significant influence of psychoanalytic theory onfilm nair's depiction of subjectivity 
and thought. Frank Krutnik suggests that the 1940s saw the rapid 'popularization' of 
psychoanalysis in the United States, and film nair played a key role in the general 
dissemination of basic psychoanalytic concepts.36 In Stranger on the Third Floor, a 
popularized Freudianism is immediately evident. Experiencing intense guilt over the 
fact that he may have helped to condemn an innocent man to death, the protagonist 
finds himself dreaming of his own wrongful conviction. The obvious parallels 
between the dream and reality are then accentuated by the film's repetition of 
dialogue: hauled in front of a judge (the archetypal embodiment of the Freudian 
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superego), Mike finds himself obsessively echoing the words of the convicted man -
'1 didn't do it!' Yet, implicitly, Mike's innocence is not so straightforward. In a 
flashback prior to the dream, we see that Mike has a long-running and bitter feud with 
his neighbour. The neighbour's murder, therefore, seems an exemplary case of 
Freudian wish-fulfilment. 
Psychoanalysis, we should note, was influential beyond the generic boundaries of 
film nair. The 'solution' to Citizen Kane's central mystery clearly operates according 
to a psychoanalytic rationale, with 'Rosebud' symbolizing, among other things, the 
childhood trauma (separation from the mother) from which Kane has never fully 
recovered - although Welles himself famously dismissed this aspect of the plot as 
'dollarbook Freud' .37 Similarly, psychoanalytic ideas concerning guilt, repression and 
hysteria are abundant in Hitchcock's films - most notably, of course, in Spellbound 
(1945), in which Ingrid Bergman plays a psychiatrist attempting to uncover the 
identity of an amnesiac (Gregory Peck) suspected of murder. Yet film nair's 
appropriation of psychoanalysis is distinctive in that it is particularly concerned with 
the theory's treatment of transgressive themes and behaviour - which reflects its own 
fascination with criminality, violence and, perhaps most significantly, illicit sexuality. 
Krutnik suggests that, initially at least, the theory's 'foregrounding of sex' was 
inherently problematic for the film industry, which, consequently, was 'resistant to 
any wide-scale exploitation of the visible cultural interest in psychoanalysis' .38 
However, almost paradoxically, psychoanalysis, and the way in which it 
conceptualized sexual behaviour, proved, in the 1940s, to be extremely valuable, for it 
suggested a means of circumventing censorship and implying a forbidden sexual 
content: 
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In popularised accounts there was a strong assocIatIOn between Freudian 
psychoanalysis and hidden or illicit sexuality. In nair thrillers - and in 1940s 
cinema more generally - the invocation of psychoanalysis proved a 
particularly useful means of suggesting that which could not directly be shown. 
The narratives of many nair thrillers are concerned with corruptive and 
criminal sexual intrigues which were problematic within the representational 
confines of classical Hollywood. The association between psychoanalysis and 
sex allowed a mode of indirect representation in which condensation and 
displacement played integral roles.39 
In other words, psychoanalysis not only provided a theoretical framework for 
denoting 'unrepresentable' aspects of sexual behaviour, but was itself used to 
symbolize an illicit, sexual content. 
Gilda, as Krutnik notes, provides some of the best examples of both uses of 
psychoanalysis. Early on in the film, Gilda (Rita Hayworth) asks her husband (George 
Macready) to help her fasten her dress. As he dutifully obliges, she says: 'I can never 
get a zipper to close. Maybe that stands for something - what do you think?' This 
quip clearly signposts the film's central strategy of repeatedly implying or 
symbolizing that which cannot be shown openly - Gilda's promiscuity. Later on in 
the film, psychoanalysis is evoked in a more direct manner. After Johnny (Glenn 
Ford) compares his chauffeuring of Gilda to picking up his boss' laundry, Gilda 
retorts: 'Shame on you, Johnny! Any psychiatrist would tell you that your thought-
associations are very revealing. ' 
The psychoanalytic symbolization and displacement of sexual themes occurs in 
different form in numerous films nair, though it is rarely as self-evident and pervasive 
as is the case in Gilda. The Freudian narrative of Stranger on the Third Floor 
provides another interesting example of the way in which film nair incorporates 
sexual desire as a fundamental element in characterization and plotting. Throughout 
the film Mike's actions have an implicit sexual motivation that conflicts with the 
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rational logic by which they are ostensibly justified. Mike works as a reporter, and by 
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helping to convict a man of murder with his eye-witness testimony, he also manages 
to secure a promotion and pay-rise. This in tum, it is revealed, will allow him to 
finally marry his long-term fiancee. Implicitly, Mike's immediate guilt following the 
suspect's conviction is caused by his deep-seated suspicion that his judgment has been 
impaired by ulterior motives. Similarly, it is suggested that Mike's feud with his 
neighbour is rooted in sexual frustration. While Mike considers the fact that he might 
be blamed if his neighbour has been murdered, he recalls (in flashback) an evening 
when he had brought his fiancee back to his rented apartment. The flashback shows 
Mike's prurient neighbour alerting the landlady to the fact that Mike has a woman in 
his apartment (although, we are meant to infer, the circumstances are perfectly 
innocent). The scandalized landlady promptly informs Mike that his girlfriend is to 
leave at once, after which Mike loses his temper and attempts to assault the interfering 
neighbour. This back-story not only provides the logical reason why Mike might be 
considered a suspect in his neighbour's murder (the feud and attempted assault), but 
also suggests that, because of his thwarted desire, he unconsciously identifies with the 
'stranger' who commits the brutal crime - something that then feeds into his guilty 
dream. Ultimately, Stranger on the Third Floor constructs, alongside its surface story, 
an alternate fantastical narrative in which sexual desire is the irrational, motivational , 
logic behind the protagonist's thoughts and actions.4o 
Clearly, in terms of both its style and its themes, film nair begins to test the 
boundaries of Hollywood cinema, and, undoubtedly, this aspect of the genre must 
have appealed to Kubrick's sensibilities. Yet Kubrick, like Welles, wished to go 
significantly beyond the achievements of film nair and develop a more adult, 
aesthetically-complex type of film, which would be able to depict themes, ideas and 
images that were still inherently problematical within the confines of mainstream 
American cinema. This desire was clear from the earliest stage of his career. In July 
1953, Kubrick submitted a script titled Along Came a Spider - co-written with his 
friend Howard Sackler (who also wrote the script for Fear and Desire) - to Joseph 
Breen at the Production Code Administration. As James N aremore records Breen , 
'rejected the project on the grounds that it contained "scenes of nudity and suggested 
nudity, excessive brutality, attempted rape, illicit sex ... treated with no voice of 
morality or compensating moral values.",41 The script had to be extensively revised, 
and was eventually transformed into Killer's Kiss. 
Killer's Kiss retains only a small amount of the sensational content that made 
Along Came a Spider untenable. The violence in the film is no longer 'brutal'; 
instead, it is either implicit or, in the case of the film's denouement, leavened by black 
humour.42 The more problematical sexual violence of Along Came a Spider is, 
unsurprisingly, almost entirely absent from Killer's Kiss: all that remains is the vague 
and ambiguous suggestion that Gloria (Irene Kane), the film's heroine, may have been 
sexually assaulted by Vincent (Frank Silvera), her boss and spumed lover. 
Stylistically, Kubrick was more able to experiment and pursue his own interests. 
Killer's Kiss appropriates many of film nair's narrative devices in a particularly 
effective manner. The film opens in a New York City train station, where Davy 
(Jamie Smith), the main protagonist and narrator, is waiting anxiously for Gloria, 
who, we soon learn, has promised to leave the city with him. As he paces back and 
forth, Davy's voiceover introduces his story in the conventional nair fashion ('It's 
crazy how you can get yourself in a mess sometimes ... '). Shortly thereafter, we 
dissolve to the flashback that discloses Davy's story in full. The tale itself is very 
generic: Gloria is in danger from Vincent, her exploitative and violent ex-lover; Davy, 
her neighbour, stumbles into this intrigue after hearing Gloria screaming for help one 
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evening. The two promptly fall in love, and plan to flee the city together, but before 
they can, Gloria is kidnapped by Vincent and his criminal associates. After a violent 
showdown with Vincent, Davy manages to rescue Gloria, and, finally, we are shown 
the two reunited at the train station. There is, however, a certain level of ingenuity in 
Kubrick's realization of this standard Hollywood fare. Outside of Davy's fairly 
extensive voiceovers, dialogue is relatively sparse, with a great deal of narrative 
information being conveyed visually through editing and the film's expressive mise-
en-scene. Many of the film's more innovative devices can, of course, be linked to its 
very small budget and lack of technical resources. Financed mainly with money 
invested by Maurice Bousel, a friend of Kubrick's family, Killer's Kiss had an initial 
budget of only $40 000.43 Consequently, Kubrick could not afford to record live 
sound. The entire soundtrack had to be post-synchronized, which helps to explain the 
film's pervasive use of voiceover or music, in conjunction with expressive images, in 
place of direct speech. Nevertheless, important aspects of Kubrick's later aesthetic 
experimentation are clearly foreshadowed in Killer's Kiss, especially with regard to 
subjective narration and the visual representation of thought. 
Naremore observes that in Killer's Kiss 
A great deal of what we see relies on nothing more than non-diegetic music 
and dubbed sound effects in support of three fundamental editing techniques 
from the silent era - parallel editing, which historians tend to associate with 
Griffith, point-of-view editing, which is usually associated with Kuleshov or 
Hitchcock, and montage, which derives from Eisenstein and the Soviets. By 
virtue of its almost total reliance on editing rather than dialogue, Killer's Kiss 
could be described as what Hitchcock liked to call 'pure cinema'.44 
Clearly, Hitchcock's concept of 'pure cinema' is close to what I have been describing 
as non-verbal, cinematic thought, and Naremore is correct to identify the centrality of 
this aesthetic to Kubrick's early work. Yet in addition, Naremore's references to 
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different filmmakers and narrative traditions from the silent era have a further 
significance when discussing Kubrick's stylistic evolution. So far, my introduction to 
Kubrick's work has focussed on its relationship to American cinema in the 1940s and 
early '50s, but this immediate context does not provide a full picture of Kubrick's 
cinematic heritage. From the earliest stages of his career, Kubrick was also influenced 
by European cinema (from the silent era onwards), which affords additional insight 
into both his early stylistic experimentation and his later relationship to Hollywood. 
Kubrick learnt the basics of film aesthetics from reading the works of Eisenstein 
and Pudovkin, which became available in translation in the 1940s.45 At the same time, 
the first art cinemas were opening in New York, which allowed Kubrick to watch 
both the best of contemporary European cinema and retrospectives showcasing earlier 
'classics' .46 The disparate mixture of American and European, commercial and avant-
garde, films that he consumed whilst learning his craft certainly helps to contextualize 
and clarify the curious fusion of Hollywood convention (in terms of generic devices, 
plotting, characterization, and so forth) and stylistic experimentation in Killer's Kiss. 
These early viewing habits also attest to the inherent eclecticism of Kubrick's 
cinematic taste, and to his ongoing desire to blend ostensibly opposed aspects of art 
and popular, commercial cinema.47 From his earliest work, Kubrick's impulse has 
been to make hybrid films that defy easy categorization and test the boundaries of 
Hollywood, and it is this same impulse that underpins his adaptation of Lolita. 
How Did They Ever Make a Movie of Lolita? 
In 1980 Michel Ciment wrote, 
249 
Kubrick's strength derives from his realisation that if the filmmaker is not in 
charge of every element of his product - from the original rights via the 
screenplay down to the advertising campaign that will launch his film and the 
very cinemas in which it will be screened - three or four years work may go 
for nothing. 
. . . [T]oday all of his efforts are channelled into preserving the same 
autonomy which he had in his first films, so that, instead of becoming a victim 
of the means at his disposal, he can on the contrary make them serve his own 
purpose, one which has never changed: self-expression.48 
It was Kubrick's experiences in between Paths of Glory (1957) and Lolita which 
cemented his resolve to secure his independence as a producer. The frustration he felt 
at his inability to influence the casting or storyline of Spartacus (1960) has been well-
documented. Kubrick was drafted into the movie by Kirk Douglas, the film's star and 
executive producer, as a last-minute replacement for the original director, Anthony 
Mann (with whom Douglas had had major disagreements). Kubrick subsequently 
referred to his role on the film as that of a 'hired hand. ,49 In addition, this period saw 
Kubrick's tentative, and ultimately futile, collaboration with Marlon Brando on One 
Eyed lacks (which was eventually released in 1961). After months of working on a 
screenplay with the star, it became clear to Kubrick that Brando saw himself as the 
creative impetus behind the film and would be unwilling to relinquish any control 
over the project. This was confirmed when, shortly before Kubrick received the 
Spartacus offer, Brando indicated his intention to direct the film himself and asked 
Kubrick to leave the project.50 
Throughout this frustrating period in Kubrick's career, Lolita provided both the 
promise of artistic fulfilment and the possibility of producing the kind of commercial 
success that could be used to facilitate financial independence from the Hollywood 
studios. Displaying a shrewd awareness of the novel's cinematic potential, Kubrick 
and his partner James Harris had obtained the rights to Lolita for a relatively small 
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sum of money in 1958, shortly after it was first published in America. 51 Three years 
earlier, it had actually been rejected by four major American publishing houses before 
being published in Paris by the Olympia Press, which specialized in erotica.52 Despite 
the fact that many critics immediately heralded the book as a literary masterpiece, the 
circumstances of its publication, and its protracted unavailability in several countries, 
fuelled a widespread notoriety, and, inevitably, it was its scandalous reputation, rather 
than its literary merit, that drove Lolita's rapid sales upon its general release. Thus by 
1960, Harris-Kubrick Productions owned the rights to a best-seller that, if handled 
correctly, could be turned into a film that would have broad appeal across both 
mainstream and burgeoning art house markets. However, the source of Lolita's 
commercial potential was, paradoxically, also the source of the major problems that 
Kubrick and Harris faced in securing financial backing for the film. In a parallel with 
Nabokov's original experience of attempting to get his novel published, the major 
U.S. studios initially refused to touch the project, estimating that the censorship 
problems the film would encounter seriously damaged its prospects as an achievable -
let alone profitable - enterprise. This meant that from the earliest stages of pre-
production, Kubrick and Harris were made highly aware of the need to acknowledge 
censorship concerns in every aspect of the film's planning. 
However, despite certain inevitable concessions, the early choices that Kubrick 
made in tenns of developing the screenplay and casting the film indicated his 
determination to ensure that in meeting the censorship requirements he did not 
sacrifice all of his artistic ambitions for the project. Kubrick eventually persuaded 
Nabokov to write a screenplay for the film after convincing him that he would make 
every attempt to keep the novel's basic storyline and spirit intact. 53 The choice of 
Nabokov as screenwriter seems to be more than simple deference to his authorship of 
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the source novel (though this doubtlessly helped to reinforce the literary credentials of 
the adaptation). It also acknowledges the intensely 'cinematic' nature of his 
imagination: not only does Nabokov's work contain a wealth of references to the 
cinema, but his prose also displays a propensity towards extremely detailed 
reconstructions of visual impressions, especially as they pertain to a character's 
memory of events. Gene D. Phillips notes that in one particular passage from Lolita, 
Humbert Humbert, the novel's narrator, recollects himself watching his teenage 
mistress play tennis and 'regrets that he had not immortalized her in segments of 
celluloid, which he could then run in the projection room of his mind. ,54 
Nabokov's visualization of his book was also central to casting the film, as he 
picked out Sue Lyon for the title role after Kubrick consulted him with photographs of 
applicants.55 Needless to say, all of the potential applicants that Kubrick had short-
listed for the role already met certain criteria that would help to appease the censors. It 
had been made clear in an earlier meeting with Geoffrey Shurlock, the head of the 
Production Code Administration, that in order to obtain the PCA' s seal of approval 
(without which most exhibitors would refuse to show a film) the film should make no 
mention of Lolita's age and the actress chosen to play the role should not appear to be 
too child-like.56 Lolita is twelve at the beginning of the novel and seventeen at the 
end, and Sue Lyon was fourteen when the film began shooting. This still seems 
surprisingly young, but Sue Lyon looked quite a bit older than her actual age, with 
many critics placing her apparent age at around seventeen. 57 For Kubrick, this was not 
too much of a concession, as he felt that Lyon could convincingly portray the age 
range required by the novel. 
With a suitably mature-looking leading lady in place, Kubrick still faced 
considerable problems in tenns of handling the erotic aspects of the story. His other 
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casting decisions were central to his strategy for dealing with these problems, and 
should be understood in relation to the intertextual framework provided by the 
Hollywood star system. James Mason was always Kubrick's first choice for the role 
of Humbert. 58 Not only did Mason possess a sense of natural reserve and intelligence 
that were essential to the role, but the ambiguities of his status as a romantic lead had 
already been played upon in a number of previous films. In particular, his 
performance as Norman Maine in A Star is Born (1954) - arguably his most famous 
role - anticipates his role in Lolita in how it negotiates the film's highly unusual 
gender politics. Mason plays the 'man behind the famous woman', a washed-up actor 
whose relationship with rising star Vicki Lester (Judy Garland, whose own career 
revival the film was designed to showcase) sees him eventually relegated to the 
position of permanent house-husband. The relationship between Maine and Lester -
which appears to be based on mutual dependence more than mutual attraction - is 
desexualized, and fails to alleviate the inner turmoil associated with Maine's sense of 
personal failure. Clearly, many aspects of Mason's performance in A Star is Born are 
drawn upon to characterize Humbert in Lolita, particularly in depicting his 
relationships with Lolita and her mother, Charlotte (Shelley Winters). Humbert's 
identity is comprised of a series of roles that he plays (first husband to Charlotte, and 
later father to Lolita) in order to disguise the true nature of his desire. As in A Star is 
Born, Mason's performance suggests the network of fa9ades, deceptions, hidden 
motivations and sublimations that constitute the disparity between the protagonist's 
d . 1· C' 59 outer appearance an Inner lie. 
The casting of Shelley Winters as Charlotte Haze also suits the demands of 
Lolita's plot, as many of her supporting roles in the 1950s had led to her pervasive 
screen persona as the easily-manipulated, needy woman. Especially notable for its 
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Lolita parallels is her role as a recently-widowed mother of two in The Night of the 
Hunter (Laughton, 1955). Here Robert Mitchum depicts an ostensibly respectable 
preacher - in fact, a convicted criminal recently released from jail - who seduces and 
marries Winters' character in order to get close to her children, who alone have access 
to their late father's hidden fortune. It is almost certain that Kubrick, an avid cinema-
goer throughout the 1950s, would have been conscious of the connections he was 
evoking through his casting choices.6o These intertextualities indicate the extent to 
which Kubrick thinks through the images and icons of Hollywood, recognizing the 
potential wealth of mental associations and narrative implications that can be 
activated through star personae. 
Finally, although not directly linked to his star status, the casting of Peter Sellers 
III the role of Clare Quilty can also be seen as being important to Kubrick's 
negotiation of Nabokov's original story. Kubrick had persuaded Nabokov that in 
order to downplay the novel's erotic storyline, and to offer a point of narrative interest 
beyond Humbert's attempts to bed his nymphet, the murder of Quilty should occur at 
the beginning of the film and Quilty's general role as antagonist should be expanded. 
But this narrative decision also seems to have suggested another angle for handling 
the book's psychological content. In transforming Quilty from the shadowy, 
peripheral figure of the novel to an intrusive and almost omni-present force in the 
film, Nabokov and Kubrick were able to externalize something of the sense of guilt, 
paranoia and fear of exposure that plagues Humbert in the original text. It is therefore 
easy to see why Peter Sellers' ability to switch seamlessly between different roles 
became integral to the characterization of Quilty. His parodic portrayal of different 
authority figures - including a policeman and a school psychologist (archetypal 
embodiments of the Freudian superego) both of whom interrogate Humbert about the 
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nature of his relationship with Lolita - works in conjunction with Mason's nervous 
and introverted perfonnance to dramatize elements of the novel's original first -person 
perspective. Furthennore, in his extended role in the film, Quilty acts as Humbert's 
doppelganger, with his perverse desires and exaggerated perfonnances reflecting and 
commenting on Humbert's own personality. 
The casting and scripting of Lolita thus offered a roadmap for circumventing some 
of the anticipated censorship problems whilst preserving the key elements that had 
first attracted Kubrick to the book. Yet even with this clear strategy in place, and with 
James Mason and Shelley Winters signed up to the project, Kubrick and Harris still 
found it very difficult to secure additional funding for the film. After unsuccessful 
negotiations with Warner Brothers - who offered a generous budget and a percentage 
of the film's profits to Harris-Kubrick, but demanded a high degree of control over 
the production, including the right to final cut - Kubrick and Harris decided to move 
the production to Europe, where the film could feasibly be made at a much lower cost 
and might avoid some of the immediate censorship problems it faced in America.61 
Whilst investigating financial backers in Europe, Harris discovered that Kenneth 
Hyman, an old school friend who had gone into the film distribution business with his 
father, was currently funding production in England via a company called Seven Arts 
UK. In the course of a short meeting with Hyman's father, Harris and Kubrick were 
able to negotiate a deal with Seven Arts that saw Lolita fully funded, with a 
preliminary budget of one million dollars. The contract also ensured Kubrick's right 
to final CUt.62 However, in light of the controversy that still surrounded the novel, 
Seven Arts required absolute guarantees that the film would meet the industry 
standards necessary to achieve the PCA's seal of approval in the US and to be passed 
by the BBFC in the UK. It was stipulated that Kubrick should not only liaise with the 
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official industry censors during production, but should also consult the Catholic 
Legion of Decency, an independent pressure group that had been rating the 
acceptability of movies since its formation in the 1930s. At this point the Motion 
Picture Association of America had yet to introduce its own ratings system (which 
came into existence in 1968), and in lieu of this, the Legion's ratings were influential 
for a broad cross-section of the American movie-going public; a 'condemned' 
classification could therefore do serious damage to a film's financial prospects.63 
The PCA quickly made it clear that there could be no amorous scenes between 
Humbert and Lolita, but considering his leading actress' age it is difficult to imagine 
how Kubrick could have handled any such scenes. Subsequent films that have 
depicted illicit scenes involving children have managed to negotiate a potential legal 
minefield by using adult body doubles. Taxi Driver (Scorsese, 1976) provides a 
famous example, where the thirteen-year-old Jodie Foster, portraying a child 
prostitute, had to be replaced by her twenty-year-old sister for some of her scenes.64 
Similarly, Adrian Lyne's 1997 version of Lolita cast the fifteen-year-old Dominique 
Swain in the title role, and required a body double for several explicit scenes. But 
beyond the legal problems associated with mixing adult material and child actors, 
there are the much more complicated moral ramifications of eroticizing a child's 
image. This brings us back to Kubrick's twofold problem with Lolita and the 
marketing campaign that launched the film. 
Point of View and the Ambiguous Image 
One of the most interesting images that was produced in the making of Lolita does not 
actually appear in the film itself, but was used on all of the publicity posters. This is 
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the now iconic picture of Sue Lyon taken by renowned photographer Bert Stem.65 The 
photograph depicts Lolita sucking a lollipop and peering directly towards the camera 
over the top of her gaudy, heart-shaped sunglasses, and beautifully sums up the many 
contradictions surrounding the movie. The image is at once provocative and darkly 
humorous (something that also underpins the film), emphasizing the fact that Lolita is, 
in essence, a very twisted love story. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is only 
through the juxtaposition of the film's tagline with this image of Lolita, gazing out 
towards us, that we can fully appreciate the way in which Lolita's marketing 
addresses a potential audience. Together, the image and tagline not only confront us 
with the terms by which our spectatorship is mediated, but also make an asset of the 
film's controversial subj ect. 
It is, of course, highly significant that the film's most provocative image should 
occur in its advert; it is also significant that this image would prove readily acceptable 
to MGM, who, like the other majors, had originally deemed Lolita too sensational to 
finance, but were eager to distribute the film once it had been pronounced acceptable 
by the various censors. As A Clockwork Orange would demonstrate incontrovertibly 
ten years later, a little notoriety could be a liability, but it could also prove to be 
immensely beneficial at the box office. The Lolita poster skilfully negotiates the 
adaptation's risque subject matter, courting a small amount of controversy without 
being overly sensational. This clearly demonstrates some of the contradictions - and 
hypocrisy - surrounding self-censorship during this period of Hollywood history. 
Writing in 1968, just before Hollywood finally abandoned the Production Code, 
Richard Randall observed: 
The first task of formal self-regulation over the years has actually not been that 
of censorship at all, but the protection of the industry against loss. By holding 
down extremes of sensationalism and vulgarity, or at least appearing to do so, 
the code not only creates an image of a responsible industry, but also tends to 
reduce pressure for 'outside' control and to cut any loss of confidence in (and 
hence patronage of) the industry on the part of the movie-going pUblic.66 
However, we should not conclude that the provocative image of the Lolita poster 
is intended merely to tantalize the prospective viewer with an implied sensational 
content. By foregrounding the problematical image of Lolita - as simultaneously child 
and sex object, victim and seductress - the poster also highlights the fundamental 
artistic challenge that Kubrick faced in attempting to translate cinematically the 
novel's ambiguous, eroticized depiction of its young heroine. Kubrick was aware of 
the absolute necessity of presenting some sense of Humbert's sexual obsession with 
Lolita, which was, after all, the very heart of Nabokov's story, but in so doing he 
would inevitably have to eroticize the image of his real-life underage actress. This is 
where problems of form and content - that is, of first-person narration and illicit 
material - truly converge. In the novel we are never in any doubt that the sexual 
fascination with a pubescent girl is the product of Humbert's perspective, and 
Nabokov is able to inject a sense of ironic distance between narrator and implied 
author. This is more challenging in film, where subjective experience has to be 
conveyed, to some extent, through the objective image. A comparison between 
Lolita's introduction in the novel and her first appearance in the film is highly 
instructive in this respect. It illustrates the way in which Kubrick attempts to filter our 
impression of Lolita through Humbert's perception, and so achieve similar (though 
not identical) effects to those produced by Nabokov's prose. 
In the novel, when Humbert discovers Lolita for the first time, in the garden of his 
potential summer lodgings, this is what he tells us: 
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I find it most difficult to express with adequate force that flash, that shiver, that 
impact of passionate recognition. In the course of the sun-shot moment that my 
glance slithered over the kneeling child ... while I passed by her in my adult 
disguise (a great big handsome hunk of movieland manhood), the vacuum of 
my soul managed to suck in every detail of her bright beauty ... 67 
As is frequently the case in Lolita, our charismatic narrator's description of events has 
a lyrical beauty that, superficially, masks the true nature of what is being described. 
Yet, at the same time, this effect is balanced by some of the words Humbert uses and 
the details he emphasizes. He tells us that his glance 'slithered' over Lolita, providing 
us with a queasy moment of clarity within this 'sun-shot moment'. Furthermore, 
Lolita is not described with any level of euphemism: she is simply 'the kneeling 
child', and, at this point, the vulnerable victim of Humbert's perverse gaze. 
While Kubrick could not hope to convey the various layers of meaning that 
Nabokov implants in this encounter, he does succeed in plunging the viewer into 
Humbert's subjective experience of the moment, whilst maintaining some sense of 
ironic detachment. We see Humbert's rapt gaze as he looks offscreen, followed by a 
point-of-view shot of Lolita on the lawn, staring back - an image that closely 
resembles the poster photograph described earlier. The glance towards the camera is 
not as direct as in the poster, but once again it suggests a kind of address to the 
viewer, who is placed in Humbert's position to an unusual degree. This obviously 
helps to anchor our identification with Humbert, as we share his perspective at this 
significant point in the narrative, but at the same time, it subtly transforms the 
relationship between the characters in the scene. Staring confidently towards the 
camera, Lolita no longer seems the passive victim of Humbert's predatory gaze. 
Nevertheless, we are made very aware of the fact that her eroticized image is the 
direct product of Humbert's perspective. By having Lolita glance toward the camera, 
Kubrick indicates that the shot depicts Humbert's point of view in a particularly 
precise manner, and so reinforces the subjective status of the image. Simultaneously, 
this glance temporarily breaks the illusionism of the moment, affording the viewer 
some sense of detachment from the fictional action. Therefore, somewhat 
paradoxically, this scene fosters a close identification with Humbert whilst also 
providing a sense of ironic detachment from his perspective, and this mixed effect is 
accentuated through Kubrick's use of sound. Whilst Humbert gazes at Lolita, the 
soundtrack is filled by the diegetic pop music from Lolita's radio, which is at once 
inane and strangely hypnotic in its repetitiveness. This intrusive music immerses us in 
the protagonist's point of view whilst also satirizing his infatuation. (A similarly 
dualistic use of music - as simultaneously evocative and ironic - can, of course, be 
found in A Clockwork Orange.) 
Finally, we should note that this scene also illustrates the centrality of James 
Mason's persona and performance to Kubrick's negotiation of Lolita's eroticism. 
Rather than seeming overtly lecherous or sexually threatening, Mason's carefully 
measured portrayal of Humbert manages to convey a sense of repressed infatuation, 
perhaps taking its cue from the protagonist's self-perception of his disingenuous 
image at this moment in the novel. Arlene Croce, reviewing Lolita for Sight and 
Sound, recognized the brilliance of Mason's introverted performance in implying the 
book's forbidden, paedophilic content: 
James Mason has been quietly good, or merely quiet, for so long, in so many 
films, that it would be easy to underestimate his achievement here. But it is 
solely through his inwardly convulsed portrayal that an intimation of the 
novel's complete metaphysical anarchy reaches the screen ... the grim levity, 
the sense of imposture, the callousness and howling pain; it's essential that 
Mason be possessed of an affective life which the other characters in the film 
never see, and this he is utterly.68 
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Croce's response, like the negative reVIews examined earlier in this chapter, 
clearly interprets and evaluates Kubrick's film through reference to the source novel. 
Yet, in addition, she displays a shrewd awareness of how Lolita's material has to be 
reinvented - or rethought - in its new medium. As Croce suggests, regardless of 
industrial censorship, there is already a vital sense in which the film version of Lolita 
must mask Humbert's desires for large segments of the narrative. In front of the other 
characters, Humbert is forced to comport himself with an air of utter propriety, and 
the disjunction between the respectability of the narrator's outward appearance and 
the perversity of his thoughts is essential to both the novel's black humour and its 
dramatic appeal. With the additional restrictions imposed by industrial censorship, 
this aspect of the book clearly sparked Kubrick's artistic imagination. This is 
illustrated by a second scene that negotiates the problem of representing Humbert's 
veiled desire. 
Shortly after Humbert has married Charlotte, and Lolita has been sent away to 
summer camp, we are given a comedic sequence that exemplifies the way in which 
Kubrick represents Humbert's sexual obsession as the repressed subtext of the film. 
A humorous exchange of dialogue sets up the situation that Humbert is having 
difficulty fulfilling his inconvenient marital duties. Spurring her husband on, 
Charlotte tells him, 'You just touch me and I go as limp as a noodle. It scares me.' 
To which Humbert replies, 'Yes, I know the feeling.' The dialogue obviously 
reinforces our alignment with Humbert's perspective by involving us in the joke, of 
which Charlotte is blissfully unaware. Subsequently, there is a visual continuation of 
the joke in a shot/ reverse shot sequence. We see Humbert move to embrace 
Charlotte on her bed and then glance surreptitiously towards a photo frame in the 
foreground. Inevitably, the reverse-angle shot then reveals Lolita's smiling portrait. 
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Although this sequence is obviously played for its comedic value, it also 
addresses an idea that is central to the adaptation: that Lolita functions as an 
unobtainable fantasy image within the film. This idea works on different levels, both 
inside and outside the fiction. Ultimately, a part of Lolita remains unattainable to 
Humbert even after he has slept with her, as his initial sexual obsession evolves into 
an unrequited love and, eventually, a hopeless desire for her forgiveness. There is a 
clear suggestion that the idealized fantasy of Lolita that Humbert has constructed can 
never be answered by reality. For the viewer - and perhaps also for Kubrick - we 
can trace a similar path of frustrated narrative desire, as the story moves 
asymptotically towards the unrealizable consummation of Humbert's relationship 
with Lolita (something that is mirrored in Kubrick's final film, Eyes Wide Shut, 
which takes unfulfilled fantasy as both its theme and form). This forbidden content is 
essential to the emotional trajectory of the original story, as the details of Humbert's 
doomed affair with Lolita gradually transform comedy into tragedy. Yet this content 
can only be implied within Kubrick's adaptation: it can never be given adequate 
weight. The shot of Humbert fantasizing over the inaccessible image of Lolita, 
therefore, acts as a succinct metaphor for the entire narrative situation. It provides 
another instant where the psychological content of the story is conceptualized in 
1 ' I h' 69 re atlOn to extra-textua censors lp. 
Conclusions: The Problematic Adaptation 
In the winter of 1960, while Lolita was in production, Kubrick wrote a short article 
for Sight and Sound. This addresses some of his thoughts on adaptation, and 
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provides valuable insight into his cinematic reworking of Lolita's original first-
person perspective. In this article, he argues that, 
The perfect novel from which to make a movie is, I think, not the novel of 
action but, on the contrary, the novel which is mainly concerned with the inner 
life of its characters. It will give the adaptor an absolute compass bearing, as it 
were, on what a character is thinking or feeling at any given moment of the 
story. And from this he can invent action which will be an objective correlative 
of the book's psychological content ... 70 
The idea that film can recreate subjective experience through its manipulation of 
'objective correlatives' is clearly very pertinent to the scene described above, in 
which Humbert's psychological perspective is encapsulated in his glance towards 
Lolita's inaccessible image. But it also suggests the more general way in which 
Kubrick, responding in part to censorship, transfonns Nabokov's subjective narrative. 
Unable to represent Humbert's sexual obsession with sufficient force, Kubrick 
reworks Lolita's overt and flamboyant subjective narration into something that is 
subtler, less pervasive and more naturalistic. Like many of the films nair examined 
earlier, Lolita is presented in flashback with an intennittent first-person voiceover that 
sporadically reminds us that the story is being 'told' from the narrator's approximate 
perspective. Yet, for the most part, it lacks the expressionistic devices that would 
mark the film's images as being overtly subjective. Greg Jenkins provides an accurate 
appraisal of how Kubrick reworks Lolita's narration. He suggests that although 
Humbert's point of view is 'privileged' within Kubrick's version of Lolita, 
the story no longer channels through him. The narration has been nudged some 
distance therefore from a strict first-person orientation toward the film , , . , 
equivalent of a third-person limited approach. As a result, our perceptIon of 
what happens becomes slightly more detached and balanced.
71 
263 
However, it is important to reiterate that there are certain key moments in the film 
when Humbert's point of view is not merely 'privileged' but foregrounded. It is in 
these moments that the novel's original, first-person perspective has an integral 
significance that Kubrick wishes to highlight. 
As a final point of consideration in our discussion, it is worth noting that 
Kubrick's use of the phrase 'objective correlative' seems to have a further, specific 
relevance to the problems associated with adapting Lolita. Originally, T. S. Eliot 
popularized the term in an essay on Hamlet, in which he suggested: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when 
the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the 
emotion is immediately evoked.72 
Yet in his original essay, Eliot evokes the concept of an objective correlative in order 
to demonstrate the absence, or deficiency, of any such device in Hamlet. For Eliot, 
Hamlet is an artistic 'failure' because of its inability to attune its psychological drama 
to the 'intractable' material of the original story. He argues that 'Hamlet (the man) is 
dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as 
they appear.' 73 In other words, Eliot believes that Hamlet's psychological and 
emotional turmoil is incongruous in the context of the play's plot: the emotion 
Shakespeare wishes to convey is nqt answered (adequately) by any objective 
correlative in the story. 
It is unclear whether or not Kubrick was familiar with Eliot's essay, and was 
consciously drawing upon its argument in his analysis of adaptation. Yet, clearly, 
Eliot's evocation of some form of narrative deficiency, caused by the incongruence of 
an original story and the terms by which it is reworked, is extremely pertinent to 
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Kubrick's Lolita. In hindsight, Kubrick certainly felt that in adapting Lolita he had 
been unable to retain the emotional and psychological depth of the novel. In an 
interview in 1970, Kubrick expressed his retrospective frustration at the final shape 
that Lolita had taken: 
Because of all the pressure over the Production Code and the Catholic Legion 
of Decency, I believe I didn't sufficiently dramatize the erotic aspect of 
Humbert's relationship with Lolita, and because his sexual obsession was only 
barely hinted at, many people guessed too quickly that Humbert was in love 
with Lolita. Whereas in the novel this comes as a discovery at the end ... [and] 
that is one of the most poignant elements of the story. 74 
But whatever Kubrick's retrospective disappointment with Lolita, and while there 
were certain aspects of the drama that suffered in relation to censorship, we should 
acknow ledge that the film does have some success in reworking the source novel's 
psychological content. Ironically, Kubrick's inability to dramatize the destructive 
sexual obsession at the centre of his story was not entirely detrimental, for it forced 
him to negotiate the 'problem' of first-person cinematic narrative in a particularly 
innovative manner. As well as attempting, in some capacity, to represent thought in 
film, Lolita addresses the relationship between thought and the cultural context in 
which it operates, exploring how extra-textual factors, such as the conditions of our 
spectatorship, inform our interpretation of the narrative. Finally, it is perhaps the 
contradictions inherent in Lolita that make it a pivotal film in Kubrick's career. As a 
film that struggles against, and occasionally outstrips, the conditions of its production, 
Lolita marks out the unique position that Kubrick would come to occupy in relation to 
Hollywood. 
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Disturbing Fantasies: Kubrick's Later Films 
In more ways than one, it was through Lolita that Kubrick was able to establish his 
position inside - and outside - the American film industry. The sale of Lolita's 
distribution rights to MGM proved to be extremely profitable to Harris-Kubrick, and 
allowed them to buyout an existing contract with Bryna, Kirk Douglas' production 
company, for whom they had agreed to make five more pictures (as part of the deal 
that saw Paths of Glory made).l In addition, MGM submitted Lolita as the official US 
entry at the Venice Film Festival, raising Kubrick's international profile and 
confirming his position as a director whose films had crossover appeal in both 
commercial and developing art house markets. The film thus helped to secure 
Kubrick's financial position, his independence and his artistic credentials. The success 
of Lolita also signalled the end of the Harris-Kubrick partnership, with each partner 
now eager to pursue his own path. Harris returned to America to direct his own films, 
while Kubrick's newfound financial solvency allowed him to settle permanently in 
England, where he was to act as the sole producer for all his future projects. 
Kubrick's decision to make England his permanent base has been seen by many as 
a clear sign of his desire to insulate himself from the mainstream of American 
filmmaking.2 Certainly, after his experience of working in Hollywood on SpartacllS, 
he appreciated the physical separation from the major studios afforded by Lolita. With 
his subsequent work - which was all financed and distributed by the Hollywood 
majors (Dr Strangelove by Columbia, 2001 by MGM, and everything from A 
Clockwork Orange onwards by Warner Brothers) - Kubrick found that filming in 
England provided an additional level of protection against studio interference. It is 
important to note, however, that in terms of aesthetics, Kubrick did not pursue 
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independence from Hollywood In quite the same manner. With its narrative 
experimentation, personal style and difficult subject matter, Kubrick's work is 
situated on the periphery of mainstream American cinema, but it is nevertheless a part 
of that cinema. Kubrick's films respond to the narrative formulae of Hollywood with 
a certain level of satire or critical detachment, but at the same time, they display a 
very shrewd and penetrating comprehension of how these formulae can be used to 
manipulate the viewer's emotional and intellectual response. After Kubrick isolated 
himself from Hollywood, he went on to produce a body of work that was intensely 
engaged with the cultural concerns of commercial cinema. As Kolker notes: 
Kubrick did not use his isolation to create 'personal' and 'difficult' works of 
the kind European filmmakers are supposed to make ... He made complex 
films that are available to a variety of audiences. The films of his trilogy - Dr. 
Strangelove, 2001: A Space Odyssey, A Clockwork Orange - were 
commercially successful and demonstrated an unerring ability to seize on 
important cultural concerns and obsessions - the cold war, space travel, the 
ambiguities of violence - and represent them in images and narratives so 
powerful and appropriate that they became touchstones, reference points for 
these concerns: myths. 3 
Kolker's observations, in fact, indicate the inadequacy of dualistic thinking when 
it comes to Kubrick's cinema; binary oppositions such as popular and personal, or 
commercial cinema and auteur cinema, can offer only a limited insight into his work. 
We might argue that Kubrick did use his isolation to create intensely personal and 
difficult works. The films Kolker mentions are replete with Kubrick's recurring 
obsessions: the innateness of violence, the conflict between rationality and irrational 
impulses, the possibility that humanity will be destroyed by its own technology or 
political institutions. They are also thematically and stylistically complex, and, 
because of their ambiguity, ambivalence or (in the case of 2001) relative obscurity, 
they benefit considerably from repeated viewing. These films are personal in the 
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sense that they constitute Kubrick's coherent VISIOn of the world, and they are 
difficult in the sense that they are aesthetically and intellectually challenging. Yet 
Kubrick's personal vision is constituted through a profound engagement with 
Hollywood's narrative forms. Like Resnais, Kubrick is concerned with the 
relationship between individual thought and the cultural context in which it operates, 
and his films express his personal philosophy by dissecting, and often critiquing, the 
beliefs, suppositions and values implicit in Hollywood filmmaking. 
This chapter will, therefore, continue to address the question of how Kubrick 
'thinks through' Hollywood in several different senses. Once again, this will entail a 
close analysis of Kubrick's formal representation of his characters' thoughts. I shall 
begin by exploring A Clockwork Orange, which, of course, is another film that 
attempts to translate cinematically the literary first-person perspective. This will be 
followed by an examination of how different forms of thought are represented in The 
Shining and Eyes Wide Shut. Simultaneously, my analysis of these films will also 
attempt to delineate how Kubrick's cinematic thought relates to (and reflects upon) its 
evolving cultural context, addressing things such as the collapse of the Production 
Code, Hollywood's representation of violence, generic subversion, and the star 
system. 
From Lolita to A Clockwork Orange 
In a very specific sense, Kubrick's Lolita was undoubtedly ahead of its time (and this, 
essentially, is what caused its problems). When the film was released, six years before 
the MP AA' s official ratings system replaced the all-encompassing Production Code, 
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all of its publicity material carried a disclaimer (included at the behest of the Legion 
of Decency) announcing that it was intended for adults only. With Lolita, Kubrick 
was clearly attempting to overcome the artistic limitations imposed by Hollywood's 
moral conservatism and its failure to cater for a differentiated adult audience. Even by 
the early 1960s, public attitudes towards sex on the screen had started to change. This 
cultural transformation was both answered and expedited by the growth of art house 
cinema in America. Films such as Bergman's Smiles of a Summer Night (1955) and 
The Silence offered a candid representation of sex and sexuality that contrasted with 
Hollywood's innate conservatism, and these films were widely exhibited in American 
art house theatres. Lolita demonstrated Kubrick's prescience in recognizing the 
growing gap between Hollywood and European cinema, and responding to the 
changing social and cultural climate. Yet, as we have seen, practical barriers 
prevented Kubrick from making Lolita as he wished. In order to ensure that Lolita 
would reach a wide audience in America, Kubrick had to sacrifice certain artistic aims 
and work within Hollywood's ideological rationale. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that Kubrick's decision to film A Clockwork 
Orange was, in part, born out of his retrospective dissatisfaction with Lolita. As a 
prospective adaptation, A Clockwork Orange presented very similar challenges to 
Lolita in terms of its first-person narration, elaborate language and controversial 
content. In both books, the relationship between form and content is crucial: we are 
made to see the fictional world through the narrator's amoral perspective and, to a 
certain extent, identify and sympathize with that perspective. Yet because of the 
abolition of the Production Code in 1968, A Clockwork Orange did not face the same 
problems as Lolita in terms of its realization. Nevertheless, representations of illicit 
sexuality and violence continued to present a challenge to the conventional morality 
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of Hollywood in the late 1960s and early' 70s. Indeed, in many ways, screen violence 
became more problematic for Hollywood after it had abandoned the Production Code 
and relaxed its moral standards. Historically, violence had not proven as contentious 
as sex or nudity on the screen. It was only after the collapse of the Production Code 
that debates about the effects of excessive screen violence came to the fore. A 
Clockwork Orange was, of course, one of the films that fuelled this debate, but it 
should also be seen as a film that self-consciously explores our complex relationship 
with violence and violent images. While Lolita was forced to examine the conditions 
of its production and reception, A Clockwork Orange does so voluntarily. In different 
ways, both films address the relationship between their attempts to represent thought 
on screen and the offscreen ideological climate that informs that representation. 
Kubrick first read Burgess' novel on the set of Dr Strange love about a year after 
Lolita's release, but only indicated his desire to adapt it in 1969.4 This suggests that if 
the book had initially sparked his cinematic imagination, the idea of an adaptation 
only took off in relation to the final collapse of the Production Code. This is not 
simply to say that Kubrick was unwilling to face another censorship battle, although 
this would be understandable; rather, it seems that A Clockwork Orange suddenly 
presented the opportunity for a serious film about the nature of violence and our 
relationship with violence as film viewers. After all, the end of the Production Code 
did not remove all of the obstacles to producing a film like A Clockwork Orange. 
Despite the greater leeway that now existed for producing films that dealt explicitly 
with sex or violence (or any other controversial subject), there were still economic 
arguments for conservatism. A survey conducted in 1969 found that 470/0 of 
exhibitors would not show any X-rated films, and, of course, the term X-rated quickly 
became synonymous with pornography, stigmatizing any film with this classification, 
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regardless of content. 5 In addition, there was the ongomg presence of various 
influential independent pressure groups, as well as problems in terms of censorship 
and exhibition laws in foreign territories. However, the practical possibility of making 
a faithful adaptation of A Clockwork Orange existed in stark contrast to the sense of 
impossibility that had always surrounded the Lolita project. Initially, at least, Kubrick 
was able to focus on the complex artistic issues inherent in adapting Burgess' violent 
novel for the screen. 
As with Lolita, Kubrick was faced with the formal problem of rendering a 
cinematic equivalent to the book's first-person perspective and highly idiosyncratic 
language. However, the need to preserve the effects of the book's linguistic ingenuity 
was perhaps even more pressing with A Clockwork Orange than it was with Lolita. In 
Burgess' novel, the narrator, Alex (played in the film by Malcolm McDowell), speaks 
in an invented slang language (called nadsat), and this device is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it is a very effective and insidious means of presenting the 
fictional world on Alex's terms. As we gradually master Alex's alien vocabulary, we 
increasingly share in his perspective and imagination. The slang language, therefore, 
encourages an unusually close identification between reader and narrator. Secondly, it 
serves the function of stylizing the novel's violence. By describing extremely sadistic 
actions in a language that is abstract, elaborate and often highly euphemistic, the book 
finds a way of alleviating some of its brutality, whilst indicating the amoral nature of 
Alex's perception of his own violent behaviour. Burgess is clearly interested in the 
way in which language mediates in our sense of reality, and this dovetails with 
Kubrick's fascination with how the cinematic image might represent thought, 
interpreting, rather than reflecting, exterior reality. 
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In order to evoke Alex's perspective, Kubrick develops a number of the stylistic 
devices used to express subjectivity in Lolita, but instead of merely giving us 
privileged moments when the protagonist's viewpoint is foregrounded, A Cloclfl1'ork 
Orange offers a more comprehensive and systematic realization of Alex's worldview. 
Alex's voiceover is used extensively throughout the film: it introduces the first 
images, provides an ironic counterpoint to the film's conclusion, and, in between, 
offers a periodic commentary on the narrative events and our narrator's thoughts 
concerning them. This first-person voiceover is much more pervasive than the one 
used in Lolita, and, by keeping the language, tone and loquaciousness of the original 
novel, offers a greater insight into the narrator's delinquent mind. A Clockwork 
Orange also parallels Lolita in its foregrounding of the narrator's optical point of 
view at key points in the narrative, but, again, utilizes this technique more 
extensively. Our optical identification with Alex is particularly noticeable at various 
points charting his psychological 'conditioning'. We share his physical position and 
optical perspective when he is made to watch a series of violent films, then when he is 
humiliated on stage in front of a group of politicians who are gathered to witness the 
effectiveness of his treatment, and, finally, when he makes a suicidal leap from a 
second-storey window. In these scenes, we are made to identify with Alex as a victim 
of psychological torture and political manipulation. (This identification is essential to 
Kubrick's negotiation of the story's central moral conundrum, and will be considered 
in greater depth shortly, in relation to the film's representation of different forms of 
violence and victimization.) 
In addition to the first-person VOlceovers and point-of-view shots that express 
Alex's perspective at key points, we can identify in A Clockwork Orange a more 
general expressionistic aesthetic. Most of the time, the film's images and sounds do 
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not seem to depict objective reality; instead (to a greater or lesser extent), they 
represent reality as it is subjectively perceived or imagined by Alex. A Clockwork 
Orange conveys the subjectivity of its narrative through devices such as non-
naturalistic lighting, a highly theatrical acting style, fast- and slow-motion and optical 
distortions (mostly achieved through the pervasive use of wide-angle lenses for 
shooting interiors and close-ups). 6 From the first shot in the film, in which Alex 
stares directly towards the camera and raises his glass, to the closing sequence, which 
depicts one of Alex's violent sexual fantasies, the diegesis is transformed into what 
Kawin terms 'mindscreen'.7 In this way, the film finds a general, formal equivalent to 
the novel's narrative perspective, showing us exterior reality only as it is filtered or 
refracted through the narrator's consciousness. 
However, it is perhaps Kubrick's use of 'subjective' music that is most effective 
and significant in transmitting the narrator's viewpoint. Taking his cue from the 
source novel, Kubrick uses various pieces of classical music (recreated on a 
synthesizer by Walter Carlos) to suggest Alex's emotional state at different points in 
the narrative. Most notably, certain pieces are frequently used to evoke Alex's 
rapturous enjoyment of ultraviolence. Rossini's The Thieving Magpie, for example, 
provides the extremely prominent accompaniment to two violent scenes in which 
Alex is involved in fights - first, with a rival gang, and later, with his own mutinous 
underlings (his 'droogs'). As Kubrick suggested in a 1972 interview, this use of music 
was born out of his need to recreate cinematically some of the complex effects of 
Burgess' prose: 
It was necessary to find a way of stylizing the violence, just as Burgess does by 
his writing style. The ironic counterpoint of the music was certainly one of the 
ways of achieving this. All the scenes of violence are very different without the 
. 8 
musIc. 
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Yet while the soundtrack to A Clockwork Orange is motivated by specific aesthetic 
aims relating to Alex's characterization and the stylization of violence, the idea of 
mUSIc as 'counterpoint' is also something that develops independently through 
Kubrick's oeuvre. As we have already seen, a form of musical counterpoint IS 
embryonic in the innocent pop music that emerges from Lolita's radio as Humbert 
gazes at her for the first time. Dr Strangelove further develops the potential for music 
to provide an ironic commentary or counterpoint, with Vera Lynn's rendition of 
'We'll Meet Again' accompanying the film's final, apocalyptic images. Finally, the 
classical soundtrack of 2001 clearly prefigures the music in A Clockwork Orange, 
whilst also transgressing the conventions of both science fiction cinema (by mixing 
futuristic images with classical music) and the Hollywood film score (through its 
prominence in relation to the image). R. S. Brown has compared Kubrick with 
Bergman and Godard in terms of how the three have used classical music not as 
'background' but as a counterpoint that makes the image 'legible': 
[T]he excerpts of classical music compositions that replace the original film 
score no longer function purely as backing for key emotional situations, but 
rather exist as a kind of parallel emotional/aesthetic universe ... Put another 
way, the music, rather than supporting and/or coloring the visual images and 
narrative situations, stands as an image in its own right, helping the audience to 
read the film's other images as such rather than as a replacement for or 
imitation of objective reality.9 
If this musical aesthetic really emerges in 2001, as Brown argues, it is clearly A 
Clockwork Orange that seizes upon the potential of music to confer a subjective status 
on the image. 
Furthermore, A Clockwork Orange's music also helps to recreate the insidious 
effect of Burgess' prose, by which we are gradually made to identify with Alex's 
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pleasure in violence. This may at first seem paradoxical gIven the music's 
obtrusiveness in contrast to the traditional Hollywood score - the way in which it does 
not merely 'colour' the images, but stands out as a dominant stylistic feature. 
However, this is to ignore the complexity of the sound-image relationship in film. 
Michel Chion offers the best analysis of this relationship, coining the term 'added 
value' to suggest the way in which image and soundtrack inflect, transform and 
enhance each other when they come into contact. Chi on argues that because of our 
cultural prioritization of the image as the 'source' of cinematic meaning, sound can be 
a very effective means of covertly manipulating our processes of narrative 
in terpreta ti on: 
There is always something about sound that overwhelms and surprises us no 
matter what - especially when we refuse to lend it our conscious attention; and 
thus sound interferes with our perception, affects it. Surely, our conscious 
perception can valiantly work at submitting everything to its control, but, in the 
present cultural state of things, sound more than image has the ability to 
saturate and short-circuit our perception. 
The consequence for film is that sound, much more than image, can 
become an insidious means of affective and semantic manipulation. On one 
hand, sound works on us directly, physiologically (breathing noises in a film 
can directly affect our own respiration). On the other, sound has an influence 
on perception: through the phenomenon of added value it interprets the 
meaning of the image, and makes us see in the image what we would not 
otherwise see, or would see differently. 10 
Similarly, Anthony Storr, writing about the relationship between music and thought, 
suggests that music can often have emotive effects that bypass, or even overwhelm, 
our conscious, intellectual faculties: 
It is generally accepted that music causes increased arousal in those who are 
interested in it and who therefore listen to it with some degree of 
concentration. By arousal, I mean a condition of heightened alertness, 
awareness, interest, and excitement: a generally enhanced state of being. This 
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is at a mInImUm in sleep and at its maximum when human beings are 
experiencing powerful emotions like intense grief, rage or sexual excitement. II 
This description of the emotional impact of music is clearly very pertinent to A 
Clockwork Orange, in which music is used both to represent Alex's intense emotional 
arousal and to foster a comparable response in the audience. Indeed, it is worth noting 
that Storr also points to the way in which music can be used to facilitate identification 
or empathy between individuals by 'coordinating' their emotional experiences. 12 
We should conclude that in terms of its meaning and effect on the audience, the 
music in A Clockwork Orange is highly complex. On the one hand, the music is very 
obtrusive and, in certain ways, incongruous with the image-track. It is self-evidently 
ironic, provoking an intellectual, critically-detached understanding of the narrative. 
On the other hand, it is emotionally powerful and manipulative. It encourages an 
immediate identification with Alex's psychological experience, regardless of our 
conscIOus, intellectual response to his actions. Paradoxically, the film's music 
simultaneously functions as a satirical counterpoint and reinforces our identification 
with the sadistic protagonist. Claudia Gorbman suggests that Kubrick has a unique 
ability in matching images with soundtrack, selecting music that is 'at once wittily 
detached and emotionally appropriate,.13 As we have seen, Kubrick's ability to evoke 
and balance contradictory effects through music is evidenced in all of his films from 
Lolita onwards. Yet it seems that this ability has a particular pertinence in terms of 
how A Clockwork Orange seeks to represent thought and, specifically, our emotional 
and intellectual relationship with violence. The way in which A Clockwork Orange's 
music is designed to engender a dualistic response is, I believe, inextricably tied to 
Kubrick's exploration of our ambivalent relationship with violence both on and off 
the screen. 
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A Fascination with Violence 
In an interview in 1972, Kubrick made a brief comment that is highly illuminating 
with regard to A Clockwork Orange's complex evocation of Alex's perspective and 
the ambivalences that seem to define Hollywood's problematic relationship with 
screen violence: 'Although a certain amount of hypocrisy exists about it, everyone is 
fascinated by violence. After all, man is the most remorseless killer who ever stalked 
the earth.' 14 The ambiguity of the term 'fascinated' - which suggests both abstract 
intellectual curiosity and emotional engagement - is precisely what is replicated in A 
Clockwork Orange's dualistic representation of violence. Furthermore, Kubrick's 
language highlights a remarkable clarity and coherence in his cinematic imagination 
when it comes to conceptualizing violence. As I indicated earlier, 2001 makes the 
explicit connection between 'The Dawn of Man', the birth of higher mental faculties, 
and the ensuing conflict (or at least ambiguous relationship) between instinctual 
violence and the intellect. In acquiring the power of abstract reasoning, the ape chief 
simultaneously 'invents' the first weapon: from the beginning, Kubrick suggests, 
intellectual advancement does not allow humankind to transcend its animalistic 
instinct for violence. Instead, the two remain inextricably intertwined, and, if 
anything, mankind's ingenuity exacerbates its capacity for 'remorseless' violence. 
In, many ways, A Clockwork Orange continues and develops 2001's brief 
exploration of the instinctual violence that persists after the acquisition of rational 
thought. As Kolker argues: 
When 2001 makes its transition from the ape's bone floating in the air to the 
spaceship, something important is left out: what happened to the violence, 
indeed the joy of violence, that the bone represented? [ ... J A Clockwork Orange 
. h 'h· 15 returns to exam me t e ape s entage. 
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The general similarities between Alex's gang and the primitive ape tribe are plain to 
see, especially when Alex and his droogs, armed with knives, clubs and chains, set 
upon a rival gang, in a parallel to the territorial dispute depicted in 200],s prologue. 
Yet, in addition, there are more profound similarities to be discerned in terms of how 
violence is conceived, shot and choreographed in the two films. Most notably, the 
scene in which Alex attacks his droogs by the canal, reasserting his control over the 
gang, is virtually a reworking of the chief ape's triumphant celebration when he first 
discovers the bone weapon that will allow him to dominate his species. Both scenes 
use low-angle medium shots of their protagonists (augmenting their stature within the 
frame), slow-motion and classical music - Also Sprach Zarathustra in 2001 and The 
Thieving Magpie in A Clockwork Orange. Furthermore, the scenes share a similarly 
close choreography between music, editing and character movement. These 
similarities suggest a narrative continuation from one film to the next that goes 
significantly beyond a shared thematic concern. Both 2001 and A Clockwork Orange 
express an ongoing fascination with the spectacle of violence, and attempt to find the 
formal means for representing the different intellectual and emotional dimensions of 
this fascination. 
The connection between Alex and the pre-humans in 2001 suggests an unstable 
tension between socialization and an innate capacity for violence. Yet it would be 
wrong to say that instinctual brutality re-emerges only through Alex's delinquency. 
In A Cloclnt'ork Orange, violence takes on many different forms, and Kubrick 
implies that while violence has become increasingly sublimated in the socialized 
individual, it has not disappeared. Repeatedly, violence is carried out by ostensibly 
responsible and respected members of society, supported by various questionable 
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moral justifications (such as punishment, revenge and even 'treatment'). Alex is 
assaulted by various representatives of the state: his 'Post Corrective Advisor' 
(Aubrey Morris), a police officer, and, finally, two of his fonner droogs, who have 
become the state's new breed of law enforcers. He is also physically and 
psychologically tortured, first in the course of his 'treatment', and later by Mr 
Alexander (Patrick Magee) in an act of revenge. In all of these cases, it is made clear 
that the perpetrators of these acts derive the same type of pleasure from their 
'justifiable' violence as Alex does from his instinctual, amoral brutality. 
In several of Kubrick's other films we can see a similar tension between 
socialization (or civilization) and violence. In 2001, as Kolker suggested, violence 
appears to disappear from the narrative as the bone transfonns into the satellite. Yet 
2001' s most famous cut does not abandon the theme of violence, but subsumes this 
idea within a new technological and social context. In 2001's future, violence is no 
longer manifested in overt acts of aggression; it is carried out at distance, calmly. 
Technology has enabled mankind to kill at the push of a button, and, moreover, as 
that technology has advanced and become autonomous, it has attained the ability to 
kill with a single 'thought'. When HAL murders the ship's hibernating crew, the act 
is effortless, and is related to the viewer by a computer screen displaying the 
message 'life functions tenninated'. Similarly, when Bowman (Keir Dullea) 
'lobotomizes' HAL (while the computer pleads for its life, in the film's most ironic 
and emotional scene), it is simply a matter of disconnecting a few wires. In 
Kubrick's future, violence has become detached from emotion and physical action, 
but, as a consequence, it seems all the more pernicious and potent. Furthennore, with 
this type of violence it has become impossible to distinguish rationality from 
irrationalitv. HAL murders the crew because he is malfunctioning - he has become 
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'irrational'. Yet, at the same time, his actions are motivated by an implacable logic: 
he perceives a very real threat to his existence, and chooses to kill the crew to ensure 
his own survival (in much the same way that the apes' instinctual aggression is a 
product of the Darwinian fight for survival). Comparably, mankind's creation of the 
nuclear 'deterrent' in Dr Strangelove is depicted as an act of both unassailable logic 
and utter lunacy. 
More commonly, though, Kubrick depicts violence as a repressed, illogical force 
underlying rational civilization and the socialized human psyche. In Barry Lyndon 
(1975), violence is the dark underside of patriarchy, emerging when Barry (Ryan 
O'Neal) suddenly submits his stepson (Leon Vitali) to a vicious beating in front of 
assembled members of the aristocracy. Similarly, in The Shining, Jack (Jack 
Nicholson) is 'possessed' by the irrational, supernatural violence of the Overlook 
hotel and attempts to murder his own family. Finally, and perhaps most 
emphatically, the conflict between instinctual aggression and rational thought is 
represented in Full Metal Jacket (1987), where Joker (Matthew Modine) wears both 
a peace symbol and a combat helmet bearing the handwritten phrase 'born to kill', 
expressing, as he says, 'something about the duality of man.' 
Clearly, Kubrick discerns in the human mind (or, at least, the male mind) a 
repressed violent impulse. Drawing on psychoanalytic tenninology, Kubrick has 
suggested that this buried instinct is at the root of our natural, yet perhaps deeply 
unsettling, identification with Alex: 
I think... there is the basic psychological, unconscious identification with 
Alex ... [Y]ou can regard Alex as a creature of the id. He is within all of us. In 
most cases this recognition seems to bring a kind of empathy from the 
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audience, but it makes some people very angry and uncomfortable. 
Writing shortly after A Clockwork Orange's U.K. premIere, Kubrick is clearly 
responding to the myriad criticisms and polemics that greeted the film's release. The 
attacks launched in the popular press seized upon the attractiveness of Alex's 
character and the way in which we are encouraged to share his perspective, accusing 
Kubrick of shamelessly glamorizing the violent content of the film. But, inevitably, 
the representation of violence was considered separately from the context of the 
story's overall moral framework. Moreover, the various ways in which Kubrick 
injected a sense of critical distance into the action were widely ignored or 
misunderstood. For Kubrick, as for Burgess, it was absolutely necessary to portray 
Alex's enjoyment of violence and to acknowledge our shared capacity for violence, 
however distasteful. This is central to the story's moral dilemma concerning 
criminality, state-sponsored brutality and the destruction of personal liberty. 17 Yet this 
is not to say that Kubrick (or, indeed, Burgess) 'glamorizes' violence. In both book 
and film, although the story is 'told' by Alex, there is a careful layering of 
perspectives which ensures that the narrator's seductive amorality is contextualized 
and qualified. 
In what is arguably the film's most violent scene, where Mr Alexander is viciously 
beaten and forced to watch his wife (Adrienne Corri) being raped, we are given 
repeated shots from his perspective as he lies bound and gagged on the floor. Vitally, 
this scene does not use any extra-diegetic music to 'stylize' its violence. Instead, it 
uses Malcolm McDowell's disturbing rendition of 'Singin' in the Rain', which may 
act as the blackest of comedic distractions, but does nothing to mitigate the scene's 
horrific brutality. The momentary shift in perspective, where we are put in the place 
of the pacified observer of Alex's grotesque crimes, resolutely strips the viewing 
process of any potential for voyeuristic pleasure or vicarious gratification. It also 
presages Alex's eventual transition from victimizer to victim, as he later becomes the 
passive and helpless victim of state violence: firstly, when he is subjected to a from of 
torture by being poisoned and forced to watch the sickening images that will 'cure' 
him of his evil; and secondly, when he is made the object of the collective gaze of the 
politicians, who watch with undisguised relish as Alex writhes on the ground in front 
of them, his violent impulses transformed into physical pain by his psychological 
conditioning. 
What should become clear through these shifts in perspective is that Kubrick 
certainly does not represent violence as a straightforward 'spectacle' to be mindlessly 
consumed (much less enjoyed) by the uncritical viewer. Instead, he scrutinizes 
different forms of violent behaviour, and explores the way in which our reaction to 
violence is partially dependent on how that violence is contextualized and how we are 
positioned in relation to it. In A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick implies that our 
comprehension of violence and violent images is deeply ambivalent. Viewing 
violence, he suggests, can be a disturbing or even nauseating experience - but it can 
also be pleasurable, especially if we are given a 'moralizing' framework that 
sanctions our vicarious enjoyment. (Again, the scene in which the government 
ministers enjoy Alex's public torture and degradation with a sense of moral impunity 
deals with this idea directly.) In short, A Clockwork Orange is deeply self-reflexive in 
the way it addresses the meaning and effects of its violent content. 
In contrast to his disappointment with Lolita, Kubrick was initially very happy 
with his version of A Clockwork Orange, feeling that the film was a technical triumph 
which evoked both the complexity of the novel's psychological perspective and the 
moral ambiguity of cinema's conceptualization of violence. After the film's 
completion, the notoriously exacting director reported, 'I'm very pleased with A 
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Clockwork Orange. I think it's the most skilful movie I've ever made. I can see 
almost nothing wrong with it.' 18 Yet it was perhaps Kubrick's skill in evoking his 
narrator's twisted vision of the world - in conjunction with his refusal to provide an 
unambiguous moral commentary on that vision - that created much of the outrage, 
discomfort and widespread misunderstanding that followed the film's release. Media 
responses often tended towards intense personal attacks. The Washington Post review 
declared that 'Kubrick's style is inflated and ponderous,' and the film 'a deplorable 
and thoughtless spectacle of violence.' 19 The Chicago Sun- Times posed the question 
'What the hell is Kubrick up to here?' before promptly concluding that the film is 'An 
ideological mess, a paranoid right-wing fantasy masquerading as an Orwellian 
warning. ,20 Crucially, what is missing from these analyses is an adequate critical 
discrimination between the vision of Kubrick and that of his protagonist and, 
moreover, a recognition of the way in which the' spectacle of violence' has been self-
consciously foregrounded within the narrative. Don Daniels provided a more 
considered response to the question 'What the hell is Kubrick up to here?', writing a 
piece that was both a review and a critique of the media's misrepresentation of 
Kubrick's work. 'To complain of Alex's singular attractiveness', he argued, 'is to 
indicate a naIvete about the role and to compliment Malcolm McDowell's rendering 
of evil's various charms, Kubrick's future society is 'Alexed' into a child's refuse-
strewn playground. ,21 
In 1973, amid allegations of copycat violence, Kubrick famously withdrew the 
film from the U.K. (where he owned the distribution rights).22 There is, however, no 
reason to believe that he ever wavered from his firm belief that his film could not be 
blamed for real-life criminal behaviour. Rather, according to comments made by 
Christiane Kubrick after her husband's death, Kubrick only withdrew the film after 
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receiving numerous threats. She told an interviewer, '[He was] both artistically hurt 
and also scared. He didn't want to be misunderstood and misinterpreted and you don't 
like to get death threats for your family. ,23 In many ways, the fate of A Clocklvork 
Orange seemed to mirror that of its protagonist: it was transformed into a pawn, an 
emblem of a new type of cultural immorality, to be manipulated by politicians and 
elements of the media in a debate that often failed to appreciate, or even address, its 
ideas and artistry. Clearly, the film confronts man's capacity to commit (and derive 
pleasure from) violence in a very forthright, graphic, and often disturbing manner. Yet 
it also suggests that our ability to think rationally rather than acting instinctually, to 
choose compassion rather than violence, is the very essence of our humanity. It is 
therefore understandable that Kubrick should suffer a great deal of consternation at 
the general misrepresentation of his work by the mass media, which frequently 
responded to the film with hysteria rather than critical scrutiny, making it emblematic 
of a new 'tendency' toward gratuitous violence and sensationalism in Hollywood 
rather than engaging with the film on its own terms. 
In an open letter to The New York Times, Kubrick offered his response to one 
article that was fairly typical in condemning the film without addressing its actual 
content. This response is fascinating not only for how it redresses the critical 
misperception of the film, but also for how it incorporates Kubrick's cinematic 
imagination into its frame of reference (as was the case in some of the director's 
previously cited comments). Because of this, it offers perhaps the clearest elucidation 
of how A Clocklvork Orange's meaning is embedded, like 200],s, as a largely 'non-
verbal experience.' Quoting Robert Ardrey, Kubrick defends his portrayal of Alex's 
joyous barbarity as a refutation of the adequacy, and accuracy, of the assumption that 
man is by nature 'happy and good': 
Finally, the question must be considered whether Rousseau's view of man as a 
fallen angel is not really the most pessimistic and hopeless of philosophies. It 
leaves man a monster who has gone steadily away from his original nobility. It 
is, I am convinced, more optimistic to accept Ardrey's view that '... we are 
born of risen apes, not fallen angels, and the apes were armed killers besides 
[ ... J The miracle of man is not how far he has sunk but how magnificently he 
h . ,24 as nsen. 
When we examine A Clockwork Orange with due diligence, and in relation to 
Kubrick's other work, the perspective that Kubrick shares with Ardrey becomes 
increasingly visible. The film, we should conclude, exemplifies the notion of 
cinematic thought. 
'No Other Country but the Mind' 
Fear and Desire, Kubrick's first feature film, opens with a senes of shots of a 
forested mountainside and a meditative VOlceover, which sounds almost like an 
incantation: 
There is war in this forest. Not a war that has been fought, or one that will be, 
but any war. And the enemies who struggle here do not exist, unless we call 
them into being. This forest, then, and all that happens now, is outside history. 
Only the unchanging shapes of fear and doubt and death are from our world. 
These soldiers that you see keep our language and our time, but have no other 
country but the mind. 
Although Kubrick later dismissed his debut as 'a very inept and pretentious effort', 
the film nevertheless foreshadows his later accomplishments - revealing a personal 
vision that spans his career. 25 As the opening monologue suggests, Fear and Desire 
aims to tell an allegorical, even mythical, story. The principal characters (four 
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soldiers) are archetypal: they are not three-dimensional individuals, but are illustrative 
of certain ideas about human behaviour and the human psyche. Trapped behind 
enemy lines and lost in the wilderness, the soldiers become increasingly anxious, 
impulsive and, ultimately, savage. The film's action represents an internal drama, a 
conflict between different aspects of the human personality - as is made abundantly 
clear by the fact that the soldiers and their 'enemy' counterparts are played by the 
same actors. 26 At the same time, the film's natural landscape is made to appear 
dreamlike or otherworldly. 'Visually', Nelson suggests, 'Fear and Desire shows 
Kubrick's talent for creating mental landscapes that alternate between grotesquerie 
and surrealistic beauty. ,27 In brief, the film creates a 'country of the mind' not only in 
the sense that it is fantastical, or detached from the real world and its history, but also 
because it dramatizes thought, transforming 'external' reality into an interior 
mindscape. 
Throughout his career, in a variety of different ways, Kubrick has returned to the 
underlying themes and fonn of Fear and Desire, periodically exploring cinema's 
capacity to construct a subjective reality (as this relates to both his characters and his 
own conception of the world). Deleuze writes: 
If we look at Kubrick's work, we see the degree to which it is the brain which 
is mise en scene ... For in Kubrick the world itself is a brain, there is identity of 
brain and world, as in the great circular and luminous table in Doctor 
Strangelove, the giant computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey, the overlook hotel 
in The Shining ... The world-brain is A Clockwork Orange, or again a spherical 
game of chess where the general can calculate his chances of promotion on the 
basis of the relation between soldiers killed and positions captured (Paths of 
Glory). But if the calculation fails, if the computer breaks down, it is because 
the brain is no more a reasonable system than the world is a rational one.28 
What Deleuze identifies in Kubrick's cinema is a repeated conflation of world and 
mind, wherein the external environment is literally or figuratively representative of a 
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conscIOUS entity (be it human, artificial, or even supernatural). Furthermore, we 
should add, if Kubrick frequently depicts the mind through his mise en scene, then 
equally, stylistic features such as editing, framing, camera movements, music, and so 
forth, come to represent interior mental processes (and here there are clearly close 
parallels between Kubrick's cinema and Miinsterberg's theoretical model of film 
thought). There is a scene in A Clockwork Orange where Alex, having returned to his 
room after his night of ultraviolence, plays a recording of Beethoven's ninth 
symphony, which exemplifies the way in which Kubrick subjectivizes external reality. 
As Alex listens to his music, his environment suddenly comes alive, animated by his 
imagination. A rapid succession of shots of different parts of his Christ figurines 
creates the illusion that they are dancing to the music. We are then given shots of the 
'lovely pictures' that Alex imagines - which presage the fleeting visions of violence 
seen by Danny (Danny Lloyd) in The Shining. These are fully subjective images 
which depict a variety of brutal- yet highly artificial - fantasies: Alex as a vampire, a 
figure hanging from a gallows, and a series of catastrophic explosions that seem like 
stock footage from a Hollywood B-movie. Similarly, later on in the film, Alex has a 
fantasy of himself as a centurion, dressed in 'the height of Roman fashion' as he 
flagellates the condemned Christ. When Ciment asked Kubrick why he shot this latter 
fantasy 'like a bad Hollywood movie', Kubrick gave the simple reply, 'I thought Alex 
would have imagined it that way. ,29 
This last point is crucial. As we have already seen to some extent, Kubrick's 
representation of thought is deeply self-reflexive: for Kubrick, film is a means of 
expressing abstract, personal thought in non-verbal terms, but it is also the site of 
collective fantasies and ideologies. Neither Kubrick's thought nor the thought 
attributed to his characters is entirely autonomous, but operates in relation to a wider 
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cultural imagination defined by Hollywood's dominant images, moral assumptions, 
archetypal characters and narrative formulae. 
The way in which Kubrick develops his cinematic thought in relation (and often 
opposition) to Hollywood is perhaps most significant in his later films, particularly 
The Shining and Eyes Wide Shut. Ostensibly, these two films should be very different. 
Based upon a best-selling horror story by Stephen King, the former is generic and 
fantastical, and is arguably the most openly' commercial' film in Kubrick's oeuvre. In 
contrast, the latter, adapted from Arthur Schnitzler's 1926 Traumnovelle (a fairly 
obscure novella prior to Kubrick's film), is a slow-paced, contemplative, 
psychologically-complex work exploring desire, fantasy and jealousy in relation to an 
apparently stable marriage. Yet when we begin to examine these films more closely, it 
becomes clear that they are similar in some very fundamental ways. Both films are, at 
times, deeply ambiguous in terms of how they blur the lines between reality and 
fantasy. In The Shining, we are, for much of the narrative, faced with conflicting 
explanations for the eerie occurrences in the Overlook, and remain unsure whether 
events are truly 'supernatural' or merely the products of psychosis and hallucination. 
In Eyes Wide Shut, the barriers between dream and reality similarly begin to dissolve 
(as is suggested in the film's title). Furthermore, the ambiguity regarding the 
ontological status of narrative events is complemented by way in which both films 
self-reflexively explore their extra-fictional dimensions. In The Shining, there is a 
constant movement between sincerity and parody, between horror and tongue-in-
cheek humour, between genre and generic subversion, which continually forces us to 
reassess the status and meaning of the narrative. In Eyes Wide Shut, it is 
predominantly the casting of what was then Hollywood's most famous married 
couple, Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman, as the fictional husband and wife that 
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prompts us to consider the boundaries between fiction and reality in more depth. 
Finally, like Kubrick's previous films, both The Shining and Eyes Wide Shut are 
centrally concerned with the problematical relationship between rational and irrational 
thought, or consciousness and the unconscious, but in addition, both focus on the 
threat that irrationality and instinct pose to the family unit constituted by husband, 
wife and child. 
These parallels, I believe, clarify the fundamental nature of Kubrick's cinematic 
thought with regard to his conception of the mind and his strategies for conveying 
ideas to the viewer in non-verbal terms. Kubrick's cinematic thought operates through 
Hollywood not by way of straightforward critique, subversion or parody. Instead, it 
operates according to the principle of estrangement, or more precisely, the 'uncanny' 
(in the specific Freudian sense of the term). The final section of this chapter will show 
how The Shining and Eyes Wide Shut, in tum, represent a mode of uncanny thought 
that is essential to Kubrick's cinema as a whole. 
Uncanny Thought 
Freud's essay on 'The Uncanny' provided a direct theoretical basis for The Shining, as 
has been made clear by Diane Johnson, who co-wrote the script with Kubrick.3o In 
this essay, Freud argues that when we begin to explore the nature of the uncanny (das 
unheimlich), it becomes apparent that it is by no means a typical manifestation of the 
frightening. This deeply unsettling feeling, Freud suggests, is not evoked by 
occurrences that are obviously outlandish or supernatural; rather, 'The uncanny ... is 
in some way a species of the familiar'. 31 The uncanny relies upon the juxtaposition 
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of the familiar and the unfamiliar, or the distortion of what is most familiar - the 
homely - so that it becomes estranged and disconcerting. Freud identifies an array of 
fictional devices that he believes achieve an uncanny effect through their ambiguous 
mixing of the familiar and the unfamiliar, and which, it should be immediately 
apparent, are manifest in The Shining: the eerie repetition of events and motifs (the 
murders, the 1920s ball, the sentence 'All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy'), 
the representation of doubles or doppelgangers (Jack [Jack Nicholson] and the 
previous caretaker, Danny and his imaginary friend 'Tony', the murdered Grady 
girls), and the ambiguous depiction of automata, objects that may be either alive or 
inanimate (the Overlook itself). Furthermore, underpinning these uncanny motifs, 
Freud argues, is the conflict between two ways of thinking, or between two 
incompatible sets of beliefs - one derived from childish ideas and fantasies, which 
have never been fully surmounted, and the other from our adult scepticism, which is 
not as stable as it first appears. A narrative which plays upon the ambiguous line 
dividing fantasy from reality is, therefore, prone to induce a deep sense of 
uncannmess: 
an uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy and reality 
is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we had until 
now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and 
significance of what it symbolizes and so forth. 32 
There is a clear intersection between the different aspects of Freud's conception of 
the uncanny and the themes and form of The Shining, which should already be 
somewhat apparent from the previous brief discussion of the film. Firstly, of course, 
the blurring of fantasy and reality is evident up until the final section of the film: it is 
not until Jack is freed from the food locker by one of the hotel's ghosts that we are 
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presented with the film's first unequivocally supernatural event; before this, we are 
constantly left wondering whether the film's paranormal events are real or 
imaginary.33 In addition, the film's reworking of the family unit, so that it becomes 
something unfamiliar and threatening, is a prime example of the uncanny. It is also 
another element in the narrative that juxtaposes two conflicting modes of thought. At 
first (albeit, very briefly), Jack is the conventional Hollywood patriarch who provides 
for his family (by working at the hotel) and protects them from any outside threat 
(making sure that the hotel is safe after Danny is apparently attacked by a 'crazy 
woman' in room 237). Later, he has himself become the threat, having transformed 
into the deranged, punishing father of Freudian childhood fantasy. At the same time, 
Kubrick's uncanny treatment of the father can be seen as a satirical commentary on 
the inherent ambiguity of patriarchal power and authority. When Jack meets the ghost 
of Grady (Philip Stone), the previous caretaker who murdered his wife and children, it 
becomes apparent that the rhetoric of fatherly authority and discipline is being used to 
mask a sadistic brutality. Euphemistically, Grady tells Jack that he has found it 
necessary to 'correct' the behaviour of his wife and daughters, and suggests that Jack 
consider doing the same.34 
This instant, which ambiguously mixes horror and humour, also points up another 
way in which The Shining operates according to the paradigm of the uncanny. The 
horror that the film provokes relies, at some level, on a suspension of disbelief - a 
willingness to accept narrative events at face value. Contrarily, much of the film's 
humour relies on self-reflexivity and parody - events become comedic when we 
recognize their excess and artificiality. In constantly blurring the line between genuine 
emotion and parody, and between reality and artificiality, The Shining again 
juxtaposes two conflicting modes of thinking, achieving another form of uncanniness. 
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An excellent example of exactly how the film ambiguously mIxes reality and 
artificiality occurs early on in the narrative, when, at the end of the job interview, 
Ullman (Barry Nelson) tells Jack about the Overlook's violent history. Ullman's 
exposition of the story of the Grady murders veers sharply from being genuinely 
horrifying to unintentionally ridiculous: he reveals the chilling details of the 
homicides - Grady 'killed his family with an axe, stacked them neatly in one of the 
rooms of the west wing and ... put both barrels of a shotgun in his mouth' - before 
bathetic ally concluding, 'the police thought. .. it was what the old-timers used to call 
cabin fever.' Similarly, Jack's reaction seems to mirror the unlikely trajectory of the 
story. At first, he stares silently at Ullman, his face displaying an appropriate degree 
of solemnity and shock. When the story is over, Jack's characteristic grin returns, and, 
he reassures Ullman that he is still willing to take the caretaker job despite the hotel's 
recent bloody history. 'As far as my wife is concerned,' he adds, 'I'm sure she'll be 
absolutely fascinated when I tell her about it: she's a confirmed ghost story and horror 
film addict.' The rapid oscillation in this sequence between the 'real' and the self-
consciously artificial, between horror and humour, is typical of the film's narrative 
(and Nicholson's performance) as a whole. At the same time, it represents something 
fundamental to Kubrick's cinematic thought, which constantly seeks to unsettle and 
unnerve, to replace ideological or narrative certainty with ambiguity and ambivalence. 
Finally, it is worth considering how the notion of the uncanny also informs the 
film's most basic stylistic operations. If we again focus on the two components of the 
uncanny emphasized by Freud - the estrangement of the familiar and the ambiguous 
representation of events - it becomes clear that The Shining frequently achieves a 
kind of stylistic uncanniness. Kubrick's innovative use of the Steadicam (a relatiyely 
new piece of equipment at the time) certainly contributes to the film's ubiquitous 
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sense of the uncanny. The gliding camera that pursues Danny through the labyrinthine 
corridors of the Overlook evokes an ambiguous point of view. On the one hand~ the 
camera indirectly presents Danny~s vantage point: it is low to the ground, mimicking 
the five year-old~s perspective, and shows a good deal of what Danny sees in his field 
of vision. On the other hand, the camera also represents an independent, alien 
perspective: it embodies the unseen, supernatural malevolence of the 'Overlook' 
itself, whilst also foreshadowing Jack's later perspective as he pursues his son through 
the hedge maze (after he has been 'possessed' by the hotel's evil spirit). Kenneth 
Johnson suggests that The Shining repeatedly disrupts the usual relationship between 
character and camera by having the camera move semi-independently with regard to 
the demands of the immediate action it is recording: the camera 'slightly exceeds' its 
conventional role as the invisible transmitter of narrative information.35 The sense of 
something alien and unsettling within the narrative thus relies on the subtle 
estrangement of what is stylistically familiar and conventional. As Johnson argues: 
'When the camera ... wanders, we become aware, because our "classical" expectations 
have been disrupted, of a foreign presence. ,36 
There are two further, specific instances where The Shining disrupts classical 
expectations through its ambiguous depiction of space and point of view, which will 
serve to illustrate the film's general stylistic uncanniness. First, there is the scene in 
which Jack gazes over the model maze (in the 'Colorado Lounge') whilst, 
simultaneously, Wendy (Shelley Duvall) and Danny attempt to solve the full-sized 
hedge maze outside. After a shot of Jack looking downwards, we cut to what is 
apparently a point-of-view shot of the model maze - but the shot is 'impossible': it 
depicts the tiny figures of Wendy and Danny moving through the centre of the maze. 
In this ambiguous sequence, classical editing is used to problematize space and point 
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of view, so that we cannot commit to a single interpretation of what is happening 
within the narrative, and again cannot decide whether we are dealing with the 
supernatural or merely a stylistic 'trick'. The second instant where classical space is 
disrupted, with uncanny effects, occurs during a scene in the Gold Room bar, when 
Jack finally seems to succumb to his psychosis. Seated at the bar with his head 
bowed, Jack suddenly looks up towards the camera and begins to talk. Subsequently, 
a reverse shot reveals the ghostly barman who has appeared from nowhere, and whom 
Jack is addressing, but before this, there is a precise moment of uncanniness, when we 
unexpectedly lose our bearings within the narrative. The 'taboo' glance towards 
camera has the effect of being both disorientating and unsettling, as we are suddenly 
made part of the film's frame of reference through Jack's maniacal stare. Presaging a 
crucial sequence in which the boundary between fantasy and reality (or the 
paranormal and the psychological) is again blurred, the film's style becomes 
profoundly uncanny. 
It should by now be clear that the notion of the uncanny provides a model for both 
the content and the form of Kubrick's cinematic thought. Kubrick's style 
defamiliarizes and disorientates, while at the same time, his narratives concern 
conflicts between rationality and irrational forces, between our conscious beliefs, 
morals and assumptions and the apparently alien impulses and desires that dwell in 
the unconscious mind. In one way or another, his films all convey a deep sense of 
estrangement from everyday 'normality' (often through their evocation of a 
narratorial perspective that is, in some sense, aberrant, perverse, delinquent or 
monstrous). Yet it is perhaps Eyes Wide Shut, Kubrick's final film, that best illustrates 
how the principles of estrangement and uncanniness operate in his cinema. 
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Like The Shining, Eyes Wide Shut achieves a sense of uncanniness firstly through 
its ambiguous blurring of the boundary between fantasy and reality. As Rodney Hill 
notes: 'Both Schnitzler's novella and Kubrick's film navigate the treacherous, gray 
area between waking life and dreams, between 'reality' and fantasy ... between the 
conscious and the unconscious.,37 The film's foray into the fantastic begins when 
Alice Harford (Nicole Kidman) confesses to her husband, Bill (Tom Cruise), that she 
recently fantasized about infidelity after experiencing an unexpected, and almost 
overwhelming, desire for a naval officer she saw whilst on holiday. Tormented by the 
image of his wife with another man, Bill spends several hours wandering around New 
York, half-heartedly seeking some form of sexual revenge. Yet ultimately, because of 
both circumstance and the ambivalent nature of his feelings, he is unable to go 
through with his plans and remains faithful to Alice. 
While Bill's night-time odyssey is ostensibly presented as a real experience, there 
are several ways in which it achieves an oneiric and uncanny quality. As in the 
original novella, the protagonist does not seem to be fully in control of his actions, 
and the night's events unfold with a kind of fateful determinism. The night's erotic 
opportunities present themselves as if in response to Bill's unarticulated fantasies, 
linked together through a series of coincidences. He is propositioned by three 
different women - the daughter of a recently-deceased patient, a prostitute, and the 
costume shop owner's daughter. He does not plan or actively seek out these 
potentially-erotic encounters - they are presented as random occurrences. Similarly, 
although Bill chooses to attend the masked orgy, he only finds out about it through a 
series of coincidences. After wandering the streets aimlessly for some time, Bill finds 
himself outside the jazz club where Nick Nightingale (Todd Field), an old friend from 
medical school, is performing. After his set, Nightingale tells Bill about the orgy. 
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Again, this opportunity presents itself not because of Bill's actions or conscIOUS 
intentions, but seemingly in response to his unconscious thoughts - as the kind of 
wish-fulfilment that Freud identifies as the founding logic of dreams. 
Eyes Wide Shut also achieves a dreamlike logic through its subtle repetition of 
events and motifs. For Freud, the seemingly unfathomable repetition of the same thing 
is intensely uncanny, and 'recalls the helplessness we experience in certain dream 
states. ,38 Again, the uncanny is implicitly linked to a kind of cognitive dissonance, 
where we can no longer clearly differentiate fantasy from reality, the familiar from, 
the unfamiliar, and anxiety from desire. Involuntary or surprising repetitions, Freud 
argues, seem uncanny because they suggest a hidden purpose or design that is beyond 
our conscious control and understanding, but may at the same time be a product of our 
unconscious beliefs, attitudes and wishes. This is precisely the case when Bill 
consciously rejects the prospect of infidelity when it first occurs (spuming the 
daughter of the deceased patient), but finds himself confronted with eerily similar 
situations, in which new opportunities for infidelity proliferate. There are also 
repetitions that link Bill's night-time experiences to the events of the previous day. At 
the Zieglers' party, Bill flirts with two models who promise to take him to 'where the 
rainbow ends'. The following night, he finds himself attempting to hire a mask and 
cloak from a shop called 'Rainbow Fashions'. Furthennore, the shop bears an unlikely 
similarity to the Zieglers' house in tenns of its decor: both are decorated with strings 
of pale yellow light bulbs. In addition, we should note that Bill's conversation with 
the models is cut short when Ziegler (Sydney Pollack) discreetly calls him away to 
tend to a prostitute who has overdosed upstairs. This again presages Bill's odyssey of 
the following night, which is instigated when he is unexpectedly called away on a 
medical matter, and is marked by a series of encounters with prostitutes (the woman 
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who propositions him on the street, the masked prostitutes at the orgy, and the girl in 
the costume shop, whose father twice accuses her of being a 'whore'). Finally, the 
entire masked orgy sequence can be seen as an uncanny inversion of the Zieglers' 
Christmas party. As Ciment astutely observes, there is a strong sense of symmetry 
uniting the two sequences, with each lasting for eighteen minutes. 39 Moreover, each 
sequence is ritualistic, and depicts illicit activities: prostitution, extramarital sex and 
drug-taking. At the Zieglers' party, these activities are out of sight, concealed by a 
weak fac;:ade of social ritual and bourgeois propriety~ at the later party, they have 
come into the open. 
As well as creating a series of uncanny echoes and inversions, the repetition of 
events and motifs from the previous day strengthens the dreamlike quality of Bill's 
night-time odyssey. As in Wild Strawberries, there is the suggestion that the 'day's 
residues' have been transformed into the raw material of the 'dream' narrative. The 
notion that the incidents from Bill's night are in some way oneiric or fantastical is 
further reinforced when he returns home and awakes Alice from her 'real' nightmare. 
As Alice quickly relates the details of her dream, it becomes apparent that it shares 
certain characteristics with Bill's recent experience. In Alice's dream, she and Bill 
find themselves naked in an unknown place - just as Bill recently found himself in an 
unknown house in which the group of masked men menacingly demanded that he 
remove his clothes. Alice's dream centres on Bill's humiliation and emasculation, as 
he is forced to watch his wife copulating with the naval officer and a series of other 
men. While the physical details clearly call to mind the orgy sequence, the emotions 
that Alice describes - anger, resentment, fear and shame - recall Bill's shifting 
feelings in the previous scenes. 
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The parallels between Alice's dream and Bill's night-time experiences create a 
further blurring of the boundary between the real and the imaginary. While Alice's 
recollection of her dream emphasizes the oneiric qualities of Bill's experiences, it 
simultaneously draws sustenance from those experiences, attaining a significance that 
exceeds its ostensible status as a purely imaginary narrative. The paradoxical 'reality' 
of Alice's dream is reinforced by her reaction to it, which contrasts with Bill's lack of 
reaction to his real-life drama. When Bill returns home, he seems a little shaken by 
the night's occurrences, but does not convey any obvious signs of emotional distress, 
keeping his face and voice largely passive. Contrarily, upon recounting her dream, 
Alice is extremely emotional, and cannot hide the extent to which she has been 
affected by her imaginary experiences. Once more, we are subjected to processes of 
estrangement, disorientation and defamiliarization, as the normal relationship between 
fantasy and reality is disrupted. 
In Eyes Wide Shut, the evocation of the experience of the uncanny is linked to a 
single perspective: that of Bill Harford. More than anything, the sense of uncanniness 
that develops through the course of the narrative is a reflection of Bill's loss of his 
bearings with regard to his marriage and his own sexual identity. The shift from 
'normality' to the uncanny is initiated when Alice directly challenges her husband's 
unquestioning and slightly arrogant confidence in himself and in the stability of their 
marriage. Feeling neglected by Bill's apparent lack of concern over the fact that she 
has been propositioned by another man at the Zieglers' party, Alice asks, 'You are 
very, very sure of yourself, aren't you?' She then relates the story about her brief 
infatuation with the naval officer, instantly destroying Bill's self-assurance and 
forcing him to re-examine his most fundamental assumptions regarding his marriage. 
From this point on, the film's uncanniness - its defamiliarization of the everyday 
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world and its questioning of what is real and what is illusory or fantastical - mirrors 
Bill's psychical experience. 
Insofar as the uncanny or dreamlike facets of its narrative reflect Bill's point of 
view, Eyes Wide Shut provides another reworking of the 'first-person' perspective that 
was implicit in A Clockwork Orange and in certain aspects of Lolita. Indeed, specific 
stylistic and thematic elements of Eyes Wide Shut can be linked to Kubrick's previous 
experiments in subjective narration. Notably, the Ligeti piano music that recurs 
throughout the second half of the film shares a function with the music in A 
Clockwork Orange. Claudia Gorbman pithily describes the recurring Ligeti motif as 
'point of view music' for Bill.4o Yet unlike the classical music in A Clockwork 
Orange, the Ligeti piece is used with little sense of ironic detachment or critical 
distance: 
The Ligeti piano music dramatically, and entirely without irony, marks some 
key moments in Bill's emotional fall ... Its moments of extreme loudness and 
extreme softness seem to mirror the leaps in Bill's consciousness at these 
junctures, as he is now struck with panic, now questioning and exploring, now 
hit with the full force of shame.41 
In Eyes Wide Shut, the dissonant Ligeti music intricately renders those moments of 
uncanniness that demolish Bill's self-confidence and sense of social assurance. It first 
occurs at what is perhaps the film's most unsettling moment, when Bill is led 
unsuspectingly into the room of ominous, grotesquely-masked figures who have 
discovered that he is an impostor at the orgy. The Ligeti music is immediately linked 
to Bill's perception of his shameful 'unmasking'. A similar subjective meaning is 
attached to the music's final occurrence when Bill returns home to discover Alice 
asleep next to his misplaced mask, the symbol of his attempted infidelity. In both 
cases the music evokes a moment of self-consciousness, when Bill's deceptions and , 
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self-delusions become unsustainable and he IS forced to abandon his protectiye. 
carefully-constructed persona. 
The idea of the mask itself forms a powerful continuity between Lolita, A 
Clockwork Orange and Eyes Wide Shut. In Lolita, Humbert adopts a public persona, 
feigning paternal feelings for Lolita so as to hide the true nature of his desires. In A 
Clockwork Orange, the mask functions in precisely the opposite way. Although Alex 
wears a grotesque mask ostensibly to hide his identity as he commits crimes, the mask 
also reflects his deepest sense of self: if Alex is, as Kubrick suggests, 'the creature of 
the id' - entirely lacking in morality or social scruples - his carnivalesque mask is 
wholly appropriate. These contradictory functions of the mask are brought together in 
Eyes Wide Shut. In the early stages of the film in particular, the confident public 
persona that Bill projects is represented as something inherently artificial and mask-
like - as an illusory facade of masculine authority and self-assurance that quickly 
begins to crack after Alice's revelations. Later, attempting to reassert his lost sense of 
power, social status and sexual identity, Bill wears a physical mask that is akin to 
Alex's. This mask promises him entry into a hedonistic world, where everyday 
inhibitions and social codes cease to exist, and where women are again simply the 
passive objects of male desire. Yet for Bill, this mask proves equally inauthentic and 
unsustainable. In Eyes Wide Shut, the mask problematizes the relationship between 
appearance and inner identity, and, therefore, acts as an objective correlative to Bill's 
subjective experience. The mask motif is another expression of the uncanny: it 
suggests Bill's estrangement from his normal sense of self and further blurs the 
boundaries between what is real or authentic and what is artificial, illusory or 
fantastical. 
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Undoubtedly, the artificial qualities of Bill's character are emphasized by Tom 
Cruise's highly unusual performance in the role (which at no point appears either 
naturalistic or 'comfortable'). For the most part, Cruise's performance seems stilted 
and extremely self-conscious - but deliberately so. His extremely measured acting 
lends a sense of calculation - indeed, of performativity - to Bill's everyday social 
interactions. Yet Cruise's suitability in the role of Bill is not, of course, merely a 
product of his inherent capabilities as an actor. Like Lolita, Eyes Wide Shut draws 
heavily on the Hollywood personae of its stars as a means of manipulating audience 
expectations and generating meaning. The crisis of masculine identity that Eyes Wide 
Shut depicts is given additional depth and significance through the careful subversion 
of Cruise's familiar persona. And again, insofar as this subversion relies on the 
estrangement of what is ostensibly familiar, and blurs the relationship between fantasy 
and reality, it is designed to produce a sense of disorientation and uncanniness -
reflective of Bill's subjective experience. 
Tom Cruise's star status was really cemented in Top Gun (Scott, 1986). In this 
archetypal Reaganite fable, the heroic masculinity of Cruise's character is 
emblematized by the twin tropes of his military and sexual prowess - which are 
effectively conflated in the narrative (by the end of the film, Cruise's character has 
defeated the Soviet enemy and won the affections of the 'love interest' [Kelly 
McGillis]).42 Cruise's later roles in films such as Mission: Impossible (De Palma, 
1996) further developed his credentials as a sexually charismatic, self-assured action 
hero. Clearly, Eyes Wide Shut draws upon this masculine persona in order to debunk it 
- to represent Bill's sense of emasculation whilst also challenging the ideological 
fantasies of masculine identity disseminated in Hollywood. Early on in the film, 
Cruise's persona is essential in characterizing Bill, and seems a reasonably 
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unproblematic facet of Bill's 'natural' identity, but as the story progresses, this public 
face appears increasingly artificial and unsustainable. As Naremore astutely observes: 
At Ziegler's Christmas party, where Bill tries to play the role of the successful 
young doctor, we glimpse the trademark energy and vitality of the Cruise 
persona - the action-hero intensity, the 1,000 kilowatt grin, the hearty back-
slapping and hugs, and the sexual charisma. After Alice tells the story about 
the naval officer, however, Bill becomes a kind of sleepwalker, who seems to 
drift into a series of sexual encounters and near-comic sexual frustrations. 43 
Additionally, we should note that the central incident that emasculates Bill - Alice's 
admission of desire for the naval officer - further suggests a metaphorical 
displacement of the Cruise persona. The figure of the naval officer clearly recalls 
Cruise's role in Top Gun - but, paradoxically, this role is evoked to suggest the 
disconnection of Cruise's familiar persona from his fictional character.44 Bill 
Harford's emasculation is rendered through the problematization of Cruise's 'macho' 
persona. In this context, the scene where a gang of college students mock Bill with 
homosexual jibes - a reworking of an incident in the source novel where the 
protagonist is accosted with anti-Semitic insults - is particularly noteworthy, for it 
purposefully recalls the real-life rumours of Cruise's homosexuality, which have 
recurred periodically throughout his career. 
In a sense, Eyes Wide Shut's narrative takes advantage of the public's palpable 
interest in the private lives of film stars. Its exploration of its protagonist's identity 
crisis, and of the relationship between fantasy and reality, is deeply reliant on Cruise's 
persona - both on and off the screen. Equally, the way in which the film depicts the 
Harfords' marriage inevitably evokes and draws upon the spectre of the Cruise-
Kidman relationship. It is reasonable to suggest that in the early stages of her career, 
Nicole Kidman's inherent capability as an actress was largely overshadowed by her 
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status as 'Tom Cruise's wife'. Her talent (and independent star status) was not widely 
recognized until after Eyes Wide Shut, and after she and Tom Cruise had divorced. 
The sense of imbalance in the Cruise-Kidman relationship dovetails with the gender 
politics underpinning the Harfords' troubled marriage in Eyes Wide Shut. While Bill 
is a successful doctor, Alice, we learn in passing, used to run an art gallery - before it 
went out of business. Initially, Alice seems to lack an independent identity - she is 
simply the passive object of Bill's desire, and, in effect, another symbol of his 
success. The very first shot of the film shows Alice/Kidman slipping out of a dress, 
briefly baring her body to the camera, which leads Naremore to suggest that 'in 
traditional movie fashion, Kidman is offered up for the visual pleasure of the male 
audience. ,45 Yet if Kubrick does objectify Kidman early on in the film, this is in 
order to problematize her passive image in a wider narrative context. The film's 
pivotal moment occurs with the affinnation of Alice's autonomous desire - when she 
recollects her sexual fantasy - which transfonns her from the pacified object of male 
desire to the independent desiring subject. Subsequently, Bill is repeatedly tonnented 
by the fantasy image of Alice with the naval officer. In essence, Kidman's image has 
been transfonned so that it is no longer 'offered up' for voyeuristic pleasure, but 
denotes a failure of male fantasy. Again, the narrative aligns our perspective with that 
of Bill through its disorientating effects and estrangement of what is cinematically 
familiar, whilst, at the same time, critiquing a broader socio-cultural ideology. 
From a very early stage, Kubrick had decided that he wanted a real life husband 
and wife to portray the story's married couple, with Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman 
always being his first choice.46 This, one presumes, was largely because of the very-
public nature of their relationship, which afforded the potential to add another 
dimension to Traumnovelle's complex exploration of fantasy (and its relation to 
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reality). Eyes Wide Shut flaunts the prospect of a graphic onscreen consummation of 
the Cruise-Kidman celebrity relationship - which, after all, effectively began 
onscreen, when the pair co-starred in Days of Thunder (Scott, 1990). Yet this prospect 
remains unfulfilled. The first frames of the film (as noted above) provocatively reveal 
Alice/Kidman removing her clothing, and in the final line of dialogue Gust before the 
screen turns black and the credits roll) she tells Bill that the one thing they must do as 
soon as possible is 'fuck'. Kubrick ultimately denies his audience this sexual 
spectacle, which, in some sense, becomes the unrealized fantasy underpinning the 
narrative. In this respect, the similarities between Eyes Wide Shut and Lolita are 
remarkable. In each film, the narrative is constructed around a forbidden sexual 
spectacle, which is implicated as an inevitable point of speculation framing the film's 
reception. Both films utilize the prohibition of an erotic encounter to address the 
nature of fantasy and to reflect the protagonist's subjective experience. In Lolita, the 
lack of ( overt) sexual fulfilment helps to convey a sense of Humbert's thwarted desire 
and unreciprocated love for the eponymous heroine. In Eyes Wide Shut, the trajectory 
of the implicit Cruise-Kidman fantasy reflects, and comments on, the protagonist's 
fictional situation in a more oblique manner. The spectre of a Cruise-Kidman sex 
scene is repeatedly evoked but never realized. Similarly, Bill's fantasies of infidelity 
frequently seem on the verge of fulfilment, but never develop into anything concrete. 
In Eyes Wide Shut, as in Lolita, the denial of the tantalizing fantasy both frames and 
permeates the entire narrative, aligning our experience with that of the protagonist and 
confronting us with a simple truism: fantasy is that which cannot be realized, which, 
to a large extent, is the source of its power. 
There is a final similarity between Lolita and Eyes TVide Shut that we should note. 
As with Lolita, many critics responded to Eyes Wide Shut by questioning Kubrick's 
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handling of his material, and suggested that the film was in some way disappointing 
or deficient. Hill argues: 
Critics ... failed to recognize the film's keenly sophisticated exploration of the 
emotional and psychological complexities of a marriage and a couple's relation 
to the outside world. Instead, negative reviews faulted the film for not being 
what the reviewers had expected: a quasi-pornographic, erotic thriller.47 
As Hill suggests, Eyes Wide Shut raised certain expectations before its release -
assumptions concerning what the film might, or even should, be like - and was 
subsequently criticized when these somewhat ill-founded expectations were not 
fulfilled. Yet it should now be apparent that the immediate critical response to 
Kubrick's work has always been marked, to greater or lesser extent, by this pattern of 
expectation followed by bemusement, disappointment and hostility.48 Throughout 
Kubrick's career, critics have repeatedly denounced his latest release as a 'failure', 
and have identified some form of fatal disparity between the director's assumed intent 
and the film's actual meaning as a way of validating this diagnosis. This recurring 
pattern of critical response, in fact, reveals a great deal about the fundamental nature 
of Kubrick's cinema and the conceptual disorientation it seeks to provoke. It therefore 
seems appropriate to conclude this section by exploring one of the more disparaging 
responses to Kubrick's final film. 
In her New York Times review of Eyes Wide Shut, Michiko Kakutani argues that 
the film was 'an unfortunate misstep at the end of a dazzling career. ,49 She criticizes 
the film because of the two-dimensionality of the characters and the baffling lack of 
screen chemistry between Cruise and Kidman, and concludes that Kubrick's 
directorial sensibility - cool and calculating - was fundamentally at odds with the 
demands of the erotic and emotional source material. 'Alice and Bill', she asserts, 'are 
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not meant to be caricatures like the blackly comIC characters in Strangelove or 
faceless cutouts like the astronauts in 2001. They're supposed to be fairly ordinary, 
albeit privileged, New Yorkers ... ,50 Clearly, Kakutani does not 'misread' the film in a 
conventional sense; on some level, she recognizes exactly what Kubrick is doing in 
terms of characterization. Yet her criticism is deeply flawed because it rests upon a set 
of assumptions regarding what the film is 'meant' to be like - assumptions that 
Kubrick's work resolutely undennines. In a similar manner, Kakutani suggests that, 
just as Kubrick's characters lack depth, a sense of artificiality and sterility pervades 
many of the domestic scenes: Kubrick's 'stately' camera movements and 'precisely 
lighted tableaux' seem incongruous in a domestic setting, and consequently, the film 
becomes 'generic and hokey, like a tendentious art house version of a holiday 
television commercial. ,51 
In a retrospective analysis of Kubrick's final film, written one year after its 
release, Stefan Mattessich responded to the myriad criticisms levelled at Eyes Wide 
Shut (including those of Kakutani), arguing that 'The film conjures "fashion shoots" 
and "holiday television commercials" because it reads the world it depicts not as 
exceptional to these spectral aberrations but as modelled on them.,5:2 Mattessich's 
reinterpretation of the film, I believe, provides a much more viable position from 
which to understand the various ways in which the film feels problematical (or 
slightly 'off). Throughout Eyes Wide Shut there is a deliberate sense of artificiality. 
The film is extremely stylized - not only in tenns of how it is lit and shot, but also in 
the profound feeling of perfonnativity that frequently suffuses the dialogue and 
interactions between characters. Furthennore, this lack of 'realism' is certainly not at 
odds with Kubrick's source material. In The Stanley Kubrick Archives, Alison Castle 
draws attention to a critical study of Arthur Schnitzler owned by Kubrick, in which 
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the director has underlined a passage analyzing Traumnovelle' s protagonist: . As he 
moves deeper into this strange world he thinks back with affection to the stable world 
of his everyday realities ... [He] feels the orderly social reality to which he belongs is 
some kind of monstrous sham. ,53 In Kubrick's film, we share Bill's perspective: his 
growing sense of estrangement is akin to our own, as we are tacitly encouraged to 
look back on his everyday reality, with its familiar social codes and rituals, as 
something inherently artificial, bizarre and unfamiliar. 
Kubrick spent almost thirty years attempting to bring Eyes Wide Shut to the 
screen, and when he had assembled his final cut, he reputedly said that he felt it to be 
the best work of his career. 54 Whether or not we agree with this evaluation, the film 
certainly epitomizes what is unique, and fundamental, to Kubrick's cinematic thought. 
We might finally ask ourselves whether the source novel's conception of reality, as 
something of a sham, is not also the central idea underpinning much of the director's 
work. Kubrick's cinema aims to unsettle and disorientate. It is profoundly uncanny in 
the sense that it blurs the line between the authentic and the artificial, between what is 
real and what is illusory or imaginary. His cinema does not aim to depict an 
'objective' world, but shows a world suffused with artifice and supposition, a world 
deeply marked with its own ideological myths. Ultimately, Kubrick's cmema 
generates a perspective from which some of our most deeply embedded cultural 
assumptions are dissected and defamiliarized. 
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Conclusion 
Drawing upon Jean Mitry's analysis of different forms of filmic subjectivity, 
Christian Metz critiques the idea that cinema can adequately convey a character's 
internal perspective or mental images: 
The cinema is ... too 'real' to translate effectively the imaginary views of its 
characters. Besides 'views' of this kind are by definition difficult to know in 
detail, and filmmakers who undertake to 'render' them fall consciously into the 
arbitrary and gratuitous. (One has only to remember all those highly 
improbable 'dream sequences!') Even if the content of the 'vision' were 
knowable and adhered to, Mitry says, its objectification by the filmic image 
would nonetheless constitute an irrevocable 'betrayal' since it would divest the 
imaginary objects - transformed into objects of perception - of that coefficient 
of felt-absence which is precisely what gives them their whole psychological 
specificity.! 
Mitry's position with regard to subjective images In film, we should note, is 
somewhat more complex and nuanced than Metz's brief synopsis suggests.2 Yet 
leaving this problem aside, Metz' s critique of the representation of thought in film 
provides a useful restatement of some of the key issues and questions that this thesis 
has sought to address: can film be used to represent thought adequately or 
authentically? If so, does film possess any advantages over other media (such as 
literature) in depicting subjective experiences? Are there certain aspects of thought or 
consciousness that film is particularly able to capture? Finally, what purposes are 
served by the cinematic representation of thought? In summary and conclusion, I will 
attempt briefly to answer these questions, addressing Metz's various criticisms of 
direct depictions of film thought. 
In the above quote, Metz addresses the most strongly subjective mental images -
those depicting characters' 'imaginary views' - and argues that the nature of 
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cinematic representation prevents these images from attaining the specific 
psychological qualities that the filmmaker (implicitly) wishes to convey. 
Incontrovertibly, the cinematic image is always present and perceptual - and for 
Metz, this problematizes any direct filmic representation of thought, which will 
necessarily lack any sense of authenticity. Yet, as I have argued throughout this thesis, 
the qualitative difference between film images and mental images does not present an 
insurmountable problem for cinematic thought. Numerous filmmakers have achieved 
the kind of mental realism that Metz dismisses as impracticable. The best examples of 
cinematic representations of thought attain exactly the sense of 'felt-absence' which 
Metz identifies as the definitive characteristic of mental imagery. Many of the 
memory images in Hiroshima mon amour have an ephemeral and a diaphanous 
quality that precisely captures the nature of visual thought. Similarly, the fleeting 
mental image that recurs throughout Eyes Wide Shut (Bill's tormenting fantasy of his 
wife with the naval officer) attains something akin to a sense of felt-absence. In both 
films, there is a rapid movement back and forth between the protagonist's inner life 
and external reality, between imagination and perception, and this helps to suggest 
both the insubstantiality of mental imagery (its felt-absence) and its importance to the 
protagonist as an ongoing, ubiquitous obsession. 
These films clearly challenge Metz's central argument concernmg cinematic 
representations of thought, but we should also question some of the basic assumptions 
implicit in his comments. In particular, his failure to differentiate the various types of 
mental imagery is problematical. 'Felt-absence' may be a quality that suffuses mental 
processes such as imagining, visualizing or remembering, but it should not necessarily 
be attributed as a characteristic of dream imagery. As I have suggested (particularly in 
the chapters on Bergman), dream is unlike other imaginary processes in two crucial 
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ways: it is inherently much more perceptual than waking thought processes and, 
usually, one is unaware that the dream is the product of one's own imagination 
(Freud, like many other commentators on dreaming, describes dream images as 
'hallucinations' rather than imaginings). Consequently, the criteria by which we judge 
the 'authenticity' of a dream sequence should not be the same as those we use to 
assess other depictions of mental imagery. In films such as Wild Strawberries and 
Providence the realistic rendering of the dream primarily depends upon the narrative 
structure, the organization of space and time, and the relationship between the 
dream's symbolism and the dreamer's waking experiences. Certainly, it is reasonable 
to suggest, as Metz does, that a large number of filmic dream sequences seem, by any 
standard, 'highly improbable'. Yet the failure of many of these sequences should not 
lead us to conclude that the attempt to represent dream (or any other type of thought) 
is futile. If numerous filmmakers have relied on 'arbitrary' or 'gratuitous' stylistic 
markers in their attempts to differentiate the mental image from the real (or 
perceptual) image, this is precisely what directors such as Bergman, Resnais and 
Kubrick have sought to avoid. Instead, they have founded their stylistic choices for 
representing thought on their personal comprehension of the essential characteristics 
of different forms of mental experience (the 'felt-absence' of the memory image, the 
hallucinatory qualities of the dream, and so on). 
This last point touches on another issue raised by Metz: if the' content' of thought 
is by nature difficult to define or understand in detail, how can the filmmaker translate 
this content accurately or convincingly? As I suggested in the introduction (also 
drawing on Mitry's analysis of filmic subjectivity), there is no reason to accept that, in 
order to attain some level of authenticity or believability, the cinematic representation 
of thought must replicate or mimic 'actual psychological reality' with absolute 
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fidelity. Even if we cannot know the 'content' of thought in detail, there are certain 
qualities and characteristics of thought that are clearly identifiable. This, in fact, is 
partially implicit in Metz's argument. The notion that mental imagery has the quality 
of 'felt-absence' already suggests some ideas about the basic nature of thought. 
Similarly, when Metz dismisses the typical dream sequence as 'highly improbable', 
presumably this judgment rests upon an intuitive understanding of what dreams are 
really like. 'Imaginary views' may be difficult to examine, define or comprehend with 
scientific rigour, but this does not mean they are inherently incomprehensible.3 Many 
of the films I have examined suggest that personal mental experiences can be 
comprehended and defined with a reasonable level of precision, and can subsequently 
be represented or replicated cinematically. As I have shown, Bergman's cinematic 
thought in particular is founded on the aesthetic 'reconstruction' of autobiographical 
subjective experiences such as dreams and memories. In a sense, by sharing the 
intricacies of subjective experience, his films purposefully demystify the 'content' of 
the mind, rendering it more tangible and knowable.4 
The filmic representation of thought is, in Mitry's terms, a matter of finding 
'aesthetic equivalents' that evoke specific qualities of subjective experience.s 
Throughout this thesis, I have suggested that there are specific properties of cinema 
and cinematic narrative that make the medium particularly capable of evoking and 
depicting different mental processes or aspects of thought. These properties, I believe, 
help to counter Metz's objection that cinema is 'too realistic' to depict intangible 
thoughts, or that it is in some way disadvantaged in comparison to other artistic 
media. Firstly, as I have started to suggest above, film is unrivalled in its capacity to 
juxtapose images and ideas, to move swiftly between disparate locations, objects, 
perceptions, memories, and so forth (which is what allows it to capture the transient 
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quality - the felt-absence - of mental imagery). It is able to replicate the natural speed 
of thinking. Again, Kubrick's cinema is replete with instances in which rapid editing 
(or juxtaposition) is crucial in effectively capturing or mimicking the movement of 
thought: the cut from bone to satellite in 2001 and the hallucinatory images of the 
murdered twins in The Shining provide two clear examples. Similarly, longer 
sequences in Bergman and Resnais' work (such as the opening of Persona and the 
'speculative' mental images of The War Is Over) illustrate the potential of film to 
represent the rapid evolution of a complex thought process. 
In his study of Resnais, Haim Callev identifies several additional advantages that 
film possesses when it comes to depicting thought. As well as noting the potential of 
film to move swiftly between the real and the imaginary through cross-cutting, and to 
connect different ideas and images in a clear and precise manner (in a form of 'free 
association'), Callev argues that film is uniquely advantaged because it can utilize two 
distinct channels (visual and auditory) when representing thought. 6 This point strikes 
me as particularly important. As Callev observes, through devices such as voiceover 
and voice-off, film can overlap the real and the imaginary, simultaneously 
representing a thought process and the present moment (the reality) in which this 
thought is unfolding. 7 In Hiroshima, the soundtrack communicates a present moment 
in which the French woman is telling the Japanese man about wartime Nevers, while 
the images depict her memories, the content of her imagination. For Callev, this 
method of anchoring the subjective images in a concrete, readily-identifiable present 
moment helps to clarify the status and meaning of those images. 
Yet, we should add, the fact that film can utilize two autonomous channels affords 
further creative possibilities for representing thought. Sound and image can work in 
concert to strengthen our identification with a character's immediate subjective 
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experience (when, for example, interior monologue is combined with a memory 
image or point-of-view shot). Alternatively, voiceover can provide a kind of critical 
commentary that scrutinizes or reflects upon the subjective image - as occurs in 
Providence when Clive Langham comments on his own dream images. Finally, image 
and sound can also interact in a more complex manner, producing distinct, conflicting 
perspectives, or a type of 'dualistic' thought. As we have seen, A Clockwork Orange 
illustrates the way in which the relationship between music, voiceover and images can 
be complex: the music provides an ironic and satirical counterpoint to the image 
whilst simultaneously helping us to identify with Alex's perspective. 
In exploring the different formal properties that allow cinema to convey thought 
effectively, we also begin to address the final question I raised at the start of this 
concluding chapter: what purposes are served by the cinematic representation of 
thought? Metz does not confront this question explicitly, but his comments imply that 
the representation of thought is, in some sense, an end in itself. The 'purpose' of the 
filmic depiction of thought, Metz suggests, is simply to portray the mind and its 
processes in a convincing and authentic manner. Undoubtedly, this is a major - and 
worthy - goal of cinematic thought. To a significant extent, all of the filmmakers I 
have analyzed seek to elucidate the fundamental nature of the imagination - to hold a 
mirror to the mind and illuminate its workings. Contrary to Metz's argument, I 
believe that I have demonstrated that this goal is achievable, and has been achieved 
definitively in films such as Wild Strawberries and Hiroshima mon amour. 
Additionally, we should recognize two further purposes that are clearly served by 
the filmic representation of thought. Firstly, as I have noted at various points, it can 
foster an unusually close identification between viewer and character. For Mitry, this 
is the primary goal of film thought: its purpose is 'to give the audience ... the 
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impression that it is seeing or feeling "as though" it were the character in the drama.,8 
Through subjective shots and sounds, film can place us in the position of the thinking 
or perceiving character - which is integral to the notion of 'first-person' cinema 
explored in the Kubrick section. By sharing a character's inner life, we are often 
encouraged to identify with that character on a very deep level. Secondly, while 
encouraging identification, representations of thought also, inevitably, deepen 
characterization. In films such as Cries and Whispers, our knowledge and 
comprehension of character is greatly enhanced by the intermittent representation of 
dreams, memories and fantasies. 
Finally, though, we should acknowledge that cinematic depictions of thought need 
not be 'authentic', and may not necessarily strive to achieve this quality; equally, 
when a filmmaker represents a character's subjective experience, identification or 
psychological depth may not be his or her primary goal. The rendering of thought or 
subjective experience can also provide a powerful means for critiquing or dissecting a 
certain cultural, historical or ideological perspective - and this use of subjectivity, I 
have argued, is one of the key things that distinguishes the films of Bergman, Resnais 
and Kubrick. In Bergman's work, subjective experience is used to explore identity, 
sexuality and morality (both secular and religious) in relation to contemporary social 
attitudes (society'S 'scruples and laws'). In Resnais' cinema, the exploration of 
subjectivity becomes a means of addressing the relationship between personal 
memory and the dominant 'collective memory', and of challenging the veracity of the 
'objective' representations of history found in other films and discourses. For Resnais, 
the rendering of SUbjective experience necessarily entails a certain amount of self-
reflexivity: to explore thought in film is also to explore the fundamental nature of 
cinematic representation. Similarly, in A Clockwork Orange and Eyes Wide Shut, 
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Kubrick uses thought in a self-reflexive manner to address cinematic narration and 
representation, which is integral to his wider examination of Hollywood's ideological 
foundations and our assumptions concerning morality and psychology.9 
In the cinema of Bergman, Resnais and Kubrick, to identify with a character's 
subject position is also, potentially, to experience a form of alienation - to become 
estranged from daily reality. In films such as The Silence, Muriel and Eyes Wide Shut 
we are shown the world as it is refracted through a different point of view that is in 
some way idiosyncratic or aberrant. In all of these films, character subjectivity is used 
to defamiliarize the external world, and to question some of our most basic 
assumptions about the reality we experience every day. 
The End of an Era? 
Michael Herr, who co-scripted Full Metal Jacket, writes: 
The Art House Transmission that Stanley received so deeply in the forties was 
still manifesting in the early sixties, when I spent my nights and a lot of 
afternoons rocketing between the Bleecker Street Cinema, the Thalia, The New 
Yorker, and the Museum of Modem Art ... And so if I got weepy when the end 
credits rolled on Eyes Wide Shut and the waltz played one more time, it wasn't 
just because the movie was over, or because it was the final work of a man I 
admired and loved, but because that tradition, with its innocence, or anyway 
naivete, and a purity that only someone born before 1930 could continue, had 
come to a certain end, as most traditions do. It's gone and it won't be 
returning. 1 0 
Herr's elegy for Kubrick and the Art Cinema of the mid- to late-twentieth century 
raises important questions about the long-term impact of the types of art film that 
proliferated in the 1950s, '60s and '70s. These questions are particularly pertinent in 
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relation to the subjective narratives and filmic representations of thought that I have 
explored in this thesis, and I wish to conclude my study by finally considering the 
possible legacy of films such as Persona, Marienbad and A Clockwork Orange in 
contemporary cmema. 
Undoubtedly, the cinematic representation of thought reached its apex in the 
1960s and early '70s. This period saw the release of the films that effectively 
reinvented subjective cinema - not only the key works of Bergman, Resnais and 
Kubrick, but also Fellini's 8lh and Giulietta degli spiriti, Antonioni's Il Deserto rosso 
and Blow- Up (1966), Bufiuel' s Belle de jour (1967) and The Discreet Charm of the 
Bourgeoisie (1972), and Bertolucci' s The Spider's Stratagem (1970) and The 
Conformist (1970). It is these films in particular that define the Art Cinema tradition 
to which Eyes Wide Shut belongs. In his analysis of the latter film in Sight and Sound, 
Larry Gross picks up on precisely this point. 11 He likens Eyes Wide Shut to four films 
of the 1960s: Last Year at Marienbad, Persona, Blow-Up and Belle de jour. Each of 
these films, Gross suggests, is 'narrated' from a subjective perspective that is 
unreliable and potentially confusing: they give 'the uncanny impression of stories 
being told by mad-men.' 12 In each film, verbal exposition - the utterances of the 
central characters - does little to clarify the narrative, and often leads to additional 
complications and confusions. Finally, 'in all four films people of a certain privileged 
class travel in obsessive, repetitive circles through ominous landscapes with 
inexplicable symmetries and maze-like patterns, worlds so aestheticised, so 
overdetermined their reality is dubious.' 13 Gross concludes that in E.ves Wide Shut 
'Kubrick is prepared to tell the audience that the things he and cinema were 
preoccupied with 30 years ago are more interesting than the things cinema is 
concerning itself with today. Is he correct? Who knows?' 14 Of course, whether or not 
Kubrick might be 'correct' is unanswerable: it is a matter of opinion. We can~ 
however, address Gross' underlying assumptions (which are similar to Herr's): that 
contemporary film is no longer 'concerned' with SUbjective narration or cinematic 
thought, and that Eyes Wide Shut is, therefore, in some sense anachronistic - a belated 
but decisive conclusion to a cycle of films that flourished three decades earlier. 
By the late 1970s, European subjective cinema had certainly begun to lose much 
of its momentum. Directors such as Bergman and Resnais continued sporadically to 
address the subjective themes that had interested them earlier in their careers. In Face 
to Face, for instance, Bergman again returned to the subject matter of Wild 
Strawberries, exploring the relationship between dreams and waking life. Similarly, 
in films such as Man onele d 'Amerique and Melo (1986), Resnais continued to pursue 
his interest in memory and the workings of the brain. Yet these films lacked the 
acuity, vitality and inventiveness that distinguished the directors' earlier work. 
At the same time, however, the innovations in subjective narration that emerged in 
European cinema in the 1960s had an important impact on certain aspects of 
American filmmaking in the following decade. In particular, we can identify 
American directors such as Martin Scorsese and Woody Allen who have been greatly 
influenced by earlier European cinema and whose work builds upon the subjective 
narrative forms developed in the '60s. In Taxi Driver, a variety of stylistic devices 
such as first-person voiceover and expressionistic mise-en-scene are utilized to render 
the subjective perspective of the psychotic protagonist, Travis (Robert De Niro). 
Similarly, in many of Allen's self-reflexive comedies, such as Annie Hall (1977) and 
Stardust Memories (1980), the protagonist's imagination is represented directly to the 
viewer. Yet while these films are clearly indebted to the subjective cinema of the 
1960s, they also reflect a transformation (or shift in emphasis) in tenns of how and 
why thought is being represented. To paraphrase Resnais, films such as Marienbad 
and Persona attempt to capture and reflect the 'complexity of thought' - they explore 
the nature of the mind in a very direct manner. In contrast, in Taxi Driver or Annie 
Hall, the representation of thought is, in some sense, a secondary concern. In these 
latter films, subjective narration is utilized in the service of an underlying storyline 
that is more conventional, autonomous and linear. Although they are 'narrated' from a 
specific subjective perspective, these films remain grounded in an independent, 
objective reality, and unfold according to the normal logic of cause and effect. Of 
course, as I have already observed, the cinematic representation of thought need not 
be an end in itself, and many of the films I have analyzed - such as A Clockwork 
Orange - explore subjective experience whilst also telling a clear, chronological 
story. My point is that by the late 1970s, the experimental narrative procedures 
developed in the 1960s for representing thought or subjective experience had, to a 
certain extent, become conventionalized and integrated into more traditional narrative 
forms. 
When searching for the legacy of the subjective cmema of the 1960s it is, 
therefore, important to recognize that even in films that are not primarily concerned 
with exploring the nature of thought, there are often subjective sequences that are, on 
some level, indebted to the earlier experiments in depicting thought cinematically. 
Films such as Trainspotting (Boyle, 1996), Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (Gilliam, 
1998) and American Beauty (Mendes, 1999), for example, have incorporated boldly 
expressive subjective sequences in a particularly effective manner. Yet, in addition, 
there are recent films that have focussed on representing thought more systematically. 
Michel Gondry's comedies Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) and The 
Science of Sleep (2006) explore different aspects of thought (memory and dream 
respectively), and insofar as these films largely concern psychic dramas, they belong 
to the same tradition as films such as Marienbad and Providence. Yet at the same 
time, Gondry's films are unlike Resnais' in that they do not attempt to scrutinize the 
mechanisms of thought, and do not primarily aim to represent mental processes in an 
authentic manner. Gondry's cinematic representations of thought are clearly intended 
to be comedic and fantastical. 
All of these films share certain stylistic or thematic properties with the '60s films 
cited by Gross, but only in a limited sense. Unlike Eyes Wide Shut, they are not 
preoccupied with elucidating the nature of the mind, or exploring the ambiguous 
relationship between fantasy and reality. Nevertheless, there are recent films that can 
be more fruitfully compared to Eyes Wide Shut and the subjective cinema of the '60s. 
Christopher Nolan's Memento (2000), for example, offers an extremely acute and 
inventive exploration of memory. In Memento, the protagonist, Leonard (Guy Pearce), 
has suffered brain damage following an assault, and has lost the ability to make new 
long-term memories. The last thing Leonard remembers is the night of the attack, 
when two thieves broke into his house and raped and murdered his wife. Leonard 
managed to shoot one of the intruders, but the other escaped after knocking him 
unconscious. Since the police have abandoned the case, Leonard attempts to track 
down the second culprit himself, using extensive notes, photographs and tattoos to 
record his findings and compensate for his damaged memory. 
The film is unusually successful in combining the action and suspense of a 
conventional crime thriller with a serious examination of the nature of memory. 
Furthermore, Memento provides an excellent example of how cinema can utilize an 
unreliable, first-person narrator. As well as using voiceover, internal monologue and 
flashbacks to evoke Leonard's thoughts, the film's narratiYe replicates the 
protagonist's perspective (up to a point) by unfolding in reverse chronological order: 
effectively, Memento's action is broken into discrete segments that are then 
reassembled back to front. Consequently, just as Leonard has no memory of things 
that happened a few minutes previously, the viewer has no knowledge of the events 
immediately prior to each new scene. The way in which the action is rigorously 
focalized through the film's protagonist recalls some of the films noir explored earlier, 
in which the viewer's comprehension of events is largely defined by what the central 
male narrator knows or understands at any given point. Yet in Memento, we are made 
to identify with the protagonist's psychological (and emotional) perspective to an 
even greater degree, and this process of identification is further intensified through the 
film's direct representation of memory images. When Leonard recollects his wife, we 
are presented with a series of fleeting images that convey his most intimate memories 
- 'the bits and pieces', his voiceover tells us, 'that you never bother to put into 
words.' In sequences such as this one, Nolan's representation of memory is 
comparable to that of Resnais in Hiroshima mon amour. Both directors are clearly 
concerned with depicting visual memory in an authentic manner, and both are 
successful in capturing that sense of 'felt-absence' that characterizes mental images. It 
is perhaps this authenticity that is particularly effective in anchoring our emotional 
identification with the protagonists of Memento and Hiroshima; for in conveying the 
felt-absence of their characters' memories, Nolan and Resnais also capture what is 
most poignant about those memories. 
A second recent film that explores thought in a manner comparable to those films 
cited by Gross is David Lynch's Mulholland Drive (2001). Indeed, l\flllholland Drive 
shares particularly close similarities with both Eyes Wide Shut, in tenns of its 
ambiguous mixing of fantasy, dream and reality, and Persona, in tenns of its basic 
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plot concerning two women who, in some sense, 'exchange' identities. Mulholland 
Drive opens with a mysterious woman (Laura Elena Harring) fleeing from the scene 
of a car accident. Later, the woman awakes in an unfamiliar apartment, apparently 
suffering from amnesia, where she is befriended by Betty (Naomi Watts), an aspiring 
actress on the verge of stardom. Together Betty and the mystery woman, who 
assumes the name Rita (after Rita Hayworth), attempt to uncover the secret of the 
latter's identity. During their investigations, the two grow closer and eventually 
become lovers - at which point, the film's plot begins to unravel. In a figurative 
sense, Mulholland Drive seems to 'break down' (recalling Bergman's depiction of a 
literal cinematic breakdown in Persona.) The character introduced as Betty awakes 
with a new identity: in the second half of the film, she is a failed actress called Diane. 
Similarly, 'Rita' now has a new name and identity: she is now called Camilla and is 
Diane's ex-lover, having apparently left the latter for a film director (Justin Theroux). 
Consequently, the entire first half of the film can be interpreted as being some form of 
dream or jealous fantasy experienced by Naomi Watts' character. The relationship 
between the two sections of the film is certainly akin to the relationship between 
dream and reality, with one half of the film reworking the events and characters of the 
other according to the Freudian principle of wish-fulfilment. Furthermore, if the first 
half of the film is meant to represent a dream, then Lynch's refusal to differentiate 
clearly between dream and reality serves a clear purpose. As I have argued 
previously, unlike other mental phenomena, the dream is, for its duration, experienced 
by the subject as being real. The first half of Mulholland Drive, therefore, appears 
more like an authentic dream (as it is experienced by the dreaming subject) because 
its 'unreality' is not overtly signified (and, again, this recalls Bergman's later work). 
Alternatively, Mulholland Drive can be compared to Bufiuel's early surrealist films, 
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which are not presented as being the dreams of a specific character, but instead obey a 
dreamlike logic and attempt to represent thought processes in a more general and 
diffuse sense. In any case, Mulholland Drive clearly explores the potential of 
cinematic thought in a manner that bears comparison with the most experimental art 
films of earlier decades. 
These examples might suggest that Gross is slightly premature in arguing that 
contemporary cinema is no longer concerned with the forms and themes that 
proliferated in the Art Cinema of the 1960s. Yet films such Memento and Mulholland 
Drive are certainly atypical by contemporary standards. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
identify contemporary directors who are comparable to Bergman, Resnais and 
Kubrick in terms of their recurrent interest in subjective cinema - directors who have 
dedicated multiple films to exploring different aspects of cinematic thought (although 
Lynch is again something of an exception). We should, I believe, conclude that the 
type of cinematic thought that this thesis has been analyzing is firmly rooted in a 
specific historical period - just as literary modernism, with its streams of 
consciousness and other forms of radically subjective narration, is particularly rooted 
in the 191 Os and '20s. The subjective cinema that flourished from the late 1950s to the 
mid-1970s reflects and responds to the era's rapid social, cultural, philosophical and 
political transformations. In this cinema, and particularly in the films of Bergman, 
Resnais and Kubrick, the representation of subjective experience is not simply a 
matter of narrative experimentation, but is also a means of questioning contemporary 
beliefs, values and ideologies. The best subjective art films of the '50s, '60s, and '70s 
discovered new ways of expressing abstract thought in audiovisual terms, and, 
ultimately, this is their abiding achievement. 
I Christian Metz, 'Current Problems in Film Theory', Screen 14 (Spring/ Summer 1973). p. 46. 
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